The Anthrax Solution: The Sverdlovsk Incident and the Resolution of a Biological Weapons Controversy

Journal of the History of Biology

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 441-480

  Gordin, Michael D ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANTHRAX;

EID: 2542524718     PISSN: 00225010     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004299907049     Document Type: Article

References (151)

1. On the early history of biological warfare, see Vincent J. Derbes, "De Mussis and the Great Plague of 1348." J. Amer. Med. Ass., 196 (4 April 1966), 179-182.
2. The vicissitudes of the Yellow Rain affair is discussed by me in "The Yellow Rainstorm: Politics, Chemical Warfare, and the Quest for Legitimation," unpublished manuscript. For a discussion of this pendulum-like swaying of U.S. allegations as soon as any particular controversy lost momentum, see Leonard Cole, "Sverdlovsk, Yellow Rain, and Novel Soviet Bioweapons: Allegations and Responses," in Preventing a Biological Arms Race, ed. Susan Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 199-200.
3. "Bakteriologicheskaya avariya v Novosibirske," Posev, 35 (October 1979), 9.
4. David Floyd with John Fullerton and David Loshak, "The Great Russian Germ War Disaster," Now!, 26 October 1979, pp. 54-55.
5. N. N., "Sverdlovsk byl snova na grani gibeli," Posev, 36 (January 1980), 7-8.
6. Zhores Medvedev, "The Great Russian Germ War Fiasco," New Scientist, 87 (31 July 1980), 360.
7. Ambassador Roshchin issued the official notice: "[C]ompliance with the provision of the [Biological Weapons Convention], which was ratified by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated 11 February 1975, is guaranteed by the appropriate State institutions of the USSR. At present, the Soviet Union does not possess any bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery, as referred to in Article One of the Convention." Quoted in Nicholas A. Sims, The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 53.
8. William Beecher, "Logging Arms Tests Crucial," Boston Globe, 15 October 1975, p. 18.
9. "One difficulty [in conducting such an evaluation] is that officials likely to be the source of such statements are harder to reach than those likely for institutional reasons to be skeptical of them. Thus the balance of information obtained may not exactly represent the exact situation." Nicholas Wade, "Biological Warfare: Suspicions of Soviet Activity," Science, 192 (2 April 1976), 40.
10. For example, there was substantial ambiguity as to what counted as CW in the first place. The main focus of the debate was whether tear gas and herbicides, the two primary CW methods used by the United States in Vietnam, should be considered as CW under the Geneva Protocol. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see R. R. Baxter and Thomas Buergenthal, "Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925," Amer. J. Internat. Law, 64 (1970), 856.
11. Bernard J. Brungs, "The Status of Biological Warfare in International Law," Military Law Review, 24 (1 April 1964), 50-51. Note that this article was written both before the drafting of the BWC in 1972 and the U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol (with reservations) in 1975. Nevertheless, because there have been no comprehensive reviews of the status of BW in international law since this article, it provides the most indepth analysis available.
12. Joseph B. Kelly, "Gas Warfare in International Law," Military Law Review, 27 (1 July 1960), 1-67.
13. After the fact, some evidence emerged that this decision by Nixon was actually influenced by Soviet double agents, nicknamed "Fedora" and "Top Hat," who told Nixon that if he did not scale back CBW development, the Soviet Union would be compelled to undergo a crash development program. Nixon is said to have pronounced the ban out of fear of Soviet militarization. However, Nixon maintained that the decision was good on its own merits, and declined further comment. David Binder, "Bid to Mislead Nixon Laid to Soviet Spies," New York Times, 4 June 1978, p. 18.
14. At Caltech, Meselson and Frank Stahl, another graduate student, carried out an important experiment that demonstrated the semiconservative replication of DNA by differential centrifugation of isotopically labeled DNA. This established a considerable name for him in molecular biology.
15. See Anne Fadiman, "Yellow Rain," Life Magazine, August 1984, p. 24. For a discussion of Meselson's long-standing opposition to BW, see Jerry Bishop, "Storm Over Asia," Wall Street Journal, 19 June 1983, p. 60.
16. See Anne Fadiman, "Yellow Rain," Life Magazine, August 1984, p. 24. For a discussion of Meselson's long-standing opposition to BW, see Jerry Bishop, "Storm Over Asia," Wall Street Journal, 19 June 1983, p. 60.
17. One such individual was scientist and science writer Freeman Dyson: "The man who did more than any other single person to rid the world of biological weapons is Matthew Meselson, professor of biology at Harvard. . . . Seldom in human history has one man, armed only with the voice of reason, won so completely a victory." Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1979), pp. 173-176.
18. The treaty is reprinted in Jozef Goldblat and Thomas Bernauer, The Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (New York: United Nations, 1991), pp. 32-33.
19. Mark Popovsky, Manipulated Science (New York: Doubleday, 1979), pp. 156-157.
20. U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "The Sverdlovsk Incident: Soviet Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention?" (29 May 1980) (hereinafter cited as Sverdlovsk Hearings), p. 3.
21. Ibid., p. 4.
22. Leslie Gelb, "Keeping an Eye on Russia," New York Times Magazine, 29 November 1981, p. 59. It is possible but not certain that the CIA's source was the same as the source of the Posev articles.
23. Ibid., p. 60. Mark Hopkins, "The Sverdlovsk Incident," New Leader, 63 (2 June 1980), 11-12.
24. Ibid., p. 60. Mark Hopkins, "The Sverdlovsk Incident," New Leader, 63 (2 June 1980), 11-12.
25. Walter F. Hahn, "A National Scandal?" Strategic Review, 8 (spring 1980), 10. Les Aspin, Sverdlovsk Hearings, p. 1.
26. Elisa D. Harris, "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet Noncompliance?" International Security, 11 (1987), 45.
