Security requirements for key establishment proof models: Revisiting Bellare-Rogaway and Jeong-Katz-Lee protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3574, Issue , 2005, Pages 429-442

  Choo, Kim Kwang Raymond ^a   Hitchcock, Yvonne ^a  

^a QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

JEONG-KATZ-LEE PROTOCOLS; KEY SHARING;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 26444442332     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/11506157_36     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (15)

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