Exclusive rights, statutory licenses and compulsory licenses in patent and utility model law

I I C

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 251-274

  Beier, Friedrich Karl ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION   (Germany)

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EID: 25844453473     PISSN: 00189855     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. Cf. EPO proposal for a Regulation, and of the committee on the Community design, as well as the EPO proposal for a Directive, and of the committee for design protection, 1994 GRUR Int. 492; see RIEHLE, 1993 GRUR 49; KROHER, 1993 GRUR 457; KUR, 1993 GRUR Int. 71; BEIER, 1994 GRUR Int. 716; KUR, 1995 GRUR Int. 185; EICHMANN, 1996 GRUR Int. 859; KUR, 1996 GRUR Int. 876.
2. Cf. critical opinion of EICHMANN, 1996 GRUR Int. 859-860, 865-866.
3. On terminology see SCHÖNHERR, "Festschrift für A. Troller" 51, 71 et seq. (1976).
4. For a thorough analysis of the contents of the exclusive rights and the interests thus protected, see also A. TROLLER, "Immaterialgüterrecht" 69 et seq., Vol. 1 (3d ed.), with numerous further references (Basle 1983).
5. Cf. on this point BEIER, "The Significance of the Patent System for Technical, Economic and Social Progress," 11 IIC 563, 582 (1980).
6. E.g., in the ECJ decision, 1974 GRUR Int. 454 - Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug.
7. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 25 IIC 209 (1994), in which very strict requirements are imposed on the grant of statutory licenses and compulsory licenses; cf. on this point STRAUS, 1996 GRUR Int. 179, 200.
8. A. KUR, 1995 GRUR Int. 187, 192.
9. FIKENTSCHER, "FESTSCHRIFT FÜR EUGEN ULMER" 417 (MUNICH 1963).
10. I deliberately employ the term used by the ECJ, since the terms "source" and "source function" are rejected by numerous younger trademark scholars, although they mean the same thing.
11. Cf. on this point BODEWIG, 1982 GRUR Int. 346; 1983 GRUR Int. 891; and in detail MCCARTHY, "Trade Marks and Unfair Competition" Secs. 31, 26 (3d ed.);
12. id., "Compulsory Licensing of Trade Marks, Remedy or Penalty?," 67 TMR 197 (1971).
13. Borden Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982).
14. Cf. on this point BEIER, 1992 GRUR 228, 234, left-hand column and the ECJ decisions cited there.
15. Cf. on this and the following points in particular P. DEMARET, "Patent, Territorial Restrictions, and IIC Law - Legal and Economic Analysis" 3-40, Chapter I,
16. "Stimulation of Invention and Innovation through Market Mechanism" (Vol. 2, IIC Studies, Weinheim 1978), with numerous further references to the pertinent economic literature;
17. as well as the fundamental study by F. MACHLUP, "An Economic Review of the Patent System," Study No. 15, Sub-Committee of the Judiciary of the US Senate, 1958.
18. Cf. BEIER, 1989 GRUR Int. 603, 612-613.
19. Cf. MACHLUP, op. cit., note 28, at 17; and in this respect BEIER, 1979 GRUR 123, 129.
20. DEMARET, supra note 14, at 9 et seq., 12-15.
21. ULLRICH, 1984 GRUR Int. 89, 92.
22. 1996 GRUR Int. 859, 871-872.
23. Art. 14(3) of the 1996 proposal for a Directive.
24. See on these "theories," which can be attributed to the fundamental study by MACHLUP, supra note 14, and which not only apply to patent protection but also to design protection, BEIER, 1 IIC 328 (1970);
25. BEIER & STRAUS, 8 IIC 387 (1977).
26. Of the extensive literature see in particular DIETZ, 2 IIC 155 (1971); id., 1976 GRUR Int. 139 et seq., 265 et seq.; BEIER, 11 IIC 563, 575 et seq.; PRETNAR, 1982 GRUR Int. 1, 8 et seq.,
27. as well as the contributions in DIETZ (ed.), "Das Patentrecht der südosteuropäischen Staaten" (Weinheim 1983).
28. The situation did not improve when a number of countries provided for a half-hearted interim solution according to which the subsequently exploiting entity would participate in the R&D costs for the invention used, since the amount of the participation, which as a rule was determined by the state, did not cover the costs sustained by the original company and, in particular, did not compensate for the risk involved.
29. Cf. Guo, 16 IIC 367, 370 (1985).
30. A more recent, detailed overview is to be found in J. M. SALAMOLARD AND PFANNER, 1985 NIR 1, 1985 GRUR Int. 357; DEMARET, 18 IIC 161, 163-164 (1987).
