The necessary implications of wrongful life claims: Lessons from France

European Journal of Health Law

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 135-152

  Lewis, Penney ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COURT; DISABILITY; EUTHANASIA; FRANCE; HEALTH CARE; HUMAN; HUMAN RIGHTS; INSURANCE; JURISPRUDENCE; LAW; LEGAL ASPECT; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL ETHICS; REVIEW; SOCIOECONOMICS;

GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; LEGAL APPROACH;

ABORTION, INDUCED; DISABLED CHILDREN; FEMALE; FRANCE; HUMANS; INFANT, NEWBORN; MALE; MALPRACTICE; RUBELLA; WRONGFUL LIFE;

EID: 23944513365     PISSN: 09290273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/1571809054640631     Document Type: Review

References (161)

1. Perruche, Cass. ass. plén., 17 nov. 2000, no99-13.701, no 457P, Conclusions de M. l'Avocat Général Sainte-Rose; Rapport de M. Pierre Sargos, http://www.courdecassation.fr/agenda/arrets/arrets/99-13701arr. htm;
2. Gaz. Pal. no 24, 24-25 janv. 2001, 4, note J. Guigue. In so doing, the Cour de Cassation effectively refused to follow the position taken by the Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court in France, which had decided in a similar case in 1997 that only the parents could recover (misdiagnosis of Down's syndrome).
3. Quarez, Conseil d'Etat, 14 fév. 1997, req. no 133238, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu? cid=151886&indice=1&table= JADE&ligneDeb=1,
4. J.C.P. G. 1997, I, no 4025, note G. Viney. The Conseil d'Etat confirmed its earlier position after the contrary decision of the Cour de Cassation in Perruche.
5. See Conseil d'Etat, 30 avr. 2003, no 213702, http://www. legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=196585&indice=67&table= JADE&ligneDeb=61.
6. "Un arrêt historique" Le monde, 20 nov. 2000;
7. Acacio Pereira, "Le préjudice de vie d'un enfant handicapé soumis à la Cour de Cassation" Le monde, 7 nov. 2000.
8. See, e.g., J. Hauser, "Enfant et les sortilèges . . . de l'autonomie de la volonté" R.T.D. Civ., janv.-mars 2001, no 1, 103;
9. J. Hauser, "Le préjudice d'être né, question de principe" Droit et patrimoine, 1 janv. 2001, no 89, 6;
10. F. Terré, "Le prix de la vie" J.C.P. G., 13 déc. 2000, no 50, 2267;
11. G. Mémeteau, "L'action de vie dommageable" J.C.P. G., 13 déc. 2000, no 50, 2275;
12. G. Viney, "Brèves remarques à propos d'un arrêt qui affecte l'image de la justice dans l'opinion (Cass. ass. plén., 17 nov. 2000)" J.C.P. G. 2001, I, no 286;
13. F. Chabas, "Note" J.C.P. G., 13 déc. 2000, no 50, 2309;
14. Catherine Labrusse-Riou, Bertrand Mathieu, "La vie humaine comme préjudice?" Le Monde, 24 nov. 2000.
15. Association des Paralysées de France, "Questions éthiques posées par l'affaire Nicolas Perruche" Laennec, 2001-06, v.49, no2, 3;
16. "Les parents des handicapés dénoncent l'arrêt Perruche" Libération, 2 déc. 2000;
17. Acacio Pereira, Cécile Prieur, "Cent familles dénoncent l'arrêt Perruche et poursuivent l'Etat; Elles condamnent les dérives eugénistes" Le Monde, 4 déc. 2000.
18. Conseil national de l'Ordre des médecins, Indemnisation des handicaps congénitaux: une première réponse au malaise des médecins, Communiqué du 14 janv. 2002;
19. Conseil national de l'Ordre des médecins, Communiqué sur la pratique de l'échographie fœtale, 13 nov. 2001;
20. Conseil national de l'Ordre des médecins, Déclaration du Conseil national de l'Ordre des médecins: des responsabilités excessives?, 23 nov. 2000;
21. "Les échographistes se mobilisent contre l'arrêt Perruche" Le Quotidien du Médecin, 24 fév. 2001.
