Theory, data, and hypothesis testing: World Bank environmental reform redux

International Organization

Volumn 59, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 785-800

  Nielson, Daniel L ^a   Tierney, Michael J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944551938     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818305050277     Document Type: Review

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