-
1
-
-
26444612462
-
-
note
-
Several aspects of the legislature's role in Louisiana tort law are treated in the co-authored paper delivered by H. Alston Johnson and David W. Robertson to the 1995 Annual Torts Seminar of the Louisiana Judicial College, December 15, 1995. That paper was titled "Legislative 'Micromanagement' of Tort Law" and subtitled "Separation of Powers in Present-Day Louisiana: The Legislative-Judicial Dialogue on the Law of Torts." The matters treated in that paper will not be covered here. The present paper touches on another aspect of the legislature's role infra part V.E.
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
26444615970
-
-
note
-
Act 1 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 drastically curtailed Louisiana strict liability law, seemingly leaving strict liability in place only for pile driving, dynamite, dogs, and defective products.
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
26444486694
-
-
note
-
Consider the spat-upon umpire's potential lawsuit against Roberto Alomar. The plaintiff's prima facie case for liability might be analyzed in duty/risk terms somewhat as follows. (1) The duty element would require the trial judge to determine whether the umpire's complaint or petition alleged the invasion of an interest protected by law. The question would easily be answered yes. The law has long protected the interest in freedom from intentional touchings that a reasonable person would regard as harmful or offensive to a suitable sense of dignity. (2) The breach issue would inquire whether Alomar intentionally spat in the umpire's face and whether being intentionally spat upon is offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity. Here, the trial judge would probably conclude that reasonable minds could not differ in their answers to those questions, so that plaintiff should be entitled to a directed verdict on the breach issue. (3) The cause in fact inquiry would involve tracing the spittle on the umpire's face to Alomar's actions, again probably resulting in a directed verdict for the plaintiff on this issue. (4) The legal cause element would address whether the plaintiff's class of persons and the type of touching suffered fell within the ambit of protection of the rule proscribing intentional touches that affront a person's reasonable sense of dignity. Once more, the answer is undebatably yes. (5) The fifth element of the duty/risk analysis - damages - is not appropriately included, because the intentional torts that derive from the writ of trespass - battery, assault, false imprisonment - do not require the plaintiff to establish that damages were suffered in order to recover, whereas the law of negligence and strict liability does. (6) Whether Alomar's conduct might be justified or excused because it was consented to or because the defendant had a privilege to inflict it would function as affirmative defenses, which the defendant must plead and prove.
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
26444589449
-
-
note
-
For example, the garden variety battery case treated supra note 3 is more economically treated by asking: Did the defendant intentionally inflict a harmful or offensive touching upon the person of the plaintiff? Was the touching consented to? Was it privileged?
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
26444522837
-
-
note
-
La. Code Civ. P. art. 1811 details a procedure for handling JNOV motions but does not address the grounds for granting or denying them.
-
-
-
-
8
-
-
26444558796
-
-
note
-
La. Const. art. 5, § 5(C): "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts. . . ." Id. § 10(B): "Except as limited to questions of law by this constitution, or as provided by law in the review of administrative agency determinations, appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts." La. Code Civ. P. art. 2164: "The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. . . ."
-
-
-
-
9
-
-
26444523765
-
-
note
-
Andrus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (La. 1996); Reichert v. State, 674 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd and remanded for manifest error review on concluding that the findings were not tainted, 667 So. 2d 542 (1996); Theriot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 1337, 1339-44 (La. 1993); Gremillion v. Derks, 684 So. 2d 492, 494 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996); Beoh v. Watkins, 635 So. 2d 424, 427 (La. App. 4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 640 So. 2d 1325 (1994).
-
-
-
-
10
-
-
26444466340
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Smith v. Audubon Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 372, 377-78 (La. 1996); Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University, 673 So. 2d 585, 596 (La.) (Lemmon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996); Hill v. Morehouse Parish Police Jury, 666 So. 2d 612, 614-15 (La. 1996); Welch v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 655 So. 2d 309, 316 (La. 1995); Lewis v. State, 654 So. 2d 311, 314-15 (La. 1995); Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d 742, 745-46 (La. 1995); Campbell v. Department of Trans. & Dev., 648 So. 2d 898, 902-03 (La. 1995); Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep't Ambulance Serv., 639 So. 2d 216, 220 (La. 1994); Byrd v. State, 637 So. 2d 114, 120-23 (La. 1994); Theriot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 625 So. 2d 1337, 1339-44 (La. 1993); Stobart v. State, 617 So. 2d 880, 882 (La. 1993).
-
-
-
-
11
-
-
26444589448
-
-
See, e.g., Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 326 (La. 1994)
-
See, e.g., Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 326 (La. 1994).
-
-
-
-
12
-
-
26444512984
-
-
note
-
Whether a finding of no negligence falls under the yes/no category as opposed to the how/much category is treated infra text and notes 20-22.
-
-
-
-
13
-
-
26444434622
-
-
Lewis, 654 So. 2d at 314; Ferrell, 650 So. 2d at 745-46
-
Lewis, 654 So. 2d at 314; Ferrell, 650 So. 2d at 745-46.
-
-
-
-
14
-
-
26444599424
-
Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases
-
See generally David W. Robertson, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21 La. L. Rev. 402 (1961).
-
(1961)
La. L. Rev.
, vol.21
, pp. 402
-
-
Robertson, D.W.1
-
15
-
-
26444446296
-
-
Clement v. Frey, 666 So. 2d 607, 609 (La. 1996)
-
Clement v. Frey, 666 So. 2d 607, 609 (La. 1996).
-
-
-
-
16
-
-
26444582679
-
-
Lewis, 654 So. 2d at 314
-
Lewis, 654 So. 2d at 314.
-
-
-
-
17
-
-
26444494291
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Ferrell, 650 So. 2d at 745-46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 articulates the standard: "Findings of fact [in actions tried without a jury or with an advisory jury], whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
-
-
-
-
18
-
-
26444461821
-
-
Milstead v. Diamond M Offshore, Inc., 676 So. 2d 89, 98 n.2 (La. 1996) (Kimball, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
-
Milstead v. Diamond M Offshore, Inc., 676 So. 2d 89, 98 n.2 (La. 1996) (Kimball, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-
-
-
-
19
-
-
26444550438
-
-
note
-
Clement, 666 So. 2d at 609-11; Davis v. L.J. Earnest, Inc., 631 So. 2d 63, 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994) (finding manifest error in 90% assignment and using the deferential correction rule to lower it to 75%).
