Theories of government formation and the 1996 general election in Japan

Party Politics

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 229-252

  Kato, Junko ^b   Laver, Michael ^a  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

Cabinets; Coalitions; Competition; Elections; Japan; Party; Policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 2642536269     PISSN: 13540688     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1354068898004002005     Document Type: Article

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