Rethinking the origins of federalism: Puzzle, theory, and evidence from nineteenth-century Europe

World Politics

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 70-98

  Ziblatt, Daniel ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FEDERAL SYSTEM; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT; NINETEENTH CENTURY; POLITICAL HISTORY; STATE BUILDING;

EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; WORLD;

EID: 24144444774     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/wp.2005.0013     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. Mann, The Sources of Social Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 2:59-61.
2. Romeo, Risorgimento e capitalismo (The risorgimento and capitalism) (Bari: Laterza, 1959).
3. 'Additionally, in both settings, the political cores (Prussia and Piedmont) were wealthier than the states they absorbed. Recent estimates of preunification regional GDP per capita demonstrate that Prussia was on average 1.9 times wealthier than the states it absorbed. Piedmont was 1.7 times wealthier than the states it absorbed. This finding undercuts the notion that the different institutional choice in the two cases reflected deep underlying differences in regional socioeconomic inequality. See Alfredo Esposto, "Estimating Regional per Capita Income: Italy, 1861-1914," Journal of European Economic History 26, no. 4 (1997), 589;
4. see also Harald Frank, Regionale Entwicklungsdisparitäten im deutscben Industrialisierungsprozess, 1849-1939 (Regional development disparities in the German industrialization process, 1849-1939) (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1996), appendix 8, p. 30.
5. There were at least three intellectual strands that were self-consciously federal in nineteenth-century Italy: the neo-Guelphs such as the priest Vicenzo Gioberti, who advocated a confederacy of princes under the lead of the pope; liberals such as Carlo Cattaneo and Ferrera; and regional autonomists in Italy's south.
6. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871 (New York: Harper and Row, 1935), 197.
7. Stuart Woolf, The Italian Risorgimento (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969), 7.
8. Denis Mack Smith, Cavour (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), 249.
9. William Salomone, Italy in the Giolittian Era: Italian Democracy in the Making, 1900-1914 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 13.
10. It should be noted that post-1871 German federalism, often dubbed "executive federalism," contrasts with the classic American "dual federalism," insofar as most important legislation was national but was implemented by independent state-level bureaucracies. See Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland: Pfadabhängigkeit und Wandel," Discussion Paper 02/2 (Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2002).
11. See also the discussion in Daniel Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
12. "See especially Riker, Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (New York: Little Brown, 1964).
13. Ibid., 10;
14. Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, "Self-Enforcing Federalism" (Manuscript, Stanford University, 2001).
15. Riker (fn. 10), 9.
16. Ibid., 12, emphasis added.
17. I b i d.
18. The relative military power of Piedmont and Prussia is established by estimating each state's control over population, territory, and military expenditures (before unification) as a proportion of the future territory of each unified nation-state (that is, excluding Austria in both cases) after 1871. Italy's population figures are for 1861, from Vera Zamagni, The Economic History of Italy, 1860-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 14;
19. Italy's territory figures are for 1857, from Robert Fried, The Italian Prefects: A Study in Administrative Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 54;
20. German population figures are for 1865, from Thomas Nipperdey, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800-1866 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 86;
21. Germany's territory data are from Rolf Dumke, German Economic Unification in the Nineteenth Century: The Political Economy of the Zollverein (Munich: University of the Bundeswehr, 1994), 55;
22. Germany's military expenditure data are from Knut Borchard, "Staatsverbrauch und Öffentliche Investitionen in Deutschland, 1780-1850" (State expenditures and public investments in Germany, 1780-1850) (Ph.D. diss., University of Göttingen, 1968), 183-85;
23. military personnel data are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1985 (Computer file) (Ann Arbor, Mich.: ICPSR, 1993).
24. Edward L. Gibson and Tulia Falleti, "Unity by the Stick: Regional Conflict and the Origins of Argentine Federalism," in Gibson, ed., Federalism and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