-
-
-
-
20
-
-
26444438422
-
-
note
-
The question is this: When the trial court concludes that a party has not been negligent at all and the court of appeal reverses that finding for manifest error, should the court of appeal then set what it considers the proper percentage of fault, or should it follow the deferential correction approach and assign only the lowest reasonable number? I.e., does review of such an issue fall under this paper's part II.D or under part II.E? I have not found an answer to that question, but believe that it should be the former. Part of my thinking is an intuition that zero versus something is essentially a yes/no question of a qualitatively different sort from 10% versus 40%. More importantly, my choice seems slightly simpler than the alternative.
-
-
-
-
21
-
-
26444472173
-
-
Clement, 666 So. 2d at 611 (emphasis added)
-
Clement, 666 So. 2d at 611 (emphasis added).
-
-
-
-
22
-
-
26444439781
-
-
Jones v. Peyton Place, Inc., 675 So. 2d 754, 762-63 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996)
-
Jones v. Peyton Place, Inc., 675 So. 2d 754, 762-63 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
-
-
-
-
23
-
-
26444457675
-
-
Andrus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (La. 1996)
-
Andrus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (La. 1996).
-
-
-
-
24
-
-
26444475169
-
-
Kessler v. Southmark Corp., 643 So. 2d 345, 351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994)
-
Kessler v. Southmark Corp., 643 So. 2d 345, 351 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
-
-
-
-
25
-
-
26444524726
-
-
Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 583 So. 2d 829, 831-32 (La. 1991); Scott v. Hospital Service District No. 1, 496 So. 2d 270 (La. 1986)
-
Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 583 So. 2d 829, 831-32 (La. 1991); Scott v. Hospital Service District No. 1, 496 So. 2d 270 (La. 1986).
-
-
-
-
26
-
-
26444488851
-
-
note
-
Anderson, 583 So. 2d at 833: Once a trial court has concluded that a JNOV is warranted because reasonable men could not differ on the fact that the award was either abusively high or abusively low, it must then determine what is the proper amount of damages to be awarded. In making this determination, the judge is not constrained . . . to raising (or lowering) the award to the lowest (or highest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court.
-
-
-
-
27
-
-
26444552640
-
-
note
-
Scott, 496 So. 2d at 273: "Because [CCP art. 1811] was based on a federal rule, the decisions of the federal courts can be used for guidance."
-
-
-
-
28
-
-
26444456368
-
-
note
-
Dowden v. Mid State Sand & Gravel Co., 664 So. 2d 643, 647 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995), writ denied, 666 So. 2d 1099 (1996); Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994), writ denied, 651 So. 2d 276 (1995); Ourso v. Grimm, 630 So. 2d 963, 965 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 230 (1994).
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
26444522836
-
-
note
-
See Anderson, 583 So. 2d at 832-34; Scott, 496 So. 2d at 274; Ventress v. Union Pacific R. Co., 666 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), mod. on other grounds, 672 So. 2d 668 (1996); Dowden, 664 So. 2d at 647; Randolph, 646 So. 2d at 1024, 1026; Terro v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 631 So. 2d 651, 653-54 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 157 (1994); Neal v. Highlands Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 612 So. 2d 100 (1993); Hutchinson v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1148, 1151 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
26444457676
-
-
note
-
An application of formal logic would yield eight such possibilities. Only six are set forth below because one of the formal possibilities (trial judge wrong to deny JNOV, but jury findings not manifestly erroneous) is a null set and because two others are combined as item (f).
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
26444582032
-
-
note
-
The court in Ventress, 666 So. 2d at 1217, gave a careful explanation of how (at least in legal theory) jury findings that reasonable people could agree with can nevertheless sometimes be manifestly erroneous.
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
26444618908
-
-
note
-
Reichert v. State, 674 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 667 So. 2d 542 (1996); Mayo v. Audubon Indemnity Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d 1290, 1292-93 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 671 So. 2d 325 (1996); Beoh v. Watkins, 635 So. 2d 424, 428 (La. App. 4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 640 So. 2d 1325 (1994).
-
-
-
-
33
-
-
26444445405
-
-
Ourso v. Grimm, 630 So. 2d 963, 969 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (Saunders, J., dissenting), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 230 (1994)
-
Ourso v. Grimm, 630 So. 2d 963, 969 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (Saunders, J., dissenting), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 230 (1994).
-
-
-
-
34
-
-
26444589447
-
-
Hasha v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 651 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 653 So. 2d 592 (1995)
-
Hasha v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 651 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 653 So. 2d 592 (1995).
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
26444539263
-
-
note
-
Hasha, 651 So. 2d at 869; Ourso, 630 So. 2d at 969 (Saunders, J., dissenting); American Casualty Co. v. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co., 601 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1005 (1992).
-
-
-
-
36
-
-
26444445406
-
-
note
-
Stapleton v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 616 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 2d Cir.), "approved" in relevant part, 627 So. 2d 1358, 1362 (1993) - in which the trial judge was wrong to conduct a bifurcated trial - presented a different situation. There, the trial judge's findings were properly ignored and the jury's properly subjected to manifest error review.
-
-
-
-
37
-
-
26444516826
-
-
See supra note 2
-
See supra note 2.
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
26444478926
-
-
note
-
Departures from settled traditions, if pronounced enough, may be thought by some observers to violate constitutional rights. See 65 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1996) (setting forth a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, No. 96-452, seeking review of Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University, 673 So. 2d 585 (La.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996)).
-
-
-
-
39
-
-
26444555833
-
-
note
-
Here one has modest aspirations. The quintessential plasticity of negligence law counsels against large ambitions for a neat and unvarying conceptual structure. The unlikelihood of ever achieving such certainty is suggested by the example of Justice Cardozo, who was quick to absorb a major part of the legal cause issue into the duty issue in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.V. 1928) (see infra note 68), but strongly opposed the effective absorption of the breach issue into the duty issue in Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 54 S. Ct. 580 (1934) (see infra note 75).
-
-
-
-
40
-
-
26444479996
-
-
note
-
See David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 83-84, 136, 160-63 (1989); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., "Hill v. Lundin & Associates" Revisited: Duty Risked To Death? 10-11 (LSU Law Center 1993); Pitre, 673 So. 2d at 589-90.
-
-
-
-
41
-
-
26444491909
-
-
note
-
"Legal cause" is the emerging term - a significant improvement - for what used to be called "proximate cause." See Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1, 5 & n.5 (La. 1989). Cf. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984).
-
-
-
-
42
-
-
26444597782
-
-
But see infra part V.G.
-
But see infra part V.G.
