Problem-solving courts: From innovation to institutionalization

American Criminal Law Review

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 1501-1511

  Dorf, Michael C ^a   Fagan, Jeffrey A ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 2442423340     PISSN: 01640364     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Editorial

References (97)

1. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
2. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
3. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
4. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
5. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
6. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
7. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
8. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS, JR., BUREAUCRACY, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976); GABRIEL TARDE, THE LAWS OF IMITATION (Elsie Clews Parson trans., 2d ed. 1903); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Gregory Bovasso, A Network Analysis of Social Contagion Processes in an Organizational Intervention, 49 HUM. REL. 1419 (1996); Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987) (comparing competing models to analyze purported evidence of social contagion in the diffusion of technological innovation); Lawrence Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969). Two analytical frameworks have dominated theory and research on innovation in organizations. The "determinate" model posits a relation between some set of social, economic or political variables and the adoption of innovation. In the "diffusion" model, innovations spread through interpersonal contact as ideas are passed and accepted through a social influence mechanism. These models need not be mutually exclusive, however. For syntheses, see EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (4th ed. 1995); Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
9. See Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 827 (1990) (discussing the effects stemming from the overflow of inmates tied to increased drug enforcement activities). For the response of state courts to the crisis, see N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (2000) (hereinafter KAYE REPORT), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (1993); MARK KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS (1992); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); FRANK ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992).
10. See Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 827 (1990) (discussing the effects stemming from the overflow of inmates tied to increased drug enforcement activities). For the response of state courts to the crisis, see N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (2000) (hereinafter KAYE REPORT), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (1993); MARK KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS (1992); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); FRANK ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992).
11. See Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 827 (1990) (discussing the effects stemming from the overflow of inmates tied to increased drug enforcement activities). For the response of state courts to the crisis, see N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (2000) (hereinafter KAYE REPORT), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (1993); MARK KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS (1992); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); FRANK ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992).
12. See Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 827 (1990) (discussing the effects stemming from the overflow of inmates tied to increased drug enforcement activities). For the response of state courts to the crisis, see N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (2000) (hereinafter KAYE REPORT), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (1993); MARK KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS (1992); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); FRANK ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992).
13. See Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 827 (1990) (discussing the effects stemming from the overflow of inmates tied to increased drug enforcement activities). For the response of state courts to the crisis, see N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (2000) (hereinafter KAYE REPORT), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (1993); MARK KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS (1992); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); FRANK ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992).
14. See Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 827 (1990) (discussing the effects stemming from the overflow of inmates tied to increased drug enforcement activities). For the response of state courts to the crisis, see N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS AND THE COURTS, CONFRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (2000) (hereinafter KAYE REPORT), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/reports (last visited Nov. 19, 2003). See generally ELLIOTT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (1993); MARK KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS (1992); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); FRANK ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL (1992).
15. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 L. & POL'Y 125, 128 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
16. See KAYE REPORT, supra note 2; JAMES L. NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 108-10 (2001); John Feinblatt et al., The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. MGR. 28, 29 (1999).
17. See KAYE REPORT, supra note 2; JAMES L. NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 108-10 (2001); John Feinblatt et al., The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. MGR. 28, 29 (1999).
18. See KAYE REPORT, supra note 2; JAMES L. NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 108-10 (2001); John Feinblatt et al., The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. MGR. 28, 29 (1999).
19. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82 (1998); Susan N. Herman, Measuring Culpability by Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 ALB. L. REV. 777 (2000); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998); Lisa R. Nakdai, Note, Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for the Sake of the Message?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557 (2001).
20. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82 (1998); Susan N. Herman, Measuring Culpability by Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 ALB. L. REV. 777 (2000); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998); Lisa R. Nakdai, Note, Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for the Sake of the Message?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557 (2001).
21. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82 (1998); Susan N. Herman, Measuring Culpability by Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 ALB. L. REV. 777 (2000); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998); Lisa R. Nakdai, Note, Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for the Sake of the Message?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557 (2001).
22. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82 (1998); Susan N. Herman, Measuring Culpability by Measuring Drugs? Three Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 ALB. L. REV. 777 (2000); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998); Lisa R. Nakdai, Note, Are New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the Messenger for the Sake of the Message?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557 (2001).
23. See JAMES L. NOLAN, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT AT CENTURY'S END 83-84 (1998).
24. See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 133-8.
25. See id. at 51-7; see also Elaine M. Wolf, Systemic Constraints on the Implementation of a Northeastern Drug Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE (James L. Nolan ed. 2002). Critics of drug courts have also noted the sympathy of judges towards the disease model of addiction. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1471-73 (2000) (arguing that the disease model ignores complex interactions shaping drug addiction).
26. See id. at 51-7; see also Elaine M. Wolf, Systemic Constraints on the Implementation of a Northeastern Drug Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE (James L. Nolan ed. 2002). Critics of drug courts have also noted the sympathy of judges towards the disease model of addiction. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1471-73 (2000) (arguing that the disease model ignores complex interactions shaping drug addiction).
27. See id. at 51-7; see also Elaine M. Wolf, Systemic Constraints on the Implementation of a Northeastern Drug Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE (James L. Nolan ed. 2002). Critics of drug courts have also noted the sympathy of judges towards the disease model of addiction. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1471-73 (2000) (arguing that the disease model ignores complex interactions shaping drug addiction).
28. See John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 948-50 (2000). Reno was also instrumental in forming the Drug Court Program Office, now incorporated into the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Id.
29. OJP DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, DRUG COURT ACTIVITY UPDATE: OCT. 15, 2003 (2003), available at http://www.american.edu/justice/publications/2003factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003).
30. TH ANNUAL ADULT DRUG COURT TRAINING CONFERENCE OFFICIAL PROGRAM, available at http://www.nadcp.org/events/conferenceprogram.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
31. For a view of the juvenile courts as the first problem-solving courts, see David S. Tanenhaus, The Historical Roots and Growth of American Juvenile Justice, 1850-1950, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al., eds. 2002). For an analysis of how juvenile courts increasingly came to resemble conventional courts in the wake of In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), see, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988).
32. For a view of the juvenile courts as the first problem-solving courts, see David S. Tanenhaus, The Historical Roots and Growth of American Juvenile Justice, 1850-1950, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al., eds. 2002). For an analysis of how juvenile courts increasingly came to resemble conventional courts in the wake of In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), see, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988).
33. For a view of the juvenile courts as the first problem-solving courts, see David S. Tanenhaus, The Historical Roots and Growth of American Juvenile Justice, 1850-1950, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al., eds. 2002). For an analysis of how juvenile courts increasingly came to resemble conventional courts in the wake of In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), see, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988).
34. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5. The modern era of determinate sentencing began with changes in California, Washington, and Indiana. These states' sentencing practices are codified in the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (2000); IND. CODE. §§ 35-50-2-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (for juveniles). Many other states have since followed suit. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, -702 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3 (2002).
35. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5. The modern era of determinate sentencing began with changes in California, Washington, and Indiana. These states' sentencing practices are codified in the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (2000); IND. CODE. §§ 35-50-2-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (for juveniles). Many other states have since followed suit. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, -702 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3 (2002).
36. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5. The modern era of determinate sentencing began with changes in California, Washington, and Indiana. These states' sentencing practices are codified in the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (2000); IND. CODE. §§ 35-50-2-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (for juveniles). Many other states have since followed suit. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, -702 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3 (2002).
37. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5. The modern era of determinate sentencing began with changes in California, Washington, and Indiana. These states' sentencing practices are codified in the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (2000); IND. CODE. §§ 35-50-2-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (for juveniles). Many other states have since followed suit. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, -702 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3 (2002).
38. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5. The modern era of determinate sentencing began with changes in California, Washington, and Indiana. These states' sentencing practices are codified in the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (2000); IND. CODE. §§ 35-50-2-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (for juveniles). Many other states have since followed suit. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, -702 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3 (2002).
39. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5. The modern era of determinate sentencing began with changes in California, Washington, and Indiana. These states' sentencing practices are codified in the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (2000); IND. CODE. §§ 35-50-2-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (for juveniles). Many other states have since followed suit. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, -702 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3 (2002).
