Europe's leverage

Washington Quarterly

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 91-110

  Hunter, Robert E ^a  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 2442444990     PISSN: 0163660X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016366003322596945     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Robert E. Hunter, "Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics," in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (eds.), The Global Century: Globalization and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2001), www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%202001/Global%20Century%20-% 20June%202001/JDSChap4Hunter(ri)FinalCr.htm (accessed October 29, 2003).
2. See Robert E. Hunter, "Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May/June 1999), www.foreignaffairs.org/19990501faessay1037/robert-e-hunter/nato-at- fifty-maximizing-nato-a-relevant-alliance-knows-how-to-reach.html (accessed October 10, 2003).
3. "Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources." "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
4. For further information on the significant migration of Muslims into Europe, see Shireen T. Hunter, ed., Islam: Europe's Second Religion (New York: Praeger, 2002).
5. See Robert E. Hunter, European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion - or Competitor? (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2002), www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1463/ (accessed October 6, 2003).
6. "Defence Capabilities Initiative," NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)69, April 25, 1999, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm (accessed October 12, 2003);
7. "Prague Capabilities Commitment - individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in areas key to modern military operations, such as strategic air and sea lift and air-to-ground surveillance." "NATO Transformed: New Members, Capabilities, and Partnerships," NATO Update, November 21, 2002, www.nato.int/docu/ update/2002/11-november/e1121e.htm (accessed October 12, 2003).
8. The Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP), under the authority of the Joint Committee on Proliferation (CJP). See Crispin Hain-Cole, "The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Rationale and Aims," NATO Review 47, no. 2 (summer 1999): 33-34, www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-08.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
9. "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." "North Atlantic Treaty," April 4, 1949, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed October 12, 2003). Note that this act is still discretionary, thus emphasizing the political significance of invoking this provision.
10. Although little noted, before NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Kingdom and Turkey, as well as Germany and the Netherlands in joint cooperation, had in turn exercised command of ISAF.
11. "European Union Steps Up Fight Against Terrorism," European Union News Releases No. 67/01, September 20, 2001, www.eurunion.org/news/press/2001/2001067.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
12. "Operation Enduring Freedom - Order of Battle," www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-01.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
13. Other NATO countries formally supporting U.S. policy on the war in Iraq were Spain, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic. Also, the so-called Vilnius 10 group of central European states agreed to a common declaration of support for U.S. policy. See "Eight European Leaders Support Disarming of Iraq," January 30, 2003, www.useu.be/Categories/GlobalAffairs/Iraq/Jan3003EuropeLetterIraq.html (accessed October 10, 2003).
14. See also Quentin Peel et al., "The Plot That Split Old and New Europe," Financial Times, May 27, 2003, www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0527plot.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
15. "NATO Response Force - NRF," www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape-nrf/nrf_intro.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
16. The NRF was formally "stood up" - became active - on October 15, 2003. It could be the vehicle for any alliance-agreed, NATO-wide engagement in Iraq peacekeeping. It could also serve as the framework for a NATO peace-enabling force in support of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. In time, an augmented NRF could become the key institution for organizing and projecting NATO military power, perhaps becoming the dominant element of the integrated military command structure. See Robert E. Hunter, "The Perfect Army for Iraq: NATO," New York Times, September 13, 2003.
17. Notably, French forces are playing a leading role in the NRF.
18. Only Turkey and Austria, for different reasons, refused the use of their air space to coalition overflights.
19. See "Draft European Security Strategy Presented by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to the European Council, 20 June 2003 in Thessaloniki, Greece," Internationale Politik 4, no. 3 (autumn 2003), www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip0303/solana200603.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
20. This was a principal strategy of U.S. president George H. W. Bush during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
21. On June 2, the North Atlantic Council agreed to a request from the Polish [r]epresentative to support Poland in the context of its leadership of a sector in Iraq. That NATO support has consisted of providing intelligence, logistics expertise, movement coordination, force generation, and secure communications support. ... Several NATO and [p]artner countries are among the nations contributing to the Polish-led multinational division. Spain provides a substantial presence and the [d]eputy [c]ommander, while Ukraine is the second[-]largest force contributor. Other [a]llied and [p]artner contributors include Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, [t]he Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia and the United States. "Poland Assumes Command of Multinational Division in Iraq With NATO Support," NATO Press Release (2003)93, September 3, 2003, www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/ p03-093e.htm (accessed October 12, 2003).
22. This concept was a central component of U.S. military strategy from 1995 until 2002: "Shape, prepare, respond." Jim Garamone, "Capabilities, Strategy Must Converge to Face New Threats," American Forces Information Service, June 22, 2001, www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/n06222001_200106221.html (accessed October 10, 2003).
23. "The people may be likened to water, and guerrillas to the fish that swim in it." Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (1937), www.bellum.nu/wp/mtt/mttogw.html (accessed October 10, 2003).
24. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "President Outlines U.S. Plan to Help World's Poor," March 22, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-1.html (accessed October 6, 2003).