Globalization from above: Actualizing the ideal through law

Review of International Studies

Volumn 26, Issue SPEC. ISS., 2000, Pages 61-79

  Allott, Philip ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 25444521024     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210500000619     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. 'We human beings do not possess freedom; ... freedom possesses [besitzt] us.' M. Heidegger, Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), p. 85 (present author's translation). Heidegger's discussion of 'the nature of freedom' formed part of a lecture (on the nature of truth) first given in 1930 and included in this volume in a revised version first published in 1943.
2. On the nature and social function of history, see Philip Allott, 'International Law and the Idea of History', Journal of the History of International Law (1999), pp. 1-21.
3. For an exposition of this conception of international society, see Philip Allott, Eunomia - New Order for a New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Since the Reformation of the sixteenth century no single reified unifying conception of the social aspect of human existence has established itself, leaving the speculative field open to competing ideas: a universal society of human beings or of states or nations, an international society of states, the international community, an anarchical society of states, the international system, world order, and so on. Greek and Roman thought, and pre-Reformation Christian thought, had produced many such ideas: homonoia, kosmopolis, humanitas, civitas maxima, concordia, the earthly kingdom, the City of Man, Christendom.
4. 'One party is trying to drag everything down to earth out of heaven and the unseen ... and strenuously affirm that real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers resistance to the touch. They define reality as the same thing as body, and as soon as one of the opposite party asserts that anything without a body is real, they are utterly contemptuous and will not listen to another word ... and accordingly their adversaries are very wary in defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen, maintaining with all their force that true reality consists in certain intelligible and bodiless forms ... and what those others allege to be true reality they call, not real being but a sort of moving process of becoming. On this issue an interminable battle is always going on between the two camps.' Plato, Sophist (trans. F. M. Cornford), 246b-c,
5. in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds.), The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 990.
6. The negating of idealism has been called, at different times: sophism, pyrrhonism, scepticism, empiricism, nominalism, materialism, relativism, nihilism, positivism, naturalism, realism, pragmatism, logical positivism, phenomenology, neopragmatism, postmodernism. For contemporary examples of characteristically American fundamentalist anti-idealism, see: J. B. Watson, Behaviorism, 2nd edn. (London: Kegan Paul, 1931);
7. H. S. Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York: Norton, 1953);
8. H. J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edn. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985);
9. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969);
10. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975);
11. R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, c. 1986);
12. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Allen Lane, 1992).
13. 'And so, since what acts upon me is for me and for no one else, I, and no one else, am actually perceiving it ... Then my perception is true for me, for its object at any moment is my reality, and I am, as Protagoras says, a judge of what is for me, and of what is not, that it is not.' Plato, Theaetetus (trans. F. M. Cornford), 160c,
14. Collected Dialogues, p. 866. Plato's Socrates is here speaking about a subjectivist conception of the reality of reality (that is, of universal reality, not merely of what we are here calling human reality). G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) conceived of the universe as being formed from ultimate indivisible 'monads' each of which contains the whole order of the universe organized around its unique 'point of view' [point de vue], so that each 'simple substance' is 'a perpetual living mirror of the universe'.
15. The Monadology, §§56, 57,
16. in his Philosophical Papers and Letters (ed. and trans. L. E. Loemker, 2nd edn. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), p. 648.
17. Kant compared his own work to the Copernican revolution, resituating the human observer in relation to universal reality by making the human mind an integral part of the constructing of the reality of the universe. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781-87), 2nd edn., trans. N. Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 22, 25.
18. 'What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of view [eines fruchtbaren neuen Aspekts].' L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (trans. P. Winch, ed. G. H.von Wright) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p.18e.