Life in Russia's "closed city": Moscow's movement restrictions and the rule of law

New York University Law Review

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 344-373

  Schaible, Damian S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 26044452685     PISSN: 00287881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (219)

1. Sarah Karush, Chechens: City's Other Casualties, Moscow Times, Sept. 17, 1999, 1999 WL 6808975.
2. Joan Beecher Eichrodt, Moscow's Scapegoats: The War on the Chechen Diaspora, Wash. Times, Sept. 23, 1999, at A21.
3. Letter to Editor, More Than Bombs Wreck Homes After Blast, Moscow Times, Sept. 18, 1999, 1999 WL 6809021.
4. Moscow Illegals/Human Rights in Moscow, An Open Letter of "Moscow Organization of Outlaws" [hereinafter Open Letter], at http://www.nelegal.ru/letter.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2000).
5. While estimates vary wildly, the number of unregistered residents of Moscow appears to be between 100,000 and three million. See Fred Weir, Few Choices for Moscow's Homeless Children, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 16, 1999, at 7 (estimating that number of unregistered people living in Moscow is "[m]ore than a million");
6. see also U.S. Comm. for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1998, at 200 (1998) (stating that Moscow city authorities estimate number of unregistered people in city to be greater than one million, while some nongovernmental organizations place number between 100,000 and 300,000).
7. Open Letter, supra note 4.
8. See Michael Specter, Siberia's Underground Man Emerges as a Gadfly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1998, at A4 ("The propiska is a pass . . . to insure that serfs stayed in the fields where they belonged.").
9. Soviet System Alive and Kicking!, Moscow News, Mar. 17, 1999, Lexis, News Library, Mosnws file.
10. See Yury Buida, Passports Shackle Russia, Moscow Times, Dec. 11, 1997, Lexis, News Library, Mostms file (describing personal experience with propiska system).
11. See Noah Rubins, Recent Development, The Demise and Resurrection of the Propiska: Freedom of Movement in the Russian Federation, 39 Harv. Int'l L.J. 545, 545 (1998) ("The . . . dissolution of the Communist regime in Russia created widespread hope that the . . . propiska would be abandoned . . . .").
12. See Konst. RF [Constitution] art. 27, § 1 (Russ.) ("Everyone who is lawfully staying on the territory of the Russian Federation shall have the right to freedom of movement and to chose [sic] the place to stay and residence."), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 7 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994); see also infra Part II.B.1.
13. Law of the Russian Federation No. 5242-1 of June 25, 1993 on the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to the Freedom of Movement, the Choice of a Place to Stay, and Residence Within the Russian Federation [hereinafter 1993 Law], Lexis, Garant 10002748; see also Rules of Registration or Striking Off the Register of Russian Citizens at the Place of Stay or Residence on the Territory of the Russian Federation, Federal Resolution 713, July 17, 1995 (Russ.) [hereinafter Federal Rules], http://www.memo.ru/hr/refugees/sle/ chapter25.htm (implementing 1993 Law).
14. See Presidential Decree Confirms Russian Citizens' Right to Have a Passport for Foreign Travel, Even If They Have No Propiska, Kommersant-Daily, May 5, 1998, at 3 (describing decree),
15. reprinted in What the Papers Say, May 7, 1998, Lexis, News Library, Wps file.
16. See Po delu o proverke konstiutsionnosti punktov 10, 12 i 21 Pravil registratsii i sniatiya grazhdan Rossijskoj Federatsii . . . [In re the Constitutionality of Sections 10, 12, and 21 of the Rules of Registration and Removal of Citizens of the Russian Federation . . .], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 6, Art. No. 7083, at 1538 [hereinafter 1998 Decision];
17. Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti . . . Zakona Moskovskoj oblasti . . . [In re the Constitutionality . . . of the Moscow Region Statute . . .], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 27, Art. No. 3304, at 5421 [hereinafter 1997 Decision];
18. see also Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti ryada normativnykh aktov goroda Moskvy i Moskovskoj oblasti . . . [In re the Constitutionality of Normative Acts of the City of Moscow and the Moscow Region . . .], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 16, Art. No. 1909, at 4195 [hereinafter 1996 Decision].
19. Russia is a member of the United Nations and of the Council of Europe, both of which strongly assert the freedom of movement in resolutions and conventions. For the United Nations declaration, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 13.1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
20. For the Council of Europe declaration, see Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other Than Those Already Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol Thereto, Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46, as amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155. Russia signed the protocol in 1998. [1998] 1 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 4.
21. Though the term is still used by Russians today, use of the word "propiska" (or registration stamp) is technically inaccurate, as the propiska system was officially abandoned by federal regulations issued in 1995 and Moscow regulations issued in 1996. Both sets of regulations replaced the propiska system with a "registration" system, which in Moscow has the same practical effects of the former propiska system. For the federal regulation, see infra Part II.B.1; for the Moscow regulation, see infra Part I.B.1.
22. In 1998, the last year for which accurate nationwide information is available, nearly one-third of Russia's eighty-nine regions restricted migration through the use of registration regimes. See U.S. Comm. for Refugees, supra note 4, at 200. Moscow, St. Petersburg, Krasnodar, and Stavropol are known as the cities with the strictest registration requirements. See U.S. Comm. for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2000, at 269 (2000).
23. For a detailed description of the hardships faced by Meskhetian Turks as a result of a restrictive registration regime in the Krasnodar region of Russia, see Mark Whitehouse, Politics of Persecution, Moscow Times, Jan. 24, 1998, Lexis, News Library, Mostms file.
24. For a description of the hardships faced by the estimated 54,000 nonregistered people in Russia's second largest city of St. Petersburg, where unregistered homeless are reportedly trucked outside city borders by local authorities, see John Varoli, Police "Deport" St. Pete Homeless, Moscow Times, Nov. 28, 1998, at 1, 1998 WL 11691660.
25. While a specific definition of the rule of law can be elusive, its essence demands at least that the law be clear, equally applied, and supreme. See infra Part II.A.
26. Much has been written about the numerous difficult problems that Russia faces in its quest to become a nation grounded in law. See, e.g., Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, Jr., Educating Russia's Future Lawyers - Any Role for the United States?, 33 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 17, 76 (2000) (arguing that better training for Russian lawyers is prerequisite to successful development of rule of law in Russia);
27. Louise Shelley, Post-Soviet Organized Crime and the Rule of Law, 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 827, 827 (1995) (arguing that organized crime is one of greatest threats to development of rule of law in Russia). The resolution of the situation discussed in this Note would not remove all other obstacles in Russia's path; however, the conflict between federal law and Moscow's actions in this realm are emblematic of Russia's situation as a whole, and therefore worthy of study.
