"Doing and allowing" and doing and allowing

Ethics

Volumn 115, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 799-808

  Bradley, Ben ^a   Stocker, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944433158     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/431464     Document Type: Review

References (20)

1. Samuel Scheffler, "Doing and Allowing," Ethics 114 (2004): 215-39.
2. Ibid., 219.
3. Ibid., 222.
4. In, respectively, P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, 59-80 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982);
5. and R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
6. Scheffler, "Doing and Allowing," 224.
7. Ibid., 219.
8. Ibid., 223.
9. Ibid., 222.
10. As well as Aristotle and Murdoch, see Graeme Marshall, "On Being Affected," Mind 77 (1968): 241-59.
11. Bernard Williams, "Deciding to Believe," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 136-51.
12. On energeia/ai, see Terry Penner, "Verbs and the Identity of Actions - a Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation of Aristotle," in Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Oscar P. Wood and George Pitcher, 393-460 (London: Macmillan, 1970);
13. L. A. Kosman, "Aristotle's Definition of Motion," Phronesis 14 (1969): 40-62,
14. and "Substance, Being, and Energeia" Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984): 121-49.
15. On energeia as actualization, see also Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle (London: Longmans, Green, 1874), vol. 1, essay 4, sec. 2, 230-51.
16. Again, see Marshall, "On Being Affected."
17. See also David Rapaport, "Some Metapsychological Considerations concerning Activity and Passivity," in The Collected Papers of David Rapaport, ed. Merton M. Gill (New York: Basic, 1967), 530-68.
18. See David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles (New York: Basic, 1965),
19. and Autonomy and Rigid Character (New York: Basic, 1981).
20. Scheffler, "Doing and Allowing," 228.