From the act to the decision: Hannah Arendt and the question of decisionism

Political Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 320-346

  Kalyvas, Andreas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Act; Arendt; Decision; Freedom; Schmitt; Will

Indexed keywords

EID: 2542517825     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591704263032     Document Type: Article

References (159)

1. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority'," Deconstraction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. by Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 26.
2. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt. Politics, Conscience, and Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 28-33, 36, 39, 55, 88; Martin Jay, "The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt," Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 237-256; Jerome John, "Thinking/Acting," Social Research 57, no. 1 (1990): 105; Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University, 1990), 35-40, 191; and Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, Heidegger and Modernity, trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 95-96, 98, 104-108.
3. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt. Politics, Conscience, and Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 28-33, 36, 39, 55, 88; Martin Jay, "The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt," Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 237-256; Jerome John, "Thinking/Acting," Social Research 57, no. 1 (1990): 105; Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University, 1990), 35-40, 191; and Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, Heidegger and Modernity, trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 95-96, 98, 104-108.
4. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt. Politics, Conscience, and Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 28-33, 36, 39, 55, 88; Martin Jay, "The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt," Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 237-256; Jerome John, "Thinking/Acting," Social Research 57, no. 1 (1990): 105; Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University, 1990), 35-40, 191; and Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, Heidegger and Modernity, trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 95-96, 98, 104-108.
5. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt. Politics, Conscience, and Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 28-33, 36, 39, 55, 88; Martin Jay, "The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt," Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 237-256; Jerome John, "Thinking/Acting," Social Research 57, no. 1 (1990): 105; Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University, 1990), 35-40, 191; and Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, Heidegger and Modernity, trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 95-96, 98, 104-108.
6. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt. Politics, Conscience, and Evil (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 28-33, 36, 39, 55, 88; Martin Jay, "The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt," Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 237-256; Jerome John, "Thinking/Acting," Social Research 57, no. 1 (1990): 105; Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University, 1990), 35-40, 191; and Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, Heidegger and Modernity, trans. Franklin Philip (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 95-96, 98, 104-108.
7. Jürgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power," Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 173-190; Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 156-164, 169-200; Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 116; and Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), 166.
8. Jürgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power," Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 173-190; Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 156-164, 169-200; Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 116; and Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), 166.
9. Jürgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power," Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 173-190; Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 156-164, 169-200; Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 116; and Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), 166.
10. Jürgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power," Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 173-190; Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 156-164, 169-200; Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 116; and Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), 166.
11. For this point, see William E. Scheuerman, "Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt's Challenge to Carl Schmitt," Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism, ed. by David Dyzenhaus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 252-280; and Andrew Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 129-138, 145-147, 167-183, 229-256.
12. For this point, see William E. Scheuerman, "Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt's Challenge to Carl Schmitt," Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism, ed. by David Dyzenhaus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 252-280; and Andrew Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 129-138, 145-147, 167-183, 229-256.
13. For a recognition of this abrupt shift, see Peter Stern and Jean Yarbrough, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The Life of the Mind," The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 323-354; Ronald Beiner, "Hannah Arendt on Judging," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 89-156; Kateb, Hannah Arendt, 195-196; Suzanne Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):53-54; and Hauke Brukhorst, "Equality and Elitism in Arendt," The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. by Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178-198. By contrast, Bonnie Honig has argued that there is no significant shift between Arendt's earlier and later work regarding the will. Although Honig acknowledges that in Arendt's last writings the character of the will is dual and not monistic as in the earlier versions, she does not take this modification to represent a substantial change of orientation. Honig's argument seems to me to be unconvincing for the following reasons: (1) She overlooks Arendt's clear identification of the will and freedom in The Life of the Mind (hereafter, LOM). (2) Although Honig begins her exposition by claiming that Arendt's concept of the will does not undergo significant changes, she mainly confirms that her notion of action does not change. But is this the point? There is no doubt that action remains more or less consistent in Arendt. Her concept of the will, however, does not. Whereas Arendt's definition of action as spontaneous new beginnings is constant, her definition of the will as the faculty of novelty, alterity, and natality represents an important departure from previous versions. (3) Honig does not discuss the implications of Arendt's equation of the will with the organ of the future that evokes the concept of "the memory of the will." (4) Finally, Honig's argument is internally divided between showing that Arendt's concept of the will is "internally coherent and importantly consistent with her earlier accounts of action and identity" and acknowledging that "the will in LOM is not consistent with her earlier account" and that "one important change has been made." Bonnie Honing, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):77-98.
