Can we prevent the gaming of ramp constraints?

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 40, Issue 3-4 SPEC. ISS., 2005, Pages 461-471

  Oren, Shmuel S ^a,c   Ross, Andrew M ^b,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Lehigh University   (United States)

^c DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH   (United States)

^d LEHIGH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction design; Power generation dispatch; Ramp constraints

Indexed keywords

AUCTION DESIGN; POWER GENERATION DISPATCH; POWER PRODUCTION; RAMP CONSTRAINTS;

DATA REDUCTION; ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; VISUALIZATION;

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

EID: 24944442853     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2004.05.008     Document Type: Article

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