27. Bernard Gwertzman, "Soviet Mishap Tied to Germ-War Plant," New York Times, 19 March 1980, pp. A1, A14.
28. Charles C. Flowerree, "Possible Implications of the Outbreak in Sverdlovsk on Future Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention: A US Perspective," in Views on Possible Verification Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention ed. S. J. Lundin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 108-109.
29. David K. Willis, "Soviets: 'US Double-Crossed Us on Germ Warfare Charges'," Christian Science Monitor, 28 March 1980, p. 10.
30. Bernard Gwertzman, "Soviet Lays Outbreak of Illness to Bad Meat, Not Germ-War Plant," New York Times, 21 March 1980, p. A6.
31. Sims, Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament (above, n. 8), p. 159. On the U.S. position that the treaty was still inviolate, see Julian Perry Robinson, "East-West Fencing at Geneva," Nature, 284 (3 April 1980), 393.
32. Sims, Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament (above, n. 8), p. 159. On the U.S. position that the treaty was still inviolate, see Julian Perry Robinson, "East-West Fencing at Geneva," Nature, 284 (3 April 1980), 393.
33. Robinson, "East-West Fencing at Geneva" (above, n. 29), p. 393.
34. Julian Perry Robinson, "The Changing Status of Chemical and Biological Warfare," in SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook 1982 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1982), p. 343.
35. "Medical Scientists Should Monitor the Biological Weapons Convention," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, 33 (June 1980), 2.
36. Nicholas Wade, "Death at Sverdlovsk: A Critical Diagnosis," Science, 209 (26 September 1980), 1501. This argument, even if true, did not excuse the Soviets from certain clear omissions. For one, anthrax is one of the diseases that has to be reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) when a significant outbreak occurs. The Soviet Union failed to do this. See Hopkins, "Sverdlovsk Incident" (above, n. 22), p. 12.
37. Nicholas Wade, "Death at Sverdlovsk: A Critical Diagnosis," Science, 209 (26 September 1980), 1501. This argument, even if true, did not excuse the Soviets from certain clear omissions. For one, anthrax is one of the diseases that has to be reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) when a significant outbreak occurs. The Soviet Union failed to do this. See Hopkins, "Sverdlovsk Incident" (above, n. 22), p. 12.
38. A. B. Christie, Infectious Diseases (Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone, 1969), p. 752. This is the most comprehensive text on the biology of the anthrax germ.
39. On the hardiness of these spores and their application to military uses, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat ([Washington, D.C.]: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1986), pp. 3-4. Anthrax has a long history as a biological weapons agent. In England, for example, there was considerable effort expended during World War II on producing deliverable anthrax (N-bombs). See Barton J. Bernstein, "Churchill's Secret Biological Weapons," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 45-50. One of the most infamous episodes in the history of BW testing dates to this period of development, when the British chose to detonate an N-bomb on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland. Populated mostly by sheep, all people were evacuated, the bombs were detonated, and all of the sheep died - demonstrating the deliverability of the germs. The negative aspects, however, were overwhelming: the island was still not fit for human habitation until the mid-1980s, when extensive decontamination measures were undertaken to cleanse the soil. Certain areas of the island are still contaminated. The fullest account of this test is in Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 68-74. The Americans had their own development program. While not nearly as well endowed as the atomic-bomb project, it was not explicitly hamstrung like the chemical weapons division under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By the end of the war, there was a small supply of deliverable biological weapons, but the U.S. military was hostile to them and refrained from their use. Since there was no specific need to use them after the war, the program was transferred to peacetime development and was mostly forgotten. Most of the documents involved are still classified. See Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (September 1988), 292-317. Open-air testing of the anthrax germs continued well into the 1960s in Utah. Charles Piller, "Lethal Lies About Fatal Diseases," Nation, 247 (3 October 1988), 271-275.
40. On the hardiness of these spores and their application to military uses, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat ([Washington, D.C.]: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1986), pp. 3-4. Anthrax has a long history as a biological weapons agent. In England, for example, there was considerable effort expended during World War II on producing deliverable anthrax (N-bombs). See Barton J. Bernstein, "Churchill's Secret Biological Weapons," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 45-50. One of the most infamous episodes in the history of BW testing dates to this period of development, when the British chose to detonate an N-bomb on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland. Populated mostly by sheep, all people were evacuated, the bombs were detonated, and all of the sheep died - demonstrating the deliverability of the germs. The negative aspects, however, were overwhelming: the island was still not fit for human habitation until the mid-1980s, when extensive decontamination measures were undertaken to cleanse the soil. Certain areas of the island are still contaminated. The fullest account of this test is in Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 68-74. The Americans had their own development program. While not nearly as well endowed as the atomic-bomb project, it was not explicitly hamstrung like the chemical weapons division under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By the end of the war, there was a small supply of deliverable biological weapons, but the U.S. military was hostile to them and refrained from their use. Since there was no specific need to use them after the war, the program was transferred to peacetime development and was mostly forgotten. Most of the documents involved are still classified. See Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (September 1988), 292-317. Open-air testing of the anthrax germs continued well into the 1960s in Utah. Charles Piller, "Lethal Lies About Fatal Diseases," Nation, 247 (3 October 1988), 271-275.