28. Soviet System Alive and Kicking!, supra note 7.
29. This is particularly difficult for Americans, most of whom have grown up taking the freedom of movement for granted, to understand. For Americans, moving to a new city entails little more than finding a place to live and moving. In contrast, many Russians unaccustomed to the American system marvel at the idea that in the United States people need not get permission from, or even inform, the local authorities before moving into a new area.
30. Rubins, supra note 9, at 546 n.4 (detailing history of propiska system).
31. Id.
32. See Specter, supra note 6, at A4.
33. Rubins, supra note 9, at 546 n.4. This was a period of free market activity, when growing industries required the labor of the former serfs. For a good, concise history of movement restrictions throughout the Soviet period, see Vladimir A. Kartashkin, Human Rights and the Emergence of the State of the Rule of Law in the USSR, 40 Emory L.J. 889, 898-902 (1991).
34. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 546 n.4; Soviet System Alive and Kicking!, supra note 7.
35. Between 1925 and 1927, Stalin implemented the propiska system for permanent residency and temporary stays: If a citizen visited a city for more than three days, he or she first had to get a temporary propiska for the area. As the Soviet state was liberalized in the 1950s, the use of temporary registrations disappeared, but the permanent propiska system continued. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 546 n.4; Soviet System Alive and Kicking!, supra note 7.
36. Rubins, supra note 9, at 546 n.4.
37. See Kartashkin, supra note 24, at 898-902; Rubins, supra note 9, at 546 n.4.
38. Buida, supra note 8.
39. See id. (describing how "millions still long to receive a Moscow propiska").
40. See id. ("Without a passport, you don't exist . . . ."). The internal passport bearing the propiska was vitally important to the Soviet government, providing the means for achieving "desirable population dispersion and ethnic concentration, labor and job allocation, housing allocation, and internal security." Simona Pipko & Albert J. Pucciarelli, The Soviet Internal Passport System, 19 Int'l Law. 915, 915 (1985).
41. As such, almost nothing could be done in the Soviet Union without first showing a passport, from booking a room in a hotel to getting married. See Buida, supra note 8. And moving to a new place was extremely difficult: One had to apply at the office of the local militia in the area in which one wanted to move, and the militias - especially those in more desirable places, such as cities and large towns - only would issue a propiska to someone born in the jurisdiction, the incoming spouse of a resident, someone who secured an apartment in the jurisdiction, or someone who moved to take a job and had an employer to intercede on his or her behalf. Jeffrey Tayler, Thin Walls, Bad Neighbors: In the New Russia Making Yourself at Home Is Still No Easy Task, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1997, at 54, 56; see also Pipko & Pucciarelli, supra, at 918 (detailing difficulties of obtaining propiska).
42. E-mail from Serge, Co-Founder, Moscow Illegals/Human Rights in Moscow, to Damian Schaible (Mar. 31, 2000) (on file with author). Out of fear of reprisals, Serge has requested that his surname not be used in this Note.
43. Some restrictions on movement were lifted in 1988; then in 1990, one of the Soviet Union's ruling bodies, the Council of Ministers, officially relaxed the requirements of the propiska system. Rubins, supra note 9, at 546 n.4. Just before the fall of the Union, in October 1991, the U.S.S.R. Committee for Constitutional Supervision spoke out decisively against the system, finding that it violated, among other laws and covenants, the U.S.S.R. Constitution, the U.S.S.R. Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Peter B. Maggs, The Russian Constitutional Court's Decisions on Residence Permits and Housing, 2 Parker Sch. J. E. Eur. L. 561, 569 (1995). The Committee ordered that residence permit provisions be abandoned as of January 1, 1992. See id. However, the Soviet Union was dissolved before that date, and the Committee's decision was relegated to a legal limbo. See id. at 570 ("This course of events created an open legal issue as to whether Soviet residence permit law would indeed be considered abrogated . . . .").
44. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of the Russian Federation laws, constitutional provisions, and judicial holdings that set up the right to free movement and denounce the propiska, see generally Konstantin Katanian, The Propiska and the Constitutional Court, 7 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 52 (1998); Maggs, supra note 32; Rubins, supra note 9.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 109-27. The 1996 and 1997 decisions attacked the registration fees that Moscow charged. The 1998 decision, in the course of holding aspects of the federal rules on registration unconstitutional, held that local governments such as Moscow's could not place additional restrictions on registration. See id. The Constitutional Court's 1998 decision explains that the only type of registration system allowed by the Russian Constitution is one that simply seeks to "certify the act of free will of a citizen to choose a place to stay and live." 1998 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 6 Art No. 7083, at 1538, 1539.
46. 1993 Law, supra note 11, art. 3 (assigning responsibility to federal government to formulate registration regime).
47. Rubins, supra note 9, at 549-50.
48. This type of notification-based registration is used in Western European countries for tax, draft, census, and emergency management purposes. Id.
49. For instance, the Moscow city government vigorously enforced Mayor Luzhkov's September 13, 1999 decree. See infra note 60 (discussing decree). The entire city reserve police force, numbering 20,000, was immediately called for duty. In total, they inspected 14,000 premises, searching for and arresting those in violation of the city's registration regime. Alisa Nikolina, Lawlessness Made Up Like Mourning, Express Chron., Sept. 20, 1999, http://www.online.ru/sp/chronicle-eng/20-Sep-99/104-eng.html.
50. At the same time, the Moscow television station TVC conducted a public opinion poll that asked, "Do you agree with the regime of registration becoming more strict?" More than ninety percent of the respondents answered "Yes." O.I. Cherepova, Moscow After Explosions: Ethnical Purges, Moscow Illegals/Human Rights in Moscow, at http://www.nelegal.ru/purges.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2000). Though this number was almost certainly inflated by the deadly apartment bombings that had just taken place and the fact that they were being blamed on non-Muscovites, it is nonetheless a telling figure that may explain why such systems have not been relinquished.
