Who's afraid of channel 7?: Ideological radio and freedom of speech in Israel

Stanford Journal of International Law

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 78-94

  Porat, Iddo ^a,b,c   Rosen Zvi, Issachar ^a,c,d,e  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^e TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26244439859     PISSN: 07315082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (88)

1. KESHEV: THE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL, KESHEV REPORT: PIRATE RADIO IN ISRAEL - ALTERNATIVE RADIO OR DANGER FOR DEMOCRACY? 18 (Yizhar Ber, ed., 1999) [hereinafter KESHEV REPORT].
2. DAN CASPI & YEHIEL LIMOR, THE IN/OUTSIDERS: THE MEDIA IN ISRAEL 135 (1999).
3. Arutz Sheva Announces Daily News Service (Arutz-7), at http://web.macam.ac.il/~izak/israel/a/aa/0007.html (on file with the Stanford Journal of International Law).
4. Yechiel Limor, The Proliferation of Pirate Radio in Israel, 19 KESHER 42, 42 (1996).
5. Section 3 of the Broadcasting Authority Act of 1965 states that the goals of the Broadcasting Authority are, among other things, to "portray the life of the nation, its struggle, its cultural achievements and its accomplishments" as well as to "reflect the lives and cultural tenets of all the nation's tribes [the tribes of Israel]." Broadcasting Authority Act, 1965, S.H. 106, s. 3 [hereinafter BAA].
6. KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
7. Emanuel A. Winston, Destroying Arutz Sheva, GAMLA: NEWS AND VIEWS FROM ISRAEL, at http://www.gamla.org.il/english/article/1998/aug/win2.htm (Aug. 4, 1998).
8. This conflict is also known as the Six Day War.
9. Yoav Peled, Ethnic Exclusionism in the Periphery: The Case of Oriental Jews in Israel's Development Towns, 13 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 346 (1990).
10. Winston, supra note 7.
11. There is a debate as to whether Channel 7 broadcasts only from outside Israel's territorial waters. According to several reports, Channel 7 also broadcasts within the territorial waters of Israel and uses ground transmitters. KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. This point is, however, immaterial for our purposes, since we are interested more in why Channel 7 was not licensed than whether it actually abridged any specific law in its broadcasting. In addition, it seems that Channel 7's broadcasting would still be illegal, even if it conducted all its operations from outside Israel's territorial waters, due to an international convention against pirate radio broadcasting from the sea, which Israel has joined. Id.
12. Eli Nissan, Background Survey: The Suggested Public Broadcasting Framework, in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE EXPANSION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM IN ISRAEL 92 (July 15, 1997) (on file with the Stanford Journal of International Law).
13. Hillel Nossek & Yehiel Limor, Fifty Years in a "Marriage of Convenience": News, Media and Military Censorship in Israel, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 13-14 (2001).
14. Throughout the 1970s, the entire radio broadcasting map in Israel consisted of only two radio channels operated by the IBA and a third state-owned station, Galei Zahal, that was operated by the Army. These gradually increased to a total of seven state-owned channels today. See CASPI & LIMOR, supra note 2, at 132-36.
15. Id. at 134-35.
16. This included the printing of many local newspapers and the establishment of private cable television companies. Limor, supra note 4, at 42.
17. KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
18. For examples of pressures to shut down or legalize Channel 7 before 1995, see David Makovsky, Sand: Close Channel 7 Radio Station, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 5, 1994, at 1;
19. IBA Against Legalizing Pirate Radio Stations, JERUSALEM POST, May 13, 1993, at 3.
20. Israel has a unified national police force, under the direct authority of the Ministry of the Interior. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY 323 (Helen Chapin Metz, ed., 1990), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iltoc.html#i100114.
21. Evelyn Gordon, Knesset in Uproar over the Closure of Arutz 7, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 1, 1995, at 12;
22. Judy Siegel, Arutz 7 Plans Quick Return, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 2, 1995, at 12.
23. Israeli politics revolves around the considerations of coalition governments. No one party has ever succeeded in winning a majority of seats in the Knesset (Israel's parliament) in an election. Thus, forming a government necessarily demands that the party winning a plurality of seats persuade smaller parties to join it. The Likud party tends to find coalition partners among other factions on the Right. Labor is naturally inclined to seek coalition partners among the more left-leaning parties, of whom Meretz is the largest and most prominent. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 19, 210, 217.
24. Gordon, supra note 20.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Siegel, supra note 20.
28. Id.
29. Herb Keinon, Arutz 7 Back on Air, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 8, 1995, at 2.
30. Id.
31. Liat Collins & Batsheva Tsur, Zucker Asks Attorney General to Check Arutz 7 Broadcasts, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 21, 1995, at 3.
32. Arutz 7 Suspected of Violating the Law, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 14, 1997, at 3.
33. Batsheva Tsur, Arutz 7 May Get a Permit, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 12, 1998, at 3. The GSS, Israel's domestic intelligence agency, is more commonly known outside Israel as the "Shin-Bet."
34. Ami Klein, Police Raid Arutz 7 Jerusalem Studio, JERUSALEM POST, Sep. 15, 1998, at 5.
35. Margot Dudkevitch, Charges Filed Against 13 Arutz 7 Personnel, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 25, 1998, at 4.