41. On the hardiness of these spores and their application to military uses, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat ([Washington, D.C.]: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1986), pp. 3-4. Anthrax has a long history as a biological weapons agent. In England, for example, there was considerable effort expended during World War II on producing deliverable anthrax (N-bombs). See Barton J. Bernstein, "Churchill's Secret Biological Weapons," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 45-50. One of the most infamous episodes in the history of BW testing dates to this period of development, when the British chose to detonate an N-bomb on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland. Populated mostly by sheep, all people were evacuated, the bombs were detonated, and all of the sheep died - demonstrating the deliverability of the germs. The negative aspects, however, were overwhelming: the island was still not fit for human habitation until the mid-1980s, when extensive decontamination measures were undertaken to cleanse the soil. Certain areas of the island are still contaminated. The fullest account of this test is in Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 68-74. The Americans had their own development program. While not nearly as well endowed as the atomic-bomb project, it was not explicitly hamstrung like the chemical weapons division under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By the end of the war, there was a small supply of deliverable biological weapons, but the U.S. military was hostile to them and refrained from their use. Since there was no specific need to use them after the war, the program was transferred to peacetime development and was mostly forgotten. Most of the documents involved are still classified. See Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (September 1988), 292-317. Open-air testing of the anthrax germs continued well into the 1960s in Utah. Charles Piller, "Lethal Lies About Fatal Diseases," Nation, 247 (3 October 1988), 271-275.
42. On the hardiness of these spores and their application to military uses, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat ([Washington, D.C.]: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1986), pp. 3-4. Anthrax has a long history as a biological weapons agent. In England, for example, there was considerable effort expended during World War II on producing deliverable anthrax (N-bombs). See Barton J. Bernstein, "Churchill's Secret Biological Weapons," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 45-50. One of the most infamous episodes in the history of BW testing dates to this period of development, when the British chose to detonate an N-bomb on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland. Populated mostly by sheep, all people were evacuated, the bombs were detonated, and all of the sheep died - demonstrating the deliverability of the germs. The negative aspects, however, were overwhelming: the island was still not fit for human habitation until the mid-1980s, when extensive decontamination measures were undertaken to cleanse the soil. Certain areas of the island are still contaminated. The fullest account of this test is in Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 68-74. The Americans had their own development program. While not nearly as well endowed as the atomic-bomb project, it was not explicitly hamstrung like the chemical weapons division under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By the end of the war, there was a small supply of deliverable biological weapons, but the U.S. military was hostile to them and refrained from their use. Since there was no specific need to use them after the war, the program was transferred to peacetime development and was mostly forgotten. Most of the documents involved are still classified. See Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (September 1988), 292-317. Open-air testing of the anthrax germs continued well into the 1960s in Utah. Charles Piller, "Lethal Lies About Fatal Diseases," Nation, 247 (3 October 1988), 271-275.
43. On the hardiness of these spores and their application to military uses, see Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat ([Washington, D.C.]: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1986), pp. 3-4. Anthrax has a long history as a biological weapons agent. In England, for example, there was considerable effort expended during World War II on producing deliverable anthrax (N-bombs). See Barton J. Bernstein, "Churchill's Secret Biological Weapons," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 45-50. One of the most infamous episodes in the history of BW testing dates to this period of development, when the British chose to detonate an N-bomb on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland. Populated mostly by sheep, all people were evacuated, the bombs were detonated, and all of the sheep died - demonstrating the deliverability of the germs. The negative aspects, however, were overwhelming: the island was still not fit for human habitation until the mid-1980s, when extensive decontamination measures were undertaken to cleanse the soil. Certain areas of the island are still contaminated. The fullest account of this test is in Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 68-74. The Americans had their own development program. While not nearly as well endowed as the atomic-bomb project, it was not explicitly hamstrung like the chemical weapons division under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. By the end of the war, there was a small supply of deliverable biological weapons, but the U.S. military was hostile to them and refrained from their use. Since there was no specific need to use them after the war, the program was transferred to peacetime development and was mostly forgotten. Most of the documents involved are still classified. See Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Warfare Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (September 1988), 292-317. Open-air testing of the anthrax germs continued well into the 1960s in Utah. Charles Piller, "Lethal Lies About Fatal Diseases," Nation, 247 (3 October 1988), 271-275.
44. Christie, Infectious Diseases (above, n. 34), p. 755.
45. The term "anthrax" comes from the ancient Greek for "coal," and the French "charbon" probably has similar roots. It is probable that the origin of these terms comes from the coal-black sores. Ibid., p. 751.
46. Harris, "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain" (above, n. 24), p. 44. On inhalational anthrax, see also Philip S. Brachman, "Inhalation Anthrax," Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 353 (1980), 83-93. The predicted death rates for different forms of anthrax vary. For cutaneous anthrax they are 15 to 20 percent of those infected; the prognosis for pulmonary infection is much more grim, rated at well over 90 percent. James Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents (Caldwell, N.J.: Telford, 1987), p. 361.
47. Harris, "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain" (above, n. 24), p. 44. On inhalational anthrax, see also Philip S. Brachman, "Inhalation Anthrax," Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 353 (1980), 83-93. The predicted death rates for different forms of anthrax vary. For cutaneous anthrax they are 15 to 20 percent of those infected; the prognosis for pulmonary infection is much more grim, rated at well over 90 percent. James Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents (Caldwell, N.J.: Telford, 1987), p. 361.
48. Harris, "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain" (above, n. 24), p. 44. On inhalational anthrax, see also Philip S. Brachman, "Inhalation Anthrax," Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 353 (1980), 83-93. The predicted death rates for different forms of anthrax vary. For cutaneous anthrax they are 15 to 20 percent of those infected; the prognosis for pulmonary infection is much more grim, rated at well over 90 percent. James Compton, Military Chemical and Biological Agents (Caldwell, N.J.: Telford, 1987), p. 361.
49. John Woodall, "WHO Health and Epidemic Information as a Basis for Verification Activities under the Biological Weapons Convention," in Views on Possible Measures for a Biological Weapons Convention, ed. S. J. Lundin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 63.