40. See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma, & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691 (1999); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 480 (2002). But see Hoffman, supra note 8 (offering critique and view of the "pretext of treatment").
41. See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma, & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691 (1999); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 480 (2002). But see Hoffman, supra note 8 (offering critique and view of the "pretext of treatment").
42. See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma, & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691 (1999); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 480 (2002). But see Hoffman, supra note 8 (offering critique and view of the "pretext of treatment").
43. See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma, & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691 (1999); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 480 (2002). But see Hoffman, supra note 8 (offering critique and view of the "pretext of treatment").
44. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
45. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
46. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
47. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
48. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
49. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
50. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
51. For example, New York State's Rockefeller drug laws impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for possession of four ounces of "substances containing a narcotic drug." N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 220.21 (1999). Most states have also adopted predicate felony laws imposing greater sentences for repeat felons. See, e.g., CAL PEN CODE § 667.5 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2003). The consequences of these laws are well documented. See generally Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003) (showing that the growth in drug arrests coupled with the state's predicate felony laws (mandating prison sentences for repeat felony offenders) contributed to the rise in incarceration throughout the 1990s, even as crime declined sharply in the latter half of the decade); Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001); Alexander B. Smith & Harriet Pollack, Curtailing the Sentencing Power of Trial Judges: The Unintended Consequences, 36 COURT REVIEW 4 (1999). For discussion of the influence of mandatory minimum and predicate felony laws on the drug court movement, see NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 39-61; John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000).
52. See MARK MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); TONRY, supra note 2; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991).
53. See MARK MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); TONRY, supra note 2; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991).
54. See MARK MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); TONRY, supra note 2; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991).
55. See Fox Butterfield, As Budgets Shrink, Cities See an Impact on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A11; Lydia Polgreen, Hard Times Get Harder Upstate as Fiscal Crisis Spans New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at A1.
56. See Fox Butterfield, As Budgets Shrink, Cities See an Impact on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A11; Lydia Polgreen, Hard Times Get Harder Upstate as Fiscal Crisis Spans New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at A1.
57. The idea of drug courts as a counterweight to the increased severity of drug-related sentencing is a recurring narrative among drug court proponents, but as McCoy notes it is an "unspoken theme." See Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2003).
58. New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye has been instrumental in promoting drug courts in New York State. See Feinblatt et al., supra note 15, at 278-81. Some other appellate judges have raised doubts, however. An Oklahoma appellate judge even opined that his state's "Drug Court Act runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine in that it makes the adjudicating judge a part of an executive, judicial, legislative triumvirate." Alexander v. State, 48 P.3d 110, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (Lumpkin, J., concurring). Michigan Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Markman agrees, citing the danger that problem-solving courts will encourage the exercise of non-judicial powers by the judiciary, in turn running afoul of the rule of law. See Stephen J. Markman, Drug Courts, Address to the Task Force on the Ethical Implications of Problem Solving Courts, Fetzer Institute (April 26, 2002) (transcript on file with American Criminal Law Review).
59. New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye has been instrumental in promoting drug courts in New York State. See Feinblatt et al., supra note 15, at 278-81. Some other appellate judges have raised doubts, however. An Oklahoma appellate judge even opined that his state's "Drug Court Act runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine in that it makes the adjudicating judge a part of an executive, judicial, legislative triumvirate." Alexander v. State, 48 P.3d 110, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (Lumpkin, J., concurring). Michigan Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Markman agrees, citing the danger that problem-solving courts will encourage the exercise of non-judicial powers by the judiciary, in turn running afoul of the rule of law. See Stephen J. Markman, Drug Courts, Address to the Task Force on the Ethical Implications of Problem Solving Courts, Fetzer Institute (April 26, 2002) (transcript on file with American Criminal Law Review).
