The role of gender and relationship in reforming the Rockefeller drug laws

New York University Law Review

Volumn 76, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 906-944

  Tinto, Eda Katharine ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 26444442547     PISSN: 00287881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (231)

1. Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 57 (1999);
2. Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is It Time to Change the Rockefeller Drug Laws?, 13 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 613, 613 (1999) (stating that Governor Rockefeller and Legislature enacted toughest drug laws in country in response to increased drug use);
3. see also Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution and Present Status of New York Drug Control Legislation, 22 Buff. L. Rev. 705, 733 (1973) (stating that Rockefeller Drug Laws (the Laws) evidence "strict law enforcement attitude" regarding drug crime in New York).
4. See Joint Comm. on N.Y. Drug Law Evaluation, The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Nation's Toughest Drug Law: Evaluating the New York Experience 3 (1977) [hereinafter Joint Comm.] (stating that Laws raised penalties for sale and possession offenses);
5. see also Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Rockefeller Drug Law Repeal 1 (Feb. 2001) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (stating that Laws enacted long prison terms for many drug offenses); Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 732 (stating that Laws require mandatory minimum prison sentences without opportunity for probation for many drug offenders). Most of these laws were passed as part of the New York Substance Control Act revisions in 1973. See Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 618 (citing 1972 N.Y. Laws 878). Among the provisions was the establishment of mandatory enhanced sentences for all drug offenders. For more on the history and components of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, see infra Part I.A; see also Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 618.
6. A multitude of groups, including former supporters of the Laws, now speak out against them. E.g., John R. Dunne, Editorial, Paying for Failed Drug Laws, Wash. Post, August 12, 1999, at A27 (claiming laws have "failed to achieve their goals" in editorial by former State Senator Dunne, an original sponsor of Laws);
7. Editorial, The General is Right, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), July 4, 1999, at B4 (reporting that all "major figures" in debate, including Governor Pataki, recognize need for reform);
8. David I. Goldstein, Editorial, Drug Laws Handcuff Our Judges, Herald Am. (Syracuse, N.Y.), July 11, 1999, at D3, available at 1999 WL 4692318 (calling for reform in editorial by director of New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers);
9. Lara Jakes, Catholic Church Leaders Urge Drug Law Reforms, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), June 15, 1999, at B2 (discussing proreform position of Catholic Church of New York);
10. Joseph D. McNamara, Letter to the Editor, Harsh Drug Laws' Boomerang Effect, Wall St. J., June 10, 1999, at A27 (discussing failure of Laws in letter by former deputy inspector of New York Police Department);
11. Paul Shechtman, A Good Deal for Criminal Justice, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 1997, at 2 (calling Laws "draconian" in opinion piece by former Director of Criminal Justice under Governor Pataki).
12. But see Steve Dnistrian, Letter to the Editor, Harsh Drug Laws' Boomerang Effect, Wall St. J., June 10, 1999, at A27 (editorial by Executive Vice President of Partnership for a Drug-Free America voicing support of tough drug laws like Rockefeller Drug Laws);
13. Lara Jakes & John Caher, Draconian Drug Laws No Panacea, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), May 9, 1999, at A1 (quoting chief assistant district attorney of Queens County, John M. Ryan, stating view that Laws are effective).
14. A 1998 MacArthur Foundation and Robert Wood Foundation study on the effectiveness of strict sentencing statutes like the Rockefeller Drug Laws found that they have very little effect on illegal drug use. Jakes & Caher, supra note 3, at A1 (citing study and others regarding effectiveness of treatment over prison); see also Elliot Currie, Crime and Punishment in America 77 (1998) (citing studies as support for claim that "putting ordinary drug offenders behind bars has very little effect on rates of drug-related crime"); Joint Comm., supra note 2, at 7 (reporting 1976 findings that Laws did not decrease drug use; if anything, drug use increased). The cost of total prison expenditures in New York is close to three billion dollars per year; fifteen years ago, the State spent only $840,000 per year.
15. David C. Leven, Curing America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 641, 644 (1993) (citing statistics from Correctional Association of New York).
16. Meda Chesney-Lind, The Female Offender 147 (1997) (explaining that war on drugs has contributed to large increase in number of women incarcerated nationwide).
17. There are currently 950,000 women in criminal justice custody (in prison, jail, on parole or probation) in the United States. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Women in Prison Fact Sheet (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.corrassoc.org/women_fact.html. In 1991, one in three women in U.S. prisons was incarcerated for a drug offense, compared to one in ten women in 1979. Chesney-Lind, supra, at 147.
18. See infra Part I.B for statistics.
19. Previous leniency may have been due to characteristics of the particular crimes (e.g., role in the offense), characteristics of the offenders (e.g., family responsibilities), or may have been due to a paternalistic or chivalrous attitude on the part of judges. See infra note 19.
20. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
21. See Chesney-Lind, supra note 5, at 146 (stating that there has been "virtually no public discussion" despite large increases in number of women in prison). Most articles discussing the Rockefeller Drug Laws do not mention the impact on women at all or mention the effect on women only in the "facts" section but not in the "proposal of reform" section. See, e.g., Leven, supra note 4, at 654-57 (discussing prison growth nationwide and proposing reforms that do not mention women offenders); Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 613 (discussing Laws and suggestions for their reform without using word "woman").
22. A discussion on how best to reform the Laws is currently ongoing in both the academic and political communities. See, e.g., Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Basic Principles of Drug Law Reform (Feb. 2000) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (discussing current legislative proposals and suggesting reforms);
23. John Caher, Chief Judge Announces Reforms, Judiciary to Move Ahead on Reorganizing Courts, Drug Laws, 18-B Rates, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 2001, at 1 (discussing Chief Judge Judith Kaye's proposals for judicial reform);
24. Tracy Huling, Women Drug Couriers: Sentencing Reform Needed for Prisoners of War, Crim. Just., Winter 1995, at 14, 62 (discussing Rockefeller Drug Law reform as it relates to women drug couriers);
25. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 631-34 (proposing reforms of the Laws); Legal Aid Society, Reform the Rockefeller Drug Laws: Mandatory Sentencing and Drug Offenders in New York State, at http://www.legal-aid.org/rock.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (proposing alternatives to current Laws).
26. For example, proposals that benefit low-level offenders, such as not determining the crime charged solely by the amount of the drug, would often benefit women offenders as well. See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of some current reform proposals.
27. See infra notes 48-49 (defining "women in relationship").
28. See infra notes 43-44 (discussing criteria of blameworthiness).
29. See infra note 115 (defining material assistance).
30. Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in The Oxford History of the Prison 227, 243 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (discussing political pressures for increased severity in sentencing during 1960s and 1970s).
31. This same movement continues to influence criminal justice policy today. See Christopher M. Alexander, Crushing Equality: Gender Equal Sentencing in America, 6 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 199, 200-06 (1997) (discussing past decade's "tough" sentencing policies and motivating rationales).
32. See Joint Comm., supra note 2, at 3 (stating that one principal objective of Laws was to deter drug offenders by threat of "get-tough" laws); Elliott Currie, Crime and Punishment in the United States: Myths, Realities, and Possibilities, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 381, 381-82 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (noting trends toward prison labor and three-strikes-and-you're-out laws);
33. see also Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 1, 40 (1995) (stating that New York's 1960s approach to drug treatment for low-level users was deemed "failure" by early 1970s);
34. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 613, 622 (discussing public outcry against "scourge" of drug abuse and New York Court of Appeals's recognition of Legislature's emphasis on isolation and deterrence rather than rehabilitation); Families Against Mandatory Minimums, History of Mandatory Minimums, at http://www.famm.org/about3.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (noting unprecedented media attention to drugs, notably crack cocaine, in early 1980s).
35. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 205 (discussing both liberal and conservative support for mandatory minimum sentences); Mauer, supra note 1, at 47-49 (same).
36. Alexander, supra note 15, at 205 (stating that reforms were initiated to fight recognized gender, race, and class discrimination in sentencing). The concern about disparities based on race was grounded in the belief that defendants of color were treated more harshly than white offenders. The concern about gender-based disparities was rooted in the belief that women received more lenient penalties because of their gender. See infra notes 19-20. These concerns about racial and gender disparities in sentencing motivated sentencing reforms throughout the country in the 1970s and supported mandatory sentencing schemes at both the state and federal levels. See Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 31 (1998) (discussing critique of "illegitimate considerations" influencing judicial discretion as motivation for sentencing reform);
37. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 6-9 (1996) (discussing nationwide sentencing reform as motivated in part by evidence of racial and gender sentencing disparities).