14. For a recognition of this abrupt shift, see Peter Stern and Jean Yarbrough, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The Life of the Mind," The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 323-354; Ronald Beiner, "Hannah Arendt on Judging," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 89-156; Kateb, Hannah Arendt, 195-196; Suzanne Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):53-54; and Hauke Brukhorst, "Equality and Elitism in Arendt," The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. by Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178-198. By contrast, Bonnie Honig has argued that there is no significant shift between Arendt's earlier and later work regarding the will. Although Honig acknowledges that in Arendt's last writings the character of the will is dual and not monistic as in the earlier versions, she does not take this modification to represent a substantial change of orientation. Honig's argument seems to me to be unconvincing for the following reasons: (1) She overlooks Arendt's clear identification of the will and freedom in The Life of the Mind (hereafter, LOM). (2) Although Honig begins her exposition by claiming that Arendt's concept of the will does not undergo significant changes, she mainly confirms that her notion of action does not change. But is this the point? There is no doubt that action remains more or less consistent in Arendt. Her concept of the will, however, does not. Whereas Arendt's definition of action as spontaneous new beginnings is constant, her definition of the will as the faculty of novelty, alterity, and natality represents an important departure from previous versions. (3) Honig does not discuss the implications of Arendt's equation of the will with the organ of the future that evokes the concept of "the memory of the will." (4) Finally, Honig's argument is internally divided between showing that Arendt's concept of the will is "internally coherent and importantly consistent with her earlier accounts of action and identity" and acknowledging that "the will in LOM is not consistent with her earlier account" and that "one important change has been made." Bonnie Honing, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):77-98.
15. For a recognition of this abrupt shift, see Peter Stern and Jean Yarbrough, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The Life of the Mind," The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 323-354; Ronald Beiner, "Hannah Arendt on Judging," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 89-156; Kateb, Hannah Arendt, 195-196; Suzanne Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):53-54; and Hauke Brukhorst, "Equality and Elitism in Arendt," The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. by Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178-198. By contrast, Bonnie Honig has argued that there is no significant shift between Arendt's earlier and later work regarding the will. Although Honig acknowledges that in Arendt's last writings the character of the will is dual and not monistic as in the earlier versions, she does not take this modification to represent a substantial change of orientation. Honig's argument seems to me to be unconvincing for the following reasons: (1) She overlooks Arendt's clear identification of the will and freedom in The Life of the Mind (hereafter, LOM). (2) Although Honig begins her exposition by claiming that Arendt's concept of the will does not undergo significant changes, she mainly confirms that her notion of action does not change. But is this the point? There is no doubt that action remains more or less consistent in Arendt. Her concept of the will, however, does not. Whereas Arendt's definition of action as spontaneous new beginnings is constant, her definition of the will as the faculty of novelty, alterity, and natality represents an important departure from previous versions. (3) Honig does not discuss the implications of Arendt's equation of the will with the organ of the future that evokes the concept of "the memory of the will." (4) Finally, Honig's argument is internally divided between showing that Arendt's concept of the will is "internally coherent and importantly consistent with her earlier accounts of action and identity" and acknowledging that "the will in LOM is not consistent with her earlier account" and that "one important change has been made." Bonnie Honing, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):77-98.
