Maximum average violence: Underground assaults on the South African gold mines, 1913-1965

Journal of Southern African Studies

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 547-567

  Moodie, T Dunbar ^a  

^a HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOLD MINE; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; SOCIAL HISTORY; TWENTIETH CENTURY; VIOLENCE;

AFRICA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; SOUTH AFRICA; SOUTHERN AFRICA; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; WORLD;

EID: 25144490001     PISSN: 03057070     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0305707052000345090     Document Type: Article

References (94)

1. Transvaal Archives Depot (hereafter TAD), Low-grades Mines Commission, para. 1,855.
2. TAD, K358, Native Grievances Inquiry (hereafter NGI), evidence of Theodora Williams, 15 October 1913. She actually refers to problems at Rose Deep and Wits Deep, but her diagnosis has wider implications.
3. Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 167-8.
4. I interviewed Geoff Livingstone in Stilfontein on 4 November 1998. My 1998 research trip was supported by a research grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
5. K. Breckenridge, 'The Allure of Violence: Men, Race and Masculinity on the South African Goldmines, 1900-1950', Journal of Southern African Studies, 24, 4 (1998), pp. 669-93.
6. Minutes of Proceedings of Transvaal Labour Commission [ed. 1896, London, 1904], paragraphs 8,871-72.
7. Ibid., paragraph 13,809 (cf. 13,829).
8. The most thorough treatment of corporal punishment in South Africa is probably a series of articles by R. Morrell. See, most recently, 'Corporal Punishment and Masculinity in South African Schools', Men and Masculinities, 4, 2 (2001), pp. 140-57, and other work cited in that article.
9. I am less convinced by his implication that violence underground in the mines provided a model for more general South African conceptions of masculinity. If he is correct, however, the indictment against the maximum average system worked out in this article has even broader implications than I draw against it.
10. This article may in fact be read as an extended critique of the sections on 'The 1913 Crown Mines Inquiry' and 'Memories of the Boss Boys' Violence', in Breckenridge, 'Allure of Violence', pp. 681-87.
11. and 'Memories of the Boss Boys' Violence',
12. in Breckenridge, 'Allure of Violence', pp. 681-87.
13. But see T.D. Moodie, Going for Gold (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994), p. 65, where I mention the issue in passing.
14. TAD, NTS 207, 98/14/473, Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, to Secretary of Native Affairs, Cape Town, 4 January 1914.
15. TAD, K358, NGI, evidence of C.W. Villiers, 3 March 1914.
16. For a useful account of the differences and similarities between outcrop and deep-level mines, see E. Katz, 'Outcrop and Deep Level Mining in South Africa before the Anglo-Boer War: Re-Examining the Blainey Thesis', The Economic History Review, 48, 2 (1995), pp. 304-28.
17. Katz points out, 'Outcrop and Deep Level Mining', p. 314, that the average values of the Witwatersrand ores were 6.5 dwts. per ton, as opposed to Australia, Canada, and Latin and North America, where the average values were 12 dwts. per ton. Unlike Australia and the US, however, the South African ore neither petered out nor degraded in value at greater depths.
18. For an interesting etymology of the word 'lash', see Breckenridge, 'Allure of Violence', p. 674.
19. R. V. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice: The Case of South African Gold Mining Finance, 1886-1914 (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1979), is excellent on this point as well as much else on financing and management of the Rand gold mines before the First World War.
20. On 13 February 1915, for instance, Schumacher of Central Mining wrote to his London principal, Francke, about the juggling involved in mining low-grade ore at Rose Deep: 'In the Western section, for instance, at No. 4, a very large proportion of the ore mined, nearly 10% Clifford says, has been left behind in pillars, and it must be the policy to continue to leave pillars so that the low-grade Main Reef, which is immediately at hand and can be very cheaply worked, can afterwards be extracted at a profit together with these pillars. This Main Reef averages, perhaps, not over 3 dwts, but, with the pillars should yield a profit. If the pillars were taken away now this Main Reef would be lost'. See BRA (Barlow Rand Archives) Private Letters 128. For another interesting discussion of these issues, see Low-grade Ore Commission (hereafter LGOC), evidence of SAMWU, October 1930, pp. 1,783-84.
21. An exception was the J.B. Robinson group of mines. This partially explains Robinson's reluctance to co-operate with the Chamber of Mines and the recruiting monopsony.
22. F.A. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold, A Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). Johnstone, of course, was aware of such constraints, pp. 41-45. His book continues to be well worth reading, although it may be necessary to refine his account of social relations at the point of production.
23. The best account of financial constraints and opportunities for the early Randlords is Kubicek, Economic Imperialism.
24. Hence the plural title for a single large mine.