36. Liat Collins, Kleiner Urges PM to Legalize Arutz 7, JERUSALEM POST, May 26, 1997, at 3.
37. David Harris et al., Ministers File Plan for Settler's Radio Station, JERUSALEM POST, July 2, 1998, at 3.
38. Section 3 of the Bezek Act of 1982 was amended by the new legislation. The new section 3(7) reads as follows: Whoever operated and maintained for 5 consecutive years before January 1, 1999 a radio station oriented mainly to the Israeli public, and the broadcasting of which was received in most of the territory of Israel, will be considered as if he was licensed according to this Act, and to section 5(a) of the Wireless Telegraph Ordinance [New Version], 1977, as well as if he received a franchise according to section 32(a) to the Second Authority for Television and Radio Act, 1990.
39. Bezek Act, 1982, S.H. 218, s. 3(7); The Act for the Increase in Growth and Employment for the Achievement of the Budget Target for the Year 1998 (Legislative Amendments), 1999, S.H. 122.
40. Nina Gilbert & Margot Dudkevitch, Knesset Legalizes Arutz 7 Radio Station, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 24, 1999, at 1.
41. Dan Izenberg, A-G calls on High Court not to Legalize Arutz 7, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 19, 1999, at 4.
42. Haim Oron v. Knesset Chairman, Dan Tichon, H.C. 1030/99, 1031/99, 1050/99, 1053/99, 1119/99, 1201/99 (Mar. 8, 1999) (pending), at http://www.court.gov.il.
43. Dan Izenberg, Court Gives Three More Months on Pirate Radio Bill, JERUSALEM POST, July 31, 2000. at 2.
44. Moshe Reinfeld, Arutz 7 Defendents Not Off the Hook Yet, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 10, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17467373.
45. Winston, supra note 7.
46. Id.
47. Id.;
48. Evelyn Gordon, Knesset in Uproar over the Closure of Arutz 7, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 1, 1995, at 12.
49. Hillel Weiss, Channel 7 Broadcasting, Jan. 13, 1998, quoted in KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-29. Hillel Weiss is a Channel 7 radio personality.
50. Nadia Matar, Channel 7 Broadcasting, Jan. 15, 1998, quoted in KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 30, 42. Nadia Matar is a Channel 7 radio personality.
51. Dov Halperin, Channel 7 Broadcasting, Jan. 19, 1998, quoted in KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 42-43. Dov Halperin is a Channel 7 radio personality.
52. The Second TV and Radio Authority argued in a brief to the Supreme Court that "[t]he legal requirements regarding the distribution of radio channels were intended to maintain public welfare in a situation in which a scarce resource has to be divided among many interested parties." H.C. 2946/95, Brief of the Second Broadcasting Authority Council to the High Court of Justice, Ron Goata v. The Second Authority Council (not published), quoted in KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
53. The laws regulating the broadcasting spectrum are: The Wireless Telegraph Ordinance [New Version], 1972, D.M.I. 506; The Second Authority for Television and Radio Act, 1990, S.H. 59; and The Bezek Act, 1982, S.H. 218.
54. According to April 1998 figures, each regional radio station paid an annual franchise fee of about $175,000, a frequency fee of about $18,000, and royalty fees of about four to eight percent of their revenues. The regional stations also pay royalties to AKUM, Israel's composers and lyricists association. The pirate radio stations do not pay any of the above fees (although Channel 7 does pay royalties to AKUM, according to an agreement between them). According to their own estimates, the regional stations lost thirty to forty percent of their revenues in 1998 as a result of pirate radio broadcasting. KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
55. Limor, supra note 4, at 48.
56. KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11;
57. see also Paine Marcus et al., Aloni, Police Spar over Failure to Close Down Pirate Radio Stations, JERUSALEM POST, May 21, 1996, at 1 (reporting that Ben Gurion International airport was closed down for four hours due to interference in communication caused by pirate radio stations).
58. KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 4
59. Id. at 23.
60. The KESHEV REPORT adds that Channel 7's view of Israel's institutions includes statements such as - "The Israeli left . . . dictates the behavior of the [Supreme] Court, and at the basis of the Left is always a denial of its Jewish identity and self hatred," id. at 24; "The Attorney General's office is the stronghold of the most radical Left," id.; "The Israeli media has such brutality, that whoever does not ingratiate himself and does not dance to [its] tune has no chance," id. at 30; "[A] small minority controls the whole media in the country," id. at 28.
61. For a discussion of this paradox, see infra Part III.
62. CASPI & LIMOR, supra note 2, at 127-31. The British controlled Palestine from 1917. They received a League of Nations mandate in 1922 and withdrew in 1948, as Israel declared independence. ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY,
63. supra note 19, at 35-38, 51.
64. Id. AT 131. Cf. DENIS MCQUAIL, MEDIA PERFORMANCE: MASS COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 263, 297-98 (1992).