-
-
-
-
43
-
-
0345847813
-
The Common Sense of Cause in Fact
-
forthcoming
-
See generally David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause In Fact, 75 Tex. L. Rev. (1997) (forthcoming).
-
(1997)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.75
-
-
Robertson, D.W.1
-
44
-
-
26444466339
-
-
note
-
Much of the political, ideological, and legal tension generated by the choices among these models stems from different views as to the usefulness of civil (as opposed to criminal-case) juries. For that reason the presentations in this section posit the jury as the trier of fact. But the analytical features of the models do not differ when trial is to the bench. When a bench-trial judge is wearing her trier-of-fact hat, she is supposed to attend to the same currents of intuition, empathy, and love of democracy that mythologically elevate the typical jury. See also infra note 66 and infra parts IV and VI.
-
-
-
-
45
-
-
26444555244
-
-
note
-
We are here concerned with what are sometimes called "ordinary negligence" cases as distinguished from cases in which liability is sought to be predicated upon defendant's violation of a statute. Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co., 301 S.E.2d 903, 904 (Ga. App. 1983). But the models can accommodate statutory violation cases with only slight modification. See infra part V.E.
-
-
-
-
46
-
-
0348177199
-
The Duty to Take Care
-
W.W. Buckland, The Duty to Take Care, 51 L.Q. Rev. 637, 639 (1935).
-
(1935)
L.Q. Rev.
, vol.51
, pp. 637
-
-
Buckland, W.W.1
-
47
-
-
84902700571
-
-
Ex. Ch.
-
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842).
-
(1842)
Eng. Rep.
, vol.152
, pp. 402
-
-
-
48
-
-
26444490371
-
-
See Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1329 & n.4 (Or. 1987) (tracing the duty concept to Winterbottom)
-
See Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1329 & n.4 (Or. 1987) (tracing the duty concept to Winterbottom).
-
-
-
-
49
-
-
26444505223
-
-
Id. at 1328
-
Id. at 1328.
-
-
-
-
50
-
-
26444598785
-
-
Green, supra note 5, at 66
-
Green, supra note 5, at 66.
-
-
-
-
51
-
-
26444600524
-
-
Justice Linde for the Court in Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1327 (quoting Justice O'Connell for the court in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783 (Or. 1970))
-
Justice Linde for the Court in Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1327 (quoting Justice O'Connell for the court in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469 P.2d 783 (Or. 1970)).
-
-
-
-
52
-
-
26444467429
-
-
Robertson, supra note 40, at 195 (emphasis in original). See also Faziolari, 734 P.2d at 1328-29 & n.3
-
Robertson, supra note 40, at 195 (emphasis in original). See also Faziolari, 734 P.2d at 1328-29 & n.3.
-
-
-
-
53
-
-
26444472172
-
-
Heaven v. Pender, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509
-
Heaven v. Pender, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509.
-
-
-
-
54
-
-
26444580512
-
-
Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988)
-
Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988).
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
26444438421
-
-
Robertson, supra note 40, at 161
-
Robertson, supra note 40, at 161.
-
-
-
-
56
-
-
26444555832
-
-
Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1335
-
Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1335.
-
-
-
-
57
-
-
26444562676
-
-
note
-
The "affirmative conduct" phrase is necessary to signal the rule that one is ordinarily free to do nothing, even when acting might help a fellow human being. Anglo-American tort law reflects the distinction between affirmative conduct and inaction by using the terms misfeasance or malfeasance to signify affirmative wrongful conduct and nonfeasance to signify a morally questionable (but normally non-actionable) failure to act. For a no-duty-to-act case, see Mayo v. Audubon Indem. Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d 1290 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996).
-
-
-
-
58
-
-
26444503384
-
-
note
-
Emotional injuries and purely economic injuries involving no physical harm to the plaintiff's person or tangible property receive a lesser degree of legal protection. See, e.g., Evans Vending Service v. Raymond, 666 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writs denied, 667 So. 2d 533, 671 So. 2d 325 (1996).
-
-
-
-
59
-
-
26444489401
-
-
Robertson, supra note 40, at 161
-
Robertson, supra note 40, at 161.
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
26444483639
-
-
note
-
Louisiana no longer limits land occupier liability via the formal limited-duty structure that grew up around the invitee-licensee-trespasser categories of victims. Cates v. Beauregard Electric Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976). But the victim's de facto status still figures heavily into the courts' assessment of the landowner's responsibility. See, e.g., Oster v. Department of Transp. and Dev., 582 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1991); Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
-
-
-
-
61
-
-
84866217211
-
-
See Keeton, supra note 41, § 55, at 367-68
-
See Keeton, supra note 41, § 55, at 367-68.
-
-
-
-
62
-
-
26444512983
-
Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for Intangible Economic Loss: Negligence Actions and the Tort of Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
-
See, e.g., State ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903, 106 S. Ct. 3271 (1986). The extent to which Louisiana law incorporates such restrictions is unclear. See generally 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); David W. Robertson, Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for Intangible Economic Loss: Negligence Actions and the Tort of Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, 46 La. L. Rev. 737 (1986).
-
(1986)
La. L. Rev.
, vol.46
, pp. 737
-
-
Robertson, D.W.1
-
63
-
-
26444563698
-
-
See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6
-
See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
-
-
-
-
64
-
-
26444518515
-
-
note
-
See Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 234 (La. 1994); Allien v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 202 So. 2d 704, 710-12 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 204 So. 2d 574 (La. 1967).
-
-
-
-
65
-
-
26444456367
-
-
note
-
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J., for the court). The particular factual focus of the B and PL elements of Learned Hand's "formula" depend upon what the plaintiff's lawyer's has elected to prove. For example, in Grace & Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 168 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd 278 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1960), the defendant's underground water pipe ruptured and flooded a cargo shed in which plaintiff's property was stored. The defendant knew that its pipes were old and subject to sudden leaks because the soil in the area was conducive to corrosion. The shed was on a short branch water line, connected to a pipeline serving the entire waterfront that might have been several miles long. If the plaintiff's lawyer elected to confine the attack to the short branch line, the burden of digging up the pipe and checking for weak spots would probably not have been regarded as prohibitively high, but the probability of a rupture in that short segment of water line would have been quite low. So the plaintiff's lawyer elected to show that the probability of a leak somewhere in the entire water line was significantly high, and lost the bench-tried case because the judge was convinced that the burden of digging up the entire pipeline was correspondingly (and in the court's view prohibitively) high. The point of this story is simply to illustrate the intuitively obvious but occasionally neglected requirement that the same factual focus must be maintained on both sides of the B-PL balance.