16. For a recognition of this abrupt shift, see Peter Stern and Jean Yarbrough, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The Life of the Mind," The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 323-354; Ronald Beiner, "Hannah Arendt on Judging," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 89-156; Kateb, Hannah Arendt, 195-196; Suzanne Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):53-54; and Hauke Brukhorst, "Equality and Elitism in Arendt," The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. by Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178-198. By contrast, Bonnie Honig has argued that there is no significant shift between Arendt's earlier and later work regarding the will. Although Honig acknowledges that in Arendt's last writings the character of the will is dual and not monistic as in the earlier versions, she does not take this modification to represent a substantial change of orientation. Honig's argument seems to me to be unconvincing for the following reasons: (1) She overlooks Arendt's clear identification of the will and freedom in The Life of the Mind (hereafter, LOM). (2) Although Honig begins her exposition by claiming that Arendt's concept of the will does not undergo significant changes, she mainly confirms that her notion of action does not change. But is this the point? There is no doubt that action remains more or less consistent in Arendt. Her concept of the will, however, does not. Whereas Arendt's definition of action as spontaneous new beginnings is constant, her definition of the will as the faculty of novelty, alterity, and natality represents an important departure from previous versions. (3) Honig does not discuss the implications of Arendt's equation of the will with the organ of the future that evokes the concept of "the memory of the will." (4) Finally, Honig's argument is internally divided between showing that Arendt's concept of the will is "internally coherent and importantly consistent with her earlier accounts of action and identity" and acknowledging that "the will in LOM is not consistent with her earlier account" and that "one important change has been made." Bonnie Honing, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):77-98.
17. For a recognition of this abrupt shift, see Peter Stern and Jean Yarbrough, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The Life of the Mind," The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 323-354; Ronald Beiner, "Hannah Arendt on Judging," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 89-156; Kateb, Hannah Arendt, 195-196; Suzanne Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):53-54; and Hauke Brukhorst, "Equality and Elitism in Arendt," The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. by Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178-198. By contrast, Bonnie Honig has argued that there is no significant shift between Arendt's earlier and later work regarding the will. Although Honig acknowledges that in Arendt's last writings the character of the will is dual and not monistic as in the earlier versions, she does not take this modification to represent a substantial change of orientation. Honig's argument seems to me to be unconvincing for the following reasons: (1) She overlooks Arendt's clear identification of the will and freedom in The Life of the Mind (hereafter, LOM). (2) Although Honig begins her exposition by claiming that Arendt's concept of the will does not undergo significant changes, she mainly confirms that her notion of action does not change. But is this the point? There is no doubt that action remains more or less consistent in Arendt. Her concept of the will, however, does not. Whereas Arendt's definition of action as spontaneous new beginnings is constant, her definition of the will as the faculty of novelty, alterity, and natality represents an important departure from previous versions. (3) Honig does not discuss the implications of Arendt's equation of the will with the organ of the future that evokes the concept of "the memory of the will." (4) Finally, Honig's argument is internally divided between showing that Arendt's concept of the will is "internally coherent and importantly consistent with her earlier accounts of action and identity" and acknowledging that "the will in LOM is not consistent with her earlier account" and that "one important change has been made." Bonnie Honing, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):77-98.
18. For a recognition of this abrupt shift, see Peter Stern and Jean Yarbrough, "Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The Life of the Mind," The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 323-354; Ronald Beiner, "Hannah Arendt on Judging," Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 89-156; Kateb, Hannah Arendt, 195-196; Suzanne Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):53-54; and Hauke Brukhorst, "Equality and Elitism in Arendt," The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. by Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178-198. By contrast, Bonnie Honig has argued that there is no significant shift between Arendt's earlier and later work regarding the will. Although Honig acknowledges that in Arendt's last writings the character of the will is dual and not monistic as in the earlier versions, she does not take this modification to represent a substantial change of orientation. Honig's argument seems to me to be unconvincing for the following reasons: (1) She overlooks Arendt's clear identification of the will and freedom in The Life of the Mind (hereafter, LOM). (2) Although Honig begins her exposition by claiming that Arendt's concept of the will does not undergo significant changes, she mainly confirms that her notion of action does not change. But is this the point? There is no doubt that action remains more or less consistent in Arendt. Her concept of the will, however, does not. Whereas Arendt's definition of action as spontaneous new beginnings is constant, her definition of the will as the faculty of novelty, alterity, and natality represents an important departure from previous versions. (3) Honig does not discuss the implications of Arendt's equation of the will with the organ of the future that evokes the concept of "the memory of the will." (4) Finally, Honig's argument is internally divided between showing that Arendt's concept of the will is "internally coherent and importantly consistent with her earlier accounts of action and identity" and acknowledging that "the will in LOM is not consistent with her earlier account" and that "one important change has been made." Bonnie Honing, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference," Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988):77-98.
