Verifying authentication protocol implementations

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology

Volumn 81, Issue , 2002, Pages 5-24

  Schneider, Steve ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTHENTICATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY;

ALGEBRAIC PROPERTIES; AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS; EXCLUSIVE-OR; RANK FUNCTIONS;

FORMAL METHODS;

EID: 24644523336     PISSN: 18684238     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-35496-5_2     Document Type: Review

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