International agreements, the senate and the constitution

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

Volumn 36, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 143-155

  Vagts, Detlev F ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 26244466249     PISSN: 00101931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. See Myres McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1 & 2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945).
2. See generally Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 (1944);
3. Treaties and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945).
4. The consensus was picked up in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-5, 228 n.18 (2d ed. 1988), as follows: "But it does appear settled that a hybrid form of international agreement - that in which the President is supported by a Joint Resolution of Congress - is coextensive with the treaty power."
5. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175, 422-24 (1972) ("[I]t is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is a complete alternative to a treaty: the President can seek approval of any agreement by joint resolution of both houses of Congress instead of two-thirds of the Senate only.").
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance."). The author was one of three Associate Reporters of this Restatement.
7. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 889-96 (1995).
8. See generally WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1941).
9. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
10. See generally GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearing on S. 2467 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 285 (1994);
11. Detlev F. Vagts, The Exclusive Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 40 (1995) (addressing that statement).
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1997 (1997).
13. See HENRY STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 561 (4th ed. 1994).
14. HENRY STEINER TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 561 (1994). Id.
15. HENRY STEINER TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 561 (1994). Id.
16. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, art. 46, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 46 states: 1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL ¶ 721.2(b) (1974),
18. reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (1975).
19. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 815-20. From an international perspective, a "unilateral agreement" is an oxymoron.
20. Tribe, supra note 8, at 1268-69 (footnote omitted).
21. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 827 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 852.
23. Tribe, supra note 8, at 1269 (footnote omitted).
24. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
25. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
26. See 39 U.S.C. § 407 (1996).
27. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 290k (1996) (authorizing the President to accept membership for the United States in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency); 42 U.S.C. § 7671p (1996) (stratospheric ozone protection agreements); 22 U.S.C. § 2767 (1996) (cooperative project agreements with N.A.T.O. countries).
28. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, art. VI.
29. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 460 (1978).
30. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
31. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
32. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
33. Id. at 571-72.
34. See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(1)(a) ("'[T]reaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.").
35. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 460 (1978), in turn quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)).
36. Tribe, supra note 8, at 1277.
37. See id. at 1276-78.
38. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 1, Reporters' note 4.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 303, cmt. e.
40. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
41. Id. at 211.
42. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See generally Beacon Products v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting attempt to challenge President's termination of treaty with Nicaragua).
43. See generally Louis Henkin, Litigating the President's Powers to Terminate Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 647 (1979) (commenting on this case at the Court of Appeals level).
44. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
45. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
47. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992).
48. See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1996).
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
50. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1996)), contains various provisions setting in motion review procedures where W.T.O. actions impinge on state interests or invalidate state laws. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512, 3534 (1996).