19. For example, see Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, 76, 62. Similarly, Michael Denneny has contended that for Arendt the will cannot but lead to totalitarianism. Michael Denneny, "The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah Arendt on Judgment," Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, ed. by Melvyn A. Hill (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 259. Hannah Arendt, "Willing," LOM (New York: A Harvest Book, 1978), 32.
20. For example, see Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, 76, 62. Similarly, Michael Denneny has contended that for Arendt the will cannot but lead to totalitarianism. Michael Denneny, "The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah Arendt on Judgment," Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, ed. by Melvyn A. Hill (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 259. Hannah Arendt, "Willing," LOM (New York: A Harvest Book, 1978), 32.
21. For example, see Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, 76, 62. Similarly, Michael Denneny has contended that for Arendt the will cannot but lead to totalitarianism. Michael Denneny, "The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah Arendt on Judgment," Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, ed. by Melvyn A. Hill (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 259. Hannah Arendt, "Willing," LOM (New York: A Harvest Book, 1978), 32.
22. Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1993), 21, 23-24 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Schmitt's theory of the constituent decision, see my "Carl Schmitt and the Three Moments of Democracy," Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000):5-6.
23. Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1993), 21, 23-24 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Schmitt's theory of the constituent decision, see my "Carl Schmitt and the Three Moments of Democracy," Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000):5-6.
24. Carl Schmitt, Die Dictatur (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994), 23; and Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 32, 66.
25. Carl Schmitt, Die Dictatur (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994), 23; and Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 32, 66.
26. Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1989), 75-76.
27. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 224, 36, 90, 94-95; and Schmitt, Die Dictatur, 134.
28. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 224, 36, 90, 94-95; and Schmitt, Die Dictatur, 134.
29. Schmitt, Political Theology, 51; and Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 88.
30. Schmitt, Political Theology, 51; and Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 88.
31. For a helpful historical presentation, conceptual analysis, and comparative discussion of the concept of the constituent power, see Georges Burdeau, Traité de science politique: le statut du pouvoir dans l'état, vol. 4 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1983); Ernst Wolfgang Böckenforde, "Die verfassungsggebende Gewalt des Volkes-Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts, " Staat, Verfassung, Democratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1991), 90-114; Olivier Beaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1995); Claude Klein, Théorie et Pratique du pouvoir constituant (Paris: PUF, 1996); and Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
32. For a helpful historical presentation, conceptual analysis, and comparative discussion of the concept of the constituent power, see Georges Burdeau, Traité de science politique: le statut du pouvoir dans l'état, vol. 4 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1983); Ernst Wolfgang Böckenforde, "Die verfassungsggebende Gewalt des Volkes-Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts, " Staat, Verfassung, Democratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1991), 90-114; Olivier Beaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1995); Claude Klein, Théorie et Pratique du pouvoir constituant (Paris: PUF, 1996); and Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
33. For a helpful historical presentation, conceptual analysis, and comparative discussion of the concept of the constituent power, see Georges Burdeau, Traité de science politique: le statut du pouvoir dans l'état, vol. 4 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1983); Ernst Wolfgang Böckenforde, "Die verfassungsggebende Gewalt des Volkes-Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts, " Staat, Verfassung, Democratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1991), 90-114; Olivier Beaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1995); Claude Klein, Théorie et Pratique du pouvoir constituant (Paris: PUF, 1996); and Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
34. For a helpful historical presentation, conceptual analysis, and comparative discussion of the concept of the constituent power, see Georges Burdeau, Traité de science politique: le statut du pouvoir dans l'état, vol. 4 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1983); Ernst Wolfgang Böckenforde, "Die verfassungsggebende Gewalt des Volkes-Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts, " Staat, Verfassung, Democratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1991), 90-114; Olivier Beaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1995); Claude Klein, Théorie et Pratique du pouvoir constituant (Paris: PUF, 1996); and Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
35. For a helpful historical presentation, conceptual analysis, and comparative discussion of the concept of the constituent power, see Georges Burdeau, Traité de science politique: le statut du pouvoir dans l'état, vol. 4 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1983); Ernst Wolfgang Böckenforde, "Die verfassungsggebende Gewalt des Volkes-Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts, " Staat, Verfassung, Democratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Suhrkamp, 1991), 90-114; Olivier Beaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1995); Claude Klein, Théorie et Pratique du pouvoir constituant (Paris: PUF, 1996); and Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
36. Schmitt, Political Theology, 10, 30 (emphasis added), and 17 (emphasis added).
37. Ulrich Preuss, Constitutional Revolution. The Link between Constitutionalism and Progress, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanity Press, 1995), 2-5.