-
-
-
-
66
-
-
26444597308
-
The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana
-
hereinafter Precedent Value
-
The application of general norms to particular situations is part of the jury's traditional role. Issues like the breach element in the negligence-law cause of action are sometimes called "mixed question[s]" of law and fact. David W. Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions of Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 La. L. Rev. 78, 93 (1968) [hereinafter Precedent Value]. Deciding whether an actor's conduct was substandard (negligent) involves both primary fact finding - determining what the defendant did or failed to do - and norm-applying - assessing whether a reasonable person would have done better. Thus, "mixed questions" of law and fact can also be called "particular norm-applying" questions. In the Anglo-American tort system, both primary fact finding and particular norm-applying have been regarded as business for the trier of fact. See Precedent Value, at 88 ("[i]f a jury and trial judge cannot be trusted to make a decision depending 'entirely upon the question of fact whether the time and distance were sufficient for the engineer to stop his train and prevent the accident,' it is difficult to see what purposes they could serve") (internal quotation from Brown v. Louisiana R.R. & Nav. Co., 147 La. 829, 830, 86 So. 281 (1920)) (emphasis in original). Res ipsa loquitur does not belong in the illustrative listing of occasional assistance to the jury in its breach determination. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence or procedure to the effect that the mere occurrence of an accident (of a certain type) may generate a permissive inference of negligence sufficient to take the case to the jury in the absence of adequate exculpatory evidence presented on behalf of the defendant In a system treating the res ipsa doctrine sensibly, jurors never hear of it.
-
(1968)
La. L. Rev.
, vol.29
, pp. 78
-
-
Robertson, D.W.1
-
67
-
-
26444491908
-
-
note
-
For example, see Texas Pattern Jury Charge 2.04 (1987), which lumps cause in fact and legal cause under a broad "proximate cause" rubric as follows: "'Proximate cause' means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event."
-
-
-
-
68
-
-
26444543616
-
-
note
-
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that the defendant owed no duty to an unforeseeable plaintiff); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1155-58 (La. 1988) (treating the question of whether the plaintiffs fell within the scope of protection of defendant's duty as part of the duty issue and the question of whether the type of harm incurred fell within that scope as the legal cause issue).
-
-
-
-
69
-
-
26444542195
-
Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines
-
Dean Green devoted a major portion of his long and vigorous life of scholarship to the advocacy of his model. See, e.g., the following works: Green, supra note 5; Leon Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 42 (1962);
-
(1962)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.41
, pp. 42
-
-
Green, L.1
-
70
-
-
9144247267
-
The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law
-
Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 543 (1962);
-
(1962)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.60
, pp. 543
-
-
Green, L.1
-
71
-
-
13844251534
-
Foreseeability in Negligence Law
-
Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961).
-
(1961)
Colum. L. Rev.
, vol.61
, pp. 1401
-
-
Green, L.1
-
72
-
-
26444509572
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 322-23 (La. 1994) (setting forth seven factors for determining the reasonableness of police officers' conduct in approaching or arresting a subject); Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967, 974 (La. 1985) (looking to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act as the source for a six-factor approach to assessing and comparing the parties' percentages of fault); Giordano v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 643 So. 2d 492, 496 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) (announcing a rule that in the absence of a gas or electric company's actual or constructive knowledge of defects in a private wiring or piping system or appliances, the power company's responsibility for the uses of its product stops at its meter, and using that rule to uphold summary judgment for the defendant gas company).
-
-
-
-
73
-
-
26444476750
-
-
See also infra notes 77 and 80
-
See also infra notes 77 and 80.
-
-
-
-
74
-
-
26444594656
-
-
note
-
See Mathieu, 646 So. 2d at 323-26 (using the articulated factors to conclude that the trial court's conclusion that police officers were negligent was manifestly erroneous). But cf. Campbell v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 648 So. 2d 898 (La. 1995) (reviewing percentage-fault assignments without mentioning the factors set forth in Watson, 469 So. 2d at 967).
-
-
-
-
75
-
-
26444516825
-
-
note
-
Both of the decisions discussed in the text immediately below were decided before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). Under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), the Supreme Court felt itself empowered to declare nationwide tort rules binding on all federal courts.
-
-
-
-
76
-
-
26444443821
-
-
275 U.S. 66, 70, 48 S. Ct. 24, 25 (1927).
-
275 U.S. 66, 70, 48 S. Ct. 24, 25 (1927).
-
-
-
-
77
-
-
26444614455
-
-
292 U.S. 98, 104-06, 54 S. Ct. 580, 582-83 (1934)
-
292 U.S. 98, 104-06, 54 S. Ct. 580, 582-83 (1934).
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
0345891173
-
Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era
-
Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1149 (La. 1983) (recommending the judicial legislator approach to the breach issue - the "unreasonable risk" issue - in strict liability cases brought under La. Civ. Code art. 2317); Oster v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 582 So. 2d 1285, 1288-89 (La. 1991) (indicating that the approach described in Entrevia is also appropriate for the breach issue in negligence cases). It is interesting to note that the Entrevia opinion found significant support for the judicial legislator approach in the works of the French jurist Geny. 427 So. 2d at 1149. Geny has frequently been cited by the Louisiana Supreme Court. (A WESTLAW search, LA-CS database (Feb. 24, 1997), indicates citations to Geny in thirteen supreme court opinions since 1980.) In some circles, Geny's work is associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement and with a radically open-ended approach to the meaning of words in statutes. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691, 716 (1987).
-
(1987)
U. Pitt. L. Rev.
, vol.48
, pp. 691
-
-
Eskridge Jr., W.N.1
Frickey, P.P.2
-
79
-
-
26444446295
-
-
note
-
The approach described here as Model Five, like that described as Model Four (see supra text accompanying note 71), could also be engrafted onto Model Two or Model Three, but once again simplicity will be served by merely noting the existence of these additional possibilities (Models Five-A and Five-B). It is important to note explicitly that Model Five differs from Model Four in a crucial way. Under Model Four, the breach specification factors are applied by the trier of fact unless they are unduly rigid. But Model Five apparently contemplates that the judicial legislator will itself both articulate and apply the legislative wisdom posited.
-
-
-
-
80
-
-
26444556179
-
-
note
-
The approach calls for "consider[ation of] the moral, social and economic values as well as the ideal of justice" and for "study of the law and customs, a balancing of claims and interests, a weighing of the risk and the gravity of harm, and a consideration of individual and societal rights and obligations." Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1149.
