Information transparency and coordination failure: Theory and experiment

Journal of Accounting Research

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 159-195

  Anctil, Regina M ^a   Dickhaut, John ^a   Kanodia, Chandra ^a   Shapiro, Brian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST THOMAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2442515183     PISSN: 00218456     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.00134.x     Document Type: Article

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