50. I. S. Bezdenezhnykh and V. N. Nikiforov, "Epidemiologicheskiy Analiz Zabolevaniy Siberskoy Yazvoy v Sverdlovske," Zhurnal Mikrobiologii, Epidemiologii, i Immunobiologii (Journal of Microbiology, Epidemiology, and Immunobiology), 29 (May 1980), 111-113.
51. Given that 2 percent of the Soviet population inhabited anthrax-infected areas, there was a calculated 5-10 percent probability of an intestinal anthrax outbreak each decade. J. P. Perry Robinson, "'The Soviet Union and the Biological Weapons Convention' and a Guide to Sources on the Sverdlovsk Incident," Arms Control, 3 (December 1982), 43. Elisa Harris offered some statistics: "[A]nthrax is endemic to the soil in the Sverdlovsk region, 371 areas of which are considered permanently dangerous. Of these 371 areas, 48 have experienced between 2 and 4 anthrax recurrences. Between 1936 and 1968, there were 159 outbreaks of anthrax poisoning among animals as a result of this infected soil. Multiple cases of anthrax infection among humans have resulted from the slaughter and dressing of infected animals and from the consumption of contaminated meat. Although few of these cases have been written up in the scientific literature, one particular article describes five outbreaks in as many years, affecting between 5 and 40 people. Another contains information about three outbreaks involving between 3 and 11 people." Harris, "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain" (above, n. 24), p. 50.
52. "Sverdlovsk and the Biology of Anthrax," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, 41 (September 1988), 3.
53. Christie, Infectious Diseases (above, n. 34), p. 767. Philip S. Brachman, "Anthrax," in Communicable and Infectious Diseases, ed. P. Wehrle and F. H. Top (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1981), p. 121. In fact, the only reported article I could find in the non-Soviet medical literature on gastric anthrax was G. P. Jena, "Intestinal Anthrax in Man: A Case Report," Cent. Afr. J. Med., 26 (December 1980), 253-254. Located in an undoubtedly obscure journal, this article details the case of a Zimbabwean male in a few paragraphs and provides the basic symptoms and prognosis. The paucity of literature on this topic is striking, yet for some unknown reason, almost every commentator on the topic cites pulmonary anthrax as rarer than the gastrointestinal variety. I could locate no medical sources to back up such an assumption.
54. Christie, Infectious Diseases (above, n. 34), p. 767. Philip S. Brachman, "Anthrax," in Communicable and Infectious Diseases, ed. P. Wehrle and F. H. Top (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1981), p. 121. In fact, the only reported article I could find in the non-Soviet medical literature on gastric anthrax was G. P. Jena, "Intestinal Anthrax in Man: A Case Report," Cent. Afr. J. Med., 26 (December 1980), 253-254. Located in an undoubtedly obscure journal, this article details the case of a Zimbabwean male in a few paragraphs and provides the basic symptoms and prognosis. The paucity of literature on this topic is striking, yet for some unknown reason, almost every commentator on the topic cites pulmonary anthrax as rarer than the gastrointestinal variety. I could locate no medical sources to back up such an assumption.
55. Christie, Infectious Diseases (above, n. 34), p. 767. Philip S. Brachman, "Anthrax," in Communicable and Infectious Diseases, ed. P. Wehrle and F. H. Top (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1981), p. 121. In fact, the only reported article I could find in the non-Soviet medical literature on gastric anthrax was G. P. Jena, "Intestinal Anthrax in Man: A Case Report," Cent. Afr. J. Med., 26 (December 1980), 253-254. Located in an undoubtedly obscure journal, this article details the case of a Zimbabwean male in a few paragraphs and provides the basic symptoms and prognosis. The paucity of literature on this topic is striking, yet for some unknown reason, almost every commentator on the topic cites pulmonary anthrax as rarer than the gastrointestinal variety. I could locate no medical sources to back up such an assumption.
56. "Strogo Sobliudat' Veterinariye Pravila!" Chelovek i Zakon, 9 (September 1980), 70-72.
57. This death-spread argument is made repeatedly in almost every discussion of Sverdlovsk. For a clear early exposition, see Medvedev, "Great Russian Germ War Fiasco" (above, n. 6), p. 361.
58. Matthew Meselson, interview by author, 12 April 1993.
59. The most likely candidate was the "two-wave theory," in which an explosion would occur, generating a pulmonary peak. Then, as the pulmonary cases trailed off, the spores would infect animals and the gastric outbreak would follow. Gelb, "Keeping an Eye on Russia" (above, n. 21), p. 60.
60. Both Ellis and Meselson are quoted ibid., p. 66.
61. David Satter, "Support for Soviet Explanation of Anthrax," Financial Times (London), 10 June 1980, p. 2. Satter was only rarely cited as corroboration of the Soviet position. He recanted his 1980 position in 1991, claiming he was duped by KGB agents. David Satter, "Setting the Sverdlovsk Story Straight," Wall Street Journal, 18 April 1991, p. A16.
62. David Satter, "Support for Soviet Explanation of Anthrax," Financial Times (London), 10 June 1980, p. 2. Satter was only rarely cited as corroboration of the Soviet position. He recanted his 1980 position in 1991, claiming he was duped by KGB agents. David Satter, "Setting the Sverdlovsk Story Straight," Wall Street Journal, 18 April 1991, p. A16.