-
-
-
-
81
-
-
26444481346
-
-
note
-
For further treatment of the confusion respecting appellate review of breach determinations, see infra part V.B.
-
-
-
-
82
-
-
26444525968
-
-
note
-
The approach described here as Model Six, like Models Four and Five above, could be engrafted onto any of the first three models. See supra notes 71 and 77. Again, we will not pause to discuss all of the hybrids, except to note in passing that the model that would result from engrafting Model Six onto Model Three (Model Six-B) would radically reduce the jury's traditional role, leaving no work for the jury except primary fact-finding and determining the cause in fact and damages issues.
-
-
-
-
83
-
-
26444449273
-
-
note
-
Robertson, supra note 40, at 161-63, states that the instanced "duty" articulation "should be avoided" and goes on to explain: "[In] Clinton v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 36 Ill.App.3d 1064, 344 N.E.2d 509 (1976), . . . [p]laintiff's son came into contact with an uninsulated high-voltage power line that defendant (the power company) maintained above the plaintiff's property. The trial judge directed a verdict for defendant on concluding that plaintiff failed to prove maintaining an uninsulated line was unreasonable under the circumstances shown. This was clearly a no-negligence, rather than a no-duty, determination. But directed verdicts on the negligence issue, while by no means rare, are not routine. Perhaps for that reason, in affirming the trial judge's disposition the Illinois appellate court presented the issue as one of duty. First referring to the well-settled proposition that 'the determination of the existence of a legal duty is a question of law,' the court then stated that the question in the case at hand was whether 'defendants had a legal duty to insulate the wire over the Clintons' property.' Expressing the problem in the case as a duty issue made it seem more or less automatically a question for the judge to answer, with no role for the jury. Whereas, had the court said that the issue was whether it was less than reasonable care under the circumstances for defendant to maintain an uninsulated line, that formulation would have tended to make the question seem to be one for the jury to answer. None of this suggests that the Clinton result was wrong; but the court's use of a duty label for a negligence issue made the result seem foreordained, whereas in reality it was a very close case." See also supra text accompanying note 56.
-
-
-
-
84
-
-
26444595908
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Donaldson v. Sanders, 661 So. 2d 1010, 1014 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995), writ granted, 668 So. 2d 363 (1996), in which the Third Circuit phrased the question of whether a nurse had been negligent in failing to inform the treating physician of the patient's condition as whether she "was required to contact [the] treating physician" and termed that question "a legal issue" and "a question of law."
-
-
-
-
85
-
-
26444462808
-
-
673 So. 2d 585 (La.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996)
-
673 So. 2d 585 (La.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996).
-
-
-
-
86
-
-
26444567547
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
87
-
-
26444511417
-
-
note
-
Pitre, 673 So. 2d at 590-93. The Pitre court broke the B (burden of precautions) ingredient out into "the intended benefit of the thing" and "the cost of prevention"; it called the PL (probability X loss) ingredient "potential for harm." Id. at 590. This phrasing is but one of many prevalent versions of the B < PL? vocabulary. See, e.g., Allien v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 202 So. 2d 704, 710-12 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 251 La. 392, 204 So. 2d 574 (1967). The semantical differences are of no moment; in all versions the threat posed by the harm-producing activity or thing is weighed against the costs of giving up the activity or thing or of correcting its dangerous aspects, whichever is cheaper. The vocabulary of "costs" and "cheaper" should not permitted to obscure the essentially unquantifiable nature of the B < PL? inquiry. It is risk-utility evaluation of a meditative and discursive kind, not mathematics.
-
-
-
-
88
-
-
26444475168
-
-
See supra part III.B.2
-
See supra part III.B.2.
-
-
-
-
89
-
-
26444528745
-
-
Pitre, 673 So. 2d at 596
-
Pitre, 673 So. 2d at 596.
-
-
-
-
90
-
-
26444544783
-
-
note
-
See supra part II.C. An alternative explanation of Justice Lemmon's omission of any manifest error discussion is suggested infra note 102.
-
-
-
-
91
-
-
26444450253
-
-
See infra note 93
-
See infra note 93.
-
-
-
-
92
-
-
26444544782
-
-
But see supra note 39
-
But see supra note 39.
-
-
-
-
93
-
-
84979105117
-
Liability in Negligence for Nervous Shock
-
Not so long ago a highly-regarded British jurist seemed to despair of achieving consistency respecting negligence law's conceptual structure. Addressing in particular the difficulties of distinguishing between the duty and legal causation issues, Lord Denning wrote as follows: "The more I think about these cases, the more difficult I find it to put each into its proper pigeon hole. Sometimes I say: 'There was no duty.' In others I say: 'The damage was too remote [i.e., the defendant's conduct was not a legal cause of the injury].' So much so that I think the time has come to discard these tests which proved so elusive. It seems to me better to consider the particular relationship in hand, and see whether or not, as a matter of policy, [the loss sued for] should be recoverable, or not." Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd. v. Martin and Co. (Contractors) Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 27, 37. Such conceptual nihilism might be acceptable in a unified bench-trial system like England's, but would be wholly unacceptable in any American jurisdiction. See David W. Robertson, Liability in Negligence for Nervous Shock, 57 Modern L. Rev. 649, 650-52 (1994).
-
(1994)
Modern L. Rev.
, vol.57
, pp. 649
-
-
Robertson, D.W.1
-
94
-
-
26444552639
-
-
note
-
Model Five fails the firmness test for two reasons. First, courts move into the "legislative" mode unpredictably; and lower courts use it far less often than the supreme court, lending a further asymmetry and consequent unpredictability to the process. Second, the factors that the judicial legislator is supposed to resort to are so vague and general that reasoned discourse can almost always generate multiple outcomes. Model Five may fail the respect test because its logic invites the appellate court to ignore the trier of fact's breach determination and absorb that issue into a broad legislative inquiry that is treated as a matter of law. Model Five will offend the labor saving criterion to the extent that the appellate court essentially starts from scratch in determining the breach issue under the judicial legislator approach.
