Dangerous pathogens in the laboratory: From smallpox to today's SARS setbacks and tomorrow's polio-free world

Lancet

Volumn 363, Issue 9421, 2004, Pages 1566-1568

  Heymann, David L ^a   Aylward, R Bruce ^a   Wolff, Christopher ^a  

^a WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ORAL POLIOMYELITIS VACCINE;

BIOSAFETY; FOWLPOX VIRUS; GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE; HUMAN; IMMUNIZATION; LABORATORY; LABORATORY INFECTION; LABORATORY TEST; MEDICAL RESEARCH; NONHUMAN; NOTE; PATHOGENESIS; POLIOMYELITIS; POLIOMYELITIS VIRUS; POPULATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE; SARS CORONAVIRUS; SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME; SMALLPOX; VIRUS INFECTION; VIRUS TRANSMISSION; WILD TYPE; WORKER; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION;

EID: 2442620682     PISSN: 01406736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(04)16234-X     Document Type: Note

References (14)

1. World Health Organization. SARS in China - updates 6. May 5, 2004: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_05_05/en (accessed May 9, 2004).
2. Fenner F, Henderson DA, Arita I, Jezek Z., Ladnyi ID. Smallpox and its eradication. 1988;World Health Organization, Geneva
3. Fine PE, Oblapenko G, Sutter R. Polio control after certification: major issues outstanding. Bull World Health Organ. 82:2004;47-52
4. China confirms SARS infection in another previously reported case; summary of cases to date. World Health Organization SARS situation update 5, 30 April 1004. Available from: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_04_30/en (accessed May 11, 2004).
5. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Singapore - update 2. SARS case in Singapore linked to accidental laboratory contamination. Available from: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_09_24/en/ (accessed May 11, 2004).
6. World Health Organization. Severe acute respiratory syndrome in Taiwan, China. Dec 17, 2003: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_12_17/en (accessed May 9, 2004).
7. World Health Organization. WHO biosafety guidelines for handling of SARS specimens. April 25, 2003: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/biosafety2003_04_25/en (accessed May 9, 2004).
8. World Health Organization. WHO post-outbreak biosafety guidelines for handling of SARS-CoV specimens and cultures. Dec 18, 2003: http://www.who.int/ csr/sars/biosafety2003_12_18/en (accessed May 9, 2004).
9. Mulders MN, Reimerink JHJ, Koopmans MP, van Loon AM, van der Avoort HGAM. Genetic analysis of wild-type poliovirus importation into The Netherlands (1979-1995). J Infect Dis 1997; 176: 617-24.
10. Dowdle W, Wolff C, Sanders R, Lambert S, Best M. Will containment of wild poliovirus in laboratories and inactivated poliovirus vaccine production sites be effective for global certification? Bull World Health Organ. 82:2003;59-62
11. World Health Organization. Global Action Plan for laboratory containment of wild poliovirus, 2nd edition. WHO document WHO/V&B/03.11. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2003: http://www.polioeradication.org/vaccines/ polioeradication/all/news/document.asp (accessed May 11, 2004).
12. World Health Organization. Guidelines for the safe production and quality control of IPV manufactured from wild poliovirus. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2003: http://www.who.int/biologicals/IPV_final.pdf (accessed May 11, 2004).
13. Sutter RW, Caceres VM, Lago PM. The role of routine polio immunization in the post-certification era. Bull World Health Organ. 82:2004;31-39
14. World Health Organization. Report of an Informal Consultation on identification and management of vaccine-derived polioviruses, Geneva, Sept 3-5, 2003. Geneva: World Health Organization (in press).