Third party dispute settlement and international law

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

Volumn 36, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 65-88

  Charney, Jonathan I ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 26244446282     PISSN: 00101931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (142)

1. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 26 (1979).
2. See Shigeru Oda, The International Court of Justice from the Bench, 244 RECEUIL DES COURS 139-155 (1993-VII) (REC. DES COURS).
3. See also ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 21 (1991).
4. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993).
5. By the use of Chapter VII authority of the United Nations Security Council, states might be required to submit their disputes to third party forums. See Theodor Meron, The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the Proposed International Criminal Court, in IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY BODIES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 15, 16-17 (Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Bull. No. 9, 1995) (hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION).
6. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16-26, 195-207 (1990).
7. For statistics on the Courts'caseload, see ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 369, 374-384, 385, 388-392 (1996);
8. Mark W. Janis, The International Court, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992);
9. Geoffrey Marston, The London Committee and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 40, 40-47 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
10. Subsequent to 1990, the caseload of the I.C.J. has increased significantly. See Peter H. F. Bekker, The 1995 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (1996);
11. Robert Y. Jennings, The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 493, 494 (1995);
12. Keith Highet, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The World Court in Business Again?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 646 (1991).
13. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 15.
14. The first arbitration between sovereign entities appears to be the dispute between the city states of Athens and Mytilene in 600 B.C. It reached a successful conclusion. J.H.W. VERZIJL, VIII INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 72 (1976).
15. For the history of international arbitrations see id. at 71-73, 186-200; I id. at 423-24 (1968); A.M. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1794-1989 (1990).
16. For the text of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, & Navigation [hereinafter Jay Treaty], see 1 Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers 1776-1909, S. EXEC. DOC. 357, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 590 (William M. Malloy comp., 1910);
17. JOHN BASSET MOORE, 5 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 4720 (1898) [hereinafter HiSTORY AND DIGEST];
18. 1 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 1812-1814, 784 (1841).
19. For the substance of the 536 awards issued pursuant to article VII of the Jay Treaty, see 4 HISTORY AND DIGEST 299-349, supra;
20. 1 INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, ANCIENT AND MODERN HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS (John Basset Moore ed., 1931);
21. see also JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 194 (1929)
22. (discussing arbitrations between the United States and the United Kingdom after the Jay Treaty); STUYT, supra note 8, at 1-3; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 14; M.C.W. Pinto, The Prospects for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS 63, 69-70 (A.H.A. Soons ed., 1990) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION];
23. Christine Gray & Benedict Kingsbury, Inter-State Arbitration since 1945: Overview and Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 6, at 55-57, 61;
24. David J. Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of International Claims Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 6, at 161, 167, 176.
25. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 85, 86, 91, 92; Manfred Lachs, Arbitration and International Adjudication, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 52.
26. See Pinto, supra note 9, at 72; S.M. Schwebel, The Prospects for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 101, 103; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 55.
27. Two international arbitrations provide the basis for contemporary international environmental law. Trail Smelter Arb. (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (Arb. Trib. 1941); Lake Lannoux Arb. (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arb. Trib. 1957). Other historically important international arbitration awards include, Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (Int. Arb. 1951) (continental shelf regime); Clipperton Island Affair (Fr. v. Mex.) 2 R.I.A.A. 1105 (1938) (acquisition of territory); Canada-United States Settlement of Gut Dam Claims, 8 I.L.M. 118 (Lake Ont. Claims Trib. 1969) (state responsibility); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (acquisition of territory).
28. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
29. The classic British case of Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1876), concerned the creation of international law, the extent of territorial seas, coastal state rights over foreign vessels in the territorial sea, and incorporation of international law into domestic law. Domestic courts play a significant role in the promotion of international human rights law. See Meron, supra note 4, at 15. See also INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
30. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 19-37, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
31. see also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 28-41, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
32. See, e.g., Application for Review of Judgment No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18 (May 27);
33. Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325 (July 20);
34. Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166 (July 12).
35. See also Effect of Awards of Compensation Made By the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47 (July 13).