22. Assemblée Nationale, Proposition de Loi tendant à rendre irrecevable toute demande d'indemnisation du seul fait de sa naissance, No 2805, 13 déc. 2000;
23. Assemblée Nationale, Proposition de Loi relative à l'interdiction de poursuivre une action en indemnisation du fait d'un handicap naturellement transmis, No 2806, 13 déc. 2000;
24. Assemblée Nationale, Proposition de Loi instituant un moratoire sur les demandes en recherche de responsabilité du fait de la naissance ou du maintien de la vie, No 2844, 9 janv. 2001.
25. e sect, 17 janv. 2003, no 07/14790.
26. Epoux X, Epoux X, Consorts X, Cass. ass. plén., nos 97-17359, 97-19282, 97-19190, Arrêts nos 478, 479, 480, 13 juillet 2001; Rapport de M. Blondet; Conclusions de M. l'Avocat Général Sainte-Rose, http://www.courdecassation.fr/agenda/arrets/arrets/97-17359arr.htm;
27. re civ. 9 mars 2004, no 01-17.277.
28. Code de la santé publique, Art. L. 2213-1.
29. Epoux X, Mme X, Cass. ass. plén., nos 00-11.197, 00-14.248 Arrêts nos 485, 486, 28 nov. 2001, Rapport de M. Blondet, Conclusions de M. l'Avocat Général Sainte-Rosé, http://www. courdecassation.fr/agenda/arrets/arrets/00-11197arr485.htm,
30. J.C.P. G., 30 janv. 2002, no 5, II, 10018, note F. Chabas. The defendants did not contest the availability of a therapeutic abortion. Both cases involved children with Down's syndrome.
31. e ch. civ., 21 mars 2001,
32. J.C.P., II, 10600, no 40, 3 oct. 2001, 1829, note Block.
33. Loi no 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du système de santé, Art. I. This provision has been vigorously applied with immediate effect (see, e.g., C.A.A. Paris, 4 juin 2002, no 02PA00280, R.G.D.M. 2002, no8, 199; C.A.A. Marseille, 19 fév. 2004, no 99MA001790) although only to pre-natal and not pre-conception negligence (see C.A.A. Paris, 24 juin 2003, no 98PA03275, J.C.P. G., 17 mars 2004, no 12, II, 10041, note J. Saison).
34. For discussion, see Yvonne Lambert-Faivre, "La loi no 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du système de santé: I - La solidarité envers les personnes handicapées" D. 2002, chron., 1217;
35. Patrick Mistretta, "La loi no 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du système de santé: Réflexions critiques sur un droit en plein mutation" J.C.P. G., 12 juin 2002, no 24, I, 141;
36. P. Jourdain, "Loi anti-Perruche: une loi démagogique" D. 2002, Point de vue, 891;
37. A. Sériaux, "Jurisprudence Perruche: une proposition de loi ambiguë" D. 2002, Point de vue, 579.
38. See Basil Markesinis, "Réflexions d'un comparatiste anglais sur et à partir de l'arrêt Perruche" R.T.D. Civ., jan-mars 2001, 77, 93-94 arguing that the Perruche debate cannot be resolved on the basis of the appropriate test of causation.
39. Olivier Cayla, Yan Thomas, Du droit de ne pas naître: A propos de l'affaire Perruche, Gallimard, 2002, 40.
40. CCNE, above n. 7; Sénat, Auditions: Responsabilité médicale: le droit à réparation de l'enfant né sévèrement handicapé; Sénat, Dossier d'information: Responsabilité médicale: le droit à réparation de l'enfant né sévèrement handicapé;
41. Sénat, Rapport d'information sur la jurisprudence "Perruche" par M. René Garrec, No 164, 3 janv. 2002;
42. Assemblée Nationale, Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales, Table ronde organisée et présidée par M. Claude Evin, "Arrêt Perruche: Faut-il légiférer? " 29 mars 2001.
43. Cayla, above n. 14, 40. See also L. Aynès, "Préjudice de l'enfant né handicapé: la plainte de Job devant la Cour de Cassation" D. 2001, no 6, chron., 492, 495;
44. e éd., 1995, no 43;
45. J. Hauser, R.T.D. Civ, 1996, 871, 872;
46. Catherine Labrusse-Riou, "Un droit à la " normalité" La lettre de l'Espace éthique, Hors série no 3, 2001, 26, 27;
47. Park v. Chessin (1976) 387 N.Y.S. 2d 204, mod. on other grounds (1977) 400 N.Y.S. 2d 110, mod. on other grounds Becker v. Schwartz (1978) 413 N.Y.S. 2d 895.