38. Mary Coombs, Putting Women First, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1686, 1688-89 (1995)
39. (reviewing Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime, and Punishment (1994)) (describing studies that cited unwanted chivalry as explanation for why women receive more lenient sentences than similarly situated men);
40. Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 905, 917 (1993) (highlighting focus of sentencing reform on chivalry and paternalism as reasons for gender-based disparity); cf. Chesney-Lind, supra note 5, at 150-51 (stating that chivalry often worked in favor of white women only).
41. Kathleen Daly, Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist Questions About Justice, 17 Int'l J. Soc. L. 1, 9 (1989) (stating that sentencing reform affirmed value of equal treatment under law).
42. The Laws were enacted into the 1973 Laws of New York State as Chapters 276, 277, 278, 676, and 1051. S. 6204, 1973-1974 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1973) (Ch. 276); S. 6205, 1973-1974 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1973) (Ch. 277); H.R. 7328, 1973-1974 Reg. Sess. (N.Y: 1973) (Ch. 676); H.R. 7873, 1973-1974 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1973) (Ch. 278); see also Joint Comm., supra note 2, at 3 n.1, app. at 149 tbl.A-1, app. at 150 tbl.A-2 (describing crime levels and penalties for drug offenses under New York Penal Law as of June 1977).
43. Families Against Mandatory Minimums, supra note 16. By 1983, forty other states had passed mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. Id.
44. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 615-16.
45. Joint Comm., supra note 2, app. at 150 tbl.A-2, 151, app. at 152-54 tbl.A-4.
46. Id. app. at 149 tbl.A-1, app. at 150 tbl.A-2; see also Shechtman, supra note 3, at 2 (highlighting drug sanction under Laws as potentially being same sanction as for murder and almost twice that for rape).
47. Joint Comm., supra note 2, app. at 152-54 tbl.A-4.
48. Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 1, app. at 735. The sentence was the same for an A-1 felony; however, in addition to requiring a greater amount of drugs, prior to 1973 only certain drugs would merit an A-1 felony charge. See id. Prior to 1973, the sale of one ounce of an illegal substance was considered a class C felony. Joint Comm., supra note 2, app. at 151 tbl.A-3.
49. While the judge could still determine the appropriate sentence within the given range, e.g., between fifteen and twenty-five years, a judge had no discretion to go below the mandatory minimum sentence. See supra text accompanying note 2.
50. For example, for an A-1 felony, the maximum penalty is still life imprisonment and the minimum is still fifteen years for a first-time offender. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2001). Some key provisions of the current versions of the Laws include N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2001) (providing maximum and minimum sentences for felony classes A to E); N.Y. Penal Law § 60.05 (McKinney 1998) (providing for authorized disposition of sentences); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00 (McKinney 1998) (providing for sentences of probation); N.Y. Penal Law § 220 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2001) (providing general regulations regarding controlled substances and various levels of criminal sale and possession offenses); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 410.91 (McKinney Supp. 2001) (providing for parole supervision). In 1977, the Marijuana Reform Act created separate laws that dealt exclusively with marijuana offenses. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 624 (citing Marijuana Reform Act, N.Y. Penal Law § 221 (McKinney 1998)). In 1979, the Legislature passed a series of amendments which, in part, increased some of the minimum amounts needed for certain drug felonies. For example, the amount needed for an A-1 felony for an unlawful sale was increased from one ounce to two ounces. Id. at 625. In 1992, new legislation permitted the option of treatment in certain circumstances for a first-time felon convicted of a class C, D, or E drug felony. Leven, supra note 4, at 648. In 1995, the Legislature overruled a previous New York Court of Appeals case, People v. Ryan, 626 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1993), and removed the prosecutors' burden of proving knowledge of the weight of the drug involved in the offense. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 626. In the same year, the Legislature passed the New York Sentencing Reform Act, which changed some of the sentencing requirements for both predicate felons and first-time offenders. For a description of the 1995 New York Sentencing Reform Act, see Bonnie R. Cohen, New York State Sentencing Reform Act of 1995, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 1995, at 1.
51. For a chart of current felony sentencing in New York (including drug offenses), See Bonnie R. Cohen, New York State Felony Sentencing Chart, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at 1;
52. see also Human Rights Watch, Who Goes to Prison for Drug Offenses?: A Rebuttal to the New York State District Attorneys Association, at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/drugs/ny-drugs.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2001).
53. See supra note 22.
54. See Raeder, supra note 19, at 929 (noting increased sentences and proportion of sentence served in prison under Guidelines); cf. Stith & Cabranes, supra note 18, at 145-48 (discussing need for more choices for federal judges in sentencing offenders). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were written by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a commission formed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Tonry, supra note 18, at 11. In many instances, New York sentences are harsher than the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Ruling, supra note 10, at 16 (stating that switch to prosecution under New York state law could trigger harsher penalties than are available under federal law); Shechtman, supra note 3, at 2 (comparing New York versus federal sentences and noting lesser sentences under federal law). A full examination of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is beyond the scope of this Note, but for an excellent critique of the federal scheme, including an examination of its impact on women, see generally Raeder, supra note 19; Myrna S. Raeder, Gender Issues in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Crim. Just., Fall 1993, at 20.
55. Statistics are not available to evaluate trends over the complete time period from the passage of the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973 until today. Studies that gathered statistics over portions of this time period will be presented in this Part. In general, upon examination of the various statistics, one finds that the dynamics that the particular statistics demonstrate (e.g., growth of incarceration rate) remain constant since 1973. Cf. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, in Prisons 17, 19 fig.1 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilla eds., 1999) (showing steady increase in incarceration rates for state and federal prisoners from mid-1970s to 1997).
56. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Prisoner Profile (Feb. 2001) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
57. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 5.
58. Women in Prison Project, Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Mandatory Injustice: Case Histories of Women Convicted Under New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws, at ii (Apr. 1999) (on file with the New York University Law Review) [hereinafter Mandatory Injustice].
59. This significant rise in the prison population is mainly attributable to the severe sanctioning of drug offenses, rather than a result of a significant rise in other types of crime (e.g., violent crime). In 1980, only 11% of people sent to New York state prison were drug offenders; in 1999, 44.5% of people sentenced that year were drug offenders. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Basic Prison & Jail Fact Sheet (Feb. 2001) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
60. Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at ii.
61. Marc Mauer et al., The Sentencing Project, Gender and Justice: Women, Drugs, and Sentencing Policy 9 (1999). The increase for women may be due in part to the presence of more women who are repeat drug offenders and thus trigger the repeat offender portions of the drug laws. Id. at 9-10; see also N.Y. Penal Law, § 70.06 (McKinney 1998) (Second Felony Offender Law). Overall, the majority of drug offenders do not end up in prison. Mauer et al., supra, at 11. Offenders are often encouraged to plea-bargain in order to avoid the harsh sentences of imprisonment mandated in the more serious felonies. Id. Then, if the woman commits a second drug offense (having received no drug treatment in the interim), she is sentenced as a repeat felony offender, and receives a higher sentence, due to her first guilty plea to a low-level felony. Id.
62. Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 3. The high increase in the rate of women sentenced to prison is a consequence of both an increase in the number of arrests and an increase in the likelihood of being sentenced to prison once arrested for a drug offense. See id. at 8. Although there are more men in prison than women, women in prison are more likely than the men to be there because of a drug offense. Id. at 11. Overall, approximately thirty-three percent (over 22,000) of prisoners in New York are drug offenders. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Mandatory Sentencing Laws and Drug Offenders in New York State 1 (Mar. 1999) (on file with the New York University Law Review); Human Rights Watch, supra note 29. In 1997, thirty-two percent of male prisoners in New York state prisons were incarcerated for drug offenses. Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 10. This figure was over sixty percent for women. Id.; Johnson, supra note 16, at 44 & n.273 (citing data from New York State Department of Correctional Services).
63. Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 9.
64. Cf. id. (stating that "[w]hile one would expect the number of women's drug convictions to have risen along with the increase in arrests over this ten-year period, in fact women's drug convictions rose at a substantially faster rate"); see also supra note 3 (discussing general opposition to Laws). The increase in the number of women in prison for drug offenses makes startlingly clear the disproportionate number of low-income women of color who are sentenced for drug crimes in New York. In 2000, 91% of women in New York prisons for a drug offense were women of color; 55% were African American and 36% were Latina. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 5. White, non-Latina women comprised only approximately 9% of female drug offenders, compared to 17% of the general female prison population. Id. This significant increase in the percentage of African American women in prison in New York is echoed nationwide: "Between 1986 and 1991, the number of African American women in [all] state prisons for drug offenses increased by 828%." Keith Watters, Law Without Justice, Nat'l B. Ass'n Mag., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 1, 1. The majority of women in prison can be classified as "low income." In New York prisons, 92% of women report incomes under $10,000 prior to incarceration. Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at ii.
