Expert testimony by ethicists: What should be the norm?

Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 198-221

  Imwinkelried, Edward J ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Association of American Law Schools   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23944451443     PISSN: 10731105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-720X.2005.tb00487.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (418)

1. P. Cuer, "Initiation to Bioethics," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 1998): at 25, 27.
2. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1074.
3. S. M. Wolf, "Quality Assessment of Ethics in Health Care: The Accountability Revolution," American Journal of Law & Medicine 20 (1994): 105-128, at 115.
4. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert.denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); B. Spielman, "Has Faith in Health Care Ethics Consultants Gone Too Far? Risks of an Unregulated Practice and a Model Act to Contain Them," Marquette Law Review 85 (2001): 161-219, at 162-63.
5. D. B. Mishkin, "Proffering Bioethicists as Experts," The Judges' Journal (Summer 1997): 50-89.
6. S. M. Wolf, "Quality Assessment of Ethics in Health Care: The Accountability Revolution," American Journal of Law & Medicine 20 (1994): 105-128, at 119.
7. A. J. Dyck, "Ethics and Medicine," in S. Reiser, A. Dyck and W. Curran, eds., Ethics and Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1977): 114-141 at 114.
8. J. C. Fletcher, "The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees," Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 859-888, at 863.
9. Id. ("The scholarly literature in bioethics is enormous and still growing rapidly"); M. D. Hiller, "Medical Ethics and Public Policy," in M. Hiller, ed., Medical Ethics and the Law: Implications for Public Policy (1981): 3-45, at 4 (a "plethora of materials");
10. K. Kipnis, "Confessions of an Expert Ethics Witness," in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 325-343, at 331, 339 (a "substantial" body of writing on the subject).
11. J. C. Fletcher, "The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees," Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 859-888, at 860, 867.
12. "Preface," in J. Humber and R. Almeder, eds. 2d ed., Biomedical Ethics and the Law (New York: Plenum Press, 1979): at ix.
13. J. C. Fletcher, "The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees," Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 859-888, at 868.
14. Ibid. Id.
15. Id. at 869-70; D. Hoffman, A. Tarzian and J. A. O'Neil, "Are Ethics Committees Members Competent to Consult?" Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 30-37.
16. P. Cuer, "Initiation to Bioethics," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 1998): 23-37, at 25, 27 (the Hastings Centre in 1969 and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics in 1971).
17. T. J. Shannon, "Preface," in T. Shannon, ed., Bioethics: Basic Writings on the Key Ethical Questions that Surround the Major, Modern Biological Possibilities (New York, N.Y.: Paulist Press, 1976): 1;
18. J. C. Fletcher, "The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees," Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 859-888, 859, 869 (the Hastings Centre, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, and the Park Ridge Center). In addition, the Center for the Study of Bioethics is located at 8701 Watertown Plan Road, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53226, 〈centerbioethics@mcw.edu.〉
19. Amer. Soc'y for Bioethics and Humanities, Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation (Glenview, IL: American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, 1998);
20. B. Spielman, "Has Faith in Health Care Consultants Gone Too Far? Risks of an Unregulated Practice and a Model Act to Contain Them," Marquette Law Review 85 (2001): 161-221;
21. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1062, 1065 n. 97.
22. D. W. Brock, "Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in Policy-Making," Ethics 97 (1987): 186-191, at 786;
23. J. F. Childress, "The National Bioethics Advisory Commission: Bridging the Gaps in Human Subjects Research Protection," Journal of Health Care Law & Policy 1 (1998): 105-122;
24. T. Reynolds, "When Research and Politics Collide, Advice Sought from Ethics Panels," Journal of the National Cancer Institute 93 (2001): 1834-1836 (discussing the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee created in 1988, the Council on Bioethics established in 2001, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission which expired in 2001, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research established by the 1974 National Research Act, and the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research created in 1978);
25. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1046 n. 2 (the National Bioethics Advisory Commission);
26. A. J. Weisbard, "The Role of Philosophers in the Public Policy Process: A View from the President's Commission," Ethics 97 (1987): 776-785, at 776;
27. S. M. Wolf, "Quality Assessment of Ethics in Health Care: The Accountability Revolution," American Journal of Law & Medicine 20 (1994): 105-128, at 108 n. 13 ("The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects ran 1974-78; the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Ethics Advisory Board 1978-80; and the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1978-83. The Congressional Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee technically ran 1985-89, but in reality died in partisan squabbling and never functioned").
28. See authorities collected in note 17, supra.
29. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075.
30. D. L. Faigman, D. H. Kaye, M. J. Saks and J. Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (St. Paul, MN.: West, 1997): section 1-1.0;
31. P. C. Giannelli and E. J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence, 3d ed. (Charlottesville, VA.: Lexis Law Pub., 1999): section 1-1;
32. S. R. Gross, "Expert Evidence," Wisconsin Law Review (1991): 1113-1184, 1113, 1118-20.
33. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1048.
34. E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharpe, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564.
35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
36. Fed. R. Evid. 702, 28 U.S.C.A. ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify therefore in the form of an opinion or otherwise....").
37. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
38. E. J. Imwinkelried, "The Next Step after Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony," Cardozo Law Review 15 (1994): 2271-2294, 2280-81;
39. J. W. Strong, "Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form," Oregon Law Review 71 (1992): 349-379, 361-62, 366, 368.
40. D. L. Faigman, D. H. Kaye, M. J. Saks and J. Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (St. Paul, MN: West,1997): sections 1-2.0;
41. P. C. Giannelli and E. J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence, 3d ed. (Charlottesville, VA.: Lexis Law Pub., 1999): sections 1-5.
42. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
43. J. W. Strong, "Language and Law in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions on Function, Reliability, and Form," Oregon Law Review 71 (1992): 349-379, 349, 361.
44. See also E. J. Imwinkelried, "Attempts to Limit the Scope of the Frye Standard for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: Confronting the Real Cost of the General Acceptance Test," Behavioral Sciences and the Law 10 (1992): 444-446.
45. See generally B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075.
46. E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharpe, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564, 547;
47. G. R. Scofield, "Two Courts Rule Against Admissibility of Testimony," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 29 (2001): 5;
48. G. Scofield, "The Wizard of Oughts," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 232-235;
49. G. R. Scofield, "Is the Medical Ethicist an 'Expert?'" Bioethics Bulletin 3 (1994): 1-28.
50. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 903.
51. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075.
52. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): 69-95;
53. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984;
54. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 404-07. See also Adv. Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid. 201(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
55. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 875,
56. citing P. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954)
57. and Nielson, "Problems of Ethics," in P. Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1967): 117-121, at 117-21.
58. Ibid. Id.
59. G. J. Agich and B. J. Spielman, "Ethics Expert Testimony: Against the Skeptics," Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 22 (1997): 381-403, at 390.
60. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 875.
61. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930)(Holmes, J.); Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926)(Holmes, J., dissenting); LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914)(Holmes, J., concurring)("I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized....Negligence is all degree...."); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631 (1906)(Holmes, J., dissenting)("I have heard it suggested that the difference is one of degree. I am the last man in the world to quarrel with a distinction simply because it is one of degree. Most distinctions, in my opinion, are of that sort, and are none the worse for it");
62. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.5, at 736.
63. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 292.
64. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1056.
65. Ibid. Id.
66. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 877 n. 18 (an "observation that Hindus think it immoral to eat meat would represent an exercise in descriptive ethics").
67. Id. (it would be descriptive testimony for a moralist to detail "the mores of a particular community").
68. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("capable of empirical test," "falsifiability, or refutability, or testability").
69. See generally M. Goldstein and I. F. Goldstein, How We Know: An Exploration of the Scientific Process (New York: Plenum Press, 1978): Ch. 1.
70. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 892. Professor Rich tells the author that he, Professor Rich, does not know of a single experienced bioethical witness who views himself or herself primarily as a metaethicist.
71. In Professor Rich's words, metaethics is the "fuzziest" of the three types of bioethical expertise.
72. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 892-93.
73. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1056.
74. J. M. Humber and R. F. Almeder, "Introduction to Ethical Theory," in J. Humber and R. Almeder, eds., 2d ed., Biomedical Ethics and the Law (New York: Plenum Press, 1979): 1-11, at 9.
75. G. P. Smith, II, Bioethics and the Law: Medical, Socio-Legal and Philosophical Directions for a Brave New World (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993): 2-3, at 3.
76. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 893.
77. Ibid. Id.
78. Id. at 881.
79. Id. at 880, 892-93; R. M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977): 3.
80. G. J. Agich and B. J. Spielman, "Ethics Expert Testimony: Against the Skeptics," Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 22 (1997): 381-403, at 387.
81. V. A. Sharpe and E. D. Pellegrino, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 373-379, at 375.
82. Ibid. Id.
83. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 292. During the conference at Seton Hall, the author asked Professor Kipnis the following question: If the province of the metaethicist is to (1) explain the accepted meaning of terms in bioethics, (2) trace the logic of bioethical arguments, and (3) expose logical fallacies in the arguments, could (1) and (2) be reallocated to descriptive ethics, and could (3) be reassigned to normative ethics? His answer was in the affirmative. If those functions were reconceived in those terms, the classification scheme could be simplified and reduced to the two categories of descriptive and normative claims.
84. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 881. Proscriptive and prescriptive propositions do not exhaust the possibilities. A normative proposition could also be permissive, stating that a certain type of conduct is neither forbidden nor mandatory but allowed.
85. Id. at 882.
86. Ibid. Id.
87. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn.Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984); In the matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
88. Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 22 F.Supp.2d 331 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000); Carhart v. Steinberg, 11 F.Supp.2d 1099 (D.Neb. 1998), aff'd, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert.granted in part, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 744 F.Supp. 1323 (E.D.Pa. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.granted in part, 502 U.S. 1056 (1992).
89. Curran v. Bosze, 141 Ill.2d 473, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 153 Ill.Dec. 213 (1990).
90. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 291, 293, 295 ("value questions, including deeply moral ones, sometimes cannot be avoided in law;" "moral values can not be excluded from legal decisions at least some of the time").
91. Fed. R. Evid. 702, 28 U.S.C.A..
92. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
93. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
94. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
95. Fed. R. Evid. 702, 28 U.S.C.A..
96. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). See also In re; Diet Drugs, 2001 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 1174, *6 (E.D.Pa., February 1, 2001) ("mere personal belief"); D. B. Mishkin, "Proffering Bioethicists as Experts," The Judges' Journal (1997): 89.
97. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 891.
98. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1054-55.
99. E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharpe, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564, at 563;
100. G. Scofield, "The Wizard of Oughts," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 232-235, at 233.
101. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 292.
102. D. B. Mishkin, "Proffering Bioethicists as Experts," The Judges' Journal (Summer 1997): 50-89, at 89;
103. G. R. Scofield, "Is the Medical Ethicist an 'Expert?'" Bioethics Bulletin 3 (1994): 1-28;
104. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1062.
105. Id. at 1051, 1061, 1071-72 ("then-prevailing ethical practices," "in practice," "current medical ethics standards," "existing standards of care").
106. Foody v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 40 Conn.Supp. 127, 137, 482 A.2d 713, 720 (1984)("Prevailing medical ethical practice"); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 458, 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (1986)("prevailing medical ethics"); Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 265, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458 (1979); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738, 743-44, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424, 426 (1977)("the current medical ethos in this area," "Prevailing medical ethical practice," "existing medical mores"); C. B. Chapman, Physicians, Law, and Ethics (New York: New York University Press, 1984): 96.
107. Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F.Supp. 1553, 1564 (N.D.Ill. 1983); Herridge v. Bd. of Reg. in Med., 420 Mass. 154, 165, 648 N.E.2d 745, 751 (1995).
108. Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 1992 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 11540, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652 (D.N.J., July 21, 1992).
109. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 879 ("objective, factual").
110. R. Hunt and J. Arras, "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in R. Hunt and J. Arras, eds., Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto Calif.: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1977): 1-48, at 1, 10.
111. J. H. Van Den Berg, Medical Power and Medical Ethics (New York: Norton, 1978): at 7.
112. E.g., T. Beauchamp and J. F. Childress, 5th ed., Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2001);
113. B. Spielman, "Bioethics and the Law: Bridging the Divide," Journal of Legal Medicine 23 (2002): 151-158. See also Conservatorship of Morrison v. Abramovice, 206 Cal.App.3d 304, 309, 253 California Report 530 (1988): 305-314, 530, 533 ("a text on medical ethics").
114. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1065 n. 97.
115. C. B. Chapman, Physicians, Law, and Ethics (New York: New York University Press, 1984): at xiv, 104.
116. Available online at 〈http://www.aaos.org/wordhtml/papers/ ethics/code.htm〉 (last visited March 16, 2005).
117. B. Brody, M. Rothstein, L. Mccullough and M. A. Bobinski, Medical Ethics: Analysis of the Issues Raised by the Codes, Opinions, and Statements (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1999) (ethical pronouncements and codes from 26 medical specialty organizations).
118. Conservatorship of Morrison v. Abramovice, 206 Cal.App.3d 304, 310, 253 California Reporter (1988): 531-535, at 534;
119. Z. Lazzarini, "Legal and Ethical Issues of Physician Prescription and Pharmacy Sale of Syringes to Patients Who Inject Illegal Drugs," Health Matrix 11 (2001): 85-128, at 105, 108;
120. S. M. Wolf, "Quality Assessment of Ethics of Health Care: The Accountability Revolution," American Journal of Law & Medicine 20 (1994): 105-128, at 105 n. 2.
121. United States v. Morvant, 898 F.Supp. 1157, 1164 (E.D.La. 1995).
122. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1071.
123. Foody v. Manchester Mem.Hosp., 40 Conn.Supp. 127, 135-36, 482 A.2d 713, 719 (1984).
124. Conservatorship of Morrison v. Abramovice, 206 Cal.App.3d 304, 309, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (1988); Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill.2d 433, 447, 739 N.E.2d 496, 504, 250 Ill.Dec. 733 (2000); E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharpe, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564, at 547, 552.
125. Id. at 561; In the Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 42 (Ind. 1991).
126. S. S. Fluss, "An International Overview of Developments in Certain Areas, 1984-94," in C. Mazzoni, ed., A Legal Framework for Bioethics (The Hague: Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998): 11-37, 28 (a table listing international instruments).
127. J. P. Massue, "Preface," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care (Strasbourg : Council of Europe Pub., 1998): 11-17, at 12 (the Nuremberg Code of 1947);
128. A. J. Dyck, "Ethics and Medicine," Linacre Quarterly (August 1973): 182-200.
129. A. P. Rivero and T. A. Galan, "An International View of Patients' Rights," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care (Strasbourg : Council of Europe Pub., 1998): 101-109, at 105.
130. R. G. Salguero, "Medical Ethics and Competency to be Executed," Yale Law Journal 96 (1986): 167-186, at 167, 174;
131. G. Marotta, "The Enlightenment and Bioethics," in E. Bandman and B. Bandman, eds., Bioethics and Human Rights: A Reader for Health Professionals (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978): 62-65.
132. Ibid. Id.
133. Ibid. Id.
134. J. P. Massue, "Preface," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 1998): at 12.
135. Id. (the Hawaii Declaration).
136. P. Cuer, "Initation to Bioethics," in id. at 25.
137. See generally G. P. Smith, II, Human Rights and Biomedicine (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000): 1-229, at 1-13.
138. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 869, 871-72.
139. G. F. Agich and B. J. Spielman, "Ethics Expert Testimony: Against the Skeptics," Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 22 (1997): 381-403, at 387.
140. V. A. Sharpe and E. D. Pellegrino, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 373-379, at 375.
141. G. P. Smith, II, Bioethics and the Law: Medical, Socio-Legal and Philosophical Directions for A Brave New World (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993): at 3;
142. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 292 ("clarifying concepts").
143. R. M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977): at 3 ("separate");
144. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 880 ("sort out").
145. Id. at 893.
146. J. M. Humber and R. F. Almeder, "Introduction to Ethical Theory," in J. Humber and R. Almeder, eds. 2d ed., Biomedical Ethics and the Law (New York: Plenum Press, 1979): 1-11, at 11.
147. 29 Conn.Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972).
148. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 883-84, 892-93.
149. D. B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (St. Paul, Minn: West Group, 2000): section 242, at 633.
150. Id. at 163-65.
151. Id. at section 242, at 633.
152. P. G. Peters, "The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium," Washington & Lee Law Review 57 (2000): 163-205.
153. D. B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (St. Paul, Minn: West Group, 2000): 163-65.
154. W. Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990): Ch. 3 (the Rationalist Tradition).
155. See generally R. J. Kreyche, Rev. ed., Logic for Undergraduates (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961);
156. I. M. Copi and C. Cohen, 9th ed., Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan Pub. ; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994)(discussing the use of rules of inference and truth tables to determine the validity of lines of argument).
157. Compare G. F. Agich and B. J. Spielman, "Ethics Expert Testimony: Against the Skeptics," Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 22 (1997): 381-403,
158. with E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharpe, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564, at 562-63 ("We believe that professional ethicists can assist the courts but that their testimony should be limited to descriptive and analytical ethics").
159. V. A. Sharpe and E. D. Pellegrino, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 373-379, at 374.
160. P. A. Martin, "Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 27 (1999): 316-325, at 316, 317;
161. K. W. Wildes, "Particularism in Bioethics: Balancing Secular and Religious Concerns," Maryland Law Review 53 (1994): 1220-1237, at 1220.
162. R. M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977): 6;
163. G. R. Scofield, "Is the Medical Ethicist an 'Expert?'" Bioethics Bulletin 3 (Winter 1994): 1-28, at 1-2, 9-10, 28.
164. Z. Lassarini, "Legal and Ethical Issues of Physician Prescription and Pharmacy Sale of Syringes to Patients Who Inject Illegal Drugs: An Analysis of Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users," Health Matrix 11 (2001): 85-128, at 90.
165. J. M. Humber and R. J. Almeder, J. Humber and R. Almeder, eds. 2d ed., "Introduction to Ethical Theory," in Biomedical Ethics and the Law (New York: Plenum Press, 1979): 1-11, at 2-3.
166. R. M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977): 6-7.
167. R. Hunt and J. Arras, "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in R. Hunt and J. Arras, eds., Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1977): 1-48, at 12.