48. The Avocat Général is a prosecutor whose function is to present the cases before the Cour de Cassation in the name of the law. His conclusions in Perruche were not followed by the Cour de Cassation.
49. Hauser, above n. 16, 872.
50. Aynès, above n. 16, 495.
51. I b i d.
52. Conclusions de Sainte-Rose sur Perruche, above n. 1. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated. See also, G. Canselier, "La tentation du néant" Rev. gén. droit médical, 2000, no spécial, La recherche sur l'embryon, 94, cited in Sainte-Rose, Conclusions sur no 97-17.359, above n. 8.
53. See, for example, Canselier, Rev. gén. droit médical, ibid. 93-94.
54. CCNE, above n. 7 (official translation, emphasis in original).
55. Thomas, above n. 14, 102. See, for example, Catherine Labrusse-Riou, Bertrand Mathieu, "La vie humaine peut-elle être un préjudice" D. 2000, no 44, Point de vue, III; Aynès, above n. 16.
56. Thomas, above n. 14, 102, 104. A similar position is taken by C. Apostolidis, "Lire l'arrêt de la Cour de Cassation du 17 novembre 2000 (Affaire Nicolas Perruche)" Rev. Rech. Jur., 01-10-2001, no 4/1, 2047, 2052.
57. M. Strasser, "Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All But One?" Mo. L. Rev., 1999, v.64, 29, 49. Similarly, Thomas suggests that the relevant right is a right to be compensated for one's genetic or congenital disability, when birth could have been avoided due to negligence.
58. Thomas, Mo. L. Rev., ibid. 104-105.
59. nd ed., 2004, O.U.P., ¶12-01-12.26.
60. Perruche, above n. 1.
61. See Thomas, above n. 14, 104-111.
62. Sargos, Rapport sur Perruche, above n. 1, ¶49.
63. See, for example, Thomas, above n. 14, 98. For relevant U.S. cases, see Di Natale v. Lieberman (1982) 409 So. 2d 512 (Fla.), appeal after remand, Allen v. Hoover (1986) 489 So. 2d 1160 (wrongful life as a cause of action for being born deformed); Boone v. Mullendore (1982) 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala.) (wrongful life as a claim by which a child seeks recovery for being born with infirmities).
64. For example, a child who suffers damage as a result of negligently used forceps during delivery or from negligently prescribed drugs such as thalidomide.
65. Labrusse-Riou, above n. 16, 28.
66. I have derived this from Battin's typology of a right to suicide. See Margaret Pabst Battin, Ethical Issues in Suicide, 1995, 184-185.
67. Of course, the woman also possesses rights in her own right. These may at times conflict with those of the fetus, and would take precedence given her personhood.
68. Again, except where this right would conflict with the woman's right to control her bodily integrity i.e. only when the woman chooses to exercise the right of the fetus not to be born.
69. "[All humans are] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." U.S., The Declaration of Independence, 1776, ∥2.
70. The arguments in this section and the following one are an application of the discussion in Penney Lewis, "Rights Discourse and Assisted Suicide" Am. J. Law & Med., 2001, v.27:1, 45, 62-65.
71. See, e.g., D. Rosenblum & Clarke G. Forsythe, "The Right to Assisted Suicide: Protection of Autonomy or an Open Door to Social Killing?" Issues L. & Med, 1990, v.6, 3, 21;
72. Maria T. CeloCruz, "Aid-in-Dying: Should We Decriminalize Physician-Assisted Suicide and Physician-Committed Euthanasia?" Am. J.L. & Med., 1992, v.18, 369, 387.
73. This argument is described under the heading "paternalist" in Joel Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life" Phil. & Pub. Aff., 1978, v.7, 93, 120-21.
74. See generally Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights" J. Value Inquiry, 1970, v.4, 243,
75. reprinted in Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and The Bounds of Liberty, 1980, 143;
76. H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Phil Rev., 1955, v.64, 175,
77. reprinted in David Lyons, ed., Rights, 1979, 14;
78. Dan Brock, Life and Death, 1993, 105 (arguing that waivability is a central characteristic of rights);
79. Arthur Kuflik, "The Utilitarian Logic of Inalienable Rights" Ethics, 1986, v.97, 75.
80. See Cayla, above n. 14, 39; Gleitman v. Cosgrove (1967) 227 A. 2d 689 (N.J.) ("the right to life is inalienable in our society" and "a child need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life"); Berman v. Allan (1979) 404 A. 2d 8, 12 (N.J.).