65. A concern for women's imprisonment in particular is not mutually exclusive of the general concern for whether imprisonment is an appropriate punishment for certain drug crimes that both male and female offenders commit (e.g., minor possession crimes).
66. Cf. Coombs, supra note 19, at 1689 (agreeing with Kathleen Daly's argument that sometimes alleged gender-based "disparities" in sentencing reflect actual differences in crimes committed); Kathleen Daly, Gender and Sentencing: What We Know and Don't Know From Empirical Research, 8 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 163, 165 (1995) [hereinafter Daly, Sentencing] (stating that difference in sentences for men and women can be explained in part by assumption that "some features of men's and women's crimes and circumstances may differ, which could be acknowledged in sentencing").
67. Certain characteristics of the offender, such as race and class, should never be considered when assessing blameworthiness. See Tonry, supra note 18, at 54 ("Every sentencing commission has included reduction or elimination of racial and gender discrimination in sentencing among its goals . . . ."); Alexander, supra note 15, at 200 (stating that sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, and repeat felon laws were enacted to provide harsh, uniform, and fair punishment regardless of race or class). To the extent that such biases are at work in the criminal justice system, these same factors influence the rates of men's imprisonment as well as women's. Men of color, like women of color, are disproportionately represented in New York prisons. Approximately ninety-four percent of the drug offenders in New York state prisons are African American or Latino. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Drop the Rock: Repeal the Rockefeller Drug Laws (Feb. 2001) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
68. In New York, an African American male between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine is twenty-three times more likely to be in prison than a white male of the same age. Leven, supra note 4, at 645. Thirty-three percent of jail inmates in 1991 did not have jobs before entering jail and thirty-two percent of those who did work had annual incomes of less than $5000. The Sentencing Project, Facts About Prisons and Prisoners, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/brief.htm (Mar. 1999).
69. Additionally, male offenders may share with women offenders a history of victimization. Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime and Punishment 83-86 (1994) [hereinafter Daly, Gender]. While it seems as if more women than men have a history of extreme victimization, this may be due in part to the reliance on self-reporting of victimization. Id. Men, due to the ideals of "masculinity," may be less likely to admit to previous victimization. Id. at 85. Additionally, common sites of male victimization, such as school and juvenile hall, may not be incorporated into studies that focus on victimization solely in the home. Id.
70. This Note borrows the definition of "blameworthiness" from Kathleen Daly. "Blameworthiness" refers to linking the offender's personal characteristics and history to the offense. Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 168 n.18. This definition recognizes "how a defendant's social history imposes meaning on a crime." Id. Thus, if the context of the crime affects our notion of an offender's blameworthiness, then this context should be taken into account in determining an appropriate sentence.
71. Blameworthiness, along with the harm and consequences of the crime, is a traditional criterion that judges evaluate in determining an appropriate sentence. Daly, Gender, supra note 42, at 37 (discussing views on blameworthiness and how judges assess it); see also Coombs, supra note 19, at 1698 (agreeing that judges apply, or say that they apply, notions of harm, blameworthiness, and consequences).
72. See Kathleen Daly, Women's Pathways to Felony Court: Feminist Theories of Lawbreaking and Problems of Representation, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 11, 14 (1992) ("A woman may continue lawbreaking as a result of relationships with men who may also be involved in crime.");
73. Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 181, 214 (1994) (stating that many female drug offenders are involved in drug conspiracies due to their relationships with male codefendants);
74. Raeder, supra note 31, at 21 ("A number of sentenced women, particularly in drug conspiracy cases, are the wives or girlfriends of male defendants who are the fathers of their children."). This Note makes no claims regarding the actual numbers of women who become involved in drug activities because of an intimate relationship. However, regardless of whether this is the "main" reason that underlies women's drug crimes, it is a significant enough aspect to warrant analysis. The factor arises frequently in studies of drug crimes. See, e.g., Daly, Gender, supra note 42, at 48 (studying felony women offenders in New Haven, Connecticut, and identifying category of "[d]rug-connected" women as women who "used or sold drugs in their relationships with boyfriends or family members"); Human Rights Watch, Official Data Reveal Most New York Drug Offenders are Nonviolent, at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/jan/ny-drug0107.htm (Jan. 7, 1999) (reporting that their research suggests that people incarcerated for drug offenses in New York include "drug dealers' girlfriends and wives").
75. This is not to say that intimate relationships are the only reason why women become involved in drug crime. Another reason is financial crisis and the need for fast money. See Huling, supra note 10, at 59 (citing research in Great Britain demonstrating that most drug couriers, many of whom are female, tend to be drawn into job due to one-time opportunity to relieve economic pressures); see also Lisa Maher, Reconstructing the Female Criminal: Women and Crack Cocaine, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 131, 151 (1992) (highlighting economics and gender as central influences in lives of women who are street-level crack smokers).
76. For a general overview of women in prison and attempts to understand why women commit crimes, see generally Clarice Feinman, Women in the Criminal Justice System 19-87 (3d ed. 1994);
77. Daly, Gender, supra note 42; Tracy Thornburg & Diane Trunk, A Collage of Voices: A Dialogue With Women in Prison, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 155 (1992).
78. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 45, at 29 (presenting ex-offender's viewpoint that many women become involved in criminal activities because of their relationships with men); Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35 (presenting stories of several women drug offenders who were connected to male drug offenders); see also supra text accompanying note 45. The media empathetically has publicized this aspect of several women drug offenders' stories. The story of Kemba Smith, a woman who became involved with drugs through her boyfriend, was well publicized in general and black-focused media. See infra note 85 (detailing Kemba Smith's case). Nicole Richardson's case is similar and also has received a great deal of media attention. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (detailing Nicole Richardson's case). Some judges in drug cases have argued for leniency based on the fact that the female defendant is involved with a boyfriend who is engaged in drug activities. See, e.g., People v. Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d 108, 114 (App. Div. 1997) (Ellerin, J., dissenting) (stating that "the evidence supported no inference other than that, rather than being a drug dealer herself, defendant was dating a drug dealer"); People v. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (App. Div. 1982) (Mollen, J., dissenting) (stating that defendant was dating Mr. Kjellgren, person who originally was being investigated for drug activity and who served as primary witness against defendant at trial).
79. For examples of such cases, see infra text accompanying notes 73-80, 86-92, 99-107.
80. This Note uses the phrase "women in relationship" to signify women who are in intimate relationships with men involved in drug activity. Thus, although not stated explicitly in each instance, this phrase includes a woman who is married to, has a child with, lives with, or simply dates a man involved in drug activity. While this Note focuses on heterosexual relationships due to the similar focus of the available research, the context of a relationship in a drug crime should be considered in same-sex relationships as well.
81. Cf. Robin West, Caring For Justice 5 (1997) (contrasting notion of self from postmodern legal theory with notion of selfhood that "asserts either the moral importance of the self's connections with others, or the seriousness of the harms those connections sometimes occasion").
82. This viewpoint is rooted in what is often termed "an ethic of care." An ethic of care is a vision of morality in which "moral judgment is oriented toward issues of responsibility and care" rather than a morality that emphasizes justice through individual rights. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 98-99 (1982). Who demonstrates an ethic of care versus an ethic of justice is not exclusively mapped onto gender lines. However, research suggests that women's judgments are often linked with issues of care and maintaining relationships. Id. at 69.
83. For example, if judges recognized, and valued, a woman's decision to maintain a relationship (with a boyfriend who is a drug dealer), a woman's presence in her boyfriend's home would not be viewed as a crime (as it is now due to the theory of constructive possession, see infra Part II.B.1) and instead would be viewed as a positive act to maintain a relationship important to the woman. Mary Coombs argues that some women defendants are disadvantaged by judicial assumptions that men are negative forces in women's lives. For some women, connections to a husband, boyfriend, or other men provide a positive force in the woman's life and may support her ability to be law abiding. Coombs, supra note 19, at 1709.
84. Stephen Schulhofer critiques an "ethic of care" approach in part because in certain contexts it can be dangerous to women to put emphasis on the continuity of relationships. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151, 2160 (1995). However, Robin West argues that adopting an "ethic of care" into our legal system does not mean that the dangers to women in some relationships will be ignored. Indeed, she suggests the opposite. West argues that the exclusion of women's voices from legal and political history has resulted in the failure to recognize "either the moral centrality or the potential for harm that are inherent in our connected, relational lives." West, supra note 49, at 7, 10 (arguing for legal and political theory to recognize both that "our connections to others are . . . central to our moral sense and potentially harmful in ways illheeded by the modern state"). Thus, to emphasize relations and connections to others does not ignore the possible dangers; rather, it brings the potential benefits and harms to the forefront of political and legal theory discussion.