51. Referring to the dark-skinned people of the Caucasus region, some ethnic Russian Muscovites express the view that "[i]f you abolish the propiska, Moscow . . . will be bought out by 'blacks.'" Buida, supra note 8. In addition, the Moscow police force allegedly targets darker-skinned visitors for passport checks and arrests. See Mikhail A. Alexseev, Russia's Troubles, From Rubles to U-Hauls, Seattle Times, Nov. 8, 1998, at B9 (explaining that Moscow registration regime targets Moscow's ethnic minorities so extensively that one observer described its operation as "quiet ethnic cleansing . . . going on in the streets of Moscow");
52. Residence Permits Stay, Mayor Says, Moscow Times, Mar. 11, 1998, Lexis, News Library, Mostms file (arguing that local officials use residence permits to exclude "non-Russian ethnic groups"). Human rights groups argue that the Moscow police force's focus on ethnic non-Russians often serves as a pretext for soliciting bribes from the unregistered, which in turn makes many ethnic non-Russians living in Moscow fearful of leaving their homes lest they be forced to pay a bribe.
53. See Human Rights Watch, Russian Federation: Ethnic Discrimination in Southern Russia (1998) (arguing that "the system serves as a mechanism for eliciting government revenue and bribes"), http://www.hrw.org/ hrw/reports98/russia.
54. In addition to racism and the desire to protect against migrants, simple institutional inertia likely plays some role in the local support for Moscow's restrictive regime. As explained above, internal passports and movement restrictions have existed in one form or another for the better part of three hundred years. Certainly institutional memory can be overcome, but it is important to recognize that the practice of restricting movement is an entrenched one in Russia.
55. In arguments before the Russian Constitutional Court on March 12, 1996, Moscow city representatives, along with representatives of another region, explained that city residents were deeply worried "about the damaging effects of sudden population growth in their regions" if restrictions were abandoned. Katanian, supra note 33, at 54-55. When Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov made his famous statement in March 1998 that the city would continue its restrictions in the face of the decisive Constitutional Court decision declaring that local restrictions on registration could not stand, he cited concern over huge numbers of people seeking permission to live in the capital, thus draining the city's social service funds. Residence Permits Stay, Mayor Says, supra note 39; see also U.S. Comm. for Refugees, supra note 4, at 201 (authorities claim "immigrants are overrunning the city");
56. Sergei Blagov, Security Sweep Hits Displaced People, Inter Press Serv., Sept. 27, 1999, Lexis, News Library, Inpres file (expressing concern that without registration system "capital would be swamped").
57. It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine whether or not the removal of restrictions on registration would actually result in the expected deluge of migrants. However, it would be interesting to examine whether, given the huge price disparities that exist between rural and urban areas in Russia and the crippling housing shortage that exists in Moscow, removal of registration restrictions actually would lead to tremendous numbers of additional migrants.
58. Those studying rural to urban migration in other nations have discussed at length the short-term effects of mass migration and the tendency of political leaders to believe that such migration poses insurmountable problems, including high unemployment, overcrowding, and breakdowns in city services. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bussey, The Flight From Rural Poverty - How Nations Cope 2-12 (1973) (discussing debate over urbanization). However, the consensus is that those short-term difficulties can be overcome and that in the long term, the effects of restraining labor mobility are much worse than the short-term growing pains of allowing free movement. See id. at 12 (noting that "vast majority" of countries take voluntary approach to problems of internal migration).
59. Another aspect of the question of registration restrictions that is beyond the scope of this Note is the extent to which it is fair for city dwellers to want to protect their preferable city lifestyle by excluding those who were not lucky enough to be born or otherwise registered in the city.
60. David Hoffman, Moscow Mayor Defies Court on Residence Rights, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1998, at A19.
61. Moscow wields eighty percent of Russia's financial resources, and Muscovites' mean income is four times the national average. Tim Obojski, Russia's Richest City Stingy with Residence Permits, AAP Newsfeed, Jan. 18, 1998, Lexis, News Library, Aapnew file.
62. Stephanie Simon, For Many Russians, the Key to the City May Be a Marriage Certificate, L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1996, at A33. Unveiling the new system, Yuri I. Sharagorov, Deputy Director of Moscow's passport department, declared: "We're moving away from the Middle Ages and we're joining the civilized world."
63. Stephanie Simon, For Many Russians, the Key to the City May Be a Marriage Certificate, L.A. Times, 1996, A33 Id.
64. See id. (criticizing proposed system); see also Rubins, supra note 9, at 556 (discussing restrictive requirements). For a description of the administrative requirements, see infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
65. Pravila registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossijskoj Federatsii s registratsionnogo ucheta po mestu prebyvaniya i po mestu zhitel'stva v Moskve i Moskovskoj Oblasti [Rules on the Registration of Citizens of the Russian Federation and Their Removal from the Roster According to Place of Sojourn and Residence Within Moscow and Moscow Oblast] art. 3 (1999) [hereinafter Moscow Rules], http://spros.ru/answer/otv1417.htm.
66. Pravila registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossijskoj Federatsii s registratsionnogo ucheta po mestu prebyvaniya i po mestu zhitel'stva v Moskve i Moskovskoj Oblasti [Rules on the Registration of Citizens of the Russian Federation and Their Removal from the Roster According to Place of Sojourn and Residence Within Moscow and Moscow Oblast] Id. art. 1, § 8.
67. Pravila registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossijskoj Federatsii s registratsionnogo ucheta po mestu prebyvaniya i po mestu zhitel'stva v Moskve i Moskovskoj Oblasti [Rules on the Registration of Citizens of the Russian Federation and Their Removal from the Roster According to Place of Sojourn and Residence Within Moscow and Moscow Oblast] Id. art. 1. A more direct translation is "registration for the place one is and registra-tion for the place where one lives."
68. Pravila registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossijskoj Federatsii s registratsionnogo ucheta po mestu prebyvaniya i po mestu zhitel'stva v Moskve i Moskovskoj Oblasti [Rules on the Registration of Citizens of the Russian Federation and Their Removal from the Roster According to Place of Sojourn and Residence Within Moscow and Moscow Oblast] Id. art. 2.
69. Pravila registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossijskoj Federatsii s registratsionnogo ucheta po mestu prebyvaniya i po mestu zhitel'stva v Moskve i Moskovskoj Oblasti [Rules on the Registration of Citizens of the Russian Federation and Their Removal from the Roster According to Place of Sojourn and Residence Within Moscow and Moscow Oblast] Id.
