Shaping the constitutional dialogue on federalism: Canada's supreme court as meta-political actor

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 217-244

  Kelly, James B ^a   Murphy, Michael ^b  

^a Civil and Environmental Engineering   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25144489681     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pji010     Document Type: Review

References (118)

1. Alain-Robert Nadeau, "Juges et pouvoirs: le pouvoir des juges depuis l'avènement de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, '" Revue du Barreau (March 2003; special issue): xlvi.
2. James B. Kelly, "Governing with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms," Supreme Court Law Review 21 2d (2003): 301 and 321-337.
3. See, for example, Canada, the Nisga'a Nation, and British Columbia, Nisga'a Final Agreement (Ottawa: Federal Treaty Negotiation Office, 1998).
4. We thank one of the anonymous referees for suggesting this term to us.
5. We leave aside the objection that the 1982 Constitution does not legitimately apply to Quebec and First Nations, neither of whom explicitly consented to its terms. Although these claims have their merits, as a fact the Constitution does apply to both of these groups, and our purpose is to examine the Court's specific role in this application.
6. See Vriend v. Alberta, 1 S.C.R. 493 (1998);
7. Gerald Baier, "Tempering Peace, Order and Good Government: Provincial Inability and Canadian Federalism," National Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (1998): 277-306.
8. Andrée Lajoie, "La Charte, canadienne des droits el libertés el la démocratie dans la mire du pouvoir judiciare," Revue du Barreau (March 2003; special issue): 370-376.
9. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993), pp. 15-19 and 22-27.
10. Section 25 also partially shields the application of the Charter to section 35 Aboriginal rights.
11. James Tully, "The Unattained yet Attainable Democracy: Canada and Quebec Face the New Century," Les Grandes Conférences Desjardins (Montreal: Université McGill and Programme d'études sur le Québec, 2000), 4.
12. Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35 (1997): 79. This metaphor was first used by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend v. Alberta in the decision by Justices Cory and lacobucci that the underinclusion of sexual orientation in a provincial human rights code violated the equality rights provisions in the Canadian Charter.
13. Ibid., 79-80. Hogg and Bushell surveyed sixty-five statutes invalidated and found that in two-thirds of cases, only a minor legislative response was needed to ensure the constitutionality of the offending provision.
14. Christopher P. Manfredi and James B. Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37 (1999): 522-524.
15. For a response to Manfredi and Kelly, see Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Thornton, "Reply to 'Six Degrees of Dialogue,'" Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37 (1999): 529-536.
16. A related criticism is Jean Leclair, "Réflexions critiques au sujet de la métaphor du dialogue en droit constitutionnel canadien," Revue du Barreau (March 2003; special issue): 396.
17. See, for example, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 1010 (1997).
18. James B. Kelly, "Bureaucratic Activism and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Department of Justice and Its Entry into the Centre of Government," Canadian Public Administration 42 (Winter 1999): 486-490.
19. M. Delmas-Marty and M. Izorche, "Marge nationale d'appréciation et internationalisation du droit: réflexions sur la validité formelle d'un droit commun pluraliste," McGill Law Journal 46 (2001): 923.
20. See Gerald Alfred, Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism in (Canada (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995);
21. James Tully, "The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom," Political Theory and Indigenous Rights, eds. P. Patton, D. Ivison, and D. Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 36-59.
22. See Halle Bruce and Ardith Walkem, "Bringing Our Living Constitutions Home," Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35, eds. A. Walkem and H. Bruce (Penticton, British Columbia: Theytus Books, 2003), pp. 343-362.
23. This support is often qualified. See, for example, the various essays in Walkem and Bruce, eds., Box of Treasures?
24. Calder v. AG for British Columbia, S.C.R. 313 (1973).
25. Michael Asch, "From Calder to Van der Peet Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Law, 1973-96," Indigenous Peoples Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, ed. Paul Havemann (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 428-446.
26. Guerin v. R, 2 S.C.R. 335 (1984).
27. R. v. Sparrow, 1 S.C.R. 1075 (1990).
28. Ibid., 1108-1110.
29. Ibid., 1076-1080 and 1099-1122.
30. Ibid., 1110.
31. R. v. Gladstone, 2 S.C.R. 723 (1996).
32. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 1010 (1997).
33. Delgamuukw, paras. 161 and 165.
34. This was stated in the clearest of terms in Sparrow: "There was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown." Sparrow, 1103.
35. R. v. Van der Peel, 2 S.C.R. 507 (1996 ).
36. See also R. v. Sioni, 1 S.C.R. 1025 (1990), 461-465;
37. Gladstone, para. 73;
38. Delgamuukw, para. 186.
39. For discussion see John Borrows, "Uncertain Citizens: Aboriginal Peoples and the Supreme Court," Canadian Bar Review 80 (2001): 15-41, at 32-37.