168. E. K. Shriver and S. Shriver, "Foreword," in S. Reiser, A. Dyck and W. Curran, eds., Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977): xi.
169. See also W. D. Ross, "What Makes Right Acts Right?" in id. at 88.
170. R. M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977): 8;
171. R. Hunt and J. Arras, "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in R. Hunt and J. Arras, eds., Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1977): 1-48, at 24-25;
172. Z. Lazzarini, "Legal and Ethical Issues of Physician Prescription and Pharmacy Sale of Syringes to Patients Who Inject Illegal Drugs: An Analysis of Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users," Health Matrix 11 (2001): 85-128, at 85, 91. Many view John Rawls as a contemporary proponent of deontologism.
173. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, 4th ed., Principles of Biomedical Ethics 59 (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hunt and Arras, supra, at 33-36 ("Rawls' conception of justice is... very Kantian in nature").
174. R. M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977): 8.
175. R. Hunt and J. Arras, "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in R. Hunt and J. Arras, eds., Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto, CA.: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1977): at 1, 25.
176. W. A. R. Thomson, A Dictionary of Medical Ethics and Practice (Bristol: J. Wright, 1977): Preface ("the moral mores of the nation are in a state of flux").
177. F. ben Hamida, "Islam and Bioethics," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 1998): 81.
178. J. Martin, "Buddhism and the Right to Respect of the Person in the Face of Risks Associated with Progress in Biotechnologies," in id. at 93.
179. P. A. Martin, "Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 27 (1999): 316-324.
180. Z. Lazzarini, "Legal and Ethical Issues of Physician Prescription and Pharmacy Sale of Syringes to Patients Who Inject Illegal Drugs: An Analysis of Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users," Health Matrix 11 (2001): 85-128, at 91.
181. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, 5th ed., Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001);
182. K. W. Wildes, "Particularism in Bioethics: Balancing Secular and Religious Concerns," Maryland Law Review 53 (1994): 1220-1237, at 1232.
183. Ibid. Id.
184. P. A. Martin, "Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 27 (1999): 316-324.
185. Ibid. Id.
186. K. W. Wildes, "Particularism in Bioethics: Balancing Secular and Religious Concerns," Maryland Law Review 53 (1994): 1220-1237, at 1233 n. 46,
187. citing A. R. Jonsen and S. E. Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
188. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1064.
189. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, 4th ed., Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 106 ("we are doubtful that...a unified foundation for ethics is discoverable");
190. E. L. Bandman and B. Bandman, "General Introduction," in Bioethics and Human Rights: A Reader for Health Professionals (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978): 3, 16 ("There are conflicts between these values. One cannot embrace Kant's ethics oriented to deontological duty simultaneously with Mill's ethic oriented to utilitarian happiness....");
191. R. Hunt and J. Arras, R. Hunt and J. Arras, eds., "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto, CA.: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1977): 1, 44 ("It is quite conceivable that there is no possible ethical theory that will be conformable with all our attitudes");
192. C. D. Leake, "Preface to Second Edition," in Percival's Medical Ethics (Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger, 1975): vii-xi, xxxiv ("conflict");
193. Z. Lazzarini, "Legal and Ethical Issues of Physician Prescription and Pharmacy Sale of Syringes to Patients Who Inject Illegal Drugs: An Analysis of Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users," Health Matrix 11 (2001): 85-128, at 90 ("No single ethical theory or approach has achieved universal acceptance as the best or right way to resolve ethical dilemmas in medicine");
194. P. A. Martin, "Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 27 (1999): 316-324 ("competition");
195. K. W. Wildes, "The Emperor Has Very Few Clothes," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 365-371, at 368 ("the field of bioethics lacks consensus").
196. S. Bok, "The Tools of Bioethics," in S. Reiser, A. Dyck and W. Curran, eds., Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1977): 114-141, at 137, 140 (disagreements within the traditions).
197. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, 4th ed., Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1994): 50;
198. G. P. Smith, II, Bioethics and the Law: Medical, Socio-Legal and Philosophical Directions for a Brave New World (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993):): 1 (rule versus case utilitarians);
199. R. Hunt and J. Arras, R. Hunt and J. Arras, eds., "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto Calif.: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1977): 1, 13;
200. J. M. Humber and R. F. Almeder, "Introduction to Legal Theory," in 2d ed., Biomedical Ethics and the Law (New York: Plenum Press, 1979): 1-11, at 3.
201. R. Hunt and J. Arras, "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in R. Hunt and J. Arras, eds., Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto CA.: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1977): 1-48, at 29;
202. Z. Lazzarini, "Legal and Ethical Issues of Physician Prescription and Pharmacy Sale of Syringes to Patients Who Inject Illegal Drugs: An Analysis of Ethical Issues in Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Injection Drug Users," Health Matrix 11 (2001): 85-128, at 91-92.
203. E. D. Pellegrino, "Value Neutrality, Moral Integrity, and the Physician," Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 78-80, at 79;
204. K. W. Wildes, "The Emperor Has Few Clothes," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 365-371, at 368 ("the field of bioethics lacks consensus").
205. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 897.
206. G. Scofield, "The Wizard of Oughts," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 232-235, at 234.
207. K. W. Wildes, "Particularism in Bioethics: Balancing Secular and Religious Concerns," Maryland Law Review 53 (1994): 1220-1237, at 1221.
208. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 924.
209. E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharpe, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564, at 559.
210. D. B. Mishkin, "Proffering Bioethicists as Experts," The Judges' Journal (Summer 1997): 50-89, at 50, 51.
211. C. Mccormick, Evidence (5th ed. 1999): section 13, at 61; Adv.Comm.Note, Fed.R.Evid. 702, 28 U.S.C.A.
212. F. Baylis, "Expert Testimony by Persons Trained in Ethical Reasoning: The Case of Andrew Sawatzky," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 224-231, at 228-29.
213. Id.; W. Gaylin, "Foreword," in S. Gorovitz, A. Jameton, R. Macklin, J. O'Connor, E. Perrin, B. St. Clair and S. Sherwin, eds., Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976): xvi;
214. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 893.
215. In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill.2d 1, 7, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1196, 146 Ill.December 860 (1990).
216. F. Baylis, "Expert Testimony by Persons Trained in Ethical Reasoning: The Case of Andrew Sawatzky," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 224-231, at 225.