70. Simon, supra note 46, at A33. In 1996, the space requirement in Moscow was fifty-four square feet of living space per person. Pravila registratsii i snyatiya grazhdan Rossijskoj Federatsii s registratsionnogo ucheta po mestu prebyvaniya i po mestu zhitel'stva v Moskve i Moskovskoj Oblasti [Rules on the Registration of Citizens of the Russian Federation and Their Removal from the Roster According to Place of Sojourn and Residence Within Moscow and Moscow Oblast] Id.
71. Moscow Rules, supra note 48, art. 2.
72. Tayler, supra note 30, at 56 (documenting rarity of written leases in Russia).
73. See E-mail from Serge, Co-Founder, Moscow Illegals/Human Rights in Moscow, to Damian Schaible (Jan. 21, 2000) (on file with author) ("NOBODY wants to pay taxes in Russia. Taxes take away almost all money from the rent."); see also Tayler, supra note 30, at 56 (stating: [Russian landlords] need to rent apartments - but leases are almost unheard of. By law the lessors - possessors of propiski - must register leases with the Tax Inspectorate and pay tax on the rent received, but, ever wary of contact with the state and reluctant to pay taxes, they usually do neither.).
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. This poses a serious problem if one of the registered inhabitants is out of town, has left home permanently, is wary of signing a document that will go to a distrusted government, or simply does not like his or her relative.
75. Simon, supra note 46, at A33.
76. Mayor Luzhkov's unconstitutional actions restricting free movement through Moscow's registration regime have not gone unnoticed in the international community. For example, a February 2000 State Department report singled out Luzhkov for his continued use of a restrictive registration system clearly at odds with Russian Constitutional Court decisions. See 2 U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999, at 1775 (2000) [hereinafter State Department Report] (describing Luzhkov's response to decisions).
77. See Moskva mer rasporyazheniye N. 1007-RM, O neotlozhnykh merakh po obespecheniyu poryadka registratsii grazhdan, vremenno prebyvayuschikh v g[orode] Moskve [Moscow Mayor's Order No. 1007-RM, On Urgent Measures for Assuring the Proper Registration of Citizens Temporarily Residing in the City of Moscow] (Sept. 13, 1999) [hereinafter September 13 Decree], http://www.mos.ru/cgi-bin/alpha/ con_law?6,31,8407.
78. Though it is outside the scope of this Note to discuss at length, many commentators argue that the issuance of the decree was itself violative of the Russian Constitution. Article 15 of the Constitution states that no normative legal act affecting individual "rights, liberties or duties" can be enforced unless it is first officially published. Konst. RF art. 15, § 3 (Russ.), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 5 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994). Mayor Luzhkov's September 13 decree was issued and began to be enforced without any prior publication. See Cherepova, supra note 38 (arguing that because decree was unpublished, "there were no legitimate grounds for its execution"). Many also argue that another decree on Moscow's registration system issued by Mayor Luzhkov shortly after the September 13 decree is similarly contrary to Russia's Constitution.
79. See Svetlana Sukhova, Registration Is Illegitimate Child of Constitution, Segodnya, Sept. 29, 1999, at 1,
80. partially reprinted in Russian Press Digest, Sept. 29, 1999, Lexis, News Library, Spd file
81. (citing and discussing Ob utverzhdenii vremennogo poryadka peremeschenniya lits, zlostno narushayuschikh pravila registratsion-novo ucheta, za predely goroda Moskvy k mectu ikh postoyannogo prozhivanniya [Provisional Regulation for Moving Persons Outside the Moscow City Boundary for a Gross Violation of the Registration Regime] (Sept. 21, 1999) [hereinafter September 21 Decree], http://www.mos.ru/cgi-bin/alpha/con_law?6,38,8620).
82. The September 21 decree permanently tightened Moscow's registration system for visitors, imposing "administrative fines" on visitors who fail to register with authorities within three days of arrival in the city. Id. If after paying the fine a visitor still does not register, he or she can be detained and deported from the city. Id. Commentators argue that this decree is unconstitutional because it imposes punishment for registration violations in excess of that provided in Kodeks R.S.F.S.R. ob Administrativnyikh Pravonarusheniyakh [R.S.F.S.R. Code of Administrative Violations] art. 178 (2000), http://black.inforis.nnov.su/infobase/www.exe/a/90.new/ ?docid=9309264@KWX, which lists a fine or a warning as the permissible punishment. See Cherepova, supra note 38 (arguing that decree is invalid).
83. Zoya Oryakhova, Terror Against Russians, Express Chron. Hum. Rts. Wkly., Sept. 27, 1999, http://www.online.ru/sp/chronicle-eng/27-Sep-99/103-eng.html.
84. Cherepova, supra note 38.
85. Eichrodt, supra note 2, at A21 (stating that "some 15,000 people had been refused registration and ordered out of the city" only days after Mayor Luzhkov signed September 13 Decree); see also Cherepova, supra note 38 (describing reregistration ordeal).
86. Press Release, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Moscow Prepares for Final Expulsion of Chechens (Oct. 6, 1999) (discussing alleged orders), http://www.rferl.org/welcome/ english/releases/russia991006.html.
87. September 13 Decree, supra note 60 ("[I]t is necessary to establish the purpose of temporarily staying in the city.").
88. E-mail from Serge to Damian Schaible, supra note 56.
89. Oryakhova, supra note 61.
90. Both the text of the Moscow registration rules and the decrees and actions of the city's mayor severely restrict who can register to live in Moscow. However, even if one can comply with all of the official requirements imposed by both the rules and the mayor, she is still not guaranteed registration in Moscow. Registration seekers report having to stand in line for days at various offices, enduring insults and abuse from officials, and often having to bribe authorities to get registered. Rubins, supra note 9, at 556. Officials are said to demand additional documents and the payment of high fees not required by the Moscow rules. Karush, supra note 1. Though the text of the Moscow rules provides for a completely nondiscretionary registration, commentators explain that the reality in Russia's capital city is that authorities often deny registration. See Alex Grigorievs, A Letter from Moscow: Caucasians and the Capital, Forced Migration Monitor (Open Soc'y Inst., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1999 ("The authorities . . . have the right to either grant or deny registration."), http://www.soros.org/fmp2/html/march99.html.