63. Vivian Wyatt, "Anthrax: Recipe for a Blunt Weapon," New Scientist, 87 (4 September 1980), 722.
64. Vivian Wyatt, "Anthrax in the Air," New Scientist, 85 (27 March 1980), 986.
65. First of all, there was the exception clause in Article I of the BWC, which provides for peaceful and prophylactic research. Many have commented that even if the outbreak could be traced to the military outpost, there was a high likelihood that it had been working on only vaccines, and thus the accident was totally innocuous, as claimed by Philip Towle in "The Soviet Union and the Biological Weapons Convention," Arms Control, 3 (December 1982), 32-33. Second, there was a violation scenario concerning a missed stockpile, technically a violation of the BWC, although not in bad faith. It was possible that the Soviet Union had destroyed all of its biological stocks but had forgotten to eliminate one in Sverdlovsk, which then accidentally released spores. Such a situation had happened in the 1970s in the United States when a stockpile of shellfish toxin had been preserved in violation of Nixon's order. On this, see Raymond Zilinskas, "Anthrax in Sverdlovsk?" Bull. Atom. Sci., 39 (June-July 1983), 25.
66. First of all, there was the exception clause in Article I of the BWC, which provides for peaceful and prophylactic research. Many have commented that even if the outbreak could be traced to the military outpost, there was a high likelihood that it had been working on only vaccines, and thus the accident was totally innocuous, as claimed by Philip Towle in "The Soviet Union and the Biological Weapons Convention," Arms Control, 3 (December 1982), 32-33. Second, there was a violation scenario concerning a missed stockpile, technically a violation of the BWC, although not in bad faith. It was possible that the Soviet Union had destroyed all of its biological stocks but had forgotten to eliminate one in Sverdlovsk, which then accidentally released spores. Such a situation had happened in the 1970s in the United States when a stockpile of shellfish toxin had been preserved in violation of Nixon's order. On this, see Raymond Zilinskas, "Anthrax in Sverdlovsk?" Bull. Atom. Sci., 39 (June-July 1983), 25.
67. Quoted in James E. Oberg, Uncovering Soviet Disasters (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 15. This book places Sverdlovsk in the context of other Soviet disasters, such as Chernobyl.
68. Sims, Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament (above, n. 7), p. 158.
69. Quoted in Oberg, Uncovering Soviet Disasters (above, n. 53), p. 13.
70. Nicholas Sims, "The Second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention," in Preventing a Biological Arms Race, ed. Susan Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), p. 273. See also Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, "Updating the Biological Weapons Ban," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 40. On the specific proposals undertaken during the rest of the Second Review Conference, see David Dickson, "Gene Splicing Dominates Review of Weapons Pact," Science, 234 (10 October 1986), 145.
71. Nicholas Sims, "The Second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention," in Preventing a Biological Arms Race, ed. Susan Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), p. 273. See also Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, "Updating the Biological Weapons Ban," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 40. On the specific proposals undertaken during the rest of the Second Review Conference, see David Dickson, "Gene Splicing Dominates Review of Weapons Pact," Science, 234 (10 October 1986), 145.
72. Nicholas Sims, "The Second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention," in Preventing a Biological Arms Race, ed. Susan Wright (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), p. 273. See also Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, "Updating the Biological Weapons Ban," Bull. Atom. Sci., 43 (January/February 1987), 40. On the specific proposals undertaken during the rest of the Second Review Conference, see David Dickson, "Gene Splicing Dominates Review of Weapons Pact," Science, 234 (10 October 1986), 145.
73. Victor Issraelyan, "Possible Implications of the Anthrax Outbreak in Sverdlovsk on Future Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention: A Soviet Perspective," in Views on Possible Verification Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, ed. S. J. Lundin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 122.
74. Eliot Marshall, "Sverdlovsk: Anthrax Capital?" Science, 240 (22 April 1988), 384.
75. Matthew Meselson, "Discussions in Moscow Regarding Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak," 25 September 1986, p. 3. Matthew Meselson Papers (hereinafter cited as MMP).
76. I. S. Bezdenejnyh, P. N. Burgasov, and V. N. Nikifforov, "Epidemiological Analysis of Anthrax Outbreak in Sverdlovsk" [1986], p. 5, MMP.
77. Marshall, "Sverdlovsk: Anthrax Capital?" (above, n. 58), 384. Meselson, "Discussions in Moscow" (above, n. 59), p. 5.
78. Marshall, "Sverdlovsk: Anthrax Capital?" (above, n. 58), 384. Meselson, "Discussions in Moscow" (above, n. 59), p. 5.
79. Matthew Meselson, "The Biological Weapons Convention and the Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, 41 (September 1988), 5. For a more detailed account, see Bezdenejnyh et al., "Epidemiological Analysis" (above, n. 60), p. 5.
80. Matthew Meselson, "The Biological Weapons Convention and the Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, 41 (September 1988), 5. For a more detailed account, see Bezdenejnyh et al., "Epidemiological Analysis" (above, n. 60), p. 5.
81. Meselson, "Biological Weapons Convention" (above, n. 62), p. 4.
82. Meselson, "Discussions in Moscow" (above, n. 59), p. 4.
83. Bezdenejnyh et al., "Epidemiological Analysis" (above, n. 60), p. 7.
84. Joseph Palca, "Anthrax Outbreak in Soviet Union Due to Natural Causes?" Nature, 332/6164 (21 April 1988), 674.
85. Oberg, Uncovering Soviet Disasters (above, n. 53), pp. 18-19.
86. Meselson, "Discussions in Moscow" (above, n. 59), p. 4.
87. For an original flyer and corresponding translation, see Meselson, "Biological Weapons Convention" (above, n. 61), p. 5.