85. West, supra note 49, at 7.
86. See Raeder, supra note 19, at 912, 977-78 (stating that fact that women offenders often get into criminal trouble due to their associations with men should be more thoroughly examined and noting that many drug cases identify women by their relationships with men). Although beyond the scope of this Note, it is also important to question the structure of the drug economy and the effect it has on the role of women in drug crime. Lisa Maher suggests that the construction of work in the street-level drug economy is highly "raced" and "gendered," thus keeping women in subordinated roles. Lisa Maher, Sexed Work: Gender, Race, and Resistance in a Brooklyn Drug Market 107 (1997). According to Maher, it would be a mistake to conclude that a woman forms or maintains a relationship with a man involved in drug activities in order to gain the benefits of security or access into a "higher," and perhaps more stable, echelon of the street drug economy. Id. at 104-07, 127-29.
87. Over seventy percent of women in New York state prisons report having had a substance abuse problem prior to entering prison. Women in Prison Project, Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Women Prisoners and Substance Abuse (Mar. 2000) (on file with the New York University Law Review). In addition, eighty-five percent of women in New York state prisons report that they have been physically abused at some point in their lives. Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at ii; see also Daly, supra note 45, at 48 (finding in her study that incarcerated women are often victimized as adults by violent men); Thornburg & Trunk, supra note 45, at 163-64 (stating that most women prisoners in their study had been abused by husbands, fathers, and other family members).
88. While male drug offenders may also have problems with substance abuse, given the gendered structure of the drug economy, men are rarely dependent on women for their drug supply. See Maher, supra note 54, at 107 (stating that high-level positions in drug economy and those that generate income are male-dominated). Therefore, men are rarely dependent on the relationship to continue the drug habit.
89. See infra Part II.B for examples of the types of drug crimes that women in relationship commit.
90. See Raeder, supra note 31, at 21 (arguing that many women "cannot remain crime free unless they are willing to break up their families"). Seventy-five percent of women in prison in New York are mothers. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 5.
91. Raeder, supra note 31, at 60 (stating that dependent nature of women's relationships with men involved in drug activities includes limited economic and family alternatives, thus rendering it difficult for women to remove themselves from criminal activity).
92. Daly, supra note 45, at 47-48; see also Thornburg & Trunk, supra note 45, at 164 (stating their findings that women offenders are better characterized as victims themselves).
93. See Coombs, supra note 19, at 1706 n.73 (citing studies that made connection between abuse and women's crime).
94. For example, domestic violence or physical abuse. See supra note 55 (presenting statistics on rates of previous abuse of women offenders).
95. To recognize the constraints on women's will is to "contextualize their agency within the terms of the . . . structures of patriarchy, racism and capitalism." Lisa Maher & Richard Curtis, Women on the Edge of Crime, in Criminology at the Crossroads 110, 129 (Kathleen Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998).
96. As Lisa Maher states, "[d]efining social problems exclusively in terms of women's individual choices allows scant acknowledgment of the differential social, economic, cultural, and political realities that structure, and at times force, women's choices." Lisa Maher, Criminalizing Pregnancy - The Downside of a Kinder, Gentler Nation?, Soc. Just., Fall 1990, at 111, 121.
97. But cf. Leah Guggenheimer, Book Note, 17 Harv. Women's L.J. 237, 241 (1994)
98. (reviewing Women Prisoners: A Forgotten Population (Beverly R. Fletcher et al. eds., 1993)) (stating that authors of book harm women by suggesting that women are dominated by men rather than being independent persons who make their own decisions). This argument regarding the limits of women drug offenders' free will can be extended to include most offenders, as most have had some restrictions on their choices earlier in life (e.g., poverty, child abuse, racial discrimination). The argument relating to women offenders is a subset of the broader argument and is used to evaluate the blameworthiness of drug offenders who are women in relationship by highlighting their unique characteristics as well as their shared characteristics with other offenders.
99. Daly, Gender, supra note 42, at 78. Daly finds in her study of felony offenders in New Haven, Connecticut that male drug offenders are less likely to work in concert with others, whereas female drug offenders work more often with a spouse or intimate partner. Id. at 154; see also Maher, supra note 54, at 106-07 (discussing gendered nature of drug economy and men's monopolization of income-generating positions). But cf. Maher, supra note 54, at 35 (discussing study in Brooklyn, New York, of female street drug users which found that women street drug users had personal support networks which were women-centered).
100. There may be other features of the context of men's and women's crimes that differ. A study conducted by Kathleen Daly suggests that women offenders report higher rates of abuse, less extensive criminal histories, and more child-care responsibilities. Daly, Gender, supra note 42, at 84-85. However, questions to male offenders on these subjects may be asked less often and men may be less willing to share such information. Id. at 85.
101. See Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 165 (arguing that some differences in men's and women's crimes should be acknowledged in sentencing); supra text accompanying note 42.
102. This is a general problem that, in practice, hurts many offenders and not just women in relationship. See infra Part III.A. However, it is still important to examine how women in relationship are particularly disadvantaged when the context of their crime is ignored in determining their crime and sentence. Under the Laws, there is one opportunity for judges to take the context of the woman's crime into consideration. Depending on the mitigating aspects of the crime, women in relationship, along with all offenders, may be eligible for the "rare case exception." This exception is a limited opportunity for judges not to apply the mandatory sentence and to exercise their judicial discretion in prescribing a reduced sentence. In People v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1975), the New York Court of Appeals held that the laws surrounding the imposition of the A-1 drug felony sentence were not unconstitutional on their face. Id. at 341. The court, however, ended its opinion by stating that "[t]his is not to say that in some rare case on its particular facts it may not be found that the statutes have been unconstitutionally applied." Id. at 347. Scholars critique the exception as "meaningless" since it is rarely used by courts. Johnson, supra note 16, at 68. For a more detailed critique of the "rare case exception" and a discussion of both successful and unsuccessful uses of the exception, see id. at 68-71. See generally Kennard R. Strutin, Mandatory Minimums, Life Sentences and the Eighth Amendment, 66 N.Y. St. B.J., Nov. 1994, at 6.
103. See infra note 71.
104. These categories are ordered according to the level of criminal action required by the offender for conviction. The first category requires no action on the part of the offender; action is attributed to the offender through a legal doctrine and the physical circumstances of the offense. The last category requires a criminal act conducted by the offender herself. These categories are not based on what level of drug crime the woman is charged with under the Laws (e.g., A-1 felony, B, or C). Because the Laws base the level of crime on the amount of drugs involved, see infra note 97, a crime which is in the first category may be charged as a more "serious" crime and, as a result, have a longer prison sentence than a crime in the third category. See infra note 95 (detailing percentage of women sentenced for more serious drug offenses).
105. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.25(2) (McKinney 2000) (detailing statutory presumption of constructive possession).
106. See infra note 97.
107. See People v. Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 686 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y. 1997); Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at 7 (recounting story of Leah Bundy).
108. Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at 7.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
112. Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
113. Id. at 111.
114. Id. at 109. Christopher Clemente, the brother of Ms. Bundy's boyfriend, was sentenced to fifteen years to life for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree along with a consecutive term of one to three years for weapon possession. People v. Clemente, 609 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App. Div. 1994). It appears from the court's opinion that Mr. Clemente may have had previous involvement in drug activities. See id. at 8 (permitting prosecutor to impeach character witnesses by asking whether they heard about defendant's prior acts of drug possession). Mr. Clemente was offered a plea bargain of a one- to three-year sentence, but he refused. Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at 7. Because of his refusal, Ms. Bundy was not offered the same plea bargain. Id. Ms. Bundy was granted clemency in December 2000 by Governor Pataki. She had been in prison since 1991. John Caher, Clemency Granted to Rockefeller Drug Inmates, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 2000, at 1.
115. Several other cases illustrate the use of the constructive possession theory. In People v. Ortiz, 564 N.Y.S.2d 427 (App. Div. 1991), Sol Ortiz was convicted of several drug felonies and misdemeanors and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of seven to fourteen years. Id. at 428. Although Ms. Ortiz's boyfriend claimed that all the drugs and paraphernalia belonged to him, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to infer Ms. Ortiz's knowledge and control of the drugs. Id. In People v. Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 1998), the court found the evidence sufficient to establish defendant Brenda Prather's constructive possession of cocaine. Id. at 564. The cocaine was in a safe in her and her husband's home. Id. At trial, the prosecution impeached the defendant's husband when he testified that Ms. Prather was unaware of his drug-related activities. Id. Ms. Prather was found guilty of criminal possession and of aiding and abetting her husband's drug sales. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.2 (outlining facts relating to aiding her husband's drug sales). The appellate court held that her consecutive sentences resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years to life were "unduly harsh and severe" and mandated that her sentences run concurrently instead. Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 564. In People v. Gardner, 559 N.Y.S.2d 63 (App. Div. 1990), Sandra Gardner was arrested while with her boyfriend in another person's apartment. Id. at 64. Ms. Gardner and her boyfriend were allegedly at the apartment to deal drugs. Id. Ms. Gardner was arrested after the police, though finding nothing on her person, found drugs in a duffel bag and a shaving kit close to where she was sitting. Id. The court remanded her case for a new trial because the trial court failed to convey to the jury that the constructive possession presumption was a permissible presumption, but not one that the jury was required to apply. Id.