-
-
-
-
95
-
-
26444488850
-
-
note
-
The vacillation is discussed and documented in Freeman v. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 663 So. 2d 515, 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), writ denied, 666 So. 2d 680 (1996). It is also mentioned in Kenney v. Cox, 652 So. 2d 992 (La. 1995) (Dennis, J., concurring). Louisiana Supreme Court authority for Model One includes Wilson v. Department of Public Safety, 576 So. 2d 490, 493 (La. 1991), Fowler v. Roberts. 556 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (La. 1989), aff'd on reh'g, 556 So. 2d 13 (La. 1990), and Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991), rev'd in part on reh'g, 605 So. 2d 1050, 1064 (La. 1992) (Dennis, J., dissenting). For other support for Model One, see White v. City of Baker, 676 So. 2d 121, 125 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 679 So. 2d 1351 (1996); Retif v. Doe, 632 So. 2d 405, 407-08 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 638 So. 2d 1095 (1994); Jefferson v. Costanza, 628 So. 2d 1158, 1161-62 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993). Authority for Model Two includes Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151, 1155-58 (La. 1988). Authority for Model Three includes Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 233 (La. 1994).
-
-
-
-
96
-
-
26444431571
-
-
note
-
In my view Model One can usefully be combined with a careful version of Model Four whereby wise and suitably flexible factors for determining the breach issue in particular recurrent factual contexts are specified and used in a consistent and principled way.
-
-
-
-
97
-
-
26444456366
-
-
See supra note 66
-
See supra note 66.
-
-
-
-
98
-
-
0347547575
-
Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black
-
The quoted statements of Dean Green come from Green, supra note 5, at 81-82, and from Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 Yale L.J. 482, 487 (1956).
-
(1956)
Yale L.J.
, vol.65
, pp. 4827
-
-
Green, L.1
-
99
-
-
26444462806
-
The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green
-
hereinafter Green's Philosophy
-
The immediate source of the quotation is David W. Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 393, 432-33 (1978) [hereinafter Green's Philosophy]. The first half of Green's Philosophy summarizes Dean Green's career and legal philosophy. The second half constructs a series of philosophical and judicial-reform essays using Dean Green's words as a kind of montage/homage.
-
(1978)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.56
, pp. 393
-
-
Robertson, D.W.1
-
100
-
-
26444438420
-
-
Green, supra note 96, at 486
-
Green, supra note 96, at 486.
-
-
-
-
101
-
-
26444486693
-
-
note
-
Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, [1959] A.C. 743, 758 (Lord Somervell, stating that turning common-sense propositions of fact - e.g., that a particular worker was negligent in not availing himself of readily-available protective equipment - into propositions of law and hence into precedents would, unless checked, soon cause the "precedent system [to] die from a surfeit of authorities").
-
-
-
-
102
-
-
26444439424
-
-
671 So. 2d 399, 403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ denied, 668 So. 2d 366 (1996)
-
671 So. 2d 399, 403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ denied, 668 So. 2d 366 (1996).
-
-
-
-
103
-
-
26444515295
-
-
note
-
Cases or judges following Green include (in chronological order) Phipps v. Amtrak, 666 So. 2d 341, 343-44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ denied, 668 So. 2d 368 (1996); Tullis v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 670 So. 2d 245, 250 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ not considered, not timely filed, 670 So. 2d 1241 (1996) (Thibodaux, J., concurring); Miller v. State, 679 So. 2d 134, 140 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 680 So. 2d 650 (1996) (Thibodaux, J., dissenting); Dixon v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 673 So. 2d 696, 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); Migues v. City of Lake Charles, 96-626, 1996 WL 638203, ** 2-3 (La. App. 3d Cir. Nov. 11, 1996). But see Hathaway v. Jeep Corp., 679 So. 2d 913, 916 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 684 So. 2d 926 (1996) (refusing to follow Green and citing Hines v. Remington Arms Co., 648 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. 1994), to show that Green was wrong).
-
-
-
-
104
-
-
26444576224
-
-
note
-
The first two reasons are set forth in Chief Judge Lottinger's opinion for the court in Green, 671 So. 2d at 403. The third is found in Judge Gonzales's opinion for the court in Phipps, 666 So. 2d at 344.
-
-
-
-
105
-
-
26444446294
-
-
note
-
In Boyle v. Board of Supervisors, 685 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (La. 1997), the court declined to endorse or reject Green. Some might argue that the Green position was foreshadowed in the concurring opinions of Justices Ortigue (joined by Kimball) and Lemmon in Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Dep't Ambulance Serv., 639 So. 2d 216, 223-24 (La. 1994). These concurrences posited that the question of whether there is sufficient evidence to reach the jury on the breach issue is a question of law; they might (but in my view should not) be read to suggest that the breach issue itself - the norm-application portion - is also a question of law.
-
-
-
-
106
-
-
26444485226
-
-
See supra part III.E
-
See supra part III.E.
-
-
-
-
107
-
-
26444532618
-
-
Cf. Robertson, supra note 66
-
Cf. Robertson, supra note 66.
-
-
-
-
108
-
-
26444498885
-
-
note
-
See Green, 671 So. 2d at 401 ("the difference in level between the sidewalk and the curb was no greater than an inch and a half at its worst point"); id. at 403 ("[t]o require that this particular curb be maintained to a standard sufficient to protect this pedestrian . . . would place too great a burden upon the City. . . . The trial judge's determination that the curb in question posed an unreasonable risk of harm . . . was legally wrong.").
-
-
-
-
109
-
-
26444517505
-
-
Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, [1959] A.C. 743, 758. See supra note 98
-
Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, [1959] A.C. 743, 758. See supra note 98.
-
-
-
-
110
-
-
26444489399
-
-
Green, supra note 96, at 486
-
Green, supra note 96, at 486.
-
-
-
-
111
-
-
26444504388
-
-
See supra part III.F
-
See supra part III.F.
-
-
-
-
112
-
-
26444434621
-
-
My arguments may be viewed as an elaboration of Judge Shortess's dissent in Green, 671 So. 2d at 404
-
My arguments may be viewed as an elaboration of Judge Shortess's dissent in Green, 671 So. 2d at 404.
-
-
-
-
113
-
-
26444593672
-
-
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Acadiana Fast Foods, 670 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 671 So. 2d 920 (1996)
-
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Acadiana Fast Foods, 670 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 671 So. 2d 920 (1996).
-
-
-
-
114
-
-
26444585338
-
-
See supra note 2
-
See supra note 2.
-
-
-
-
115
-
-
26444588445
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
116
-
-
26444530358
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Rhodes v. State, 674 So. 2d 239, 242 (La. 1996); Farley v. State, 680 So. 2d 746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); Graves v. Page, 95-1571, 1996 WL 426563, ** 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. Aug. 31, 1996); Summerville v. Louisiana Nursery Outlet, Inc., 676 So. 2d 238, 240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); Jones v. Peyton Place, Inc., 675 So. 2d 754, 761 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996); Millet v. Cormier, 671 So. 2d 1101, 1106 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 673 So. 2d 1036 (1996); Buchert v. State, 669 So. 2d 527, 528-29 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 671 So. 2d 341 (1996); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand Formula, 52 La. L. Rev. 323, 328-30 (1991).