88. Lois Ember, "Soviet Anthrax Dispute: Details of 1979 Outbreak Presented," Chem. Eng. News, 66 (18 April 1988), 4.
89. Meselson, "Discussions in Moscow" (above, n. 59), p. 6.
90. Even the flood of victims to hospitals reported in almost every Western intelligence report was likely the product of rational public health measures. When the Soviet authorities realized that the anthrax was spreading, they required that everyone with a fever or any of the other early symptoms of gastric anthrax (stomach aches, chest pains, etc.) come to a hospital for examination. The high proportion of flu cases in late winter sparked the dramatic initial rush to hospitals and the thousands of "victims" in the Western allegations. Ember, "Soviet Anthrax Dispute" (above, n. 70), pp. 4-5.
91. This argument is presented in my unpublished manuscript "Yellow Rainstorm" (above, n. 2).
92. Oberg, Uncovering Soviet Disasters (above, n. 53), p. 21 (emphasis added). I attempted to contact Donald Ellis to find out his current position on what happened in 1979 or how he feels about this dismissal of his testimony. He refused to comment.
93. Meselson, "Biological Weapons Convention" (above, n. 61), p. 6.
94. "Biological Weapons: Debate on Anthrax Incident Flares," Chem. Eng. News, 65 (6 April 1987), 4-5.
95. As summarized in Milton Leitenberg, "A Return to Sverdlovsk: Allegations of Soviet Activities Related to Biological Weapons," Arms Control, 12 (September 1991), 168-169.
96. Natalya Zenova, "Voyennaya Tayna," Literaturnaya Gazeta, 22 August 1990, p. 12. The English translation is taken from the reprint "The Deadly Cloud Over Sverdlovsk," Wall Street Journal, 28 November 1990, p. A22.
97. Natalya Zenova, "Voyennaya Tayna," Literaturnaya Gazeta, 22 August 1990, p. 12. The English translation is taken from the reprint "The Deadly Cloud Over Sverdlovsk," Wall Street Journal, 28 November 1990, p. A22.
98. Natalya Zenova, "Voyennaya Tayna, Chast' II, " Literaturnaya Gazeta, 2 October 1991, p. 6.
99. Ibid.
100. Peter Gumbel, "The Anthrax Mystery," Wall Street Journal, 21 October 1991, p. A18.
101. Peter Gumbel, "Death in the Air," Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1991, p. A20.
102. For example, V. Chelikov's article in late 1991, on the very verge of the Soviet Union's collapse, openly claimed that the work at Military Post Number 19 was for offensive bacteriological agents, and called for a rejection of the meat theory in favor of an aerosol rendition. V. Chelikov, "Chuma na sosedney ulitse," Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 20 November 1991, p. 4. See also the summary of Znamya Yunosti article on 24-25 October 1990, in Leitenberg, "A Return to Sverdlovsk" (above, n. 77), pp. 170-172.
103. For example, V. Chelikov's article in late 1991, on the very verge of the Soviet Union's collapse, openly claimed that the work at Military Post Number 19 was for offensive bacteriological agents, and called for a rejection of the meat theory in favor of an aerosol rendition. V. Chelikov, "Chuma na sosedney ulitse," Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 20 November 1991, p. 4. See also the summary of Znamya Yunosti article on 24-25 October 1990, in Leitenberg, "A Return to Sverdlovsk" (above, n. 77), pp. 170-172.
104. As quoted in Leitenberg, "Return to Sverdlovsk" (above, n. 77), pp. 172-173.
105. Peter Gumbel, "Anthrax: The Survivors Speak," Wall Street Journal, 23 October 1991, p. A14.
106. A. Pashkov, "'Ya znayu, otkuda poyavilas' siberskaya yazva v Sverdlovske," Izvestiya, 23 November 1991, p. 4.
107. Ibid.
108. Zenova, "Voyennaya Tayna, Chast' II" (above, n. 79), p. 6.; and Gumbel, "Death in the Air" (above, n. 82), p. A20.
109. Zenova, "Voyennaya Tayna, Chast' II" (above, n. 79), p. 6.; and Gumbel, "Death in the Air" (above, n. 82), p. A20.
110. "Scientific Fraud?" Wall Street Journal, 28 November 1990, p. A22.
111. There is a significant discrepancy in the weight given to laboratory science as published in scientific journals and forensic science data, such as that presented in the courtroom. In both Yellow Rain and Sverdlovsk, the government's cases were built on forensic evidence, while Meselson critiqued them as not having the same level of certainty as a laboratory experiment. This disregard for forensic evidence has been documented (albeit sparsely) in the courtroom context. See Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), chap. 3; and Roger Smith, "Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law," in Expert Evidence, ed. R. Smith and B. Wynne (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 56-92. The lack of professional respect for forensic scientists by laboratory scientists is paralleled by the status of forensic pathologists vis-à-vis clinical pathologists. See Julie Johnson, "Coroners, Corruption, and the Politics of Death," in Legal Medicine in History, ed. M. Clark and C. Crawford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 268-289. I would like to thank Julie Johnson-McGrath for her assistance on this point.
112. There is a significant discrepancy in the weight given to laboratory science as published in scientific journals and forensic science data, such as that presented in the courtroom. In both Yellow Rain and Sverdlovsk, the government's cases were built on forensic evidence, while Meselson critiqued them as not having the same level of certainty as a laboratory experiment. This disregard for forensic evidence has been documented (albeit sparsely) in the courtroom context. See Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), chap. 3; and Roger Smith, "Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law," in Expert Evidence, ed. R. Smith and B. Wynne (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 56-92. The lack of professional respect for forensic scientists by laboratory scientists is paralleled by the status of forensic pathologists vis-à-vis clinical pathologists. See Julie Johnson, "Coroners, Corruption, and the Politics of Death," in Legal Medicine in History, ed. M. Clark and C. Crawford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 268-289. I would like to thank Julie Johnson-McGrath for her assistance on this point.
