Mass-elite equilibrium of federal constitutional legitimacy

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 125-141

  Shvetsova, Olga ^a,b  

^a BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Imperfect agents; Institutions; Parties

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444439160     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2232-8     Document Type: Conference Paper

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