217. A. J. Dyck, "Ethics and Medicine," in S. Reiser, A. Dyck and W. Curran, eds., Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1977): 114-141, at 118.
218. G. Scofield, "The Wizard of Oughts," Journal Law Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 232-235, at 233-34.
219. V. A. Sharpe and E. D. Pellegrino, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 373-379, at 374.
220. G. Scofield, "The Wizard of Oughts," Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 232- 234;
221. K. W. Wildes, "The Emperor Has Very Few Clothes," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 365-370.
222. See T. P. Hill, "Letter to the Editor," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 29 (2001): 4-5.
223. K. W. Wildes, "The Emperor Has Few Clothes," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 365-371, at 367;
224. F. Baylis, "Rebuttal: Expert Ethics Testimony," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 240-242, at 241.
225. G. Scofield, "Response: Narcissus Meets Pandora," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 28 (2000): 243-244, at 244.
226. P. Ramsey, "The Nature of Medical Ethics," in S. Reiser, A. Dyck and W. Curran, eds., Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1977): 114-141, at 123, 125.
227. A. J. Dyck, "Ethics and Medicine," in id. at 114, 118.
228. M. C. Hiller, "Medical Ethics and Public Policy," in M. C. Hiller, Medical Ethics and the Law: Implications for Public Policy (Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981): 3-45, at 7-8.
229. P. Cuer, "Initiation to Bioethics," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 1998): 23-37, at 24, 32;
230. L. R. Tancredi, "Preface," in Ethics of Health Care (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1974): iii-vi, at iii, iv.
231. Id. at v; A. R. Jonsen and A. R. Hellegers, "Conceptual Foundations for an Ethics of Medical Care," in id. at 3, 12.
232. M. R. McGarvey, "Some Considerations Regarding Ethics and the Right to Health Care," in E. Bandman and B. Bandman, eds., Bioethics and Human Rights: A Reader for Health Professionals (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978): 363-366, at 365.
233. L. R. Trancredi, "Preface," in Ethics of Health Care (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1974): iii, v.
234. S. Gorovitz, "Introduction," in S. Gorovitz, A. Jameton, R. Macklin, J. O'Connor, E. Perrin, B. St. Clair and S. Sherwin, eds., Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976): 1-11, at 9.
235. P. Cuer, "Initiation to Bioethics," in The Human Rights, Ethical and Moral Dimensions of Health Care 25, no. 32 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub., 1998): 23-37.
236. G. P. Smith, II, Bioethics and the Law: Medical, Socio-Legal and Philosophical Directions for a Brave New World (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993): 25;
237. S. Gorovitz, "Introduction," in S. Gorovitz, A. Jameton, R. Macklin, J. O'Connor, E. Perrin, B. St. Clair and S. Sherwin, eds., Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976): 1-11, at 4-5, 8-9;
238. J. Fletcher, "Foreword," in H. Brody, Ethical Decisions in Medicine (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976): v.
239. Id.; G. P. Smith, Bioethiics and the Law: Medical, Socio-Legal and Philosophical Directions for a Brave New World (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993): 14;
240. S. Bok, "The Tools of Bioethics," in S. Reiser, A. Dyck and W. Curran, eds., Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1977): 114-141, at 137.
241. W. Gaylin, "Foreword," in S. Gorovitz, A. Jameton, R. Macklin, J. O'Connor, E. Perrin, B. St. Clair and S. Sherwin, eds., Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976): xv-xxiv, at xv, xxiv.
242. Godwin Gruber v. Deuschle, 2002 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 14698, F.Supp.2d (N.D.Tex., August 9, 2002).
243. The Rules took effect in 1975. R. L. Carlson, E. J. Imwinkelried, E. J. Kionka and K. Strachan, 5th ed., Evidence: Teaching Materials for an Age of Science and Statutes (Newark, N.J.: Lexis-Nexis, 2001): 16.
244. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 902.
245. Ibid. Id.
246. Id. at 887.
247. Id. at 902-03.
248. Id. at 899.
249. Id. at 903.
250. Id. at 903. See also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 440, 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (1986) ("'such principles are recognized and accepted within a significant segment of the medical profession....'").
251. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 869, 903. The school's tenets and methodology are "transmissible" by testimony in court. Id. at 907.
252. Ibid. Id.
253. Id. at 907, 910.
254. Id. at 907, 919-21. However, the authors add: There is...one major obstacle which might preclude resort to religious ethicists: the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. The first amendment bars governmental action "respecting an establishment of religion." The Establishment Clause concerns both potential and actual fusion of church and state, and requires that states remain neutral and noninvolved with respect to religious matters. Id. at 920-21. Yet, the authors do not believe that the obstacle is insuperable. They continue: cases upholding various abortion and Sunday closing laws against charges of undue religious influence on legislatures support the view that hearing from religionists is not necessarily synonymous with instituting a particular sect's precepts. Id. at 921. The authors oppose "a per se prohibition against the use of religious moralists." Id. at 923.
255. Id. at 905-06. See also G. F. Agich and B. J. Spielman, "Ethics Expert Testimony: Against the Skeptics," Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 22 (1997): 381-403, at 383.
256. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 903.
257. Id. at 904-05.
258. Professor Rich observes that many ethicists strongly resist such simplistic categorization.
259. K. Kipnis, "Confessions of an Expert Ethics Witness," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 325-343, at 331.
260. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-59 (1993)("liberal thrust," "permissive"); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988); R. L. Carlson, E. J. Imwinkelried, E. K. Kionka and K. Strachan, 5th ed., Evidence: Teaching Materials for an Age of Science and Statutes (Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis, 2001): 617, 621-22.
261. Adv.Comm.Note, Fed.R.Evid. 703, 28 U.S.C.A..
262. D. B. Mishkin, "Proffering Bioethicists as Experts," The Judges' Journal (Summer 1997): 50-89.
263. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1047.
264. Ibid. Id.
265. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 293-95.
266. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1068-70.
267. Id. at 1066-67.
268. Fed. R. Evid. 401-02, 28 U.S.C.A..
269. Id. at Fed. R. Evid. 403.
270. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 402-09;
271. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984;
272. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): 69-95. See Adv.Comm.Note, Fed.R.Evid. 201, 28 U.S.C.A. ("The terminology was coined by Professor Kenneth Davis....").
273. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1043, 1057 ("the ethicist's potential functions").
274. See also D. M. Risinger, "Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World," in D. L. Faigman, D. H. Kaye, M. J. Saks and J. Sanders, Science in the Law: Standards, Statistics, and Research Issues (St. Paul, MN.: West Group, 2002): 66-90, Ch. 2.
275. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 960.
276. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 402.
277. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.6, at 746 (with the fourth edition, Professor Pierce assumed authorship of the treatise originally written by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis);
278. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): at 69, 82.
279. Id. at 87; K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 952; Adv.Comm.Note, Fed.R.Evid. 201, 28 U.S.C.A..
280. Id.; R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.6, at 746 ;
281. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds. Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): 69-95, at 87. At least when the statutory text is ambiguous, the court must select between the competing meanings that the text could reasonably bear. In making its selection, the court may legitimately consider the differing policy impacts of the various possible interpretations. Local 21 v. City of San Francisco, 76 Cal.App.4th 213, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 (1999); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Quin, 198 Cal.App.3d 1338, 244 Cal.Rptr. 359 (1988). A normative analysis might inform the court's policy choice.
282. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairenss and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): 69-95, at 87;
283. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 404.
284. Id. at 402.
285. Id. at 365; K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 952.
286. Adv.Comm.Note, Fed.R.Evid. 201, 28 U.S.C.A..
287. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 952.
288. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.5, at 735 , citing Louisiana Association of Independent Producers v. F.E.R.C., 958 F.2d 1101, 1103 (D.C.Cir. 1992).
289. Id. at section 10.5, 732, citing Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. F.T.C., 627 F.2d 1151, 1161 (D.C.Cir. 1979), cert.denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). In turn, that decision cites opinions from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and the District of Columbia circuits. See also Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2002).
290. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.5, at 732, citing Citizens of Southern Ohio, Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy District, 429 U.S. 651, 657 (1977).
291. Ibid. Id.
292. Id. at section 10.6, 744.
293. Id. at section10.6, 743.
294. Fed. R. Evid. 201, 28 U.S.C.A..
295. Id. at Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)-(g).
296. Id. at Fed. R. Evid. 201(a).
297. Id. at Adv. Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid. 201.
298. Ibid. Id.
299. Ibid. Id.
300. See generally E. A. Scallen, "Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes," Loyoyla of Los Angeles Law Review 28 (1995): 1283-1302.
301. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.5, at 732 (again, this treatise is the immediate successor to Professor Davis' treatise);
302. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 402.
303. Ibid. Id.
304. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 958.
305. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.5, at 735.
306. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (1964): 69, 78. See also Sealord Marine v. American Bureau, 220 F.Supp.2d 260, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, questions of foreign law are treated as questions of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1....In determining foreign law, the Court 'may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not...admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence'").
307. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.6, at 746.
308. When the proponent proposes submitting normative bioethical analysis to the judge, the procedures should be both informal and flexible. The courts already employ relatively informal procedures when normative analysis is proffered to a court in an amicus brief. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 gives a court discretion whether to accept such a brief; the court has discretion whether to grant an applicant leave. Fed.R.App.P. 29, 28 U.S.C.A.; 16A C. A. Wright, A. R. Miller and E. H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure (1999): 3975. In the brief, while the applicants ordinarily describe their credentials and interest in the case (id. at 3975.2), the applicants do not go through the process of formally qualifying as experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The court simply makes a discretionary determination whether it is worth hearing legal argument or normative analysis from the applicants. In the setting of bioethical normative analysis, the trial court could flexibly adapt existing procedures. For example, although the proponent might initially tender a written affidavit from the bioethicist, the judge might conclude that he or she wants to hear live testimony by the expert. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2), the proponent must sometimes make an offer of proof to preserve an issue for purposes of appeal. Fed.R.Evid. 103, 28 U.S.C.A.. While most offers are based on either the attorney's representation or a written description of the proposed testimony, the judge can insist that the witness actually testify outside the jury's hearing. United States v. Adams, 271 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 2001), cert.denied, 535 U.S. 978 (2002). Going farther, the judge might not only want to hear the bioethicist's live testimony; the judge could also decide that it would be useful to give the opponent an opportunity to question the bioethicist. The judge might analogize to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 governing the determination of foreign law. The rule provides that the issue is to be determined by the judge rather than the jury. Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1, 28 U.S.C.A.. The rule specifically states that the judge may consider "testimony" in deciding the tenor of the relevant foreign law. Id. Moreover, the rule adds that the testimony need not be "admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. The accompanying Advisory Committee Note makes it clear that the judge is "free" to fashion the procedures for receiving and evaluating the material. Hence, on occasion the judge not only listen to live testimony proffered by the proponent; the judge also gives the opponent an opportunity to in effect cross-examine the expert. A late colleague of the author, Professor Friedrich Juenger, was a leading authority on international conflict of laws. Professor Juenger frequently testified on that subject under Rule 44.1 and was sometimes questioned by the opposing attorney. A judge proffered a normative bioethical analysis could follow this example and accord an opportunity the chance to question a bioethical expert.
309. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): 69-95, at 85;
310. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.6, at 746.
311. Id. See also Sealord Marine v. American Bureau, 220 F.Supp.2d 260, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, questions of foreign law are treated as questions of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1....As with domestic law, judges may rely on...their own research....").
312. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.5, at 733, citing Charleston Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548 (1924) (Holmes, J.).
313. See generally M. Ariens, "Progress is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence," Law & Social Inquiry 17 (1992): 213-255 (the importance of reasoned elaboration).
314. Fed.R.Evid. 602, 28 U.S.C.A.
315. Id. at Fed.R.Evid. 901.
316. During the conference, the participants discussed a number of arguments supporting the contention that the rules of evidence apply to normative analysis. One argument runs along these lines: The rules of evidence do not apply to legislative facts; but normative analysis does not qualify as legislative facts; ergo, the rules of evidence apply to normative analysis. However, this argument rests on a logical fallacy. "No [valid] conclusion can be drawn [from a syllogism] with two negative premises." R. J. Kreyche, rev.ed., Logic for Undergraduates (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961): 200. The following example makes the fallacy evident: The rules of basketball do not apply to baseball; but football is not baseball; ergo, the rules of basketball apply to football. It was suggested that the initial premise could be reworded to read, "The rules of evidence apply only to legislative facts." However, that suggestion involves another logical fallacy, that is, begging the question. The advocate is attempting to establish the conclusion that everything other than legislative factual data is subject to the rules of evidence. That conclusion is implicit in the reworded premise. In short, there is only sound way to approach the question. We must identify the function of the rules of evidence and inquire whether it serves that function to apply the rules to the judge's consideration of normative analysis in fashioning a common-law rule, construing a statute, or formulating a constitutional standard.