60. New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye has been instrumental in promoting drug courts in New York State. See Feinblatt et al., supra note 15, at 278-81. Some other appellate judges have raised doubts, however. An Oklahoma appellate judge even opined that his state's "Drug Court Act runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine in that it makes the adjudicating judge a part of an executive, judicial, legislative triumvirate." Alexander v. State, 48 P.3d 110, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (Lumpkin, J., concurring). Michigan Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Markman agrees, citing the danger that problem-solving courts will encourage the exercise of non-judicial powers by the judiciary, in turn running afoul of the rule of law. See Stephen J. Markman, Drug Courts, Address to the Task Force on the Ethical Implications of Problem Solving Courts, Fetzer Institute (April 26, 2002) (transcript on file with American Criminal Law Review).
61. See STEVEN BELENKO, NAT'L CTR. ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001 UPDATE 22 (2001). But see, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson et al., Effectiveness of Drug Treatment Courts: Evidence from a Randomized Trial, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 171, 174-5 (2003) (reporting results of an experiment with random assignment of defendants eligible for drug court to either drug court or to the District Court where drug cases are not differentiated for special processing).
62. See STEVEN BELENKO, NAT'L CTR. ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001 UPDATE 22 (2001). But see, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson et al., Effectiveness of Drug Treatment Courts: Evidence from a Randomized Trial, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 171, 174-5 (2003) (reporting results of an experiment with random assignment of defendants eligible for drug court to either drug court or to the District Court where drug cases are not differentiated for special processing).
63. See id.; see also MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS, AND IMPACTS, available at http://courtinnovation.org (last visited January 16, 2004) (reporting evidence of significant recidivism reductions among drug court participants in multiple sites using several types of controlled studies to compare defendants in drug courts with similar defendants in regular court parts); Bruce G. Taylor et al., The Effects of a Group Batterer Treatment Program: A Randomized Experiment in Brooklyn, 18 JUST. Q. 171, 179 (2001) (reporting results of a randomized experiment on domestic violence cases).
64. See id.; see also MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS, AND IMPACTS, available at http://courtinnovation.org (last visited January 16, 2004) (reporting evidence of significant recidivism reductions among drug court participants in multiple sites using several types of controlled studies to compare defendants in drug courts with similar defendants in regular court parts); Bruce G. Taylor et al., The Effects of a Group Batterer Treatment Program: A Randomized Experiment in Brooklyn, 18 JUST. Q. 171, 179 (2001) (reporting results of a randomized experiment on domestic violence cases).
65. See, e.g., DICK B., THE GOOD BOOK AND THE BIG BOOK: A.A.'s ROOTS IN THE BIBLE (1997); NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS: WHO, WHAT, HOW, AND WHY (1976), available at http://www.na.org/ips/eng/IP1.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2003); Alcoholics Anonymous, The 12 Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous, available at http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2003) (requiring acknowledgment of a "power greater than ourselves"). This stands in contrast to the secular therapeutic model used in residency programs such as Phoenix House, Odyssey House, and Day Top Village.
66. See, e.g., DICK B., THE GOOD BOOK AND THE BIG BOOK: A.A.'s ROOTS IN THE BIBLE (1997); NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS: WHO, WHAT, HOW, AND WHY (1976), available at http://www.na.org/ips/eng/IP1.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2003); Alcoholics Anonymous, The 12 Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous, available at http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2003) (requiring acknowledgment of a "power greater than ourselves"). This stands in contrast to the secular therapeutic model used in residency programs such as Phoenix House, Odyssey House, and Day Top Village.
67. See, e.g., DICK B., THE GOOD BOOK AND THE BIG BOOK: A.A.'s ROOTS IN THE BIBLE (1997); NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS: WHO, WHAT, HOW, AND WHY (1976), available at http://www.na.org/ips/eng/IP1.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2003); Alcoholics Anonymous, The 12 Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous, available at http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2003) (requiring acknowledgment of a "power greater than ourselves"). This stands in contrast to the secular therapeutic model used in residency programs such as Phoenix House, Odyssey House, and Day Top Village.
68. For criticism of drug court research methodology, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: BETTER DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED TO MEASURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS (2002); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS (1997).
69. For criticism of drug court research methodology, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: BETTER DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED TO MEASURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS (2002); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS (1997).
