Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions

Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science

Volumn 105, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 381-407

  Melnyk, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944568360     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01063564     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Supervenience, Necessary Coextension, and Reducibility
2. Troubles With Functionalism
3. Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism does not Entail
4. Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis
5. Weak Supervenience
6. Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, Reduction
7. In Defense of Type Materialism
8. Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics
9. Supervenience and Microphysics
10. Non-Reductive Materialism and the Spectrum of Mind-Body Theories
11. Concepts of Supervenience
12. “Strong” and “Global” Supervenience Revisited
13. Supervenience Doesn't Entail Reducibility
14. Molecular Biology and the Unity of Science
15. Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications
16. New Work for a Theory of Universals
17. Scientific Methodology and the Causal Theory of Perception
18. Physicalism: From Supervenience to Elimination
19. Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis
20. Global Supervenience and Reduction
21. Minds and Machines