113. There is a significant discrepancy in the weight given to laboratory science as published in scientific journals and forensic science data, such as that presented in the courtroom. In both Yellow Rain and Sverdlovsk, the government's cases were built on forensic evidence, while Meselson critiqued them as not having the same level of certainty as a laboratory experiment. This disregard for forensic evidence has been documented (albeit sparsely) in the courtroom context. See Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), chap. 3; and Roger Smith, "Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law," in Expert Evidence, ed. R. Smith and B. Wynne (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 56-92. The lack of professional respect for forensic scientists by laboratory scientists is paralleled by the status of forensic pathologists vis-à-vis clinical pathologists. See Julie Johnson, "Coroners, Corruption, and the Politics of Death," in Legal Medicine in History, ed. M. Clark and C. Crawford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 268-289. I would like to thank Julie Johnson-McGrath for her assistance on this point.
114. David Walker, Olga Yampolska, and Lev Grinberg, "Death at Sverdlovsk: What Have We Learned?" Amer. J. Pathol., 144 (June 1994), 1136.
115. Ibid.
116. Faina Abramova, Lev Grinberg, Olga Yampolskaya, and David Walker, "Pathology of Inhalational Anthrax in 42 Cases from the Sverdlovsk Outbreak of 1979," Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., USA, 90 (March 1993), 2291.
117. Ibid., p. 2294.
118. Walker et al., "Death at Sverdlovsk" (above, n. 91), p. 1138.
119. There is a sizable but finite collection of older medical articles that were used to establish the variability of the pulmonary anthrax incubation period. Crucial in this collection are D. W. Henderson, S. Peacock, and F. C. Belton, "Observations on the Prophylaxis of Experimental Pulmonary Anthrax in the Monkey," J. Hyg., 54 (1956), 28-36; Philip S. Brachman, Stanley A. Plotkin, Forrest H. Bumford, and Mary M. Atchison, "An Epidemic of Inhalation Anthrax: The First in the Twentieth Century," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 6-23; Charles M. Dahlgren, Lee M. Buchanan, Herbert M. Decker, Samuel W. Freed, Charles R. Phillips, and Philip S. Brachman, "Bacillus Anthracis Aerosols in Goat Hair Processing Mills," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 24-31; and Harold N. Glassman, "Discussion," Bacter Rev., 30 (September 1966), 657-659.
120. There is a sizable but finite collection of older medical articles that were used to establish the variability of the pulmonary anthrax incubation period. Crucial in this collection are D. W. Henderson, S. Peacock, and F. C. Belton, "Observations on the Prophylaxis of Experimental Pulmonary Anthrax in the Monkey," J. Hyg., 54 (1956), 28-36; Philip S. Brachman, Stanley A. Plotkin, Forrest H. Bumford, and Mary M. Atchison, "An Epidemic of Inhalation Anthrax: The First in the Twentieth Century," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 6-23; Charles M. Dahlgren, Lee M. Buchanan, Herbert M. Decker, Samuel W. Freed, Charles R. Phillips, and Philip S. Brachman, "Bacillus Anthracis Aerosols in Goat Hair Processing Mills," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 24-31; and Harold N. Glassman, "Discussion," Bacter Rev., 30 (September 1966), 657-659.
121. There is a sizable but finite collection of older medical articles that were used to establish the variability of the pulmonary anthrax incubation period. Crucial in this collection are D. W. Henderson, S. Peacock, and F. C. Belton, "Observations on the Prophylaxis of Experimental Pulmonary Anthrax in the Monkey," J. Hyg., 54 (1956), 28-36; Philip S. Brachman, Stanley A. Plotkin, Forrest H. Bumford, and Mary M. Atchison, "An Epidemic of Inhalation Anthrax: The First in the Twentieth Century," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 6-23; Charles M. Dahlgren, Lee M. Buchanan, Herbert M. Decker, Samuel W. Freed, Charles R. Phillips, and Philip S. Brachman, "Bacillus Anthracis Aerosols in Goat Hair Processing Mills," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 24-31; and Harold N. Glassman, "Discussion," Bacter Rev., 30 (September 1966), 657-659.
122. There is a sizable but finite collection of older medical articles that were used to establish the variability of the pulmonary anthrax incubation period. Crucial in this collection are D. W. Henderson, S. Peacock, and F. C. Belton, "Observations on the Prophylaxis of Experimental Pulmonary Anthrax in the Monkey," J. Hyg., 54 (1956), 28-36; Philip S. Brachman, Stanley A. Plotkin, Forrest H. Bumford, and Mary M. Atchison, "An Epidemic of Inhalation Anthrax: The First in the Twentieth Century," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 6-23; Charles M. Dahlgren, Lee M. Buchanan, Herbert M. Decker, Samuel W. Freed, Charles R. Phillips, and Philip S. Brachman, "Bacillus Anthracis Aerosols in Goat Hair Processing Mills," Amer. J. Hyg., 72 (July 1960), 24-31; and Harold N. Glassman, "Discussion," Bacter Rev., 30 (September 1966), 657-659.
123. C. A. Gleiser, C. C. Berdjis, H. A. Hartman, and W. S. Gochenour, "Pathology of Experimental Respiratory Anthrax in Macaca Mulatta," Brit. J. Exp. Pathol., 44 (June 1963), 418. This is the original article that was shown to Meselson.
124. Most of the data came from interviews with Sverdlovsk residents and the families of the deceased. Matthew Meselson, Jeanne Guillemin, Martin Hugh-Jones, Alexander Langmuir, Ilona Popova, Alexis Shelokov, and Olga Yampolskaya, "The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979," Science, 266 (18 November 1994), 1203.