-
-
-
-
117
-
-
26444607233
-
-
See, e.g., Teel v. State, 681 So. 2d 340, 343-44 (La. 1996)
-
See, e.g., Teel v. State, 681 So. 2d 340, 343-44 (La. 1996).
-
-
-
-
119
-
-
26444606101
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Moos v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955) (holding that a VA hospital's mistake in amputating the wrong leg of a patient was a technical battery and hence not actionable given the Federal Tort Claims Act's retention of governmental immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994)).
-
-
-
-
120
-
-
26444563697
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 447 A.2d 84 (Md. App. 1982) (allowing a claim against a thirteen-year-old student for injuries caused by pulling a chair from beneath a teacher to be brought as a negligence claim - covered by a three-year statute of limitations - despite the fact that the one-year statute of limitations on battery had expired).
-
-
-
-
121
-
-
26444444434
-
-
note
-
646 So. 2d 318 (La. 1994). Saying that shootings are batteries does not mean that shooters will always be liable. The shooter may have a consent or privilege defense. See supra notes 3 and 4.
-
-
-
-
122
-
-
26444525967
-
-
note
-
See, e.g., Dundas v. Real Superstore, 650 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 653 So. 2d 590 (1995) (transferred-intent assault or battery); Corley v. Delaney, 629 So. 2d 1255 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 156 (1994); Clement v. Armoniet, 527 So. 2d 1004 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 475 (1988). Cf. Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229 (La. 1994) (technical battery?); Smith v. Trattler, 96-225, 1996 WL 525853 (La. App. 5th Cir. Sept. 18, 1996) (intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress?).
-
-
-
-
123
-
-
26444618907
-
-
note
-
Under Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994), some intentional tort victims could have percentage-fault assessed against them. As amended by Act 3 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1996, the Civil Code now seems to preclude docking the intentional-tort plaintiff for his or her percentage fault. La. Civ. Code art. 2323(C).
-
-
-
-
124
-
-
26444550436
-
-
The seminal negligence per se case in the United States is Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (opinion for the court by Cardozo, J.)
-
The seminal negligence per se case in the United States is Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (opinion for the court by Cardozo, J.).
-
-
-
-
125
-
-
26444470225
-
-
note
-
The negligence per se doctrine addresses statutes that prohibit or prescribe particular conduct but that do not themselves make any provision for tort consequences. Under this doctrine, courts in tort cases can and should use such statutes as a means of specifying the standard of care owed by the defendant, provided the statute was designed to protect the general class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs against the general type of harm sustained. Gorris v. Scott, [1874] 9 Ex. 125; Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co., 301 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. App. 1983).
-
-
-
-
126
-
-
26444567546
-
-
Eubanks v. Brasseal, 310 So. 2d 550, 553 (La. 1975); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821, 831 (1970)
-
Eubanks v. Brasseal, 310 So. 2d 550, 553 (La. 1975); Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821, 831 (1970).
-
-
-
-
127
-
-
26444554309
-
-
Galloway v. State Dept. of Transp., 654 So. 2d 1345, 1347 (La. 1995) (citations omitted)
-
Galloway v. State Dept. of Transp., 654 So. 2d 1345, 1347 (La. 1995) (citations omitted).
-
-
-
-
128
-
-
26444552638
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
129
-
-
26444557172
-
-
note
-
615 So. 2d 289, 293-93 (La. 1993): "The terminology 'negligence per se' has been rejected in Louisiana. The violation of a statute or regulation does not automatically, in and of itself, impose civil liability. Civil responsibility is imposed only if the act in violation of the statute is the legal cause of damage to another." (citations omitted).
-
-
-
-
130
-
-
26444447297
-
-
note
-
360 So. 2d 1164, 1168-69 (La. 1978): [W]e do not intend to revive the doctrine of "negligence per se." A violation of a criminal statute does not automatically create liability in a particular civil case, because the statute may have been designed to protect someone other than the plaintiff, or to protect the plaintiff from some evil other than the injury for which recovery is sought. . . . In this sense, criminal statutes can be said to be mere guidelines for the court. . . . Yet, where a criminal statute imposes a duty designed to protect a particular person from a particular type of injury, one who has so injured such a person by a breach of the prescribed duty cannot evade civil liability by persuading the court to disregard the clear legislative prohibition as if it were a mere discretionary "guideline."
-
-
-
-
131
-
-
26444532617
-
-
note
-
273 So. 2d 30, 33 (La. 1973): We granted this writ [because we] were apprehensive that the appellate court had held the plaintiff contributorily negligent merely because of a finding of a cause-in-fact and a statutory violation without a determination of legal cause. We have rejected the concept that a violation of a penal statute automatically constitutes negligence, and we have rejected the terminology "negligence per se."
-
-
-
-
132
-
-
26444536410
-
-
note
-
263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714, 717 (1972): We have repeatedly held that a criminal violation would lead to civil responsibility only if that act is the legal cause of damage to another. To decide whether the violation of the criminal statute by Laird imposes civil liability upon him . . ., we must determine whether his act was a cause-in-fact of the accident, what was the nature of the duty imposed upon him, what risks were encompassed within that duty, and whether under the combination of these considerations he should be declared negligent.
-
-
-
-
133
-
-
26444552637
-
-
note
-
I would put both the class-of-persons and the type-of-harm inquiry under the legal cause concept. I think the cases in supra notes 128 and 129 agree with this approach. Galligan, supra note 40, at 12, uses a slightly different analysis, whereby the class-of-persons issue falls under duty and the type-of-harm issue under legal cause. Galligan's approach exemplifies Model Two, supra part III.C; mine exemplifies Model One, supra part III.B.
-
-
-
-
134
-
-
26444528744
-
-
920 F.2d 272, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1991)
-
920 F.2d 272, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1991).
-
-
-
-
135
-
-
0041579768
-
-
§ 4-24 2d ed.
-
Id. at 277-78. Judge Rubin did not refer to it, but the maritime law's "primary duty" doctrine would have provided a rough analogy to a "repairman exception." See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 4-24 (2d ed. 1994).
-
(1994)
Admiralty and Maritime Law
-
-
Schoenbaum, T.J.1
-
136
-
-
26444504387
-
-
652 So. 2d 1299, 1304 (La. 1995)
-
652 So. 2d 1299, 1304 (La. 1995).
-
-
-
-
137
-
-
26444621105
-
-
Id. at 1305
-
Id. at 1305.