25. An accessible history of Crown Mines may be found in A.P. Cartwright, Golden Age (Cape Town, Purnell & Sons, 1968), Chapter 14.
26. As the mine deepened over the years, the central haulage was replicated at greater and greater depths - and at greater length to reach the reefs as they inclined away at deeper levels - but No. 5 remained the major working shaft.
27. Workers housed at Crown Reef ate at the Crown Deep compound 300 yards away, but they had to cross the busy (and dusty) Main Reef Road - a source of considerable grievance until it was fixed by the construction of a subway.
28. It is my impression from the testimony that Langlaagte Deep compound largely served the new deep level western section of the mine, Crown Deep the eastern deep level development, and Robinson Central Deep the older producing northern mine workings, although workers seem to have been shunted around as needed. Cooke interviewed compound managers and black workers at all three main compounds.
29. Kubicek, Economic Imperialism, p. 80. Some of the outcrop mines incorporated into Crown Mines had been paying dividends of up to 200 per cent, however. The mining house had assured them of 150 per cent after the amalgamation.
30. White miners at this stage usually contracted to produce a certain amount of gold ore at a particular price. The costs of equipment and black workers were charged to their accounts. By 1915, largely thanks to recommendations of the Buckle Commission, most white miners had become supervisors on a daily wage. They were paid bonuses as incentives to produce.
31. For the concept of 'making out', see M. Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1979).
32. CMI, evidence of Njali (Fingo Hammer Boy), 25 June 1913, p. 97.
33. CMI, evidence of Jim, 24 June 1913, p. 80.
34. CMI, evidence of John from Khama country, 25 June 1913, p. 92.
35. CMI, evidence of Timothy, 24 June 1913, p. 81.
36. CMI, evidence, 26 June 1913, p. 102;
37. see also the evidence of Gogoda, an Mpondo, 25 June 1913, pp. 86-87,
38. and Jobe from Kingwilliamstown, 26 June 1913, p. 101.
39. CMI, evidence of Jim, trammer, 26 June 1913, p. 104.
40. Indeed, the most detailed complaint about assault Cooke heard at Robinson Central Deep came from a hammer-driller who actually worked at Crown Deep and was beaten at the cage there. CMI, evidence of Charlie, 26 June 1913, p. 104.
41. CMI, handwritten notes of confidential interviews with E. Kuckard, 1 July 1913
42. and C.E. Howe, 31 June(?). Crown Reef's drillers were largely 'hammer boys'.
43. TAD, NLB (Native Labour Bureau) 111, 1376/13, S. McKenzie, Chief Compound Manager Crown Mines to A.J. Brett, Acting General Manager, 14 June 1913.
44. Breckenridge, 'Allure of Violence', p. 683.
45. Except on 'E' section of Langlaagte Deep where F.L. Keeny, the Mine Captain, known to his black workers as Gundwana (the Rat), was notorious for egregious assaults. See further below.
46. CMI, evidence, 24 June 1913.
47. CMI, evidence on behalf of 'a very large number of natives, who wished to interview the Commission and lay complaints before them', 23 June 1913, p. 63.
48. See Cartwright, Golden Age, p. 214.
49. CML Cooke's handwritten notes of confidential evidence from C.E. Howe, Compound Manager, Crown Deep, 31 June (?) 1913. Assaults at the hoisting stations seem to have been particularly problematic at Crown Mines where the push for production was most intense. Hoisting problems must have been as severe at Block B, Langlaagte Gold Mine, just north of Crown Mines, where the two skips could hold only eight men each. Workers there complained to Buckle of delays in haulage, but seem not to have suffered serious assaults at the stations. See NGI [K358], evidence of Hugh Mitchell, Manager, Langlaagte Gold Mine.
50. CMI, Cooke's handwritten notes of confidential interview with P.J. Rount, c. 17 July 1913. Eventually most of the mines adopted variations on Rount's strategy to overcome problems with hoisting, which was always a sore point for tired men waiting to be hauled to the surface at the end of the shift. Note for reasons of clarity, the text in square brackets has been inserted, from a different part of the notes on the interview cited.
51. TAD, K358, evidence of Theodora Williams.
52. CMI, evidence, 25 June 1913, p. 98.
53. CMI, evidence, 23 June 1913, p. 60.
54. CMI, evidence, 25 June 1913, p. 99.
55. CMI, handwritten confidential evidence, 3 July 1913.
56. CMI, confidential handwritten evidence, 31 June (?) 1913.
57. In order to be paid for a shift, black workers needed their white supervisors to sign off on their work tickets.
58. CMI, confidential handwritten evidence, 31 June (?) 1913.
59. CMI, handwritten notes of confidential interview, 3 July 1913.
60. CMI, evidence, 25 June 1913, p. 95.
61. CMI, evidence, 25 June 1913, p. 86.
62. See Moodie, Going for Gold, pp. 58-61.
63. CMI, evidence of Willie, 24 June 1913, pp. 80-81.
64. CMI, evidence of Jantje, 26 June 1913, p. 83.
65. CMI, confidential handwritten evidence, 7 July 1913 (Rount's evidence undated, but presumably same date as Keeny).
66. 'Dry holes' were holes drilled into the ceiling of the tunnel directly overhead. Working with a jumper (heavy cold chisel) and sledgehammer over one's head was obviously much more strenuous.
67. The Schedule of Rates almost at once excluded machine-drillers from the maximum average system. They were on piecework by the end of 1913.
