Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege Cases

Mind and Language

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 423-447

  Schneider, Susan ^a  

^a MORAVIAN COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944481573     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00294.x     Document Type: Review

References (26)

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