91. From a practical perspective, unofficial restrictions imposed by city authorities are said to limit registrations to those with the financial means either to buy property or to pay large bribes. David Hoffman, A State of Lawlessness: Corruption, Coercion Reign in Russia, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1999, at A18.
92. Ethnic minorities in Russia, especially dark-skinned people from the Caucasus region, fare the worst, with authorities regularly discriminating against them in refusing their applications for registration. See Jon Wright, Criticism of Police Crackdown Was Media's Right, Duty, Russ. J., Oct. 4, 1999 ("[Police] officers have been known to demand bribes and refuse registration on ethnic grounds."), http://www.russiajournal.ru/weekly/article.shtml?ad=1452; see also Alexseev, supra note 39, at B9 (detailing hardships faced by Caucasians under Moscow system).
93. Among those kept out was Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the liberal Yabloko party that opposes Mayor Luzhkov's party. Mr. Yavlinsky was denied a propiska in December 1998 in the Moscow district of Odintsovo amid speculation that he was denied registration in order to block him from running for governor of the region. Yavlinsky Is Denied the Propiska, Parlamentskaya Gazeta, Dec. 3, 1998, at 4, Lexis, News Library, Wps file.
94. One might argue about what constitutes the set of "human rights" and whether the right to free movement should be included. However, under Russian law the argument is moot, because the 1993 Constitution includes the right to free movement in a chapter entitled "Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen." Konst. RF ch. 2 (Russ.), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 5 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994).
95. In addition to violating the human rights of the unregistered, Moscow's restrictive registration system also presents more general problems that affect the registered and unregistered alike. For example, it opens Russia to international criticism, since the nation is a signatory to several conventions upholding the right to free movement. See supra note 14. For examples of criticism by groups such as Human Rights Watch, the Soros Foundation, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Moscow Illegals/Human Rights in Moscow (a grassroots organization founded by a group of unregistered Muscovites), and the U.S. Department of State, see Human Rights Watch, supra note 39 (arguing that propiska is illegal); see also 2 State Department Report, supra note 59, at 1774 (condemning discriminatory use of registration system);
96. Human Rights Watch, Confessions at Any Cost: Police Torture in Russia (1999) (same), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/russia/Russ99o-10.htm#P1307_259151; U.S. Comm. for Refugees, supra note 4, at 200 (describing "enormous" registration barriers); Grigorievs, supra note 68 (detailing plight of unregistered);
97. Moscow Illegals/Human Rights in Moscow, at http://www.nelegal.net.
98. Also, restricting labor mobility can have dire effects on Russia's economy, as it did on the Soviet Union's. See Nicholas Daniloff, In Russia, Shortage of Workers Is the Problem, U.S. News & World Rep., July 18, 1983, at 68 (explaining that economy of Soviet Union was severely impaired by labor mobility restrictions, as some businesses experienced massive labor shortages while others remained overstaffed);
99. see also Amy J. Bliss, Comment, Proletariat to Perestroika: A Comparison of Labor Law in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, 18 Comp. Lab. L.J. 264, 268-69 (1997) (arguing that restricted labor mobility tying was constant and severe problem under highly regulated economy of Soviet Union).
100. Specter, supra note 6, at A4.
101. See Simon, supra note 46, at 6 (describing entitlements of propiska).
102. Obojski, supra note 45.
103. See Matthew Fisher, An Entire Nation on the Take: Russia, Especially in Moscow, Must Replace Rule of Thuggery with the Rule of Law, Toronto Sun, Dec. 28, 1998, at 16 (describing common practice of bribing police).
104. See Open Letter, supra note 4 (describing process of removal). There is evidence that even with the widespread practice of bribing police to avoid detention, unregistered Muscovites are often taken into custody. For instance, during September 1999 alone, Moscow police took 20,000 people into custody for violations of the city's registration rules. Karush, supra note 1; Fred Weir, Return of Babushki and Pogroms, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 23, 1999, at 6.
105. As one commentator put it: "The propiska amounts to a municipal citizenship of sorts - those caught without the indigo blotch in their internal passports risk jail, fines, or expulsion beyond city limits." Tayler, supra note 30, at 56. However, the unregistered in Moscow are treated much worse than noncitizens in many places of the world. As Amnesty International observed, they "do not enjoy regular access to medical care, education and social services and are often subjected to arbitrary arrest and forcible expulsion by the law enforcement officials." Amnesty Int'l, Russian Federation: Chechnya: For the Motherland (Report No. EUR 46/46/99, 1999), http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1999/EUR/ 44604699.htm.
106. Indeed, the existence of this class is itself compelling evidence that Moscow is a "closed" city for many potential registrants. When one looks at the tremendous hardships and persecutions faced by unregistered Muscovites, it becomes obvious that few would choose the situation in which they find themselves.
107. See supra note 4.
108. Dana Dallas Atchison, Notes on Constitutionalism for a 21st-century Russian President, 6 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 239, 336 (1998);
109. William E. Butler, The Rule of Law and the Legal System, in Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics 104 (Stephen White et al. eds., 1992). Atchison argues that in the Soviet period, all law came out of present political expediency, instead of some concept of fundamental ideals. Atchison, supra, at 289. She argues that this muddying of the line between politics (based on short-term interests) and law (based on long-term principles) remains a problem in Russia today. See id. at 243 ("[W]hen the distinction between politics and [law] is obscured, the constitutional order is threatened.").
110. See Christopher T. Ruder, Comment, Individual Economic Rights Under the New Russian Constitution: A Practical Framework for Competitive Capitalism or Mere Theoretical Exercise?, 39 St. Louis U.L.J. 1429, 1435 (1995) (arguing that dictatorship of proletariat, or in Russia, dictatorship of Communist Party, alone was to define boundaries of political and economic activities in socialist system). Lenin defined this dictatorship as "nothing more nor less than authority untrammeled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on force."
111. V.I. Lenin, A Contribution to the History of Dictatorship (1920),
112. reprinted in 31 Collected Works 340, 353 (Julius Katzer ed., 1966).
113. See Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1327, 1339 (1998) (describing Soviet Union as nation where "[1]aws, rules, and sentences to labor camps could all be changed at the whim of a Communist official").
114. For a good general history of the role of law in Russia and how legality was strongly rejected in favor of unlimited power for the state under both Czarism and pre-Gorbachev Soviet rule, see Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for Constitutional Law in Soviet Disunion, 30 Stan. J. Int'l L. 41, 48-83 (1994).