68. On 26 November 1917, Lionel Phillips had written from Central Mining head office in London to E.A. Wallers, who was running the Johannesburg operation, as follows: 'Although I am sure our decision not to renew Warriner's contract came to you as rather a shock and though we are just as grieved personally as you are, the tone of my letters during the last two or three years must have convinced you that I was very uneasy on the subject of the system of working, particularly at the Crown Mines for which he is primarily responsible.' M. Fraser and A. Jeeves, All That Glittered (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 306. See also pp. 287-8, where, as early as January 1915, Phillips suggests that Crown Mines' 'organisation is not working as well as it should'.
69. Cartwright, Golden Age, p. 224.
70. CMI, evidence of Jim, 24 June 1913, p. 80.
71. CMI, evidence of Jantje, 24 June 1913, p. 83.
72. CMI, evidence of Mpalane, 25 June 1913, p. 86.
73. CMI, evidence of John, 23 June 1913, p. 53.
74. CMI, evidence of Jim from Mqanduli, 24 June 1913, p. 80.
75. CMI, evidence of Mfunda, 25 June 1913, p. 95.
76. The system did lead to occasional disputes among gang members about sharing out the proceeds. In one case at Crown Mines, a portion of the workers' three-quarter share was 'given to a white man underground for his generosity of exaggerating the number of our trucks we made'. Gang members thought that such overheads should have been paid out of the fourth week's takings. See court records for 28 January 1913, in TAD, NLB 3, 313/09. A. Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy (Kingston and Montreal, McGill/Queens University Press, 1985), pp. 158-61, has a useful summary of how the system worked.
77. BRA, Nourse Mines, Box 382, File No. 5, Native Labour 1910-18, R.A. Barry, Manager, to NRC, 15 April 1913.
78. Correspondence in BRA, Nourse Mines, Box 382, File No. 5, Native Labour 1910-18, 4 January 1913 and following. See also Native Affairs Department Commission Report in TAD, NLB 3, 313/09. The Cooke Inquiry at Crown Mines heard evidence from a representative of Sotho pieceworkers at Crown Deep, who said that: 'The Basutos were fed by the Company now and only get 5d. a truck, but they would much rather buy their own food and get more money. When they were cut down from 10d. to 5d. they had to feed themselves but the Crown Mines decided to feed them because they grumbled and were leaving the work. Witness went on to say that he was a Boss Boy with 20 natives under him (two gangs). He collects all the money and pays out the gang according to the Time Office sheets, but he keeps all the money of the fourth week, except for giving the boys some little present if they have worked well.' CMI, evidence of a large deputation, 23 June 1913, p. 64.
79. BRA, Nourse Mines, Box 382, File No. 5, Native Labour 1910-18, Barry to Madew, 29 May 1913.
80. See also NRC evidence to the Buckle Commission (K358), 3 March 1914, p. 14, where C.W. Villiers criticises Barry's handling of the affair.
81. TAD, K358, Buckle's remarks to C.W. Villiers, 3 March 1914, p. 14.
82. See, for instance, Taberer's lengthy Report on Native Labour for the Economic Commission, 27 November 1913, in TAD, COM, T2380, Economic Commission - Native Labour, p. 1,910, where he attacks the 'absurd restrictions to the earning power of natives' imposed by the NRC Schedule of Wages and its maximum average system.
83. TAD, K358, evidence of H.M. Taberer, NRC, 6 February 1914, p. 31.
84. TAD, K358, evidence of A.W. Stockett, March 1914.
85. In Marxist language, unrestrained extraction of relative surplus value would have made it impossible to work technologically backward mines. These would immediately have become 'low-grade' by definition because of their organisation of work, regardless of their 'actual' grade of ore. Hammer mines, for instance, which required far more black workers, would have had to pay very high wages or close up shop. Conversion to machines would have involved widening stopes, both excessively expensive and quite dangerous.
86. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold, p. 44.
87. See, for example, Cooke's handwritten notes of his interview with P.J. Rount, Mine Captain at No. 2 Shaft, Crown Deep, n.d. (c. 17 July 1913), in TAD, NLB 111, 136/13/154. In a participant observation study on Welkom mine in 1975-6, we found occasional white miners who shared a portion of their production bonus with their teams. As I recall, Patrick Pearson was able to cite similar instances from his experience. Such miners were always superb producers. By then, the maximum average system was no longer being applied and everyone in authority frowned on violence underground. I suspect that in earlier periods there were probably also cases of this sort.
88. TAD, LGMC, 21 August 1919, paragraph 13,488.
89. TAD, LGOC, October 1930, Paragraph 2,301.
90. Moodie, Going for Gold, p. 65.
91. Breckenridge, 'Allure of Violence', p. 685.
92. Moodie, Going for Gold, pp. 66-7.
93. Ibid., p. 67.
94. Buckle told Theodora Williams, the missionary, that overall in the mines things were much improved with regard to assaults: 'A group of extremely intelligent Xosas on the E.R.P.M. who had been working on the mines ever since the mines had been here told me ... there was no comparison between the old conditions and the present day conditions and they are much improved ... they were unanimous'. See TAD, K358, 15 October 1913, p. 12.