-
-
-
-
138
-
-
26444570649
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
139
-
-
26444575167
-
-
note
-
See Genusa v. B & B Sheet Metal, 663 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995), writ denied, 666 So. 2d 672 (1996); Touchet v. Estate of Bass, 653 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 654 So. 2d 1112 (1995); Desormeaux v. Audubon Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 1002 (1993); Triplette v. Exxon Corp., 554 So. 2d 1361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Eldridge v. Bonanza Family Restaurant, 542 So. 2d 1146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
-
-
-
-
140
-
-
26444475167
-
-
The repairman-plaintiff succeeded in getting past the summary judgment stage in Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995)
-
The repairman-plaintiff succeeded in getting past the summary judgment stage in Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
-
-
-
-
141
-
-
26444473890
-
-
note
-
"Pure" comparative fault means that victim fault even as great as 99.99% will yield a recovery of some damages provided the prima facie case against the defendant is made. It is contrasted with "modified" comparative fault whereby victim fault above a certain level - usually 49% or 50% - cuts off the plaintiff's right to recover. See Robertson, supra note 40, at 362-64.
-
-
-
-
142
-
-
26444595089
-
-
La. Civ. Code art. 2323. See Murray v. Ramada Inns. Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988)
-
La. Civ. Code art. 2323. See Murray v. Ramada Inns. Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
-
-
-
-
143
-
-
26444491394
-
-
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975)
-
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
-
-
-
-
145
-
-
25844451808
-
Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana
-
David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 La. L. Rev. 1341 (1984).
-
(1984)
La. L. Rev.
, vol.44
, pp. 1341
-
-
Robertson, D.W.1
-
146
-
-
25844491286
-
Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis
-
See H. Alston Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 La. L. Rev. 319 (1980).
-
(1980)
La. L. Rev.
, vol.40
, pp. 319
-
-
Johnson, H.A.1
-
147
-
-
26444536007
-
-
590 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991)
-
590 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
-
-
-
-
148
-
-
26444547342
-
-
note
-
116 S. Ct. 1813 (1996). The word "arguendo" in the text is necessary because the Sofec plaintiff never got to try the issue of the defendant's fault. The trial judge bifurcated the trial in such a way that the issue of victim fault was tried to the bench first, preceding and in isolation from all of the other potential issues in the case. This unusual trial methodology was upheld by the Ninth Circuit and by the Supreme Court.
-
-
-
-
149
-
-
26444448718
-
-
See Green, supra note 5, at 59-60
-
See Green, supra note 5, at 59-60.
-
-
-
-
150
-
-
26444521983
-
-
See id. at 30-31, 57, 184-85
-
See id. at 30-31, 57, 184-85.
-
-
-
-
151
-
-
26444504386
-
-
See id. at 26-27, 29-30, 57
-
See id. at 26-27, 29-30, 57.
-
-
-
-
152
-
-
26444462796
-
-
hereinafter Studies
-
See Wex S. Malone and Leah Guerry, Studies in Louisiana Torts Law 238, 296, 302, 462, 465, 632-33, 646-47 (1970) [hereinafter Studies];
-
(1970)
Studies in Louisiana Torts Law
, pp. 238
-
-
Malone, W.S.1
Guerry, L.2
-
153
-
-
26444585317
-
Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company
-
hereinafter Ruminations
-
Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 La. L. Rev. 363, 369, 377, 378-79, 380, 382, 383 (1970) [hereinafter Ruminations].
-
(1970)
La. L. Rev.
, vol.30
, pp. 363
-
-
Malone, W.S.1
-
154
-
-
26444502348
-
-
See Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 401, 423, 476, 632-33, 646-47, 663-68
-
See Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 401, 423, 476, 632-33, 646-47, 663-68.
-
-
-
-
155
-
-
26444607215
-
-
See id. at 268, 269, 418, 422, 479, 686; Malone, Ruminations, supra note 148, at 387-88. But cf. Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 423, 427, 646, 685
-
See id. at 268, 269, 418, 422, 479, 686; Malone, Ruminations, supra note 148, at 387-88. But cf. Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 423, 427, 646, 685.
-
-
-
-
156
-
-
26444461802
-
-
See, e.g., Malone, Studies, supra note 148, at 802 (an excerpt from the annual torts survey at 25 La. L. Rev. 49 (1964), in which Professor Malone criticized as having been wholly unnecessary legislation protecting "good samaritans" from liability. Malone argued that such actors always escaped liability in litigation against them in any event. He gave no weight to the evident desirability of avoiding suits against physicians and others who voluntarily administer emergency aid).
-
(1964)
La. L. Rev.
, vol.25
, pp. 49
-
-
-
158
-
-
26444483622
-
Must the Litigation Profession Undergo a Spiritual Rebirth?
-
Robertson, supra note 96, at 437 (quoting and blending Green's articles, Must the Litigation Profession Undergo a Spiritual Rebirth?, 16 Ind. L.J. 15, 28 (1940),
-
(1940)
Ind. L.J.
, vol.16
, pp. 15
-
-
Green1
-
159
-
-
26444535991
-
No-Fault: A Perspective
-
and No-Fault: A Perspective, 1975 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 80).
-
B.Y.U. L. Rev.
, vol.1975
, pp. 79
-
-
-
160
-
-
26444468255
-
-
See supra note 60
-
See supra note 60.
-
-
-
-
161
-
-
26444582664
-
-
note
-
Ledbetter v. State, 502 So. 2d 1383, 1387 n.5 (La. 1987) ("the doctrine of assured clear distance has been rejected by this court in Craker v. Allstate Insurance Co., 259 La. 578, 250 So.2d 746 (1971)").
-
-
-
-
162
-
-
26444470213
-
-
See supra part V.F.
-
See supra part V.F.
-
-
-
-
163
-
-
26444468256
-
-
See supra part V.E.
-
See supra part V.E.
-
-
-
-
164
-
-
26444513934
-
-
See supra parts III.D and III.G.
-
See supra parts III.D and III.G.
-
-
-
-
165
-
-
26444594642
-
-
See supra part III.F.
-
See supra part III.F.
-
-
-
-
166
-
-
26444447724
-
-
See supra part V.B.
-
See supra part V.B.
-
-
-
-
167
-
-
26444610988
-
-
See supra text accompanying note 102
-
See supra text accompanying note 102.
-
-
-
|