317. Lewis v. Rucker, 2 Burr 1167, 1171, 97 Eng.Rep. 769, 772 (K.B. 1961). See K. C. Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 406;
318. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 959
319. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.6, at 744.
320. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 406-07.
321. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 955 ("commonplace").
322. Id. at 955, 983 ("without even mentioning that they are doing so").
323. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364, 403-04;
324. K. C. Davis, "System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): 69-95, at 85.
325. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 403-04.
326. Id., citing Jay Burns Baking v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
327. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.5 at 535 and section 10.6, at 746 ("the universal practice" is to accept such information "without any restriction by 'rules of evidence;'" the information may be submitted to the court in briefs or oral argument).
328. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 959, citing North End Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 217 Wis. 363, 371, 258 N.W. 439, 442 (1935).
329. K. C. Davis, "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process," Harvard Law Review 55 (1942): 364-425, at 406, citing Wisconsin Ornamental Iron and Bronze Co. v. Tax Commission, 202 Wis. 355, 371, 233 N.W. 72, 75 (1930).
330. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.6, at 746.
331. This hypothetical is loosely based on Curran v. Bosze, 141 Ill.2d 473, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 153 Ill.Dec. 213 (1990).
332. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, 28 U.S.C.A..
333. R. L. Carlson, E. J. Imwinkelried, E. J. Kionka and K. Strachan, 5th ed., Evidence: Teaching Materials for an Age of Science and Statutes (Newark, N.J.: LexisNexis, 2001): 16-17.
334. J. C. Fletcher, "Bioethics in a Legal Forum: Confessions of an 'Expert' Witness," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 297-324, at 316.
335. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 870;
336. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 293.
337. R. Delgado and P.McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 61 (1982): 869-926, at 903 n. 138.
338. Id. at 882.
339. I. Kennedy and J. Stone, "Making Public Policy on Medical-Moral Issues," in Ethics and Law in Health Care and Research (Chichester, New York: Wiley, 1990): 81-103, at 82-83;
340. C. M. Maszzoni, C. Mazzoni, ed., "Bioethics Needs Legal Regulation," in A Legal Framework for Bioethics (The Hague: Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998): 3, 6.
341. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 952.
342. V. A. Sharpe and E. D. Pellegrino, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 373-379, at 378.
343. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 294 ("Not all laws have moral content, of course. Traffic laws requiring motorists to drive on the right side of the road establish somewhat arbitrary patterns in order to achieve efficiency...").
344. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 40 Cal.App.4th 255, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 560 ("ethical and moral overtones"), superseded, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 556, 882 P.2d 247 (1994); E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 293.
345. Id. at 295.
346. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, 4th ed., Principles of Biomedical Ethics 8-10 (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1994).
347. Id. at 8. See also A. Dyck, "Ethics and Medicine," in S. Reiser, A. Dyck and W. Curran, eds., Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns 114, 115, 119 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977): 114-141 ("moral policy").
348. E. H. Morreim, "Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and an Argument for Inevitability," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 291-295, at 293-94.
349. W. Keeton, ed., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn : West Group, 1984): section 4, at 21.
350. D. B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (St. Paul, MN.: West Group, 2000): section 8, at 12.
351. T. Beaumchamp and J. Childress, 4th ed., Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994): 95, 102, 110 (ethicists often agree on normative questions even when they cannot agree why they agreed).
352. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 897.
353. J. Biesanz and M. Biesanz, Introduction to Sociology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969): 586;
354. L. Broom and P. Selznick, 5th ed., Sociology (New York: Harper & Row, 1973): 607-08;
355. Lipset and Schneider, "Political Sociology," in N. Smelser, ed., Sociology: An Introduction (New York: Wiley, 1973): 399-491, at 405;
356. Sternberger, "Legitimacy," in D.Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 9 (New York: Macmillan, 1968, 1979): 244-248.
357. C. Nesson, "The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts," Harvard Law Review 98 (1985): 1960-1970.
358. See generally B. Bix, 2d ed., Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999): Chs. 1-7.
359. T. Morawetz, The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980): 3, 10, 71.
360. Id. at 13, 26, 29.
361. Id. at 14, 19, 29-30, 54.
362. See generally R. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
363. T. Morawetz, The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980): 14, 38, 40, 62;
364. "Symposium in Memory of Professor Edgar Bodenheimer: The Reemergence of Natural Law Jurisprudence in Decisional Law," U.C. Davis Law Review 26 (1993): 503-725.
365. K. C. Davis, "Judicial Notice," Columbia Law Review 55 (1955): 945-984, at 955, 983.
366. R. J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, 4th ed. (New York, N.Y.: Aspen Law & Business, 2002): section 10.6, at 754;
367. K. C. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience," in R. Pound, E. Griswold and A. Sutherland, eds., Perspectives of Law: Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964): 69-95, at 81, 94-95.
368. K. F. O'malley, J. E. Grenig and W. C. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Civil, 5th ed. (St. Paul, MN.: West Group, 2000): section 128.81 (the instruction on punitive damages tells the jurors to consider "the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct");
369. Comm. Standard Jury Instructions, Civil, Super.Ct., L.A. Cty, Cal., California Jury Instructions-Civil Baji 7.12, 9th ed. (2002)(the California pattern instruction on punitive damages in libel/slander cases directs the jurors to consider "[t]he reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant").
370. Alternatively, the judge may appoint an expert. See Fed.R.Evid. 706, 28 U.S.C.A.. Professor Rich speculates that if the bioethical community became aware that they could opine on purely general legislative issues in court, more bioethicists would be willing to participate in judicial proceedings. Some of his colleagues have told him that they are uncomfortable appearing as a partisan witness.