40. Sparrow, 1105.
41. R v. Marshall (II), 3 S.C.R. 533 (1999), para. 23.
42. Borrows, "Uncertain Citizens," 37. Reasons for this preference include the high cost of litigation, in both economic and human terms, and the sheer complexity of the issues and competing interests involved in Aboriginal rights cases, issues which the Court reasons (quite rightly) that it is not the most competent actor to resolve. For the Court's articulation of these reasons see
43. Delgamuukw, para. 186;
44. Marshall (II), para. 22.
45. The Court sometimes recommends both types of dialogue in the same case, and without clearly distinguishing one form from the other. See, for example, Sparrow, 1086, 1105, 1119;
46. Delgamuukw, para. 168 and 186;
47. Marshall 11, para. 22.
48. See Delgamuukw, para. 168;
49. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 73 SCC (2004), paras. 40-42 and 47;
50. http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/index.html.
51. Haida, para. 39. One of the key dimensions of the Court's jurisprudence on the duty to consult is that the Aboriginal parties are not required to prove that a right exists before consultation is required by the Crown - they need only make the case that there is some likelihood that such a right exists (indeed, the Haida decision was concerned exclusively with these types of cases). Nevertheless, as we discuss below, the strength of the prima facie case for the existence of a right will dictate the nature and extent of the consultation in which the Crown is obliged to engage.
52. Haida, paras. 43-44.
53. Ibid., paras. 46-47.
54. Ibid., para. 48;
55. Delgamuukw, para. 168. The Aboriginal parties are also held up to a certain standard of conduct in the consultation process. Specifically, "they must not frustrate the Crown's reasonable good faith attempts, nor should they take unreasonable positions to thwart government from making decisions or acting in cases where, despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not reached."
56. See Haida, para. 42.
57. Haidn, paras. 43-47.
58. Sparrow, 1105.
59. Ddgamuukw, para. 186.
60. I b i d.
61. Ibid., emphasis added.
62. In addition to the Nisga'a Final Agreement, these include the Yukon First Nations Self-Government Agreements, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, and Nunavut. For details on these agreements, see Helena Catt and Michael Murphy, Sub-State Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Design (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
63. See Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia: Negotiating a Mutually Beneficial Future (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), pp. 26-30. According to McKee (pp. 92-6), the Court's later decision in Delgamuukw also helped breathe new life into the treaty process, which had until then been showing increasing signs of ill health.
64. Marshall (II), para. 22.
65. See Government of Canada, "The Marshall Response Initiative," Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 6 January 2004; http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/ communic/marshall/marshall_e.htm.
66. McKee, Treaty Talks, pp. 93-94.
67. For additional discussion of Delgamuukw's policy impact outside of British Columbia see the various essays in Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme Court's Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2000).
68. British Columbia, 2002, "Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Nations," accessed 12 August 2004; http://srmwww.gov.bc.ca/clrg/alrb/ cabinet/ConsultationPolicyFN.pdf.
69. K. Lunman, "Ottawa Says It May Quit Stalled Land Claims," Globe and Mail, 7 October 2002. Web edition, accessed 9 October 2002; http://www.globeandmail.com. The first tables were shut down in the month following this announcement.
70. The policy is outlined in Canada, Aboriginal Self-Government: The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1995).
71. See R. F. McDonnel and R. C. Depew, "Aboriginal Self-Government and Self-Determination in Canada: A Critical Commentary, " Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, ed. John Hylton (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1999), 352-376.
72. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] SCC 74 http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/index.html (accessed 21 December 2004).
73. Bradford W. Morse, "Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R. v. Pamajewon," McGill Law Journal 42 (1997): 1011-1042;
74. Michael Murphy, "Culture and the Courts: A New Direction in Canadian Jurisprudence on Aboriginal Rights?" Canadian Journal of Political Science 34 (March 2001): 109-129.
75. Borrows, "Uncertain Citizens," 34-37.
76. Following Delgamuukw, para. 165, these include "the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims."
77. See Sparrow, 1103;
78. Van der Peet, para. 31;
79. Delgamuukw, para. 186. For a somewhat different take on the question of Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty see Mitchell v. Canada (MNR), 1 S.C.R. 911 (2001).
80. Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), p. 134.
81. Fernand Dumont, Raisons communes (Montreal: Boréal, 1995), p. 45;
82. Fernand Dumont, Genèse de la société québécoise (Montreal: Boréal, 1993).
83. Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, "La Charter canadienne des droits et libertés et la fédéralisme: quelques remarques sur les vingt premières années d'une relation amigugë," Revue du Barreau (March 2003; special issue): 278-280.