81. "In exercising my own choice in these matters, I am not renouncing, abjuring, forswearing, resigning, or relinquishing my right to life; quite the contrary, I am acting on that right by exercising it one way or the other." Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthanasia" above n. 38, 121.
82. Feinberg Voluntary Euthanasia 121. Ibid.
83. Feinberg Voluntary Euthanasia Ibid. 114-15.
84. See, e.g., Richard Doerflinger, "Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life?" Hastings Center Rep., Jan.-Feb. 1989, 16.
85. See Brock, above n. 39, 125-26 (arguing that the waivability aspect of rights provides a compelling argument in favour of a rights-based account of morality, in that it better promotes people's actual interest in life which may not always be a strong or present one); Philippa Foot, "Euthanasia" Phil. & Pub. Aff., 1977, v.6, 85, 105 (assuming that the right to life is waivable).
86. This connection can be seen explicitly in Samuel Adams' The Rights of Colonists. Adams wrote that it would be "[T]he greatest absurdity to suppose it in the power of one or any number of men at the entering into society, to renounce their essential natural rights, or the means of preserving those rights when the great end of civil government ... is for the support, protection, and defence of those very rights: the principal of which ... are life, liberty, and property. If men through fear, fraud, or mistake, should in terms renounce and give up any essential natural right, the eternal law of reason ... would absolutely vacate such renunciation; the right to freedom being the gift of God Almighty, it is not in the power of Man to alienate this gift, and voluntarily become a slave."
87. Samuel Adams, The Rights of Colonists,
88. quoted in B.A. Richards, "Inalienable Rights: Recent Criticism and Old Doctrine" Phil. & Phenomenological Research, 1969, v.29, 398, n. 33.
89. See Sainte-Rose, Conclusions sur Perruche, above n. ?, quoting Carbonnier, cited by A. Sériaux, Droit des obligations, 1992, PUF, no 136; Labrusse-Riou, above n. 16, 31; D. 1997, Jurisprudence, 38, note J. Roche-Dahan.
90. P.-Y. Gautier, "Les distances du juge: à propos d'un débat éthique sur la responsabilité civile" J.C.P. G. 2001, I, no 287, 67. For commentary, see Apostolidis, above n. ?, 25, 2050.
91. In France, see Code Civil, Art. 16-3, Code de déontologie médicale, Art. 36, Code de la santé publique, Art. L1111-4;
92. Loi No 2005-370 du 22 avril 2005 relative aux droits des malades et à la fin de vie; Gatineau, Cass. Crim., 3 janv. 1973, D. 1973, Inf. Rap., 13; D. 1973, Jur., 220;
93. Pech, Conseil d'Etat, 6 mars 1981, Rec. des Décisions du C.E., 1981, 133;
94. Rev. sanit. soc. 1981, 407, note Dubouis;
95. Rev. sanit. soc. 1981, 413, conc. Labetoulle; but see also Garnier, Conseil d'Etat, 29 juillet 1994, no 146.978;
96. Gaz. Pal., 13 juillet 1995, Jurisprudence, 366, note Garay.
97. th) 385 (Qué. S.C.). In the United States, see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990) 497 U.S. 261 (U.S.S.C.).
98. In the United Kingdom, see the Abortion Act 1967, s.1. In France, see Code de la santé publique, Arts. L-2212, L-2213. In the United States, see Roe v. Wade (1973) 35 L.Ed. 147 (U.S.S.C.); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) 120 L.Ed. 2d 674 (U.S.S.C.). In Canada, see R v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). See also, below, text accompanying n. 52.
99. I am indebted to Sabine Michalowski for this point. See, e.g., Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 242 (Eng. C.A.);
100. Penney Lewis, "Proxy Refusals Of Medical Treatment" King's College L.J., 1997-98, v.8, 101;
101. Marie Fox and Jean McHale, "In Whose Best Interests?" Mod. L.R., 1997, v.60, 700;
102. Andrew Bainham, "Do babies have rights?" Camb. L.J., 1997, 48;
103. Sabine Michalowski, "Is it in the best interests of a child to have a life-saving liver transplantation? Re T (Wardship: Medical Treatment)" Child Fam. L.Q., 1997, v.9:2, 179.
