An assessment of port reform in Argentina: Outcomes and challenges ahead

Maritime Policy and Management

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 191-207

  Serebrisky, Tomás ^a   Trujillo, Lourdes ^b  

^a WORLD BANK GROUP   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LAS PALMAS DE GRAN CANARIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PORT OPERATION; REFORM PROCESS;

ARGENTINA; SOUTH AMERICA; WESTERN HEMISPHERE; WORLD;

EID: 24744459212     PISSN: 03088839     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03088830500136659     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Hoffmann, J., 2001, Latin American ports: results and determinants of private sector participation. International Journal of Maritime Economics, 3, 221-241.
2. Juhel, M., 2001, Globalisation, privatisation and restructuring of ports. International Journal of Maritime Economics, 3, 139-174.
3. Ibid. 1.
4. For a comprehensive study of the extent of privatization trends in the world's top 100 container ports see Baird, A., 2002, Privatization trends at the world's top-100 container ports. Maritime Policy & Management, 29, 271-284.
5. For a comprehensive view of all the dimensions involved in the reform of ports see the toolkit developed by the World Bank: World Bank and PPIAF, 2003, Port Reform Toolkit. Effective Decision Support for Policymakers (Washington, DC: World Bank). Available at www.ppiaf.org
6. The data collected in table 1 deals exclusively with projects in which private companies assume development and operating risks during the contract period. Investments are recorded on a commitment basis in the year of financial closure. Actual disbursements are not tracked.
7. The specific legal instruments applied to the port sector were: the Decrees 906/91, 2284/91 and 817/92, the Ports' Law (Ley 24.093, June 1992 complemented by Decree 1092/92) and the Regulation of the Law (Decree 769/93).
8. Sgut, M., 2000, Informe sobre reestructuración portuaria. Impacto social del Puerto de Buenos Aires. Oficina Internacional. del Trabajo. XX Reunión del Comité Técnico Permanente de Puertos de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (Cali, Colombia: OIT).
9. World Bank, 1996, Argentina-transport Privatization and Regulation: The Next Wave of Challenges. Report No. 14469 (Washington, DC: World Bank).
10. Coelli, T., Estache, A., Perelman, S. and Trujillo, L., 2003, A Primer on Efficiency Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulators (Washington, DC: World Bank Institute Development Studies).
11. Estache, A. and Serebrisky, T., 2004, Where Do We Stand on Transport Infrastructure Deregulation and Public Private Partnership? Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 3356 (Washington, DC: World Bank).
12. Source: Ministerio de Planificación Federal, Inversion Pública y Servicios, Subsecretaría de Puertos y Vías Navegables (www.puertosbuenosaires.gov.ar).
13. Ibid. 4, World Bank.
14. Estache, A. and De Rus, G., 2000, Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure: Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators (Washington, DC: World Bank Institute Development Studies).
15. For an empirical study of the relationship of port efficiency and maritime transport costs in Latin America see Sánchez, R., Hoffmann, J., Micco, A., Pizzolitto, G., Sgut, M. and Wilmsmeier, G., 2003, Port efficiency and international trade: port efficiency as a determinant of maritime transport costs. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 5, 199-218.
16. A model for monitoring the conditions in which anticompetitive conducts are likely to develop is developed in: Kent, P. and Ashar, A., 2001, Port competition and regulation: a tool for monitoring for anti-competitive behaviour. International Journal of Maritime Economics, 3, 27-51. This tool could be of significant help for countries that do not have significant antitrust experience and lack human resources specialized in transport economics. Besides, the model could be jointly developed and applied by the sector regulator (port authority) and the antitrust agency, fostering the much needed cooperation between these agencies.
17. Flor, L. and Defilippi, E., 2003, Port infrastructure: an access model for the essential facility. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 5, 116-132.
18. Heaver, T., Meersman, H., Moglia, F. and Van de Voorde, E., 2000, Do mergers and alliances influence European shipping and port competition? Maritime Policy & Management, 27(4), 363-373.
19. The concern for competition was present throughout the privatization process. Bidders were allowed to bid for more than one terminal but had to express a preference and could be awarded only one terminal. Terminals 1 and 2 would eventually be awarded jointly.
20. Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia 'Maersk Argentina Holdings SA, Terminal 4 SA y Terminal EMCYM SA S/notificación art 8 Ley 25156'.
21. A relevant geographic market is the minimum area where a hypothetical monopolist can profitably increase prices. In other words, the minimum area where there is no effective competition because consumers (or users) cannot demand services from other suppliers. For a detailed description of port competition in geographical areas see: Heaver, T., Meersman, H., and Van de Voorde, E., 2001, Co-operation and competition in international container transport: strategies for ports. Maritime Policy & Management, 28, 293-305.
22. For US thresholds see US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines. The CNDC does not pre-define changes and levels thresholds in merger analysis.
23. The existence of barriers to entry in the European container handling industry and the potential consequences of having firms with dominant position in this industry is discussed in: Notteboom, T., 2002, Consolidation and contestability in the European container handling industry. Maritime Policy & Management, 29, 257-269.
24. Dock Sud is an actual competitior, with a market share of 30% in the relevant market. Zarate opened a container terminal in November 2001 with a capacity of 50,000 TEUs and has plans to expand it to 500,000 TEUs.
25. For an analysis of the role of excess capacity as an efficiency enhancing decision or a tool for entry deterrence in ocean liner shipping markets see: Fusillo, M., 2003, Excess capacity and entry deterrence: the case of ocean liner shipping markets. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 5, 100-115.
26. Haralambides, H. E., 2002, Competition, excess capacity and the pricing of port infra-structure. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 4, 323-347.
27. Estache, A., González, M. and Trujillo, L., 2002, Efficiency gains from port reform and the potencial for yardstick competition: lessons from Mexico. World Development, 30, 545-560.
28. See publications at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/ 3888
29. Rowlinson, M. and Wixey, S., 2002, The Politics and Economics of Developing Coastal Shipping. IAME Panama 2002 Conference Proceedings. Available at http://www.eclac.cl/Transporte/perfil/ iame_papers/papers.asp
30. Breuillet, A., Harding, A. and West, R., 2002, The Potential for Regional Cabotage in Central America. IAME Panama 2002 Conference Proceedings. Available at http://www.eclac.cl/Transporte/perfil/ iame_papers/papers.asp