31. Cf. PFANNER, 1985 GRUR Int. 371, with further references in note 96; CORNISH, "Intellectual Property" 205-206 (2d ed. 1989);
32. DEMARET, 18 IIC 161, 165 (1987); GREIF, 1981 GRUR Int. 731, 733, with statistics.
33. The compulsory license granted by the Federal Patent Court in its decision dated June 7, 1991, 1994 GRUR 98, for the manufacture and distribution of the pharmaceutical "Polyferon" was revoked by the Federal Supreme Court in its decision of December 5, 1995, 1996 GRUR 190,28 IIC 242 (1997), for lack of a sufficient "public interest."
34. Cf. DURIE, 20 IIC 637, 658-659 (1989).
35. The British Patent System, 4407 Cmnd 1970.
36. Patent Act, S. C. 1993, c. 2, s. 3; see in detail TORREMANS, 27 IIC 316 (1996).
37. However, the justification of international provisions on such licenses within the context of the Paris Convention (Art. 5A) provoked a bitter debate between the developing and the industrialized countries, the dimensions of which stood, in my opinion, in no relation to the minimal benefit of such compulsory measures for the technology transfer to developing countries and for their industrialization. Cf. BEIER, [1986] 12 EIPR 363-365; and in detail KUNZ-HALLSTEIN, 1981 GRUR Int. 347; GREIF, 1981 GRUR Int. 731; in contrast, for a basically positive assessment of the grant of compulsory licenses, particularly for developing countries, see K. PFANNER, supra note 26.
38. The main reason for this willingness is, in my opinion, not the mere existence of provisions on compulsory licenses but the understandable interest on the part of businesses to negotiate privately the amount of the license fees and the remaining licensing conditions with their contractual partners. This is preferable to disclosing to an authority or a court internal business matters, e.g., the amount of R&D costs, in order to determine a reasonable license fee, and have to accept the amount based on such disclosures.
39. Cf. Art. 82 CPC and in this respect DEMARET, supra note 14, at 183-184.
40. Cf. SCHATZ, 1968 GRUR Int. 273.
41. 1996 GRUR 190, 192, 28 IIC 242 (1997).
42. Regarding the historical development, see AKERMAN, "L'obligation d'exploiter et la licence obligatoire en matière de brevets d'invention" 57 et seq. (1936);
43. PENROSE, "The Economics of the International Patent System" 137 et seq. (1951); KUNZ-HALLSTEIN, supra note 31, at 348-349, 353.
44. Cf. in detail on this point GREIF, supra note 31.
45. Correctly, KUNZ-HALLSTEIN, supra note 31, at 354.
46. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
47. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
48. Cf. PIETZKE, "Patentschutz, Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und Konzentration im Recht der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika" 45 et seq. (Cologne 1983), with further information.
49. Id. at 113 et seq.
50. Id. at 121-123 (summary).
51. Prevailing opinion: cf. KRASSER, "Lehrbuch des Patentrechts" 611 (4th ed. 1987);
52. BENKARD, "Patentgesetz," Sec. 24, point 15 (7th ed. 1981); U. KRIEGER, 1989 GRUR Int. 216-218; 1990 GRUR Int. 596, 579 (concerning specifically licenses for dependent patents).
53. Cf. Reich Supreme Court, RGZ 113, 115, 123; Patent Office, 1926 Bl.f.PMZ 149, 151; Federal Supreme Court: 1972 GRUR 471 - Cafilon; - Polyferon, - supra note 27.
54. 83 RGZ 9, 14, in detail and with reference to the historical development.
55. 83 RGZ 9, 14, 15.
56. Correctly, KRASSER, supra note 44, at 615, decision of the Reich Supreme Court, supra note 46.
57. Regarding the term "dependent," cf. KRASSER, supra note 44, at 539; U. KRIEGER, 1989 GRUR Int. 216, 217.
58. Cf. STRAUS, 1996 GRUR Int. 179, 200, 201.
59. Cf. BENKARD, supra note 44 and the case law cited therein.
60. Exceptions from this principle only applied previously in the case of bilateral contracts according to which the manufacture in a different country was viewed as national working of the patent; with respect to the manufacture in other EU Member States, cf. Arts. 47, 82 CPC.
61. Cf. the comparative law study of the 1983 Annuaire AIPPI, III, Item 7b.
62. The provisions, namely Sec. 10(1) of the British Design Act of 1949 and Sec. 75(1)(b) of the Irish Statute on Industrial Property of 1927 have never attained practical significance; at least in part, they also violate the Paris Convention and the EC Treaty.
63. See CORNISH, "Intellectual Property" 371 et seq., 378-379 (2d ed. 1989); on the drafting of the new provisions in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, cf. DURIE, supra note 28, at 838.
64. I.e., all EU Member States except for Greece, where so far only a draft design law exists; cf. on this point MINOUDIS, 1980 GRUR Int. 145; KUR, 1980 GRUR Int. 185, 188.
65. The provision in the Scandinavian design laws (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), which in the case of "extraordinary reasons" grants the user acting in good faith at the time of publication of the design the right to a compulsory license for continued use, concerns cases of prior use and intervening right which provide for continued use. In Sweden, a compulsory license can of course be granted where there is a public interest of overriding economic significance.