65. DAN HOROWITZ & MOSHE LISSAK, TROUBLE IN UTOPIA: THE OVERBURDENED POLITY OF ISRAEL 75 (1989).
66. KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
67. CASPI & LIMOR, supra note 2, at 136-37.
68. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Political Religion in a New State: Ben Gurion's Mamlachtiyut, in ISRAEL: THE FIRST DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE 171, 171 (S. Ilan Troen & Noah Lucas eds., 1995).
69. Alan Dowty, Israel's First Decade: Building a Civic State, in ISRAEL: THE FIRST DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 61, at 31, 36.
70. Section 3 of the BAA stipulates that the broadcasting authority has to broadcast programs that will: [P]ortray the life of the nation, its struggle, its cultural achievements and its accomplishments; nurture good citizenship; tighten the connection with Jewish traditions and values and deepen the knowledge of them; reflect the lives and cultural tenets of all the nation's tribes [the tribes of Israel]; expand education and disseminate knowledge; reflect the life of Diaspora Jews; promote the goals of statist education as they are defined by law: a society built on freedom, equality, mutual help, and love for fellows human; promote Israeli and Hebrew cultural achievements; promote understanding and peace with neighboring states.
71. Broadcasting Authority Act, 1965, S.H. 106, s. 3 (emphasis added).
72. During the War of 1967, the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA) for the first time extended its broadcasting hours, increasing awareness of radio's ability to keep the public informed. Later years saw a continuing increase in the air-time dedicated to current events (both in the IBA stations and in the popular Army station), culminating in news being aired every half hour after the Lebanon War, and earning the Israeli public the title of "News Junkies." CASPI & LIMOR, supra note 2, at 134.
73. See Peled, supra note 9.
74. Also known as "Israeli Arabs."
75. See Tamar Liebes et al., The Media and the Alternative Media in Israel's 1996 Elections, in 20 KESHER 5, 11 (1996). The shift of support from the two main parties to more sectarian ones was facilitated by changes in the electoral system instituted in 1996. In the 1996 election, voters chose a prime minister and a political party by separate ballots. This encouraged many people to "split the ticket," opting for a smaller party to balance a vote for one of the two prime ministerial candidates.
76. Press Release, Israel Radio, Heritage Network Launches on 88.5 FM, at http://israelradio.org/dat.htm. This is clearly an attempt to supply a cultural-sectorial demand in order to cope with the threat of Channel 7.
77. Hillel Sommer, Legitimizing Arutz 7: Not an Easy Matter, JERUSALEM POST, June 19, 1998, at 3.
78. Yehiel Limor, "The Little Prince" and "The Big Brother" or: The Communication Industry in Israel in an Era of Changes, in COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 29, 37 (Dan Caspi ed., 1997).
79. This concept is reflected in Section 4 of the Broadcasting Authority Act which states that "the IBA will insure that its broadcasting appropriately expresses different views and opinions prevailing in the [Israeli] public and that the information it broadcasts will be reliable." Broadcasting Authority Act, 1965, S.H. 106, s. 4; see also MOSHE NEGBI, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ISRAEL-THE LEGAL ASPECT 163 (1995). The only possible threat to the state's monopoly of nonregional radio broadcasting before the appearance of Channel 7 was the Voice of Peace. This pirate radio station, however, did not pose a real threat to the state-owned radio's position as the sole political mediator since it aired news from the state-owned radio channels and devoted most of its air time to music, keeping its ideological message of peace and reconciliation at the most abstract level.
80. This is reflected in the following quote from a Channel 7 broadcast: What do they [the Left] want to do to Channel 7? Radio for the settlers? Settlers do not need radio. Channel 7 is radio for all the Israeli people. The entire national camp, which comprises most of the Jewish population in the State of Israel, listens to Channel 7. Channel 7 is today an internationally recognized media. . . . Channel 7 should be a radio for the settlers? They think they do us a favor? Channel 7 wants to be the national element within the media, as it is becoming clearer and clearer. . . . that nothing will change the Israeli media, that is to say the IBA and Galey Zahal.
81. Adir Zik, Channel 7 Broadcasting, Jan. 2, 1998, quoted in KESHEV REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
82. CASPI & LIMOR, supra note 2, at 144;
83. Arutz Sheva Announces Daily News Service, supra note 3.
84. Yuli Haromachenko, Here is the Voice of Frustration, HA'ARETZ MAGAZINE, June 8, 2001, at 34.
85. The print media is different in this respect from the broadcast media. Israel's print media was always privately owned and did not feel the need to share the broadcast media's commitment to objectivity or addressing the entire Israeli public. CASPI & LIMOR, supra note 2, at 37-38.
86. CRAIG CALHOUN, CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIFFERENCE 240 (1995).
87. The situation in Europe is in transition in this respect.
88. There is ambivalence in Channel 7's claims. On the one hand, it claims that the views it airs are not represented in the state-owned media, and broadcasting is an exercise of its right to freedom of expression. On the other hand, Channel 7 claims that it represents the "true" consciousness of the Jewish people, and, therefore, it should replace the state-owned media as the authoritative public voice. The first claim seems to undermine the possibility of a common denominator in Israeli society; the second challenges only the "false" common denominator represented by state-owned media, but remains loyal to the basic Zionist credo that such a common denominator indeed exists.