25. This definition of "infrastructural capacity" borrows from Mann (fn. 1), 59-61.
26. "On patrimonialism, see Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 334.
27. "Institutionalization" refers to the degree to which a political system has acquired value and stability, indicated by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of organizations and procedures. See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.
28. "Cavour to Victor Emanuel, Baden-Baden, July 24, 1858," in John Santore, Modern Naples: A Documentary History, 1799-1999 (New York Italica Press, 2001), 164.
29. Stefan Oeter, Integration und Subsidiarität im deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht: Untersuchungen zu Bundesstaatstheorie unter dem Grundgesetz (Integration and subsidiarity in German federal constitutional law: A study of federalism theory in the constitution) (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 29.
30. Otto von Bismarck, "Rede in der Kommissionssitzung des Abgeordnetenhauses zur Beratung einer Adresse an den Konig vom 17.8 1866," in Eberhard Scheler, ed., Otto von Bismarck: Werke in Auswahl (Otto von Bismarck: Selected works) (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965), 3:799.
31. Ibid., 755. These terms come from a memo from Otto von Bismarck to his ambassador in Paris on July 9, 1866.
32. Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibalidi: A Study in Political Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 50-51.
33. "Cavour to Victor Emanuel, Baden-Baden, July 24, 1858," in Santore (fn. 20), 164.
34. J. A. R Marriott, The Makers of Modern Italy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), 125-26.
35. Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (New York Oxford University Press, 1955), 200.
36. Hermann Oncken, ed., Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon III von 1863-1870 (The Rhineland politics of Emperor Napoleon III between 1863 and 1870) (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1926).
37. G. Felloni, "La Spese Effettive e Il Bilancio degli Stati Sabaudi dal 1825 al 1860," in Archivio Economico dell'Unificazione Italiana (Archive of Economic Unification of Italy), ser. 1, vol. 9 (1959), 5.
38. This argument has a long pedigree. For the German case, see Helmut Böhme, Deutschlands Weg Zur Grossmacht (Germany's path to great power status) (1966; Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1972);
39. for the Italian case, see Shepard Clough, The Economic History of Modern Italy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).
40. See Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification (London: Routledge, 1994).
41. Luigi Izzo, La Finanza Pubblica: Nel Primo Decennio Dell'Unita Italiana (Public finance in the first decade of Italian unification) (Milan: Dottore a Giuffre Editore, 1962), 3-4.
42. For a description of these rural uprisings, see Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly, The Contentious Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 124.
43. See Commissione Editrice dei Carteggi Di Camillo Cavour in Count Camillo di Cavour, Carteggi di Cavour: La Liberazione del Mezzogiorno e la formazione del Regno d'Italie (Cavour's correspondence: The liberation of the mezzogiorno and the formation of the kingdom of Italy), vol. 2 (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1961).
44. For examples of repeated efforts at negotiation, see the collection of diplomatic correspondence in the multivolume work, Carlo Pischedda and Rosanna Roccía, eds., Camillo Cavour Epistolario (Camillo Cavour's letters) (Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2000).
45. I b i d.
46. Evidence of these diplomatic reports between Cavour and his envoy in Florence can be seen in "Da Carlo Bon Compagni di Mombello," Doc. 380, March 18 (p. 352);
47. see also "A Carlo Bon Compagni di Mombello" (p. 619).
48. I b i d.
49. "Da Carlo Bon Compagni di Mombello," Doc. 800 (pp. 628-29). These are Cavour's envoy's words describing the situation in Tuscany in his April 27, 1859, report.
50. I b i d.
51. Lucy Riall, Sicily and the Unification of Italy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 106.
52. Pischedda and Roccía (fn. 35), August 16, 1860, Doc. 639 (p. 94).
53. Ibid., August 2, 1860, Doc. 528 (p. 8).
54. Alberto Caracciolo, Stato e societa civile (State and civil society) (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1960), 119.
55. James Albisetti, "Julie Schwabe and the Poor of Naples" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Standing Conference for the History of Education, Birmingham, England, July 12-15, 2001).
56. Pischedda and Roccía (fn. 35), August 17, 1860, Doc. 647 (p. 99).
57. Riall (fn. 39), 84.
58. These three measures correspond to the concepts of "extraction, conscription, and control," in Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 50.