66. Cf. BODENHAUSEN, "Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property," Art. 5B(C) (Geneva 1968);
67. "Actes de la Conférence de Londres" 380, 460, 515 (Berne 1934).
68. Cf. for Germany: FURLER, "Geschmacksmustergesetz" 122, 286 (3d ed. 1966), 259 et seq. (4th ed. 1984);
69. ENGLERT, "Grundzüge des Rechtsschutzes der industriellen Formgebung" 90 (1976);
70. VON GAMM, "Geschmacksmustergesetz," Sec. 2, point 12 (1966);
71. GERSTENBERG, "Geschmacksmustergesetz" 150-151 (1984);
72. for France: GREFFE & GREFFE, "Traité des dessins et modèles" 203 (Paris 1974);
73. Supreme Court, October 30, 1900, 1901 Dallos 2, 119; for Benelux states: BRAUN & EVRAD, "Droit des dessins et modèles aux Bénelux" 133, No. 171 (Brussels 1975).
74. The resolutions have been published in the "Actes de la Conférence de Washington" 366-368 (1911), "Actes de la Conférence de la Haye" 82, 21 (1926), and "Actes de la Conférence de Londres" 61 (1934).
75. Cf. "Actes de la Conférence de Londres" 506, 520, 540, 541,
76. and in that respect LADAS, "Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights" 903, 904, Vol. 2 (1975).
77. "La protection des dessins et modèles industriels ne peut être ni atteinte par une déchéance quelconque, ni limitée par une licence obligatoire, soit pour défaut d'exploitation, soit pour improduction d'objets conformes à ceux qui sont protégés," cf. "Actes de Londres" 61.
78. Cf. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 58; LADAS, supra note 61, is of a different opinion, at 904, 905, Sec. 519, and refers to the fact that in the case of failure to work design and models there is no abuse of an exclusive right which as such might justify restrictive measures.
79. This is demonstrated by surveying the "Design Laws and Treaties of the World" published by Bogsch in the English language (Leyden/Washington 1960 et seq.). Of the comparative literature on design law, cf. in particular PEROT-MOREL, "Les principes de protection des dessins et modèles dans les pays du Marché Commun" (Paris 1968); ENGLERT, supra note 59;
80. COHEN JEHORAM (ed.), "Design Protection" (1976);
81. "Dessins et modèles" 73, 1983 Annuaire AIPPI III; and, finally M. LEVIN, "Formskydd" (Stockholm 1984), with English summary.
82. Cf. the comparative law study "Dessins et modèles" by the AIPPI, supra note 53, and the responses of the various national groups to questions 2d and 2g; Danish design law alone - just as the law of the other Scandinavian countries - goes beyond this due to the absence of utility model protection and adequate copyright and competition law protection against imitation, in relation to the protection of so-called "functional designs," by including within protection the rare cases of an exclusively technically dictated exterior form; cf. report of the Danish national group in 1983 Annuaire AIPPI, III, 59; LJUNGMAN, "The Scandinavian Approach in Design Protection," in COHEN JEHORAM, "Design Protection," supra note 64, at 117 et seq., 124-126.
83. Cf. Sec. 5 Design Act and FURLER, "Geschmacksmustergesetz" 17, 18, 24, and 1153-54; ENGLERT, supra note 59, at 102-103.
84. Cf. the AIPPI study "Dessins et modèles," supra note 53 and the responses of the national groups to question 6b.
85. On US antitrust law, which is a special case due to the absence of specific provisions on compulsory licenses, cf. supra note 50 et seq.
86. Only EMMERICH is this explicit, in IMMENGA & MESTMÄCKER, "GWB," Sec. 20, point 341 (1981).
87. Cf. BENKARD, "Patentgesetz," Sec. 24, point 19; FAHRENSCHON, 1955 GRUR 218; MÖHRING, 1955 GRUR 512, 517-518; DREISS, "Die kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Lizenzvertragssystemen" 216 (1972);
88. JABBUSCH, "Begrenzung der konzentrationsfördernden Wirkungen des Patentschutzes durch Erweiterung des Instituts der Zwangslizenz" 72 et seq. (1977).
89. Correctly, KRASSER, supra note 44, at 614; cf. also BANDASCH, LEMHOEFER & HORN, "Die Verwaltungspraxis des Bundeskartellamtes" 46 (1969).
90. See also in this sense the authors cited in BEIER, "Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Patentschutz," 1978 GRUR 123, 124, note 5.
91. 1987 GRUR 438, 20 IIC 228 (1989) - Towel Dispenser.
92. AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 20 IIC 64 (1989), and on this issue BEIER, in "Festschrift für K.H. QUACK" 15 et seq. (Berlin 1991) and the other ECJ decisions cited there.