36. On January 29, 1996, the United Nations General Assembly eliminated this I.C.J. review by resolution. Review of the Procedure Provided for under Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 50/54, U.N. G.A.O.R., 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/54 (1996). The General Assembly retains the authority to request an advisory opinion on these matters on a case by case basis.
37. See, e.g., Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the I.C.A.O. Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18).
38. See Georges Abi-Saab, The International Court as a World Court, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 3, 12-13; Schwebel, supra note 11, at 104; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 57.
39. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 57.
40. See Abi-Saab, supra note 18, at 12; Schwebel, supra note 11, at 104; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 63-68.
41. Gray & Kingsbury argue also that the I.C.J. inherently is burdened with dual roles: deciding the case before it and pronouncing on general international law for the entire world. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 66. States may fear that their interests might be sacrificed at the altar of law for the world community as a whole.
42. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 56-57.
43. Id.
44. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 18; see also Lachs, supra note 10, at 53.
45. See Oda, supra note 2, at 139-55. See also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 4-5 (1958); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 21, 112; U.N. Doc. A/48/PV.31 (Nov. 8, 1993) (Statement of Robert Jennings).
46. At the 1945 San Francisco negotiations on the U.N. Charter the participants clearly chose not to give the I.C.J. the ultimate authority to interpret the U.N. Charter itself, much less all general international law. See 3 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 339 (1945); 9 id. 74; 13 id. 633-35, 645-46, 653-54, 664, 668-69, 667-68.
47. See also MICHLA POMERANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT AS A 'SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS': DREAMS, ILLUSIONS AND DISSOLUTION 182-83 (1996);
48. Louis B. Sohn, The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter of its Law, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 169, 171-74 (O. Schachter & C. Joyner eds., 1995).
49. Some treaties have provided for resort to the World Court to review decisions of other bodies. For example, Elihu Lauterpacht discusses appeals provided from the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established after World War I to the P.C.I.J. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 104-105.
50. In a few cases the validity of ad hoc arbitrations have been brought to the I.C.J. for consideration. See Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December, 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18); Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12). The advisory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. also is available for use as a vehicle to obtain I.C.J. review of prior decisions of other bodies, such as: the International Civil Aviation Organization (pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 84, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295); the International Labour Organisation (pursuant to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation as amended 29 June 1949 and 17 June 1986, art. 12, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION STATUTE AND RULES OF COURT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 3, 6 (1991));
51. the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations (pursuant to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, art. 11, UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, STATUTE AND RULES IN FORCE WITH EFFECT FROM 16 OCTOBER 1970, U.N. Doc. AT/11/Rev. 3, U.N. Sales No. E.71.X.1 (1970)).
52. See, e.g., Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the I.C.A.O. Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18); Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon Complaints Made against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956 I.C.J. 77 (Oct. 23). For advisory opinions reviewing decisions by the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations and the recent change, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
53. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 111; Ian Brownlie, Arbitration and International Adjudication, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 55, 59-61.
54. See Statute of the I.C.J., done Oct. 24, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
55. See MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996). Shahabuddeen demonstrates why, despite the prohibition on stare decisis in article 59 of the I.C.J. Statute, supra note 29, inevitably the Court must build a coherent jurisprudence that heavily relies on the persuasive force of its prior decisions. At the same time it must remain true to its obligation to apply the law established by the international community. The appropriateness of non-binding precedent is permitted by article 38, para. I(d) of the I.C.J. Statute, supra note 29, which provides that the "[c]ourt . . . shall apply . . . subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions . . . as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."
56. See SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 30, at 35-39.
57. For the role of precedent in the European Court of Justice, see T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 83-84 (1994);
58. BERNARD RUDDEN, BASIC COMMUNITY CASES 39-40 (1987);
59. T. Koopmans, Stare decisis in European Law, in ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 11 (David O'Keefe and Henry G. Schermers eds., 1982).
60. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 71-73; Maurice Mendelson, The International Court of Justice and the sources of international law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 63, 83.
61. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 71-72.
62. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994);
63. also published in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 14, at 37.
64. See Slaughter, supra note 35, at 132-33; MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 158 (1991).
65. The U.N. Charter makes amendments difficult. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 108-09. Articles 92-96 of the U.N. Charter concern the creation and role of the I.C.J. The enforcement provisions in these articles address only states.
66. The competence of the I.C.J. is found in the I.C.J. Statute, supra note 29, arts. 34-38.
67. It has been suggested that when a domestic court is required to decide a question of international law a U.N. procedure should permit requests for I.C.J. advisory opinions. See Louis B. Sohn, Broadening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (1983); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 114-15. The Court of Justice of the European Communities (E.J.C.) has authority to consider whether domestic law of the member states of the European Union is in conformity with E.U. law or treaties. Upon submission to the Court the domestic proceeding is suspended. If the domestic law violates E.U. law or treaties the state is obliged to correct the situation.
68. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 118-122 (1994). This approach has been relatively successful. Id. at 108-110, 357-58, 371-76;
69. John W. Bridge, The Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Prospects for International Adjudication, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 6, at 87, 88;
70. NEVILLE MARCH HUNNINGS, THE EUROPEAN COURTS 75-76, 145-151 (1996).
71. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 112; Abi-Saab, supra note 18, at 13; Robert Jennings, The Role and Functioning of the Court, 46 I.C.J. Y.B. 1991-1992 at 205, 210.
72. See P.H. Kooijmans, Comments on paper by Professor L.B. Sohn, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 23, 733.
73. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 29, art. 35.
74. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 96.
75. Few international tribunals permit individuals to bring claims directly against states. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 69-70. While state espousal of claims has declined in recent years, regional and human rights tribunals have established procedures that closely approach or provide direct access for individuals. Thus, for example, under article 25(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note14, a state party may recognize the competence of the European Commission on Human Rights to receive petitions by individuals. See J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (1993). See, e.g., Protocol No. 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 6, 1990, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 140 (amending art. 44 of the European Convention); American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 44-51, 61-62, 9 I.L.M. 99, 113-15, 117-18; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, opened for signature July 27, 1981, arts. 55-59, 21 I.L.M. 59, 66-67; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 25, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1280-81, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 174-176;
76. Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for the Settlement of International Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State, adopted Feb. 1962, art. 1, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 500 (1963); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 187, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/1-22 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1307,
77. UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No. E.83 v.5 (1983).
78. See generally, William E. Butler, The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 6, at 43, 49;
79. Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 6, at 117, 120, 123; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 69-70, 73, 79;
80. Mark W. Janis, The European Court of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 6, at 105-07, 110.
81. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Redundancy in a system may be beneficial. See W. Michael Reisman, Creating, Adapting and Designing Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for the International Protection of Human Rights, in IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION, supra note 4, at 8, 10.
82. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 624-25 (1981) (discussing the responsibility of U.S. State courts to decide federal law issues). This is the approach that the E.J.C. has taken in regard to the implementation of European Union law by national courts of state members. See HUNNINGS, supra note 39, at 18-21, 37.
83. For example, despite the Court's substantial expertise in maritime boundary disputes several disputes have been brought before ad hoc tribunals notwithstanding considerable expenses and logistical difficulties. See, e.g., Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, 18 R.I.A.A. 3 (Ct. Arb. 1977); Delimitation of the Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre & Miquelon), 31 I.L.M. 1149 (Ct. Arb. 1992); Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 77 I.L.R. 635 (Arb. Trib. 1988).
84. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 29, art. 58.
85. See Reisman, supra note 45, at 10-11. Sometimes, however, this may be a negative consideration. See Robert Y. Jennings, The Proliferation of Adjudicatory Bodies, in IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION, supra note 4, at 2, 3.