116. The evidence that supported the government's case in Bundy also can be explained as evidence of the existence of an intimate relationship. Evidence upon which the Court of Appeals affirmed Ms. Bundy's conviction included her photograph in the apartment, which "suggested a connection to this obvious drug factory," and the fact that she was allowed in the apartment, because "a reasonable jury could conclude that only trusted members of the operation would be permitted to enter." Bundy, 686 N.E.2d at 496. These two pieces of evidence easily are viewed as evidence of being the girlfriend of the apartment's occupant rather than being a member of the drug conspiracy.
117. See Raeder, supra note 31, at 60 (arguing that "[b]ecause of the ways in which women have been socialized to further their relationships with men, a woman's mere presence in the home is easily seen as tantamount to membership in a conspiracy"); see also Maher, supra note 45, at 150-51 (stating that labeling low-level crimes women commit as "volitional lawbreaking" criminalizes what, in reality, are these women's survival strategies).
118. Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
119. For example, in People v. Vanderpool, 629 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. Div. 1995), Teresa Vanderpool appealed her conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Id. at 308. Ms. Vanderpool was arrested when the police searched the car she was driving, a car owned by her boyfriend and codefendant, Ronald Vincent. Id. The search warrant for the car was based on a tip that stated that Mr. Vincent was a drug dealer and Ms. Vanderpool was actively involved in the operation. Id. The arrest occurred when Mr. Vincent was allegedly making a trip to purchase drugs and Ms. Vanderpool was accompanying him. Id. at 308-09. Ms. Vanderpool appealed on the legality of the search warrant but her sentence was affirmed by the court. Id. at 309-10. Debbie Davis was arrested and convicted of criminal possession following a search of her apartment that she shared with her boyfriend, Thomas Ruffo. People v. Davis, 537 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (App. Div. 1989). Ms. Davis was convicted upon a plea of guilty and appealed the legality of the search warrant. Id. The search warrant was obtained on the basis of a tip which stated that Mr. Ruffo was a supplier of drugs and likely had drugs at the apartment where he lived. Id. at 94. The tip did not mention that Ms. Davis was involved in the sale of drugs. Id. When Mr. Ruffo was arrested on drug charges, he told the police his address where he lived with his girlfriend, Ms. Davis. Id. This statement then led to her arrest. Id. Cynthia Vitanza and her husband were indicted for the criminal sale of a controlled substance. People v. Vitanza, 563 N.Y.S.2d 558 (App. Div. 1990). Ms. Vitanza alleged she was innocently at their home, the scene of the sale, and that she lacked intent for the completion of the sale. Id. at 560. The court, however, found her actions of handing the buyer a plastic bag to hold the cocaine as evidence that she provided "the medium for packaging it." Id. Thus, in the court's view, she aided and abetted the criminal sale. Id. Kemba Smith, sentenced under the Federal Guidelines, is another well-publicized example of how an intimate relationship provides a greater understanding regarding a woman's commission of low-level support acts. While a college student, Ms. Smith became the girlfriend of a high-level drug dealer who proceeded to physically and emotionally abuse her. Reginald Stuart, Justice Denied: Kemba's Nightmare Continues as Movement to Reverse Mandatory Minimums Grows, Emerge, May 31, 1998, at 41, 41. Ms. Smith's charges focused on her helping her boyfriend run a drug ring. Id. At the age of twenty-six, she was convicted as part of a drug conspiracy, receiving a sentence of twenty-four-and-a-half years in prison with no parole. Id. Ms. Smith received such a sentence despite prosecutors' statements that she did not use or sell drugs or benefit from her boyfriend's drug operation. Id. Ms. Smith was pardoned by President Clinton in December 2000. Deb Riechmann, Clinton Grants Pardons to 59 People, Associated Press, Dec. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 30836209.
120. People v. Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d 562, 564 (App. Div. 1998); see also supra note 81 for facts related to the possession charge.
121. See Alan Feuer, Proposal to Ease Drug Laws Means Hope to Some in Jail, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2001, at B3 (reporting Ms. Prather's statements that she was barbecuing when her husband requested foil, and that he also cooked often).
122. See id. (reporting Ms. Prather's statement that she knew her husband was dealing drugs but that she was not involved and did not approve).
123. Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
124. Feuer, supra note 87, at B3.
125. David Dolinko, Ethical Problems of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Tikkun, Mar.-Apr., 1998, at 27, 30;
126. Gregg Easterbrook, Run-on Sentencing, New Republic, Apr. 26, 1999, at 57, 57. While Nicole Richardson was sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Guidelines are very similar to the Rockefeller Drug Laws in their treatment of the charged criminal acts of women in relationship.
127. Dolinko, supra note 91, at 30. One article summed up her case by noting that "[a] foolish 18-year-old named Nicole Richardson, whose boyfriend had been dealing drugs, gets ten years for a telephone conversation in which she told a buyer where to find him." Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 57.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 54-61.
129. See supra text accompanying note 70 and infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text for discussion of how low-level acts are punished harshly under the Laws.
130. Research suggests that women, in general, play "peripheral roles in male-dominated drug selling networks." Maher, supra note 54, at 87, 106-07 (additionally noting that hierarchy of labor within street drug market is based largely on gender). Seventy percent of women prisoners in New York were convicted of nonviolent crimes. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 5. Under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, in 1997, women constituted only 8.3% of those convicted of the most serious (class A-1) drug felonies. N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., New York State Felony Drug Convictions by Category and Class (Sept. 1998) (on file with the New York University Law Review). Sixty percent of drug offenders in prison in 1998 were convicted of the three lowest-level drug felonies (Class C, D, or E). Human Rights Watch, supra note 45 (based on data from New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services). Ninety-five percent of women charged as drug couriers in New York had no previous criminal involvement. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 2, at 2.
131. See supra note 95.
132. A review of the various drug offenses in New York's penal law shows the absence of provisions for considering state of mind or role in the offense. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 (McKinney 2000) (defining criminal possession of controlled substance in fifth degree). The level of drug offense is determined solely by the weight of the drugs involved in the offense. See New York Sentence Charts, Chart VII: Controlled Substances and Marijuana Offenses (McKinney 2001) (listing drugs and amounts needed to constitute different offenses). While each offense requires "knowing" the amount of drugs in one's possession, in 1995, the Legislature made knowledge of the quantity a strict liability element. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 626; see also supra note 29.
133. Unlike under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, there is no adjustment under the Laws for a minor role in the drug offense. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (West 1999) (describing minor role adjustment).
134. See People v. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd, 451 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1983).
135. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
136. Id. at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 119 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 122 (Mollen, J., dissenting). The only evidence that Ms. Donovan had experience in drug activities was uncorroborated and unsworn statements by her boyfriend, Mr. Kjellgren. Id.
139. People v. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1994) (discussing People v. Donovan as presented in Justice Mollen's dissent).
140. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 121-22 (Mollen, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the cooperation aspects of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
142. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
143. Other cases that exemplify this category include People v. Tovar, 685 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1999), People v. Migliore, 540 N.Y.S.2d 442 (App. Div. 1989), and People v. Robinson, 417 N.Y.S.2d 88 (App. Div. 1979). Tina Tovar had been found guilty of two counts of the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Tovar, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 528. She received an aggregate sentence of four to twelve years. Id. Ms. Tovar appealed her sentence as unduly harsh due to her lack of criminal history, the small scale of the offense, and her remorse for the offense, which "stemmed from her involvement with a drug-dealing boyfriend." Id. In Migliore, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's discretionary sentencing of Eucharista Migliore to four years to life and resentenced her to the mandatory fifteen years to life. Migliore, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 443. Ms. Migliore was found guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. Id. at 442. The court disagreed with the sentencing court's finding that the "defendant played merely a passive role as a courier for her husband." Id. at 443. The appellate court found the record to show that she was an active participant in the drug sale, that she had committed perjury on the stand, and that she had committed other crimes in the past. Id. Mary Lee Robinson was convicted of the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. Robinson, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 88. Ms. Robinson was tried jointly with her husband, who was convicted of the same offense. Id. at 89. The husband's counsel reported that his client, Mr. Simmons, was threatened that if he did not cooperate, his wife would also be indicted. The husband did not cooperate. His wife, Ms. Robinson, was arrested approximately one month after her husband's arrest for the same incident. Id. The trial court judge said with respect to Ms. Robinson, "I feel she became involved in this case because of her husband, Mr. Simmons." Id. While her involvement in the sale was unclear, it appears from the record that she transferred the package containing drugs from her and her husband's home to the location of the eventual sale. Id. The trial court sentenced her to six years to life. Id. at 90. However, the appellate court decided that this was a "rare case" exception as described in Broadie and reduced the sentence to one year to life. Id.; see also supra note 68 (discussing rare case exception).
144. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (Mollen, J., dissenting) (arguing that defendant's sentence violated Eighth Amendment); cf. Carmona v. Ward, 439 U.S. 1091, 1102 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("However serious its narcotics problem, New York cannot constitutionally treat those with peripheral involvement in drug trafficking as if they were responsible for the problem in its entirety.").
145. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 54-61. The probation report in Dolores
147. N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) (McKinney 1998) (defining material assistance). Research on the application of the material assistance provision of the Rockefeller Drug Laws is scarce. Some researchers, most notably Myrna Raeder, have questioned and critiqued the parallel provision in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Raeder, supra note 19, at 980-84. For an excellent documentary on some of the results of reliance on assistance to the government, see generally Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Snitch], transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ snitch/etc/script.html. Since there is little research on the New York provision, this Note will discuss it using studies of the federal provision. Despite some differences in application (e.g., different judges and prosecutors), the provisions are almost identical in text and structure. Compare Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98, § 5K1.1, with N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) (McKinney 1998).
148. In the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this aid is labeled "substantial assistance." Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98, § 5K1.1. The terms are interchangeable for the purposes of this discussion.
149. People v. Lofton, 366 N.Y.S.2d 769, 774 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975) (discussing objective of New York Legislature in enacting material assistance statute).
150. Id. ("'Material' is defined as being of real importance or great significance and 'assistance' is defined as help supplied or given."). The decision of whether the information offered is sufficiently helpful lies in the hands of the prosecutor rather than the judge. Id. at 776.
151. The relevant part of New York Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) reads: The court . . . may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction of a class A-II felony or a class B felony defined in article two hundred twenty if the prosecutor either orally on the record or in a writing filed with the indictment recommends that the court sentence such person to a period of probation upon the ground that such person has or is providing material assistance in the investigation, apprehension or prosecution of any person for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or the attempt or the conspiracy to commit any such felony . . . . N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) (McKinney 1998).
152. Ruling, supra note 10, at 19.
153. In researching this Note, no studies or documentation were found on the application of the material assistance provision of the New York law.
154. For example, Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson report that the data of the U.S. Sentencing Commission indicates that female drug offenders are considerably more likely than male drug offenders to receive substantial assistance departures. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 45, at 217 (analyzing data from fiscal years 1991 and 1992). In contrast, Myrna Raeder, looking at the same data, concludes that substantial assistance accounts for a larger percentage of all departures given to men than given to women. Raeder, supra note 19, at 980 (analyzing data from fiscal years 1991 and 1992). As Raeder notes, the difficulty in analyzing this data is the lack of information on the individual circumstances in each case and how the treatment of women and men who attempt to offer assistance may differ. Id. at 981.
155. While Nagel and Johnson state that female drug offenders are more likely than males to receive a departure due to substantial assistance, they still give credence to Raeder's contention that women offenders often lack sufficient information to provide legally sufficient assistance. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 45, at 218 & n.175 (stating this proposition and citing to Raeder in corresponding footnote).
156. Id. at 218 (citing research of Nagel and Professor Stephen Schulhofer). Factors such as sympathy toward a woman offender or the belief that the mandatory sentence is too harsh may influence the prosecutor's decision to make a motion and the judge's decision of how great a reduction in sentence to grant. Id.; see also Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 501, 531 (1992) (suggesting that under Federal Guidelines, substantial assistance departures may be awarded to sympathetic defendants rather than defendants who provided substantial help to prosecutors).
157. While these discretionary factors apply to both male and female offenders, in practice they disproportionately may benefit women offenders. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 45, at 218 (stating that disproportionate share of substantial assistance departures given to women defendants may reflect judges' and prosecutors' greater sympathy for female offenders). Nagel and Johnson argue that their finding that women receive more substantial departures than men is evidence of continuing special treatment for women, but Kathleen Daly argues that such disparity can be seen as judges addressing, and attempting to remedy, the fact that the guidelines have "not been fashioned with women or variations in their lawbreaking in mind." Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166. There are other considerations that apply to both male and female offenders that might cause prosecutors to ask for a substantial assistance departure. E.g., Roberto Suro, More Informers Buy a Break on U.S. Sentence Guidelines, Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1997, at A1 (stating that whether defendant gets deduction may depend on how defendant performs as government witness at trial).
158. Raeder describes the current use of the substantial assistance departure by stating "the fortuity of the departure is evident." Raeder, supra note 19, at 983. Raeder goes on to say, "[w]e will never know whether the wife was really granted the departure as a way of ensuring the husband's participation . . ., whether she had enough information to justify a departure, or whether she simply appeared deserving enough to warrant a sentence below the mandatory minimum." Id. Discretion also removes any checks on prosecutors' decisions whether or not to award material assistance. See People v. Garcia, 558 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) "in no way commits the prosecution to taking any action to facilitate or otherwise accept defendant's offer of assistance"); see also Stuart, supra note 85, at 42 (discussing case of Kemba Smith and claim by her lawyers from NAACP Legal Defense Fund that government reneged on promise to make substantial assistance motion in federal court). Although the sympathy of prosecutors and judges and their feelings about mandatory sentencing laws may lead to a more appropriate sentence for a particular woman offender, reliance on such feelings is not an appropriate policy solution. Mechanisms in the actual sentencing process should be created for the fair and appropriate sentencing of offenders statewide, rather than forcing offenders (those who happened to know sufficient information to be considered for an assistance motion in the first place) to rely on the possibility of sympathy. For a policy proposal regarding the material assistance provision, see infra Part III.B.1. Additionally, the fact that prosecutors or judges may grant an "unearned" material assistance motion because of their belief that the sentence would otherwise be too harsh speaks for the need to evaluate and reform both the material assistance provision in particular and drug penalties in general. See Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166 (arguing that gender disparity in sentence deductions is due to legal officials redressing an unjust, male-normed sentencing scheme and suggesting more general reform based on viewing women as sentencing subjects).
159. Many of the reasons why a woman may not be able to offer legally sufficient material assistance, such as threat of physical harm and lack of sufficient knowledge, also may apply to male defendants. See, e.g., People v. Eason, 353 N.E.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that despite fact that defendant told prosecutor all he knew about local drug crime, prosecutor is not required to deem that sufficient material assistance); Juan Gonzalez, A Loving Dad Dies in Prison, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 14, 1999, at 12 (reporting that offender Jose Garcia did not take offer to provide substantial assistance to government as gang leaders threatened to hurt his family if he testified against them). This Note does not argue that these reasons are exclusive to female offenders. Rather, it highlights that these reasons why offenders cannot offer sufficient material assistance are often present in the context of women's drug crimes.
160. See supra note 95 (discussing women's low-level support role in drug crimes); see also infra note 127 (examining women's common role as low-level offenders as related to providing assistance).
161. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 2, at 2 (stating that "[l]ess culpable persons generally do not possess information that would be useful to prosecutors"). But cf. Linda D. Maxfield & John H. Kramer, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Substantial Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Practice 12, at http:// www.ussc.gov/pdf/5kreport.pdf (Jan. 1998) (stating that study results demonstrate that defendants' positions in drug conspiracies do not correlate with likelihood of getting substantial assistance motion).
162. See supra notes 54, 56, 95 (discussing women's general roles in drug activities).
163. Ruling, supra note 10, at 19 (noting opinion of drug enforcement agents and prosecutors that women rarely can offer valuable assistance due to marginal roles); Raeder, supra note 31, at 61 (stating that women's peripheral roles in drug activities place them "at a disadvantage" in obtaining assistance departure because they often have little to offer government); Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 169, 174 (1996) (stating that women's minor roles in drug trade, dominance of men, and fear for their children make it unlikely that women will receive assistance reduction).
164. See, e.g., infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (presenting story of Dolores Donovan); see also supra note 127 (discussing disadvantage of women generally in obtaining assistance motions).
165. In mainstream culture, offering assistance to prosecutors often has negative connotations. Most commonly referred to in prison culture as "snitching," providing material assistance is also referred to in the mass media as when someone "turn[s] in a few friends," helps "rat out" others, or, in the case of a large-scale drug dealer who comes forward, a "kingfish who turned state's evidence." Jakes & Caher, supra note 3, at A1.
166. See supra text accompanying note 55 (listing comfort and companionship as positive reasons for maintaining relationship, and drug addiction and domestic abuse as negative reasons for doing so).