104. Although cases with these facts are unusual, judicial decisions reviewing and overruling parental decisions not to agree to withdrawal of treatment indicate acceptance that parents can consent to the withdrawal of life-saving or life-sustaining treatment, thereby waiving the child's right to life. See, e.g., Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] Fam. 33 (Eng. C.A.);
105. Re C (Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 F.L.R. 384 (Eng. H.C.);
106. Jane Fortin, "A Baby's Right to Die" Child Fam. L.Q., 1998, v.10(4), 411.
107. See generally, Penney Lewis, "Medical Treatment of Children" in Julia Fionda, ed., Legal Concepts of Childhood, 2001, Hart Publishing, 151, 158-163.
108. See also, above, text accompanying n. 51.
109. See T.G.I. Lille, 6 mai 1996, D. 1997, 543, note Xavier Labbé; Canselier, above n. 21, 95; Labrusse-Riou, Mathieu, above n. 3.
110. Sainte-Rose, Conclusions sur no 97-17.359, above n. 8. See also, Sainte-Rosé, Conclusions sur Perruche, above n. 1, citing Hauser. For other examples, see Labrusse-Riou, Mathieu, ibid.; Cayla, above n. 14, 42.
111. See also, for example, the discussion in McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] Q.B. 1166, 1188 (Eng. C.A.) in which Ackner L.J. invokes the spectre of a legal obligation to terminate the existence of the fetus.
112. This section draws on Penney Lewis, "The Dutch Experience of Euthanasia" J. L. and Society, 1998, v.25:4, 636, 645 and Lewis, above n. 37, 87-91.
113. On slippery slopes generally, see Frederick Shauer, "Slippery Slopes" Harv. L. Rev., 1985, v.99, 361;
114. Wilbren van der Burg, "The Slippery-Slope Argument" Ethics, 1991, v.102, 42, 42-43
115. (noting that the slippery slope argument has been invoked against the legalisation of abortion, euthanasia, in vitro fertilization, and D.N.A. research); Benjamin Freedman, "The Slippery-Slope Argument Reconstructed: Response to van der Burg" J. Clinical Ethics, 1992, v.3, 293.
116. See also Bernard Williams, "Which Slopes Are Slippery?" in Michael Lockwood, ed., Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1985, 126, 126-27 (pointing out that slippery slope arguments are often applied to matters of medical practice).
117. See, for example, G. Mémeteau, "La mort aux trousses" Rev. Rech. Jur., 2000/3, 914, 920.
118. For examples, see Yale Kamisar, "Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy Killing' Legislation" Minn. L. Rev., 1958, v.42, 969, 1030-41 (discussing the "parade of horrors" that could occur following legalisation of euthanasia);
119. Canadian Law Reform Commission, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment, Working Paper 28, 1982, 46;
120. Gregory Gelfand, "Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill", Neb. L. Rev., 1984, v.63, 741, 764-65;
121. J. Gay-Williams, "The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia" in Ronald Munson, ed., Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics, 1983, 156;
122. Joseph V. Sullivan, "The Immorality of Euthanasia" in Marvin Kohl, ed., Beneficent Euthanasia, 1975, 12, 23-26.
123. Sainte-Rose, Conclusions sur no 97-17.359, above n. 8; Aynès, above n. 16, 496. Mémeteau even goes so far as to assert that the right not to be born is equivalent to the right to die. Above n. 3, 2279. Other types of slippery slope arguments are also made in this context. For example, the fears that wrongful life claims re-invoke the horrors of the Nazi genocide (see the Conclusions of Sainte-Rose in Perruche, above n. 1 (referring to doctrines of sinister memory); Quarez, above n. 1, R.F.D.A., 1997, 374, cone. V. Pécresse; Mémeteau, Traité de responsabilité médicale, mise à jour 1997, no 126 (referring to "tendances éliminatrices")); erode the rights of the disabled; or promote the idea that only some lives are inherently worthwhile and encourage the disabled towards suicide (see Chabas, above n. 3, 2312). Another slippery slope fear is that wrongful life claims will be brought by a child against his or her parents for failure to terminate the pregnancy. See Canselier, above n. 21, 96.
124. Chabas, ibid.;
125. A. Shapira, "'Wrongful life' lawsuits for faulty genetic counselling: should the impaired newborn be entitled to sue?" J.M.E., 1998, v.24, 369, 372.
126. "'[W]rongful life' implies that an individual should never have existed; and a child's life, when characterized by severe pain and deprivation, can be an 'injury of continued existence.' On utilitarian grounds, and because of a positive duty to avoid harm, this argument provides for justifying euthanasia of small children for the sake of the children themselves." James Bopp, Jr., Barry A. Bostrom and Donald A. McKinney, "The 'Rights' and 'Wrongs' of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis Of Birth Related Torts" Duquesne L. Rev., Spring 1989, 461, 504
127. (citing W. Reich, "Life: Quality of Life" in W. Reich, ed., Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, 1978, v.2, 829, 836).