38. Ernesto Laclau, "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony," Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. by Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1996), 54-55.
39. For the most systematic treatment of the event, see Alain Badiou, L'étre et l'événement (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1988).
40. Schmitt, Political Theology, 36-38; and Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. Gary Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2003), 82.
41. Schmitt, Political Theology, 36-38; and Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. Gary Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2003), 82.
42. Schmitt, Political Theology, 15, 49-51.
43. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (hereafter, HC) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 246, 247.
44. Arendt, HC, 205, 206; and Hannah Arendt, "The Concept of History," Between Past and Future (hereafter, BPF) (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), 43.
45. Arendt, HC, 205, 206; and Hannah Arendt, "The Concept of History," Between Past and Future (hereafter, BPF) (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), 43.
46. Arendt, HC, 190; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (hereafter, OR (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 205, 27, 172-173; and Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," Crisis of the Republic (hereafter, CR) (New York: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1972), 109, 27.
47. Arendt, HC, 190; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (hereafter, OR (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 205, 27, 172-173; and Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," Crisis of the Republic (hereafter, CR) (New York: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1972), 109, 27.
48. Arendt, HC, 190; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (hereafter, OR (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 205, 27, 172-173; and Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," Crisis of the Republic (hereafter, CR) (New York: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1972), 109, 27.
49. Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" BPF, 169,170-171; and Arendt, "Preface," BPF, 5. Margaret Canovan has proposed a different reading of miracles in Arendt by disassociating them from new foundings. Her interpretation focuses on the Christian and theological origins of the concept of miracle, while placing political foundations and forms of constitutional making in the Roman political legacy. Notwithstanding its merits, this interpretation eludes the miraculous dimension of revolutions and new collective beginnings. In Canovan's reading, miracles are performed only by individuals. According to my reading, Arendt thought that revolutionary foundings were also miracles because they defied the preordered structure of normal politics. See Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, 146-147.
50. Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" BPF, 169,170-171; and Arendt, "Preface," BPF, 5. Margaret Canovan has proposed a different reading of miracles in Arendt by disassociating them from new foundings. Her interpretation focuses on the Christian and theological origins of the concept of miracle, while placing political foundations and forms of constitutional making in the Roman political legacy. Notwithstanding its merits, this interpretation eludes the miraculous dimension of revolutions and new collective beginnings. In Canovan's reading, miracles are performed only by individuals. According to my reading, Arendt thought that revolutionary foundings were also miracles because they defied the preordered structure of normal politics. See Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, 146-147.
51. Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" BPF, 169,170-171; and Arendt, "Preface," BPF, 5. Margaret Canovan has proposed a different reading of miracles in Arendt by disassociating them from new foundings. Her interpretation focuses on the Christian and theological origins of the concept of miracle, while placing political foundations and forms of constitutional making in the Roman political legacy. Notwithstanding its merits, this interpretation eludes the miraculous dimension of revolutions and new collective beginnings. In Canovan's reading, miracles are performed only by individuals. According to my reading, Arendt thought that revolutionary foundings were also miracles because they defied the preordered structure of normal politics. See Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, 146-147.
52. Arendt, HC, 190-191; "Willing," 195-217; Arendt "The Concept of History," 63; Arendt OR, 212.
53. Arendt, HC, 190-191; "Willing," 195-217; Arendt "The Concept of History," 63; Arendt OR, 212.
54. Arendt, HC, 190-191; "Willing," 195-217; Arendt "The Concept of History," 63; Arendt OR, 212.
55. Arendt, HC, 190-191; "Willing," 195-217; Arendt "The Concept of History," 63; Arendt OR, 212.
56. Arendt, OR, 198-199, 202, 204; Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 152.
57. Arendt, OR, 198-199, 202, 204; Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 152.
58. Kateb, Hannah Arendt, 12.
59. Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 145-147, 151-152; Arendt, OR, 76, 225.
60. Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 145-147, 151-152; Arendt, OR, 76, 225.
61. Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 164, 155.
62. Arendt, HC, 234-236.
63. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (hereafter, TOT) (New York: A Harvest Book, 1973), 466.
64. Arendt, OR, 24, 153, 156-158, 163, 185.On the concept of the People-as-One that builds on Arendt's writings, see Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, ed. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), 297-304.
65. Arendt, OR, 24, 153, 156-158, 163, 185.On the concept of the People-as-One that builds on Arendt's writings, see Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, ed. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Polity, 1986), 297-304.
66. Arendt, "Willing," 208, 63, 66; and Arendt, OR, 188-190, 194, 206.
67. Arendt, OR, 165, 194; and Arendt, "On Violence," 138.
68. Arendt, "Willing," 208, 63, 66; and Arendt, OR, 188-190, 194, 206.
69. Arendt, "Willing," 208, 63, 66; and Arendt, OR, 188-190, 194, 206.
70. Arendt, "Willing," 69, 207-208; Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 161. Interesting enough, Arendt comes extremely close to Hans Kelsen's discussion of the will. Like Arendt, Reisen attributed this demiurgic power of the will in the Judeo-Christian theological tradition. And like Arendt, he condemned this formulation in a polemic that is highly reminiscent of her own critique of the will. See Hans Reisen, "Foundations of Democracy," Ethics, 66, no. 1 (1955): 19-20.
71. Hannah Arendt, "Postscriptum to Thinking," LOM, 215; Arendt, "Willing," 68.
72. Arendt, "Willing," 69, 207-208; Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 161. Interesting enough, Arendt comes extremely close to Hans Kelsen's discussion of the will. Like Arendt, Reisen attributed this demiurgic power of the will in the Judeo-Christian theological tradition. And like Arendt, he condemned this formulation in a polemic that is highly reminiscent of her own critique of the will. See Hans Reisen, "Foundations of Democracy," Ethics, 66, no. 1 (1955): 19-20.
73. Arendt, "Willing," 69, 207-208; Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 161. Interesting enough, Arendt comes extremely close to Hans Kelsen's discussion of the will. Like Arendt, Reisen attributed this demiurgic power of the will in the Judeo-Christian theological tradition. And like Arendt, he condemned this formulation in a polemic that is highly reminiscent of her own critique of the will. See Hans Reisen, "Foundations of Democracy," Ethics, 66, no. 1 (1955): 19-20.
74. Arendt, "Willing," 69, 207-208; Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 161. Interesting enough, Arendt comes extremely close to Hans Kelsen's discussion of the will. Like Arendt, Reisen attributed this demiurgic power of the will in the Judeo-Christian theological tradition. And like Arendt, he condemned this formulation in a polemic that is highly reminiscent of her own critique of the will. See Hans Reisen, "Foundations of Democracy," Ethics, 66, no. 1 (1955): 19-20.
75. Arendt, OR, 94.
76. Schmitt, Political Theology, 36-52.
77. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 31.
78. Arendt, "Willing," 78; Arendt, OR, 155.
79. Arendt, "Willing," 78; Arendt, OR, 155.
80. Arendt, HC, 17.
81. Arendt, "Willing," 208.
82. Arendt, OR, 206.
83. Arendt, "Willing," 208; Arendt, OR, 186.
84. Arendt, "Willing," 208; Arendt, OR, 186.
85. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. by Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 38-39.
86. Hugo Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix (Paris: PUF, 1999), bk. I, chap. 3, paragraph 7, 98.
87. Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), 211.
88. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998), 255, 254.
89. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, 111.
90. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pt. II, chap. 26, 184.
91. Arendt, TOT, 230.
92. Arendt, OR, 77, 163.
93. Arendt, OR, 125.
94. Arendt, "Willing," 83; Arendt, OR, 93, 144, 159, 125.
95. Arendt, "Willing," 83; Arendt, OR, 93, 144, 159, 125.
96. Arendt, "What Is Freedom?" 296, fn. 21. Arendt fails to see the significant differences between Rousseau's and Schmitt's notions of sovereignty, particularly the instituting dimension of the latter. Schmitt's version fuses the legislator and the people instead of keeping them separate as Rousseau did.
97. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, foreword by Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 39. Jeremy Waldron misses this aspect of Arendt's theory, gratuitously claiming that she relied on a Schmittian understanding of enmity. Jeremy Waldron, "Arendt's Constitutional Politics," Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 206. By contrast, for an illuminating discussion of Arendt's rejection of the friend/enemy distinction, see Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 81, 109, 123.
98. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, foreword by Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 39. Jeremy Waldron misses this aspect of Arendt's theory, gratuitously claiming that she relied on a Schmittian understanding of enmity. Jeremy Waldron, "Arendt's Constitutional Politics," Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 206. By contrast, for an illuminating discussion of Arendt's rejection of the friend/enemy distinction, see Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 81, 109, 123.
99. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, foreword by Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 39. Jeremy Waldron misses this aspect of Arendt's theory, gratuitously claiming that she relied on a Schmittian understanding of enmity. Jeremy Waldron, "Arendt's Constitutional Politics," Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 206. By contrast, for an illuminating discussion of Arendt's rejection of the friend/enemy distinction, see Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 81, 109, 123.
100. Arendt, HC, 200; Arendt, OR, 164.
101. Arendt, HC, 200; Arendt, OR, 164.
102. Arendt, OR, 91.
103. Arendt, OR, 77.
104. Arendt, OR, 78.
105. Arendt, TOT, 468 (emphasis added).
106. Arendt, HC, 186 (emphasis added).
107. Arendt, HC, 246 (emphasis added), 245, 186-187.
108. Hannah Arendt, "Civil Disobedience," CR, 98 (emphasis added).
109. Arendt, "On Violence," 118 (emphasis added).
110. Arendt, HC, 243.
111. Arendt, HC, 245.
112. Arendt, HC, 245. For an enlightening discussion of Arendt's shifting views on sovereignty, see Hanna Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob. Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 199-200.
113. Arendt, HC, 245. For an enlightening discussion of Arendt's shifting views on sovereignty, see Hanna Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob. Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 199-200.
114. Arendt, TOT, 473.
115. Arendt, TOT, 479.
116. In a seminal 1953 essay, Arendt transposes the power to make new beginnings solely to political freedom. Hannah Arendt, "Understanding and Politics," Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954, ed. by Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994), 320-321.
117. Arendt, "Willing," 110.
118. Arendt, "Willing," 6-7, 109-110, 130-131.
119. Arendt, "Willing," 29.
120. Arendt, "Willing," 214. For Arendt's silence, see Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," 54.
121. Arendt, "Willing," 214. For Arendt's silence, see Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," 54.
122. Arendt, "Willing," 3.
123. Arendt, "Willing," 5, 89. For a discussion of the relationship between freedom and will in Arendt, see J. Glenn Gray, "The Abyss of Freedom-and Hannah Arendt," Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 227-228. It should be noted, however, that Gray remains unaware of the shift in Arendt's thought discussed here. By contrast, Pitkin has argued that Arendt's notion of political freedom cannot be completely separated from the idea of free will. Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob, 245.
124. Arendt, "Willing," 5, 89. For a discussion of the relationship between freedom and will in Arendt, see J. Glenn Gray, "The Abyss of Freedom-and Hannah Arendt," Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 227-228. It should be noted, however, that Gray remains unaware of the shift in Arendt's thought discussed here. By contrast, Pitkin has argued that Arendt's notion of political freedom cannot be completely separated from the idea of free will. Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob, 245.
125. Arendt, "Willing," 5, 89. For a discussion of the relationship between freedom and will in Arendt, see J. Glenn Gray, "The Abyss of Freedom-and Hannah Arendt," Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, 227-228. It should be noted, however, that Gray remains unaware of the shift in Arendt's thought discussed here. By contrast, Pitkin has argued that Arendt's notion of political freedom cannot be completely separated from the idea of free will. Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob, 245.
126. On this point, see Jacobitti's incisive discussion in "Hannah Arendt and the Will," 59, 62-70.
127. Arendt, "Willing," 13, 14, 155, 196.
128. In her book on the trial of Adolf Eichmann Arendt has complained about a "reluctance evident everywhere to make judgments in terms of individual moral responsibility," because of the tendency to think that no one has the right to judge somebody else. What public opinion permits us to judge and even to condemn are trends, or whole groups of people-the larger the better-in short, something so general that distinctions can no longer be made, names no longer named. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 297, 296.