125. Meselson and his colleagues were able to determine that of the 77 tabulated patients (on 66 of whom they had data), 57 lived and worked in the Chkalovskiy region. Of the remaining 9, 6 had jobs (such as truck driver) that could easily have taken them through that area, and 5 of those had attended military reserve training in the area during the early part of April. That left 3 whose connection to the district was unexplained: one was temporarily working south of the military plant, one was on vacation, and so could have been in the area, and there was inadequate information on the last. Ibid., pp. 1205-1206.
126. Ibid., p. 1206.
127. Ibid., p. 1207.
128. Gordin, "The Yellow Rainstorm," unpublished manuscript.
129. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Anthrax in Sverdlovsk?" Bull. Atom. Sci., 39 (June-July 1983), 27. See also Gelb, "Keeping an Eye on Russia" (above, n. 21), p. 31.
130. Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Anthrax in Sverdlovsk?" Bull. Atom. Sci., 39 (June-July 1983), 27. See also Gelb, "Keeping an Eye on Russia" (above, n. 21), p. 31.
131. Mark M. Lowenthal and Joel S. Wit, "The Politics of Verification," in Verification and Arms Control, ed. William C. Potter (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 161. See also John H. Barton, The Politics of Peace: An Evaluation of Arms Control (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 165-166.
132. Mark M. Lowenthal and Joel S. Wit, "The Politics of Verification," in Verification and Arms Control, ed. William C. Potter (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 161. See also John H. Barton, The Politics of Peace: An Evaluation of Arms Control (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 165-166.
133. See especially Jim Leach's testimony in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, and International Operations, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Yellow Rain" and Other Forms of Chemical and Biological Warfare in Asia (10 November 1981), p. 11: "If the Soviets are not prepared to be forthcoming in negotiating a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, they can have little expectation of meaningful progress in other arms control areas."
134. Sverdlovsk Hearings (above, n. 19), p. 1.
135. Quoted in Michael A. Lerner, "Yellow Rain Dance," New Republic (3 February 1982), p. 15. This attitude is also ascribed to the Carter administration specifically in Jane Hamilton-Merrit, Tragic Mountains (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 415. Robert J. Einhorn, "Treaty Compliance," Foreign Policy, 45 (winter 1981-1982), 44, describes this as a general phenomenon.
136. Quoted in Michael A. Lerner, "Yellow Rain Dance," New Republic (3 February 1982), p. 15. This attitude is also ascribed to the Carter administration specifically in Jane Hamilton-Merrit, Tragic Mountains (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 415. Robert J. Einhorn, "Treaty Compliance," Foreign Policy, 45 (winter 1981-1982), 44, describes this as a general phenomenon.
137. Quoted in Michael A. Lerner, "Yellow Rain Dance," New Republic (3 February 1982), p. 15. This attitude is also ascribed to the Carter administration specifically in Jane Hamilton-Merrit, Tragic Mountains (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 415. Robert J. Einhorn, "Treaty Compliance," Foreign Policy, 45 (winter 1981-1982), 44, describes this as a general phenomenon.
138. Towle, "Soviet Union and the Biological Weapons Convention" (above, n. 52), p. 39. See also Alan F. Neidle, "The Rise and Fall of Multilateral Arms Control," in Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative ed. Edward C. Luck (New York: New York University Press, 1983), p. 27, for this point on verification specifically applied to Sverdlovsk.
139. Towle, "Soviet Union and the Biological Weapons Convention" (above, n. 52), p. 39. See also Alan F. Neidle, "The Rise and Fall of Multilateral Arms Control," in Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative ed. Edward C. Luck (New York: New York University Press, 1983), p. 27, for this point on verification specifically applied to Sverdlovsk.
140. Flowerree, "Possible Implications of the Outbreak in Sverdlovsk" (above, n. 26), p. 111.
141. Harris, "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain" (above, n. 24), p. 95; and Elisa D. Harris, "CBW Arms Control: A Regime Under Attack?" Arms Control Today, 16 (September 1986), 9.
142. Harris, "Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain" (above, n. 24), p. 95; and Elisa D. Harris, "CBW Arms Control: A Regime Under Attack?" Arms Control Today, 16 (September 1986), 9.
143. Stephen Meyer, "Verification and Risk in Arms Control," International Security, 8 (spring 1984), 115-116.
144. Goldblat and Bernauer, Third Review Conference (above, n. 17), p. 14. The inherent difficulties of adversarial verification, as detailed earlier, were also pointed out in diplomatic contexts. See Joseph Finder, "Biological Warfare, Genetic Engineering, and the Treaty That Failed," Washington Quarterly, 9 (spring 1986), 13.
145. Goldblat and Bernauer, Third Review Conference (above, n. 17), p. 14. The inherent difficulties of adversarial verification, as detailed earlier, were also pointed out in diplomatic contexts. See Joseph Finder, "Biological Warfare, Genetic Engineering, and the Treaty That Failed," Washington Quarterly, 9 (spring 1986), 13.
146. Paul G. Cassell, "Establishing Violations of International Law: Yellow Rain and the Treaties Regulating Chemical and Biological Warfare," Stanford Law Review (January 1983), 273.
147. Rosenberg, "Updating the Biological Weapons Ban" (above, n. 56), p. 43.
148. Barton, Politics of Peace (above, n. 104), p. 74.
149. Pierre J. M. Canonne, "The Role of the Scientific Community within the Context of the Convention," Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, 24 (June 1994), 2.
150. Graham S. Pearson, "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms
151. United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament: The Chemical Weapons Convention with Selective Index (New York: United Nations, 1994).