128. See also, Bernadette Kennedy, "The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View" U.C.L.A. L. Rev., Dec. 1983, 473, 496.
129. Mémeteau, above n. 57, 920. See also the remarks of the Avocat-Général Sainte-Rose, Conclusions sur no 97-17.359, above n. 8: "Moreover, the existence of a right not to be born abnormal implies the fixing of a norm, which induces the risk of depreciating that which one will qualify as abnormal. To depreciate certain lives could progress insidiously to legitimise their suppression."
130. Chabas, above n. 3.
131. James Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality, 1986, 172-73.
132. th Cir.). None of these states allow euthanasia or assisted suicide.
133. On the Israeli jurisprudence, see Shapira, above n. 60. Levi, "Wrongful life decision in Israel. Civil appeal 518/82, 540/82" Med. Law, 1987, v.6(4), 373;
134. Anton Carmi, "Wrongful life: an Israeli case" Med Law, 1990, v.9(2), 777.
135. Although the Netherlands has recently allowed a wrongful life claim to be brought, the legalisation of euthanasia preceded this decision by some years. See Tony Sheldon, "Dutch Supreme Court backs damages for child for having been born" B.M.J. 2005, v.330:7494, 747;
136. John Griffiths, Alex Bood, Heleen Weyers, Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands, 1998;
137. Lewis, "The Dutch Experience", above n. 56;
138. Netherlands, Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, E.J.H.L., 2001, v.8, 183.
139. Griffiths et al., E.J.H.L., ibid. 300-301.
140. Shapira, above n. 60, 372. See also Thomas, above n. 14, 110.
141. Shapira, ibid.
142. I b i d.
143. Code Civil, Art. 16: "Legislation ensures the primacy of the person, prohibits any infringement of the latter's dignity and safeguards the respect of the human being from the outset of life." (official translation).
144. Sainte-Rose sur Perruche, above n. 1, citing CCNE, "Avis sur le dépistage du risque de la trisomie 21 fœtale à l'aide de tests sanguins chez les femmes enceintes", no 37, 22 juin 1993.
145. See also, A.M. Duguet, "Wrongful life: the recent French Cour de Cassation decisions" E.J.H.L., 2002, v.9, 139, 147.
146. Sainte-Rose sur no 97-17359, above n. 8.
147. P. Murat, "Wrongful life à la française" J.C.P. G. 1996, chron. "Droit de la famille", 282,
148. cited in Cayla, above n. 14, 55. See also, Sainte-Rose sur no 97-17359, ibid.,
149. citing L. Mayaux, "Naissance d'un enfant handicapé: la Cour de Cassation au péril de la causalité" R.G.D.A. 2001, no 1, 13.
150. See Apostolidis, above n. 25, 2061 ("The compensation awarded to the child himself in no way constitutes a discriminatory act.").
151. Sargos, Rapport sur Perruche, above n. 1, ¶48.
152. Frances Olsen, "Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis" Tex. L. Rev., 1984, v.63, 387, 412.
153. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis Tex. L. Rev., 1984, 63, 387, 412. Ibid.
154. Carl Schneider, "Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia" Calif L. Rev., 1988, v.76, 151, 170.
155. See above, n. 12.
156. Lambert-Faivre, above n. 12, 1218-1219.
157. Even when the provision for the disabled is improved, it is unlikely that it will cover all costs. The child will still have been better off under the Perruche jurisprudence. Ibid. 1220.
158. See also, Dictionnaire Permanent Bioéthique et biotechnologies, Mise à jour 36, 1 juin 2004, 2167, no 84.
159. A move which is itself currently the subject of a claim of discrimination under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See Maurice c. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., no 11810/03, 6 juillet 2004;
160. Draon et Draon c. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., no 1513/03, 6 juillet 2004. In both cases the argument under Art. 14 has been declared admissible. The cases were brought following the issuance of an opinion by the Conseil d'Etat to the effect that the new law is compatible with international law including Article 14.
161. See Conseil d'Etat, no 250167, 6 déc. 2002, Draon, http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index_ac_ld0242.shtml, J.C.P. G. 2003, IV, 2190, obs. M.-C. Rouault.