86. For a recent example in which the European Court of Human Rights interpreted the European Convention in order to produce a result consistent with current developments in general international law, see Piermont v. France, 314 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 18-28 (1995). For comment, see Juliane Kokott & Beate Rudolf, European Convention on Human Rights: Conditions for Modified Applicability in Overseas Territories - Restrictions on Political Activities of Aliens, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 456 (1996). However, some are of the opinion that this court decided a question of reservations to jurisdiction provisions that on its face is inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the World Court. See Jennings, supra note 49, at 5-6. Others have disputed this view.
87. See Statement of Nicolas Valticos, in IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION, supra note 4, at 45.
88. The I.C.J. has purported to adopt the text based rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6, 18, at ¶ 33 (Feb. 15). Arguably it diverged from this position in its judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 397-415, ¶¶ 11-51 (Nov. 26). See E.W. Vierdag, The International Court of Justice and the Law of Treaties, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 159-162. It has also been argued that it takes a teleological approach to treaty interpretation when at issue is the scope of the authority of intergovernmental organizations. See id.; see also Mendelson, supra note 33, at 65. But recent cases have reflected a more rigorous, Vienna Convention based, use of treaty text and travaux préparatoires. See Vierdag, supra, at 163, 165. In contrast, the E.J.C. has given the ideological approach increasing importance in the interpretation of European Community law and relied less on textual analyses and travaux préparatoires. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 299-322. This may be unique to the special circumstances of the European Community and, thus, distinguishable from the issues faced by the I.C.J. Id. The E.J.C. also has taken an approach to general principles that differs from the I.C.J., although that difference is said to be a function of the uniqueness of the E.U. context. Id. at 323-342.
89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, arts. 53, 64. See also Charney, supra note 3, at 541-42.
90. See Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).
91. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, art. 41.
92. See generally, National Reports, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. (1972-1987).
93. See also Jin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems," Three Law Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Laws in China, 1995 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289 (1995) (reviewing the independent court systems in the P.R.C.);
94. Benjamin Aaron, The Administration of Justice in Labor Law: Arbitration and the Role of Courts: International Survey, 3 COMP. LAB. L. 3 (1979) (reviewing the treatment of labor disputes in tribunals throughout the world).
95. See MICHAEL BOGDAN, COMPARATIVE LAW 173-177 (1994);
96. Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 75-76 (1994);
97. René David et al., Structure and Divisions of the Law, 2 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. 2-2, 2-40 and 2-41 (c. 1974);
98. Xavier Blanc-Jouvan & Jean Boulouis, France, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. F-46, F-33 through F-57 (c. 1974). In the rare situation when the same case has been the subject of directly conflicting judgments by the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat, the Tribunal des Conflits may resolve the substantive conflict.
99. See BOGDAN, supra note 56, at 173-177; Kublicki, supra note 56, at 66-67; KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, 1 INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 123-128 (1987);
100. David et al., supra note 56, at 2-2, 2-40 and 2-41; Blanc-Jouvan & Boulouis, supra note 56, at F-46, F-33 through F-57. The Italian legal system is similar to that of France. It divides the court system among the Constitutional Court, the courts of general jurisdiction with final review on the law by the Corte di Cassazione, and the Administrative Courts. See Antonio Baldassare, Structure and Organization of the Constitutional Court of Italy, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 649, 650 (1996);
101. Mauro Cappelletti & Pietro Rescigno, Italy, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. I-93, I-94, I-95 (c. 1973). Germany also divides its complex court system among lines of ordinary jurisdiction and administrative jurisdiction, but its system is more hierarchical. It has a common panel of judges to reconcile conflicting positions among the different federal courts (Bundesgerichtshof). The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has final jurisdiction over constitutional questions.
102. See BOGDAN, supra note 56, at 190-192; Erhard Denninger, Judicial Review Revisited: The German Experience, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1013, 1024, 1025 (1985);
103. Deiter Medicus, Federal Republic of Germany, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. F-1, F-2 through F-4 (c. 1974).
104. Canada has a unified judicial system. See Jacob S. Ziegel & John E.C. Brierley, Canada, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. C-11, C-14 through C-16 (1979). The same is true for Argentina, Japan, and England.