84. Ibid., 307-310.
85. F. L. Morton, "The Effect of the Charter of Rights on Canadian Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 25 (Summer 1995): 179;
86. James B. Kelly, "Reconciling Rights and Federalism during Review of the Charter of Rights and Federalism: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Centralization Thesis, 1982 to 1999," Canadian Journal of Political Science 34 (June 2001): 321-326.
87. Attorney General (Quebec) v. Protestant School Boards, 2 S.C.R. 66 (1984); Ford v. Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 712 (1988); Devine v. Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 790 (1988); Libman. v. Quebec, 3 S.C.R. 569 (1997).
88. Between 1982 and 2003, a total of eleven Quebec statutes were reviewed by the Supreme Court, resulting in a finding of constitutionality of 55 percent. Once the legislative responses in Ford, Devine, and Libman and the limited policy consequences of Protestant School Boards are considered, the National Assembly has retained policy autonomy in 91 percent of cases (ten out of eleven) reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
89. A total of twenty-five provincial statutes were found to violate the Canadian Charter between 1982 and 2003. Quebec's experience has been similar to other provinces: five statutes have been found unconstitutional in Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta and four statutes in Ontario.
90. Section 33 applies only to fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and equality rights. It does not apply to section 6 (mobility rights), sections 16-22 (official languages), or section 23 (minority language education rights), exceptions considered indicative of the Canadian Charter's asymmetrical threat to Quebec's distinctive language and cultural policies.
91. The second instrument would be the notwithstanding clause. However, it has been argued that a convention now exists that section 33 cannot be used and has fallen into disuse, similar to the power of disallowance. However, Quebec academics argue that section 33 is still operational in this province. See André Binette, "Le Pouvoir dérogatoire de l'article 33 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et la structure de la Constitution du Canada," Revue du Barreau (March 2000; special issue): 134-137.
92. R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103 (1986).
93. Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), pp. 78-88.
94. RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada, 3 S.C.R. 199 (1995) at 342.
95. Leclair, "Réflexions critiques," 415-416.
96. Protestant School Boards, 78.
97. Laforest, Trudeau, pp. 125-149.
98. Between 1991 and 2001, a net outflow of 53,750 Quebec anglophones moved to other Canadian provinces, reducing this community to 8 percent of the Quebec population. In the same period, the allophone community increased to 10 percent of Quebec's population. Statistics Canada, cited at http://www12.statcan.ca/ english/census01/Products/Analytic/companion/lang/pdf/96F0030XIE2001005.pdf (accessed 22 December 2004).
99. Ford v. Quebec, para. 74.
100. Gaudreault-DesBiens, "La Charter canadienne," 300-302.
101. The Charter of the French Language "Regulation defining the scope of the expression 'markedly predominant' for the purposes of the Charter of the French Language." Cited at http://www.olf.gouv.gc.ca/english/regulations/ reg_predominant.html (accessed 22 December 2004).
102. Binette, "Le Pouvoir dérogatoire," 148-149.
103. Under the Referendum Act, two official committees (Yes and No) are established and individuals or groups not willing to affiliate with an official committee are severally restricted in their ability to spend during the campaign.
104. Libman v. Quebec, paras. 76-78.
105. Ibid., para. 86.
106. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 (1998), para. 104.
107. Ibid., paras. 132-136.
108. Mary Dawson, "Reflections on the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference," National Journal ofConstitutional Law 11 (1999): 15-18.
109. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para. 88.
110. Ibid., para. 93.
111. Bill 99, An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Quebec People and the Quebec State. Cited at www.assant.qc.ca/achives-36leg1se/FRA/Publications/Projects-loi/etat-051.htm (accessed 28 December 2004).
112. R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd., 3 S.C.R. 209 (2001). The constitutional challenge involved an Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry.
113. Ibid., para. 118.
114. Ibid., para. 239.
115. Gaudreault-DesBiens, "La Charter canadienne," 303-304.
116. Interview with departmental officials: Ministry of Justice, Government of Quebec (23 November 2003); Commission des Droits de la Personne et des Droits de al Jeunesse, Government of Quebec (3 November 2003).
117. In 2003 the Quebec Human Rights Commission reviewed approximately 130 bills and presented nine written briefs to the Quebec National Assembly. Officials indicated that approximately 60 percent of its recommendations were accepted by the National Assembly. Interview with departmental officials: Commission des Droits de la Personne et des Droits de al Jeunesse, Government of Quebec (3 November 2003).
118. This is not a common practice. Provincial human rights commissions generally investigate complaints and perform an educational role.