70. The long history of specialized courts includes family, juvenile, bankruptcy, and housing courts. See generally Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A.J. 32 (2003) (discussing the development and particular issues facing specialty courts). The current trend is for even greater specialization. For example, there are now youth peer courts, teen courts, re-entry courts, wellness courts, and community courts. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (2000); David C. Anderson, Kids, Courts, and Communities, Center for Court Innovation, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/kid_courts_com.pdf; Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska's Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2002); Goldkamp, supra note 9, at 924.
71. The long history of specialized courts includes family, juvenile, bankruptcy, and housing courts. See generally Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A.J. 32 (2003) (discussing the development and particular issues facing specialty courts). The current trend is for even greater specialization. For example, there are now youth peer courts, teen courts, re-entry courts, wellness courts, and community courts. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (2000); David C. Anderson, Kids, Courts, and Communities, Center for Court Innovation, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/kid_courts_com.pdf; Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska's Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2002); Goldkamp, supra note 9, at 924.
72. The long history of specialized courts includes family, juvenile, bankruptcy, and housing courts. See generally Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A.J. 32 (2003) (discussing the development and particular issues facing specialty courts). The current trend is for even greater specialization. For example, there are now youth peer courts, teen courts, re-entry courts, wellness courts, and community courts. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (2000); David C. Anderson, Kids, Courts, and Communities, Center for Court Innovation, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/kid_courts_com.pdf; Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska's Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2002); Goldkamp, supra note 9, at 924.
73. The long history of specialized courts includes family, juvenile, bankruptcy, and housing courts. See generally Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A.J. 32 (2003) (discussing the development and particular issues facing specialty courts). The current trend is for even greater specialization. For example, there are now youth peer courts, teen courts, re-entry courts, wellness courts, and community courts. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (2000); David C. Anderson, Kids, Courts, and Communities, Center for Court Innovation, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/kid_courts_com.pdf; Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska's Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2002); Goldkamp, supra note 9, at 924.
74. The long history of specialized courts includes family, juvenile, bankruptcy, and housing courts. See generally Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A.J. 32 (2003) (discussing the development and particular issues facing specialty courts). The current trend is for even greater specialization. For example, there are now youth peer courts, teen courts, re-entry courts, wellness courts, and community courts. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (2000); David C. Anderson, Kids, Courts, and Communities, Center for Court Innovation, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/kid_courts_com.pdf; Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska's Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2002); Goldkamp, supra note 9, at 924.
75. See COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE INTERVENTIONS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES: ASSESSING PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS (Rosemary Chalk & Patricia A. King eds., 1998).
76. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 185-86 (2000). Advocates for victims of domestic violence do not so much worry that violence is implicitly excused by substituting treatment for punishment, as that a non-punitive sanction can increase victim risk of more and worse injury. See JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORTS (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
77. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 185-86 (2000). Advocates for victims of domestic violence do not so much worry that violence is implicitly excused by substituting treatment for punishment, as that a non-punitive sanction can increase victim risk of more and worse injury. See JEFFREY FAGAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORTS (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
78. See Donald G. Dutton et al., Intimacy-Anger and Insecure Attachment as Precursors of Abuse in Intimate Relationships, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1367 (1994).
79. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & G.L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994). For empirical studies on the heterogeneity of personality types among men who assault intimate partners, see generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Donald G. Dutton et al., Client Personality Disorders Affecting Wife Assault Post-treatment Recidivism, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 37 (1997); Zvi Eisikovits et al., Cognitive Styles and Socialized Attitudes of Men who Batter: Where Should We Intervene?, 40 FAM. REL. 72 (1991); W. Gleason et al., Psychological and Social Dysfunctions in Battering Men: A Review, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 43 (1997); Edward W. Gondolf, Characteristics of Court-Mandated Batterers in Four Cities: Diversity and Dichotomies, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1277 (1999).
80. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & G.L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994). For empirical studies on the heterogeneity of personality types among men who assault intimate partners, see generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Donald G. Dutton et al., Client Personality Disorders Affecting Wife Assault Post-treatment Recidivism, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 37 (1997); Zvi Eisikovits et al., Cognitive Styles and Socialized Attitudes of Men who Batter: Where Should We Intervene?, 40 FAM. REL. 72 (1991); W. Gleason et al., Psychological and Social Dysfunctions in Battering Men: A Review, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 43 (1997); Edward W. Gondolf, Characteristics of Court-Mandated Batterers in Four Cities: Diversity and Dichotomies, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1277 (1999).
81. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & G.L. Stuart, Typologies of Male
82. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & G.L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994). For empirical studies on the heterogeneity of personality types among men who assault intimate partners, see generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Donald G. Dutton et al., Client Personality Disorders Affecting Wife Assault Post-treatment Recidivism, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 37 (1997); Zvi Eisikovits et al., Cognitive Styles and Socialized Attitudes of Men who Batter: Where Should We Intervene?, 40 FAM. REL. 72 (1991); W. Gleason et al., Psychological and Social Dysfunctions in Battering Men: A Review, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 43 (1997); Edward W. Gondolf, Characteristics of Court-Mandated Batterers in Four Cities: Diversity and Dichotomies, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1277 (1999).
83. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & G.L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994). For empirical studies on the heterogeneity of personality types among men who assault intimate partners, see generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Donald G. Dutton et al., Client Personality Disorders Affecting Wife Assault Post-treatment Recidivism, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 37 (1997); Zvi Eisikovits et al., Cognitive Styles and Socialized Attitudes of Men who Batter: Where Should We Intervene?, 40 FAM. REL. 72 (1991); W. Gleason et al., Psychological and Social Dysfunctions in Battering Men: A Review, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 43 (1997); Edward W. Gondolf, Characteristics of Court-Mandated Batterers in Four Cities: Diversity and Dichotomies, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1277 (1999).
84. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & G.L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994). For empirical studies on the heterogeneity of personality types among men who assault intimate partners, see generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Donald G. Dutton et al., Client Personality Disorders Affecting Wife Assault Post-treatment Recidivism, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 37 (1997); Zvi Eisikovits et al., Cognitive Styles and Socialized Attitudes of Men who Batter: Where Should We Intervene?, 40 FAM. REL. 72 (1991); W. Gleason et al., Psychological and Social Dysfunctions in Battering Men: A Review, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 43 (1997); Edward W. Gondolf, Characteristics of Court-Mandated Batterers in Four Cities: Diversity and Dichotomies, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1277 (1999).
85. See Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & G.L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994). For empirical studies on the heterogeneity of personality types among men who assault intimate partners, see generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Donald G. Dutton et al., Client Personality Disorders Affecting Wife Assault Post-treatment Recidivism, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 37 (1997); Zvi Eisikovits et al., Cognitive Styles and Socialized Attitudes of Men who Batter: Where Should We Intervene?, 40 FAM. REL. 72 (1991); W. Gleason et al., Psychological and Social Dysfunctions in Battering Men: A Review, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 43 (1997); Edward W. Gondolf, Characteristics of Court-Mandated Batterers in Four Cities: Diversity and Dichotomies, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1277 (1999).
86. For a normative view on criminal accountability, see Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight Of Welfare Criminology: A Reply To Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976). For a literary approach to substituting treatment for punishment, see ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).
87. For a normative view on criminal accountability, see Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight Of Welfare Criminology: A Reply To Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976). For a literary approach to substituting treatment for punishment, see ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).
88. See Wendy N. Davis, supra note 24, at 34, 37.
89. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 L. & POL'Y 125, 128 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2003); Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63, 83-92 (2002).
90. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 L. & POL'Y 125, 128 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2003); Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63, 83-92 (2002).
91. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (confirming ability of HUD to evict public housing tenants when a member of the household or a guest engaged in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew or should have known about the activity).
92. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 942-43 (2003).
93. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 849 (2000); Thompson, supra note 31, at 64, 66-67.
94. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 849 (2000); Thompson, supra note 31, at 64, 66-67.
95. NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 194-6.
96. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 33, 948-51; Thompson, supra note 31, at 89-91.
97. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 33, 948-51; Thompson, supra note 31, at 89-91.