129. Hannah Arendt, "Introduction," LOM.
130. Arendt, "Thinking," LOM, 97. Similarly, Castoriadis has argued that "If reflection does not will something, it is not reflection." Cornelius Castoriadis, The Castoriadis Reader, trans. David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 393.
131. Arendt, "Thinking," LOM, 97. Similarly, Castoriadis has argued that "If reflection does not will something, it is not reflection." Cornelius Castoriadis, The Castoriadis Reader, trans. David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 393.
132. Arendt, "Willing," 195-196.
133. Jacques Derrida, "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," Deconstruction and Pragmatism, 84. In a similar vein, Laclau speaks of the subject of the decision as a "partial subject." Ernesto Laclau, "Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics," Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, ed. by Judith Butler, Emesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek (London: Verso, 2000), 83.
134. Jacques Derrida, "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," Deconstruction and Pragmatism, 84. In a similar vein, Laclau speaks of the subject of the decision as a "partial subject." Ernesto Laclau, "Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political Logics," Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, ed. by Judith Butler, Emesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek (London: Verso, 2000), 83.
135. Arendt, "Thinking," 214.
136. Castoriadis, The Castoriadis Reader, 393.
137. Arendt, "Willing," 5, 60.
138. Arendt, "Postscriptum to Thinking," 215.
139. Arendt, "Thinking," 213.
140. Arendt, "Willing," 215.
141. Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis of Culture: Its Social and Political Significance," BPF, 223 (emphasis added).
142. Jacques Derrida, "Deconstructions: The Im-possible," French Theory in America, ed. by Sylvère Lotringer and Sande Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2001), 27; and Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. Davil Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5-7, 25-26.
143. Jacques Derrida, "Deconstructions: The Im-possible," French Theory in America, ed. by Sylvère Lotringer and Sande Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2001), 27; and Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. Davil Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5-7, 25-26.
144. A possible answer to these questions can be extracted from Bernard Flynn's argument that the will cannot be of any political relevance for Arendt because it is mute and solitary, thus opposed to the dialogical, plural, and public character of politics. Flynn is right to claim that some properties of the will do not fit naturally in Arendt's understanding of the political. His claim cannot be accepted, however, if the question is not whether to replace the faculty of speech with the will, but to selectively introduce elements of the will in Arendt's theory of politics. Once we break with Flynn's either/or dilemmatic approach to the relationship between the will and politics, it becomes possible to adopt a more dialectical and selective approach. See Bernard Flynn, "Arendt: The Return of the Political," Political Philosophy at the Closure of Metaphysics (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanity Press, 1992), 116-118.
145. Antonio Negri, Du retour. Abécédaire biopolitique (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2002), 94.
146. Arendt, "Willing," 69.
147. Arendt, "Willing," 101.
148. Hannah Arendt, "Tradition in the Modern Age," BPF, 25.
149. Arendt, "Willing," 7. By doing so, she becomes Schmitt's inverted mirror image: his monistic 'politics of the will" is replaced by her equally monistic 'will-less politics of opinion.'
150. Hannah Arendt, "Revolution and Freedom/A Lecture," In Zwei Welten. Siegfried Moses zum fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag (Tel-Aviv, Israel: Verlag Bitaon, 1982), 589-590, 597-598.
151. Arendt, "What is Freedom?" 166.
152. Arendt, "Willing," 69.
153. For such an attempt, see Antonio Negri, Kairòs, Alma Venus, multitude (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2002), 172.
154. Arendt, "The Abyss of Freedom and the novus ordo seclorum," LOM, 203. In such a case, even Arendt's unattainable distinction between the social and the political can be overcome from within her own theoretical framework.
155. Arendt, OR, 279, 280.
156. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power," 186.
157. Arendt, "Willing," 199-200.
158. Arendt, "Willing," 140; and Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," 54, 56.
159. Arendt, "Willing," 140; and Jacobitti, "Hannah Arendt and the Will," 54, 56.