167. Even if the woman is not actually threatened with physical harm by an abusive partner, as a victim of possible emotional and mental abuse, she may not have the courage, self-esteem, or outside support needed to give information about him to the government and survive the possible consequences.
168. Forty-seven percent of the female state prison population have been victims of physical abuse, while thirty-nine percent report being victims of sexual abuse. Many have been victims of both. Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 1; see also supra text accompanying note 55.
169. See, e.g., Tammy Wynette, Stand By Your Man, on Stand By Your Man (Sony/Epic 1968) (imploring listeners to "[s]tand by your man / And tell the world you love him / Keep giving all the love you can / Stand by your man"), available at http://ckcountry.homestead.com/standbyman-ie4.html;
170. see also Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigoration of the Traditional Family, 73 Ind. L.J. 517, 521 (1998) (arguing that women have been "subject to a variety of social norms that emphasize the centrality of marriage to women's happiness and that characterize unmarried women in harsh and stigmatizing terms");
171. Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2502 (1994) (stating that alimony laws are more willing to reward women who have "attached themselves to men in very traditional ways" and are "good wives");
172. cf. Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem," 13 Berkeley Women's L.J. 117, 134 (1998) (arguing that Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 "posits marriage as both a moral and practical solution to poverty").
173. The message that a man is a necessary component of a woman's life and that a woman should do whatever it takes to keep him in her life is omnipresent in mass media. See, e.g., Laura Doyle, The Surrendered Wife 19-20, 23 (2001) (arguing that women should surrender to their husbands for happier marriages);
174. Tamala M. Edwards, I Surrender, Dear, Time, Jan. 22, 2001, at 71 (reporting national popularity of Doyle's The Surrendered Wife and book's presence on national book circuit and Amazon's Top Ten);
175. Suzanne Fields, Editorial, Hillary Clinton's Election A Rebuke to her Smarmy Husband, Grand Rapids Press (Grand Rapids, MI), Nov. 12, 2000, at D3, 2000 WL 29128075 (calling Hillary Clinton "the stand-by-her man candidate");
176. Ruth Mathewson, Star Attraction, Australasian Business Intelligence: The Courier-Mail, June 23, 2000, 2000 WL 23431186 (listing celebrity women, including Hillary Clinton, who stayed with their men despite embarrassing events);
177. Eve, Gotta Man, on Let There Be Eve: Ruff Ryders' First Lady (Interscope Records 1999) (hit hip-hop song in which woman raps: "[c]arry stories that can hurt him, still he only trustin' me / Secrets never leave my mouth, even if they torture me / Always taught to hold the ground, that's why I'll always be his queen"), available at http:// www.eve-empire.com/03.html; French Kiss (20th Century Fox 1995) (film in which heroine falls in love with criminal and forgives him for all his crimes).
178. Dolinko, supra note 91, at 30 (quoting federal appellate judge Frank Easterbrook's mention of possibility of inverted sentencing). There are some troubling results of the use of the assistance provision, in addition to inverted sentencing, which are beyond the scope of this Note. Attention has been brought to a growing underground business of selling useful information to criminal defendants. A criminal defendant can purchase information from outside informers and then use that information to attempt to get a reduction in sentence for substantial assistance. Suro, supra note 121, at A1 (describing booming business of trading information).
179. Stephanie Fleischer Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of Women Offenders, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 26 (1995) (stating that first-time offenders can receive longer sentences than "career criminals" as only these high-level drug traffickers can offer sufficient assistance).
180. See supra text accompanying note 114.
181. The case of Nicole Richardson illustrates this problem. See supra notes 91-92. Ms. Richardson and her boyfriend were convicted of conspiracy to distribute drugs. Dolinko, supra note 91, at 30. Her boyfriend received a sentence of five years as he was able to provide substantial assistance to the government. Id. Ms. Richardson, on the other hand, was not able to give enough information and received a sentence of ten years. Id.
182. For example, Dorothy Gaines received a twenty-year sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. She was involved with a man who used and sold drugs. In exchange for a reduced sentence, he implicated her in the crime. Snitch, supra note 112 (discussing story of Dorothy Gaines). Such assistance by men is not helping put more serious drug offenders behind bars; their girlfriends are rarely high-level drug offenders. Rather, the men are simply helping to secure another conviction and their own reduced sentence. See supra notes 95, 127; see also infra Part III.B.1 for proposal against "snitching down."
183. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
184. People v. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (App. Div. 1982) (Mollen, J., dissenting) (noting that defendant stated she was unable to provide more cooperation as she had no further knowledge about drug dealing).
185. Id. at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting). Mr. Kjellgren was originally facing a fifteen-year minimum sentence. Id. at 121-22 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
187. See supra text accompanying note 97.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98; cf. Raeder, supra note 19, at 990 (stating that mandatory sentences and prosecutors' power to plea-bargain can often disadvantage women because of their minor roles in drug conspiracies).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
190. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing problems with Governor Pataki's proposal).
191. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (presenting statements supporting reform from various groups).
192. Governor Pataki (Republican) proposed one of the most publicized reform bills, S.B. 5877. Aspects of the bill included appellate review for some drug offenders and the elimination of parole for high-level drug offenders. S.B. 5877, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); John McArdle & Marcia White, Senate Approves Rockefeller Drug Law Reforms, at http:// www.senate.state.ny.us (Aug. 4, 1999) (describing Pataki's bill);
193. see also infra notes 153-57. Chief Judge Judith Kaye also authored a reform proposal that is similar to Governor Pataki's. Her proposal allowed for some appellate review of serious drug felony convictions and diversion of some low-level offenders into treatment. John Caher & Lara Jakes, Reform Plans Push Chief Judge Into Debate, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), May 12, 1999, at A1.
194. Senator John DeFrancisco (Republican) has twice proposed a bill that doubles the amount of drugs required before offenders could be sentenced for the most serious drug felonies. S.B. 585, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 2992, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); Yancey Roy, Drug-Law Reform Gains Steam, Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, N.Y.), May 16, 1999, at 1B.
195. Former Republican State Senator John Dunne's proposal also called for the doubling of the amount of drugs required for each level of drug offense, and allowed for more judicial discretion in sentencing and the deferral of prison time for drug treatment. Roy, supra, at 1B; Gary Spencer, Past Supporters Urge Drug Law Reform, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 1999, at 1. Assemblyman Jeffrion Aubry (Democrat) proposed a bill that called for the repeal of the mandatory sentencing requirements of the Laws and the substitution of policies that allow more judicial discretion in sentencing. A.B. 4117, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); Roy, supra, at 1B.
196. Reform may have a better chance in 2001 than it had in earlier years. Governor Pataki appears to have made reform one of his top priorities. See John Caher, Governor Seeks Reform of Rockefeller Laws, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 4, 2001, at 1 (stating that lawmakers in both parties agree that drug law reform is now top priority).
197. The bill was blocked in the Assembly by Democrat Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver. Lara Jakes, Vote on Drug Law Leads to Criticism, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 5, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Jakes, Vote] (reporting Silver's refusal to allow Assembly vote on Senate bill).
198. Although Democrats in the Assembly stated they were in support of reform of the Laws, it appears that Silver did not want to back any reform package for fear of Democrats appearing "soft on crime" in the November 2000 election. Lara Jakes, Silver Softens Drug Law Stance, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), May 27, 1999, at A1 [hereinafter Jakes, Silver Softens];
199. see also Lara Jakes, Drug Law Debate Blocked, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), May 21, 1999, at A1 (discussing Silver's blocking of reforms).
200. The New York Senate passed the bill, which was sponsored by Republican Senator Dale Volker, on August 4, 1999. McArdle & White, supra note 149. The bill was passed in the Republican-controlled Senate by a vote of 52-4. Jakes, Vote, supra note 151, at A1.
201. In January 2001, Governor Pataki announced new plans to reform the Rockefeller Drug Laws. See Richard Pérez-Peña, Pataki Presents His Plan to Ease State Drug Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2001, at A1. His publicized proposals include reducing the mandatory sentence for A-1 felonies to ten years to life for first-time drug offenders and offering judges some discretion to order treatment for repeat nonviolent drug offenders. See id. While nonviolent drug offenders would receive some benefits under these proposals, any drug offense during which the offender possessed a gun would now be treated as a violent offense. See id. The analysis in this Part focuses on Governor Pataki's reform bill of 1999 as an example of how policy reforms often fail to address the concerns of women in relationship. This same analysis should be done with all future proposals.
202. Governor Pataki's bill will have some benefits for women in relationship. The bill provides for the option of drug treatment for some repeat nonviolent offenders with substance abuse problems. Highlights of Sentencing Reform Act of 1999 [hereinafter Highlights] (on file with the New York University Law Review).
