A note on participatory decision-making and rationality

Cambridge Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 457-467

  Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Norms; Participation; Rationality

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH; PRODUCTIVITY;

EID: 2442680064     PISSN: 0309166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cje/28.3.457     Document Type: Article

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