59. In response to the criticism that this measure and the other two might simply reflect underlying socioeconomic differences, it is instructive that the correlation between regional GDP per capita and each of the measures is very weak, suggesting that institutional capacity has a conceptual weight of its own. For GDP per capita data on the Italian states, see Esposto (fn. 3), 585-604.
60. Riall (fn.39), 90.
61. I b i d.
62. Fried (fn. 15), 75.
63. Ibid., for a summary of these debates
64. I b i d.
65. Dieter Grimm, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 1776-1866 (German constitutional history, 1776-1866) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 112.
66. Reinhard Mussgnug, "Die rechtlichen und pragmatischcn Beziehungen zwischen Regierung, Parlament, und Verwaltung," in Kurt Jeserich, Hans Pohl, and Georg-Christoph von Unruh, eds., Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte (German administrative history) (Stuttgart: Deutsche-Verlags Anstalt, 1983), 2:96.
67. For a description of these reforms, see Ernst Rudolf Huber, ed., Dokumente zur Deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Documents of German constitutional history) (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964), 2:182-223.
68. See the description in James Sheehan, German History, 1770-1866 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 439.
69. The extension of the North German Constitution to southern Germany in 1871 might have represented an opportunity for further renegotiation, but instead it was not renegotiated. See Karl Bosl, "Die Verhandlungen über den Eintritt der süddeutschen Staaten in den Norddeutschen Bund und die Entstehung der Reichsverfassung," in Theodor Schieder, ed., Reichsgründung 1870-71 (Founding of the the empire, 1870-71) (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1970), 148-63.
70. The term "negotiated peace" is from Lothar Gall, Bismarck: The White Revolutionary (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 307.
71. That Saxony was left intact and Hannover completely annexed can be explained by two factors. First, Hannover was of greater strategic and geographical importance, allowing Prussia to link its western and eastern provinces, creating a "tenable territory." For more on this point, see Stewart Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem, 1866-1890 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 34-41.
72. The second reason for the contrasting fates of Saxony and Hannover was that Saxony's independence, unlike Hannover's, was insisted upon by both French and Austrian powers. See correspondence "Graf Goltz an Bismarck," July 23, 1866, no. 224, in Oncken (fn. 28), 372-75.
73. Otto von Bismarck, in Scheler (fn. 22), 755.
74. Huber (fn. 55), 212-20.
75. Otto von Bismarck, in Scheler (fn. 22), 739-40.
76. Text of treaty is in Huber (fn. 55), 224-25.
77. Gall (fn. 58), 317.
78. Erich Brandenburg, Die Reichsgründung (The founding of the empire), 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1923), 219.
79. Gall (fn. 58), 317.
80. For an overview of these negotiations, see Otto Becker, Bismarcks Ringen Um Deutschlands Gestaltung (Bismarck's struggle in the shaping of Germany) (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1958), 290-371.
81. Jacob, German Administration since Bismarck (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
82. Of the universe of seventeen cases, the only three in which state building gave rise to federal outcomes, Switzerland (1848), Germany (1871), and Austria (1920), all had regional-level parliaments, constitutions, and systems of administration in the constituent states at the moment of the first modern national constitution. In the remaining fourteen cases, state building resulted in unitary outcomes. Of these fourteen cases, only one case, Denmark (1849), had modern subnational parliamentary institutions at the moment of polity formation. In all other cases, including the Netherlands (1815) and Italy (1861), unitary institutions were adopted in a context where subnational parliamentary institutions were absent. The single exception, Denmark, might be explained by the absence of a federal ideology in 1849, which undermined the prospects of federalism. For further systematic testing of the infrastructural account vis-à-vis other arguments, see Daniel Ziblatt, "The Federal-Unitary Divide: Lessons of Seventeen European Nation-States," Center for European Studies Working Paper (Cambridge, Harvard University, 2005).
83. For a discussion of the limits of the European model in the African context, see Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
84. For a discussion of the limits of European models in Latin America, see Miguel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
85. See, for example, Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo, eds., Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).