Quasi-anonymous channels

Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Communication, Network, and Information Security

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 126-131

  Moskowitz, Ira S ^a   Newman, Richard E ^b   Syverson, Paul F ^a  

^a NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Anonymity; Covert channel; Information theory; Mix

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; DATA PROCESSING; FORMAL LOGIC; INFORMATION THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SECURITY OF DATA;

ANONYMITY; COVERT CHANNEL; MIX;

CHANNEL CAPACITY;

EID: 2642560372     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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