105. See Yosiyuki Noda, Japan, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. J-5, J-8, J-9 (c. 1972);
106. Humberto Quiroga Lavié, Argentine, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. A-32, A-35, A-36 (c. 1972); BOGDAN, supra note 56, at 119-127;
107. Kenneth R. Simmonds, United Kingdom, 1 INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. U-59, U-65 through U-68 (c. 1972). The same cannot be said for the greater United Kingdom (including England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) or for Argentina in regard to the local laws of their constituent provinces. See Lavié, supra, at A-32; Simmonds, supra, at U-59.
108. See BOGDAN, supra note 56, at 151-56; Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States' Experience, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1081, 1083, 1086-87 (1986).
109. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 283 (1996);
110. Sean A. Bryan et al., Special Project: An Empirical Study of Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income Tax Issues, 9 VA. TAX REV. 125, 126, 129 (1989);
111. Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, Commentary: The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1400-01 (1987).
112. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
113. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 57 (1986).
114. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 51, arts. 41, 53, 64. See also Charney, supra note 3, at 541-42.
115. See HARTLEY, supra note 32; RUDDEN, supra note 32; and Koopmans, supra note 32.
116. See Bekker, supra note 6; Jennings, supra note 6, at 494; Highet, supra note 6.
117. See Jennings, supra note 6, at 497-98.
118. See Jonathan I. Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 288 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987);
119. B.A. Ajibola, Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 9, 35-36 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996);
120. S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in id. at 39, 42.
121. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has review jurisdiction over federal issues. Considerable law of the 50 constituent states remains outside of its scope. Thus, the judiciaries of those states are independent on these questions without review by a higher single authority. Even without a hierarchical system, over time the cross fertilization of these jurisdictions has produced considerable uniformity. Stein argues that in many areas, forces within the legal system have promoted uniformity of the law. See Stein, supra note 59, at 1088-90, 1101-02. The same phenomena are equally applicable to the international legal system.
122. Support for the percolation theory is found in ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 62, at 6-7, 35, 38, 41-70; Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, Commentary: The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1434-35 (1987);
123. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: an Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716-720 (1984);
124. J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 941 (1983).
125. Opposing arguments are found in Todd J. Tiberi, Comment: Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 891-92 (1993);
126. Thomas E. Baker, 1989 Survey of Books Relating to the Law; IV. Constitutional Law and the Federal Courts: Siskel and Ebert at the Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1472 (1989).
127. have argued this point previously in the context of international law. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Law Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 73-75 (1996). See also Brownlie, supra note 28, at 61.
128. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
129. See A.L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 LAW Q. REV. 40, 42-43 (1934);
130. RENÉ DAVID & HENRY P. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 113-21 (1958);
131. H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY & RESEARCH 90 (1949);
132. RENÉ DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 179-188 (1972);
133. ROGER PERROT, INSTITUTIONS JUDICIAIRES ¶ 26, at 29-30 (4th ed. 1992).
134. See also MICHAEL BOGDAN, COMPARATIVE LAW 114, 194, 196 (1954);
135. Mauro Cappelletti & Pietro Rescigno, Italy, in I INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, NATIONAL REPORTS I-93, 97 (c. 1973).
136. See Peter Passell, Trade Pacts By Regions: Not the Elixir As Advertised, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at C1.
137. Perhaps that is what Professor Henkin meant by the term constitutional international law, although his category may be narrower than mine. See Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 REC. DES COURS 9, 52-59 (1989-IV).
138. See Sohn, supra note 26.
139. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 112.
140. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 9, at 63; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 111. This is clear from the limited role given to the Court in the U.N. CHARTER, arts. 92-96, and in the I.C.J. Statute, supra note 29, arts. 34-38.
141. Notwithstanding determinations by other tribunals, the orders of the I.C.J. are the most significant when they address general international law in a well reasoned judgment, especially when there are few, if any differing opinions on the question by the judges who heard the case. See Mendelson, supra note 33, at 63-87; Vierdag, supra note 51, at 145, 159-165.
142. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 2, at 112.