The design of public agencies: Overcoming agency costs and commitment problems

Public Administration and Development

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 119-127

  Yesilkagit, Kutsal ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMY; DESIGN; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION;

EID: 2442421919     PISSN: 02712075     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/pad.317     Document Type: Article

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