115. See Konst. RF art. 4, § 2 (Russ.) ("The Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws shall have supremacy throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation."), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 2 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994);
116. see also id. at art. 1, § 1 ("Russia shall be a democratic federal rule-of-law state with the republican form of government."), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 1 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994).
117. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, Foreign Aff., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 95, 96.
118. See Atchison, supra note 80, at 250 (arguing that "no one should stand above the law"); see also Carothers, supra note 84, at 96 (explaining that in rule-of-law nation, government and government officials accept that law applies to them and seek to be law-abiding).
119. Vasily A. Vlashin, Toward a Rule of Law and a Bill of Rights for Russia, in Law and Democracy in the New Russia 43, 43 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Gennady M. Danilenko eds., 1993);
120. see also Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat): With Special Reference to the Soviet Union, in Toward the "Rule of Law" in Russia? 43, 47 (Donald D. Barry ed., 1992) (arguing that in addition to other elements, rule of law includes rule of laws, whereby state rules by law rather than fiat, and is bound by its own laws, which it must enforce fairly);
121. Kathryn Hendley, The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian Legal Culture, 5 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 39, 41 (1995) ("The core element of the rule of law is that law applies in equal measure to the powerful and the non-powerful and that legal institutions have sufficient authority and independence to make the remedies imposed against the powerful meaningful.").
122. See Berman, supra note 86, at 45 (explaining that idea of rule of law, as currently used, includes concept of natural law); see also Carothers, supra note 84, at 96 (explaining that laws of rule-of-law state protect civil liberties and universal human rights); Kartashkin, supra note 24, at 893 (arguing that in rule-of-law state, "legislation must . . . be democratic as well as supreme, protecting human rights and freedoms directly or indirectly, and serving the interests of society as a whole"). These scholars use different terms, such as "law-based state" to discuss nations in which law is supreme, but whose laws may or may not be just. See Berman, supra note 86, at 47 (explaining that in law-based state, nation's lawmaker - rather than higher conception of justice - is ultimate source of law, but state is still bound by law it creates).
123. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text (discussing legislature's declarations of freedom of movement in Russia).
124. Kartashkin, supra note 24, at 893.
125. See Konst. RF art. 4, § 2 (Russ.) ("The Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws shall have supremacy throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation."), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 2 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994).
126. The Russian Constitution, approved by national referendum on December 12, 1993, created a federal structure with a central government and various "subjects of the Russian Federation." Id at art. 5, reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 2 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994).
127. There are currently eighty-nine such "subjects," divided into republics, territories (krais), regions (oblasts), federal cities, and autonomous areas (okrugs), each with different rights and responsibilities under the Constitution. Id. at art. 5, § 1, reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 2 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994).
128. For a general discussion of the Russian federal system and the types of subjects it includes, see Todd Alan Frommeyer, Power Sharing Treaties in Russia's Federal System, 21 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 1, 4-10 (1999).
129. Judicial review of the nation's laws is considered by many scholars to be vital to a constitution-based, rule-of-law state. See Atchison, supra note 80, at 255 (arguing that judicial review is important component of rule-of-law state). Some commentators argue for alternatives to judicial review in nations where it does not operate effectively, especially in the context of enforcing the rights of individuals against attack by unconstitutional government action. See Justice Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 559, 587-89 (1993) (arguing for use of ombudsman or procurator - independent agent or agent of State, respectively - to challenge unconstitutional government actions on individuals' behalf). However, this Note will limit its discussion to traditional judicial review, because the Russian Constitution allows for it,
130. see Konst. RF art. 125, §§ 4-6 (Russ.), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 37 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994), and the Russian Constitutional Court has engaged in it, see infra Part II.B.1.
131. See Maggs, supra note 32, at 564-65 (noting Court's turbulent beginnings). The Russian Constitution establishes the Constitutional Court as, among other things, the protector of constitutional rights, both hearing cases brought by individual citizens and deciding on constitutional questions certified by ordinary courts. Herbert Hausmaninger, Towards a "New" Russian Constitutional Court, 28 Cornell Int'l L.J. 349, 367 n.120 (1995). For a description of the Russian Constitutional Court, see id. at 366-78.
132. The right to free movement is granted in Chapter 2 of the Russian Constitution, entitled "The Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen." Konst. RF ch. 2 (Russ.), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 5 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994). Article 72 of the Constitution explains that human rights and freedoms are an area of joint jurisdiction, meaning that both subjects of the Federation and the federal government can legislate in the area. See Frommeyer, supra note 90, at 23, 27 (listing areas of joint jurisdiction). However, when the federal government legislates in an area of joint jurisdiction, federal law is controlling over local or regional law. See id. at 23 (requiring subjects to "pass laws in their own territory bringing into effect the federal law"). Therefore, under the Russian Constitution, regional and local governments must comply with federal law on the topic of movement restrictions.
133. 1993 Law, supra note 11.
134. Id. art. 1.
135. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 549 (analogizing registration system ideal to census or draft registration).
136. Id.
137. The 1993 Constitution's focus on human rights led many commentators, upon its adoption, to be extremely optimistic about human and civil rights in Russia. See, e.g., Ronald C. Monticone, A Brief Comparative Analysis of the Russian Constitution, in Constitution of the Russian Federation: With Commentaries and Interpretation by American and Russian Scholars 7, 9 (Vladimir V. Belyakov & Walter J. Raymond eds., 1994) (comparing new Russian Constitution favorably to U.S. Constitution).
138. Konst. RF art. 27, § 1 (Russ.), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 7 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994).
139. Section 2 of Article 27 extends this right of free movement to non-Russian citizens legally in Russia. Rubins, supra note 9, at 552. Article 18 of the Constitution also takes the significant step of giving direct effect to "[t]he rights and liberties of man and citizen," declaring that they be used to "determine the meaning, content[,] and application of the laws, and the activities of the legislative and executive branches and local self-government, and [ordering that they be] secured by the judiciary." Konst. RF art. 18 (Russ.), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 5 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994). The "rights and liberties" that should be used to give meaning to any other laws of the country clearly include the right to freedom of movement. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 552-53 (pointing out that Article 18 of Constitution effectively defines rights to be given special status as those "codified in treaties and conventions signed by the Russian Federation," and listing three such documents that establish freedom of movement as right: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Council of Europe Charter and Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
140. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [Civil Code] ch. 2 (Russ.), translated in Lexis, Garant 10064072.
141. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [Civil Code] Id. art. 150.1.
142. It is important to note that the freedom of movement enunciated by the 1993 Law, the Constitution, and the Civil Code is not absolute. For instance, the 1993 Law provides for exceptions, when the right may be "restricted according to the laws of the Russian Federation." 1993 Law, supra note 11, art. 8. Neither the Constitution nor the Civil Code renounce these exceptions. Restrictions are permitted in border areas, closed military cities, closed territories, ecological disaster areas, quarantined cities, and "territories where a state of emergency or martial law has been introduced." Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [Civil Code] Id.
143. However, in a 1998 decision, the Constitutional Court held that only the federal government may invoke these exceptions. 1998 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 6, Art. No. 7083, at 1538, 1539-40. Since the federal government has not included the city of Moscow in any of these categories, these exceptions are not important for the purposes of this Note.
144. 1993 Law, supra note 11, art. 4.
145. Federal Rules, supra note 11.
146. Federal Rules, Id.
147. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 551 (arguing that in some ways, Federal Rules missed their chance truly to support right to free movement, because they allowed for "limited circumstances" under which someone could be denied registration, which actually resulted in great deal of administrative discretion to reject registrations).
148. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 109, 117, 121. The Court actually touched upon the propiska system in a case decided on April 25, 1995, before the promulgation of the 1995 Federal Rules, but it is not discussed herein because it did not reach the constitutionality of the system. See Katanian, supra note 33, at 53 (describing litigation over housing code). The Court also addressed registration systems in a 1998 decision declaring that Russian citizens need not go to the city in which they are registered to apply for a passport to travel abroad. See infra note 120.
150. See 1996 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 16, Art. No. 1909, at 4195 (finding propiska unconstitutional).
151. Zakon goroda Moskvy, O sbore na kompensatsiyu zatrat gorodskogo byudzheta po razvitiyu infrastruktury goroda i obspecheniyu sotsial'no bytovymi usloviyami grazhdan, pribivayuschikh v g[orod] Moskvu na zhitelstvo [City of Moscow Law on Fees to Compensate the City Budget for Expenses Incurred in Developing the City's Infrastructure and Guaranteeing Social and Living Conditions for Citizens Who Arrive in the City for Residency] (Sept. 14, 1994), http://www.duma.mos.ru/cgi-bin/mgd/lawlhtml?73,1.
152. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 559 n.88 ("All [statutes] provided for some substantial payment of registration tax or fee . . . .").
153. See id. at 560 (describing Court's findings).
154. See Katanian, supra note 33, at 55 ("The imposition of a registration fee may not impair an individual in his free exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms."). At the time of this decision, regions, pursuant to a presidential decree, had the power to impose taxes. This decree was repealed, so regions now may impose only taxes specifically envisaged by the federal government. Id. at 56.
155. See supra note 102.
156. See 1996 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 16, Art. No. 1909, at 4195, 4199 (holding that limitations on right to free movement only can be imposed by federal law and even then only "to the degree necessary to defend the basis of constitutional governance, morality, health, the rights and legal interests of others; for the national defense and security of the state").
157. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 561 (describing generally reaction to 1996 decision). For instance, the Moscow region enacted a new registration law, lowering its registration fee from $6000 (or 500 times the monthly minimum wage) to $3900 (or 300 times the wage). Id. at 561 n.99; Moscow Oblast Law on Fees to Compensate for Budget Expenses Related to the Development of Municipal Infrastructure in Populated Areas of the Oblast and the Guarantee of Social and Living Conditions of Citizens Who Arrive in Moscow Oblast for Permanent Residence (July 5, 1996), cited in Katanian, supra note 33, at 56.
158. 1997 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 27, Art. No. 3304, at 5421.
159. Katanian, supra note 33, at 56.
160. 1997 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1997, No. 27, Art. No. 3304, at 5423.
161. There was another decision, handed down by the Court one month earlier, which also touched on the propiska. This Note, however, will not discuss this decision because it attacked the federal practice of requiring citizens to go to the city where they are registered in order to apply for a passport to travel abroad, rather than attacking the registration systems themselves. See Katanian, supra note 33, at 56-57 (describing case).
162. 1998 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 6, Art. No. 7083, at 1538. This decision differed from the first two discussed herein in that it focused not on regional or local registration regimes, but on an act of the federal government.
163. In the 1998 decision, the Court found the 1995 Rules to be constitutionally defective. It also overturned Point 10 of the 1995 Rules, which limited temporary residence in an area to six months. Rubins, supra note 9, at 562. The Court held that by setting a limit on the amount of time a person can stay in a place away from home, the federal government unconstitutionally "'intru[des] . . . into civil, housing and other legal relationships.'" Andrei Zolotov, Jr., Court Takes Step Towards Dismantling Propiskas, Moscow Times, Feb. 4, 1998, 1998 WL 11689872 (quoting decision).
164. See Rubins, supra note 9, at 562 ("[G]rounds for refusal provided in the Rules were deemed unacceptable.").
165. 1998 Decision, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1998, No. 6, Art. No. 7083, at 1538, 1539.
166. Id. at 1542. Unfortunately, the Court failed to set a specific timeline for abolishment.
167. Id. at 1539.
168. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
169. See Residence Permits Stay, Mayor Says, supra note 39 (reporting that Luzhkov vowed to preserve registration system).
170. Hoffman, supra note 45, at A19.
171. One noted commentator has written: "Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has always refused to honor the provision of the Russian Constitution guaranteeing freedom of movement, so the city still retains its Soviet era 'propiska' system." Eichrodt, supra note 2, at A21. Similarly, Georgy Pavlov, an analyst with the Russian-European Center for Economic Policy, has said that '"[e]ven though the Constitutional Court ruled that Luzhkov's order to keep the propiska in Moscow is unconstitutional, it is still here.'" Yevgenia Borisova, City Says Firms Must Justify Western Staff, Moscow Times, Apr. 3, 1999, Lexis, News Library, Mostms file (quoting Pavlov).
172. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.1.
173. Though it is beyond the scope of this Note, one natural question might be: "Why do federal leaders not desire strongly to enforce federal will and laws in this area?" This question is extremely complicated and straightforward at the same time. On the one hand, as in many complex sociopolitical situations, there are innumerable potential reasons for the indifference of federal leaders and pointing to one or another is pure speculation. On the other hand, the answer is simply that Russia has not yet attained the rule of law, and therefore the leaders - as well as average Russians - do not live in a nation where enforcement of the law is assumed.
174. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
175. Blagov, supra note 41. It is interesting to note that there is Russian precedent for this type of decentralization of state power. Throughout the Soviet period, power was centralized in the Union government. See G. Alan Tarr, Creating Federalism in Russia, 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 689, 692 & n.10 (1999) (explaining that despite fact that Soviet Constitution set Union up as federal state, it was unitary state with strong center). However, the system of centralized power was challenged just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1990, the Russian government - which at the time was just one republic of the Soviet Union - challenged the superiority of Soviet law by passing a declaration that proclaimed the "supremacy" of the Russian Constitution and Russian laws throughout the territory of Russia and declaring void all Soviet laws that ran counter to Russian law.
176. O gosudarstvennom surerenitete Rossiiskoy Sovyetskoy Federativnoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki [Declaration of State Sovereignty of the R.S.F.S.R.] (adopted June 12, 1990), http:// black.inforis.nnov.su/infobase/www.exe/a/90.new/?docid=9038679@KWX.
177. See Cherepova, supra note 38 (discussing draft resolution calling for strict observation of federal constitutional and statutory provisions in responding to terrorist acts).
178. See id.
179. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
180. See Boylan, supra note 82, at 1337 (arguing that attitude of Russian officials towards Constitutional Court must change).
181. Id. at 1329, 1337.
182. Nikolai T. Vedernikov & O.N. Vedernikova, Problems of Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Formulation of a "Rule of Law" State in Russia, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 907, 912 (1994).
183. See Boylan, supra note 82, at 1329 (explaining that in constitutional democracy, government officials must uphold decisions of judiciary, even if they disagree with them).
184. See Konst. RF ch. 7 (Russ.) (providing for organization and operation of federal judiciary), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 35-38 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994); see also Vedernikov & Vedernikova, supra note 140, at 912 (explaining that Russian Constitutional Court has no enforcement power of its own and must rely on other branches of government to enforce its decisions).
185. Cf. Boylan, supra note 82, at 1336 (arguing that unlike U.S. counterparts, Russian officials are unwilling to abide by Court decisions).
186. See id. at 1336-37 ("If Russia is ever to create a true democracy, this [lack of respect for Russian Courts] must change.").
187. Supra note 90 and accompanying text.
188. Supra Part II.B.1.
189. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1779), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 480 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1977).
190. Louise I. Shelley, Legal Consciousness and the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, in Toward the "Rule of Law" in Russia?, supra note 86, at 63, 68.
191. See Atchison, supra note 80, at 258-61 (citing lack of respect for written law under Soviet system, because it was used to further state interests over those of individual).
192. Interview with Alexander Domrin, Foundation for Legal Reform and Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 20, 2000).
193. See Berman, supra note 86, at 43 (arguing that concept of law-based state conflicted with absolute supremacy of Communist Party and with Marxist-Leninist idea that law is only expression of ruling class will).
194. Kathryn Hendley, Trying to Make Law Matter: Legal Reform and Labor Law in the Soviet Union 4 (1996).
195. See Atchison, supra note 80, at 255 (describing Soviet judiciary's complete dependence on Communist Party and "telephone justice," whereby party leaders would call judges to dictate decisions); see also Utter & Lundsgaard, supra note 91, at 573 (explaining that independent judicial review was incompatible with socialist system in Soviet Union).
196. Boylan, supra note 82, at 1339.
197. See Konst. RF art. 1 (Russ.) ("Russia shall be a democratic federal rule-of-law state . . . ."), reprinted in Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Russian Federation 1, 1 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1994).
198. See Boylan, supra note 82, at 1340-41 (listing several cases since 1991 where Russian courts have declared practices unconstitutional, including holding that practice of charging foreigners extra for accommodations violates Equal Protection Clause of Russian Constitution, and declaring that prosecutors' common practice of appealing criminal acquittals violates Double Jeopardy Clause).
199. See id. at 1328 (explaining that as part of Soviet legacy, "Russians remain very suspicious of the judiciary").
200. See id. at 1328, 1344 (describing lack of confidence in legal and judicial system).
201. Shelley, supra note 148, at 66.
202. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
203. See Shelley, supra note 148, at 69 ("Citizens . . . cannot immediately reorient their attitudes toward Soviet legal institutions. Long suppressed by the law, they cannot be expected to rapidly turn to the courts for the protection of their rights.").
204. See supra note 147; see also Boylan, supra note 82, at 1337 ("The burden rests with the Russian voter.").
205. See Boylan, supra note 82, at 1337, 1344 (describing lack of respect for rule of law).
206. Commentators, drawing lessons from the early United States Supreme Court and Chief Justice John Marshall, argue that the Russian Constitutional Court must seek to establish itself as the final arbiter of the Russian Constitution, while carefully avoiding direct confrontation with political leaders, until the legal culture develops to provide it direct support. See Hausmaninger, supra note 92, at 386 (arguing for judicial restraint); Ruder, supra note 81, at 1461 (same).
207. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
208. This option, aside from its absurd results, is also highly unlikely to be adopted. First, the Soviet propiska system was on its way out even before the fall of the Soviet Union. See supra note 32. As one scholar has noted, the propiska system and its inherent restrictions on the freedom of movement so obviously violated human rights that it had become an "embarrassment" to the Soviet government. Maggs, supra note 32, at 567. If the prereform Soviet government was stepping away from restrictions on movement, it is unlikely that the postreform Russian government will choose to reembrace them. Second, as previously discussed, several international treaties, to which the federal government is a signatory, assert the freedom of movement. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Though that freedom is not uniformly provided today, it is still unlikely that the federal government could renounce the right officially without incurring pressure from these organizations.
209. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
211. See Berman, supra note 86, at 57-58 ("[I]n light of the lack of a sufficiently developed legal culture the time is not yet ripe . . . for . . . the rule of law."); Carothers, supra note 84, at 105 (arguing that overcoming problems Russia faces in attaining rule of law will take decades).
212. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 4.
214. See supra note 71.
215. Hendley, supra note 86, at 62.
216. See supra note 18.
217. Shelley, supra note 148, at 68.
218. Hendley, supra note 86, at 62.
219. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.