Modern constitutions and human rights treaties

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

Volumn 36, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 211-223

  Buergenthal, Thomas ^a,b,c  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNITED NATIONS   (United States)

^c Inter American Court of Human Rights ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25844513937     PISSN: 00101931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. See the list of Professor Henkin's publications in his general course given at the Hague Academy of International Law, Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS [REC. DES COURS] 18 (1989-IV).
2. For Professor Henkin's most recent article on the subject, see generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
3. In my opinion, it was important to get the United States to ratify these treaties in the first place and to attempt thereafter to get the Senate gradually to withdraw some of the RUDs. Moreover, even though the United States ratified with many RUDs, including reservations designed to ensure that these ratifications did not compel the United States to change its domestic law, it is clear that the United States assumed significant international human rights obligations under international law with regard to those international human rights that do not conflict with U.S. law. This is so because the ratifications have the effect of internationalizing these rights, thus obligating the United States to protect such rights both as a matter of domestic and international law. Of course, it would have been preferable not to have the reservations, but this conclusion does not detract from the fact that internationalization of this vast catalogue of rights is a major step forward.
4. See generally Antonio Cassese, Modern Constitutions and International Law, 192 REC. DES COURS 331 (1985-III);
5. Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law, 235 REC. DES COURS 303 (1992-IV).
6. See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 25 (F.R.G.) and COSTITUZIONE art. 10 (Italy). For a discussion of the interrelationship in these countries between treaties and general principles of international law, see Buergenthal, supra note 4 at 342-44.
7. See generally Rosalyn Higgins, United Kingdom, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 123 (F.G. Jacobs & S. Roberts eds., 1987); Buergenthal, supra note 4, at 363-67.
8. See CONST. art. 31 (Arg. 1853).
9. See CONST. art. 133 (Mex. 1917).
10. This is the case in Uruguay, for example. See Héctor Gros Espiell, Los Tratados sobre Derechos Humanos y el Derecho Interno, in 2 ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL DOCTOR HECTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO 1025, 1027-28 (Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1988).
11. See Henry Schermers, Netherlands, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 109, 112-13 (F.G. Jacobs & S. Roberts eds., 1987);
12. E.A. Alkema, Foreign Relations in the Netherlands Constitution of 1983, 31 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 307, 311-13 (1984).
13. Translation by author.
14. See RONNY ABRAHAM, DROIT INTERNATIONAL, DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT FRANÇAIS 117 (1989).
15. See Law No. 7128, art. 1, amending articles 10, 48, 105, and 128 of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Revista Jurisprudencia Constitucional, No. 1, at 13 (1989).
16. See generally, Trejos, La Convencion Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en la Jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional de Costa Rica, REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, No. 1, at 65 (1991).
17. See Cour de Cass., May 27, 1971, Pasicrisie Belge 1971, I, 886 at 915 (Belg.). See also P. De Visscher, La Constitution Belge et le Droit International, 19 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 5, 30-31 (1986).
18. See gernerally Lucius Caflisch, La Pratique Suisse en Matière de Droit International Public 1986, 43 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 156 (1986);
19. Luzius Wildhaber, Conclusion and Implementation of Treaties in Switzerland, in SWISS REPORTS PRESENTED TO THE XIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 173, 190 (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, 1990).
20. But see Lucius Caflisch, Pratique Suisse en Matière de Droit International Public 1989, 47 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 138 (1990).
21. For a complete survey, see Cassese, supra note 4.
22. For an interesting survey of the case law of the States Parties to the European Convention of Human Rights, see Jörg Polakiewicz & Valérie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: The Impact of the Strasbourg Case-Law in States Where Direct Effect is Given to the Convention, (Parts I and II), 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 65, 125 (1991).
23. Translation by author.
24. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force March 23, 1976);
26. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, done Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
27. See Luis Ignacio Sanches Rodríguez, Los Tratados Internacionales Como Fuente del Ordenamiento Jurídico Español, in CURSOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE VITORIA-GASTEK 138, 167-70 (1984).
28. For an analysis of the relevant case law, see Eduardo García de Enterría, Valeur de la Jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme en Droit Espagnol, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION (STUDIES IN HONOUR OF GERARD J. WIARDA) 221 (1989).
29. See Trejos, supra note 13. See, e.g., Case No. 241-89, Supreme Court of Costa Rica (Constitutional Chamber), Dec. 1, 1989, Revista Jurisprudencia Constitutional, No. 1, at 133 (1989).
30. The amendment followed in the wake of a decision of the Argentine Supreme Court that reversed a series of earlier cases and ruled that treaties had to be accorded a higher rank than statutes under Argentine law. That same decision also gave effect to an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, 315 Fallos 1492, 1511-15 (1992) (Arg.). For an extensive analysis of this case, see Thomas Buergenthal, International Tribunals and National Courts: The Internationalization of Domestic Adjudication, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 687, 695-99 (U. Beyerlin, et al. eds., 1995).
31. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE CHILE art. 5 (1989).
32. See generally Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 427 (1994).
33. See generally Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 451 (1994).
34. See generally Manfred Nowak, Allgemeine Bemerkungen zur europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention aus völkerrechtlicher und innerstaatlicher Sicht, in DIE EUROPÄISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION IN DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN HÖCHSTGERICHTE 37, 49-50 (1983). See also Buergenthal, supra note 4, at 356.
35. On this subject, see Lloyd Barnett, The Domestic Appellate Review Process and the Inter-American Convention System: The English-Speaking Caribbean Perspective, 3 EMORY J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 25, 26-27 (1988).
36. For an overview of this practice, see Buergenthal, supra note 4, at 359-63. For an analysis of an interesting U.K. Privy Council case bearing on this subject, see Buergenthal, supra note 24, at 689-95.
37. See Henkin, supra note 2.
38. For a review of the intended meaning of these RUDs, see David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declaration, 14 HUM. RTS. L. J. 77 (1993).
39. See also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 176-98 (2d ed. 1995).
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
41. See Henkin, supra note 2, at 346-48, who albeit for different reasons also believes the practice to be unconstitutional.
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
43. Reservations, Understandings and Declarations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rep. S4781 (Apr. 2, 1982).
44. For example, by not permitting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 32, which the U.S. ratified with the non-self-executing declaration, to be directly invoked in U.S. courts and by not ratifying the Optional Protocol to this instrument, the U.S. has deprived all individuals subject to its jurisdiction of the possibility of challenging the legality of its actions under the Covenant in any forum, be it national or international. This approach is certainly in conflict with the commitment of the United States to the rule of law and the legal principles implicit in it.