203. Jakes, Silver Softens, supra note 151, at A1. A defendant convicted of the most serious drug felony (Class A-1) can seek a reduction in sentence from a minimum of fifteen years to a minimum of ten years. Highlights, supra note 154; Caher & Jakes, supra note 149, at A1.
204. In 1997, only 8.3% of those convicted of the most serious drug felony (A-1) were women. Moreover, only 2.1 % of women convicted for drug felonies were convicted of A-1 or A-2 felonies. N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., supra note 95.
205. Highlights, supra note 154.
206. Coombs, supra note 19, at 1703-04 (using this phrase to describe her approach as replacement for traditional male-focused and allegedly gender-neutral criminology).
207. Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166.
208. Id. at 167 (arguing for investigation of circumstances of women's lives and crimes and using findings as starting point for discussion of broader questions about appropriateness of men's and women's penalties); see also Coombs, supra note 19, at 1706 (arguing that once certain factors that affect notions of blameworthiness in crime are observed in women offenders, these factors should be taken into account in both women's and men's lives). The proposed policy changes are motivated in part by the need to point out the traditional centrality of the "male" perspective in the formation of policies and the lack of incorporation of the realities of women's lives. However, as part of the awareness of the exclusion of women's experiences from this "male" perspective, it is recognized that men of color and low-income men are also not included in this traditional "male" perspective. Therefore, while this Note focuses on a dialogue about women, this dialogue does not have to exclude the experiences of men. Reforms in this vein "maintain[ ] a focus on women's lives and on redressing harms to women, but . . . do[ ] not ignore those men who have been crippled by patriarchal, class, and race relations." Daly, supra note 20, at 15. Thus, by suggesting policy reforms that focus on the realities of women offenders' lives, these policies also strive to address the similar needs of many marginalized men.
209. Reform proposals emerging from an analysis of women's drug crimes are arguably gender-neutral, as opposed to gender-specific, thus achieving one of the goals of the Laws' original sponsors. Kathleen Daly defines gender-neutral policies as those "that have considered the varied ways in which sex and gender matter in the social organization of crime, in the particular contexts in which crimes emerge, in the seriousness of crime, in the culpability and blameworthiness of offenders, and in the consequences of punishment." Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166. The proposals are not gender-specific because they can be applied to both male and female offenders.
210. The amount (measured by weight) of the drug currently mandates the level of crime committed and the corresponding sentence. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
211. If quantity of drugs were determined to be an important factor in assessing blameworthiness, it would be possible to add consideration of the amount as an aggravating factor to the sentence. This is the approach in California. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.73 (West Supp. 2001) (stating that court should consider quantity of drugs in determining whether to impose aggravated sentence).
212. See supra note 95 (discussing women's low-level roles in drug crimes).
213. This term is used to describe when an offender gives information on a lower-level offender, thus snitching on someone lower on the drug chain.
214. While it is recognized that the government depends on the provision for material assistance to provide needed sources of information, given that many offenders, particularly women in relationship, cannot provide sufficient information, see supra Part II.C, it should not be the sole mechanism for sentence reduction. Other means of reduction, such as the mechanisms suggested in this Part, should also be available.
215. This option is exemplified by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. While this option still does not allow a lot of judicial discretion, it would allow more tailoring of sentences than currently allowed under the Laws. Under the Guidelines, there are explicit set sentence adjustments for certain circumstances of the offense or offender (e.g., role in offense, acceptance of responsibility). Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98, §§ 3B1.2, 3E1.1. A larger departure is possible under the Guidelines but is rarely used by judges. Judges are able to depart from the given sentencing range if they find circumstances in the case that make it unlike most other cases and render the defendant less blameworthy. Id. at ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (stating guidelines for departures outside sentencing range); see also, e.g., United States v. Milken, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,933, 1992 WL 196797, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1992) (No. SS 89 CR 41 (KMW)) (mem.) (granting reduction by taking into account substantial assistance by defendant, defendant's good acts in prison, defendant's actions to work towards settlements of other related lawsuits, and illness in defendant's family). While this second type of adjustment is relatively rare, it is still a means of rendering the sentence more appropriate. Currently, under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, judges do not have the ability to reduce a sentence in either manner.
216. Delaware is one of several states that have a voluntary guidelines system. See Tonry, supra note 18, at 27-28 (discussing sentencing system of Delaware). One caveat is that some studies show that voluntary guidelines have little effect on the sentences imposed. See id. at 27. Delaware may be the one exception. See id. at 27-28.
217. This mechanism currently is used in California. California has a determinate sentencing system in which the judge has the option of sentencing an offender to one of three sentence terms for the particular crime: the base term, the aggravated term, or the mitigated term. See Cal. Penal Code § 1170 (West Supp. 2001); Cal. Ct. R. 4.405 (defining sentencing terms). Circumstances of aggravation and mitigation explicitly are listed. See Cal. Ct. R. 4.421 (listing aggravating circumstances such as vulnerable victim and abuse of position of trust); Cal. Ct. R. 4.423 (listing mitigating circumstances such as being induced by others or playing passive or minor role).
218. A reduction in sentence would not be automatic simply because the offender was in a relationship at the time of the offense. The judge would have to evaluate the circumstances of the crime and the individual offender to determine if the context of the relationship affected the blameworthiness of the offender.
219. There is a risk that paternalistic attitudes will be inserted back into the sentencing process. However, this risk is minimized by creating explicit instructions to look at the effect of the relationship on the crime rather than allowing judges to sentence a woman offender to a lower sentence simply because she is a woman. Additionally, instructions that guide the judges' evaluation of the relationship, see infra note 173, help ensure that judges will evaluate all offenders' crimes for the presence of such an influential relationship rather than only some women offenders. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing paternalistic attitudes and favoring of white women).
220. Federal and state judges currently evaluate these various sentencing criteria. See, e.g., Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98, § 3E1.1 (allowing sentence adjustment for acceptance of responsibility); Cal. Ct. R. 4.423 (allowing sentence mitigation if offender's participation was induced by others or was motivated by desire to provide necessities to family).
221. The offender should not be forced to testify in order to get information to the judge about the relationship, as this would be in tension with her right against compelled self-incrimination. Instead, the judge should look to the probation report, the factual record, and the prosecution and defense witnesses as sources for determining the circumstances of the offense and the influence of the relationship. For example, if the primary government witness is the offender's partner, this would be an important clue that the intimate relationship may have had a significant influence on the offender.
222. One option is to place more drug offenders in treatment programs as opposed to prison. Studies have shown that drug treatment is more effective in reducing drug crime and less costly than imprisonment. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 42. In New York, Chief Judge Judith Kaye has promised to expand drug treatment courts into every county. Caher, supra note 10, at 1. In California, in November 2000, voters passed Proposition 36, a reform bill that mandates that first- or second-time drug users who are arrested for possession offenses are to be sent to drug treatment programs instead of being sent to prison. Charles L. Lindner, The State: Is the Criminal Justice System Ready for Proposition 36?, L.A. Times, Dec. 31, 2000, at M6.
223. See supra notes 54-61 (detailing low-level place of women in criminal drug hierarchy, and frequency of abuse and addiction among incarcerated women).
224. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 29 (noting effects of imprisonment on offenders' families, communities, and their own difficulties of reintegration upon release).
225. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 4, at 81 (listing several preventative programs such as program preventing child abuse); Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 2, at 4 (proposing program of "intensive supervision probation" that would entail job training, mandatory drug treatment, and community service). Such programs should be available both before an offender commits a crime and as an alternative to incarceration once a crime has been committed.
226. See Currie, supra note 4, at 166-68 (discussing need, particularly for women drug offenders, for drug treatment and community reintegration programs in prison); see also Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent Women Offenders and Their Children, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 377, 378-79 (2000) (urging funding of federal community incarceration program that would serve as incarceration location for women drug offenders and their children and offer treatment and services).
227. See Tonry, supra note 18, at 30 tbl.2.1 (summarizing state sentencing guidelines systems); Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 6 (discussing study of New York's, California's, and Minnesota's drug laws).
228. The term "gender-linked" is used to suggest that the various circumstances of an offender's drug crime will differ depending on the gender of the offender. These differences are not innate to gender; rather, they are a product of the role gender plays in shaping the circumstances and context of crime. See Coombs, supra note 19, at 1689 (supporting proposition that differences in men and women's crimes are not product of gender as such, but rather are "gendered").
229. See Chesney-Lind, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that gender, race, and class of women offenders often place them at periphery of socioeconomic society); see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1246 (1993) (stating that in context of battered women of color, systems of race, gender, and class domination converge); supra note 40 (providing statistics regarding race and class of women offenders).
230. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L.J. 1373, 1394-96 (1986) (arguing that law should focus not on gender differences but on social and economic deprivation, which is promulgated based on these differences); see also supra note 54.
231. James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic 237 (1996).