371. Of course, it is conceivable that the legislative function, formulating the rule, will have been performed earlier in the same case. Thus, the same judge ruling on the admissibility of this testimony during the damages phase might have accepted normative information in the prior liability phase in order to rule on a motion to dismiss the complaint. That ruling would announce "the law of the case" for the balance of the proceeding. Indeed, it is possible that the legislative function will have to performed at roughly the same stage as the adjudicative function. Suppose, for example, a modification of the facts of the first hypothetical involving the suit to compel the hospital to conduct the transplant surgery. Assume that during the pleading stage, there had been no motion to dismiss or demurrer. In that event, the judge might not face the need to clarify the substantive law-including any related ethical issues-until the trial phase. At that later phase, the judge might have to consider normative information proffered for legislative as well as adjudicative purposes. In ruling on a given "relevance" objection (Fed.R.Evid. 401-02, 28 U.S.C.A.), the judge might have to resolve the legislative question and then determine the adjudicative issue. The resolution of the legislative question is logically antecedent to the evidentiary ruling.
372. See D. M. Risinger, "Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World," Seton Hall Law Review 31 (2000): 508-536, at 526 ("the official delegation of a normative, or value-judgment function to the jury").
373. D. B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (St. Paul, MN.: West Group, 2000): section 8, at 12;
374. W. Keeton, ed., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul, MN.: West Group, 1984): section 4, at 21.
375. See Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heiman, 30 Cal.4th 1037, 69 P.3d 965, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 46, 54 (2003) (in discussing the propriety of awarding punitive damages, the court resorted to such expressions as "moral determination," "moral condemnation," and "moral judgment").
376. Comm. Standard Jury Instructions, Civil, Super.Ct., L.A.Cty, Cal., California Jury Instructions-Civil Baji 14.71, 9th ed. (2002)(the definition of "despicable conduct" as a basis for awarding punitive damages).
377. It is understandable that a number of legal standards contemplate that the jury will apply lay notions of morality and substantive justice. One of the basic functions of the institution of the lay jury is to infuse such notions into the justice system. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1983) ("the 'community conscience'"); D. Farnham, "Jury Nullification: History Proves It's Not a New Idea," Criminal Justice 11 (Winter 1997): 4-14, at 7;
378. R. B. Hogan, III. "The Seventh Amendment: The Founders' View," Trial 23 (September 1987): 76-81, at 80;
379. E. Knittel and D. Seiler, "The Merits of Trial by Jury," Cambridge Law Journal 30 (1972): 316-325, at 322;
380. S. D. Krauss, "An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America," Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 89 (1998): 111-214;
381. H. M. Philo, "Honor and Defend the Jury System," Trial 17 (1981): 4. In the typical case in which the jury is authorized to exercise moral judgment, the judge is likely to conclude that the judgment should be based on ordinary conceptions of lay morality. Immediately after the Revolution, in some states petit jurors were judges of the law as well as the facts. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895);
382. S. D. Krauss, "An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America," Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 89 (1998): 111-214. That view was understandable; immediately after the Revolution, Americans had a fresh memory of the enforcement of oppressive laws by the King's judges. In that period, many Americans favored petit jurors who could nullify the law set out in the judge's instructions. However, in the late 19th century Sparf announced that in federal court, the judge's legal instructions bind the jurors. Today, it is thus rare for the substantive law to authorize the jurors to exercise moral judgment as part of their decision-making process.
383. D. M. Risinger, "Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World," Seton Hall Law Review 31 (2000): 508-536, at 526-27.
384. Professor Rich suggested that the author add an explanation for readers who are bioethicists rather than lawyers. In this context, the use of the expression, "open court," does not imply that other procedural settings are secret or closed to the public. Rather, in litigation parlance, "open court" means that the evidence is presented in the hearing of the jury rather than out of the hearing of the trier of fact.
385. At one time, in at least several states jurors were judges of the law as well as the facts. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (discussing the English view and the history of the American jurisprudence on the issue); S. D. Krauss, "An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America," Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 89 (1998): 111-214. It is understandable that that view enjoyed support immediately after the Revolution; during that period, America had a fresh memory of the enforcement of oppressive laws by the King's judges. Many Americans believed that lay jurors should have the right to nullify the law described in the judge's instructions. However, in the late 19th century the Sparf established that in federal court, the judge's legal instructions bind the jury; federal jurors might have the power to nullify the law, but they no longer have the right to do so. The role of the modern petit jurors is largely confined to finding the historical facts. If there is a normative question to be answered, it is typically allocated to the judge.
386. D. M. Risinger, "Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World," Seton Hall Law Review 31 (2000): 508-536, at 526. If in the exceptional modern case the question is assigned to the jury, it is usually based on the policy judgment that the peculiar issue requires a democratic infusion of lay values.
387. As the preceding footnote indicated, more often than not, when the law authorizes the modern jury to exercise moral judgment, the judge will conclude that the judgment should be based on ordinary notions of lay morality. However, the third condition stated in text is that the substantive law standard in question not limit the jurors to such notions in resolving the normative moral question. The question is whether the set of fact situations satisfying the third condition is a null or empty set. Perhaps not. In some cases involving minors, the governing standard requires the trial judge to decide the case as parens patriae. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745-46, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427-28 (1976)(in that capacity, the judge must be guided by the best interests of the child); In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 452-53, 456 (D.C.Apps. 1999). When the legal standard is that broad, the judge is arguably permitted to factor moral considerations into the assessment of the child's interests. See D. Price, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 475 (the best interests approach). Or consider a case in which a physician challenges disciplinary punishment meted out by a medical regulatory board. E.g., Herridge v. Bd. Reg. Med., 420 Mass. 154, 648 N.E.2d 745 (1995)(the board suspended a physician's license for three years on the ground that he developed an inappropriate sexual relationship with a patient); Breesman v. Dept. Prof.Reg., Bd.Medicine, 567 So.2d 469 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990). The question presented might be whether the physician violated a statutory standard. Id. at 471 ("the statutory standard"). Suppose that the statute provides that the physician may be disciplined for conduct contrary to "the ethical integrity" of the medical profession. The statute's wording poses an interpretive question: Does the reference to "the ethical integrity" allow the court to make a normative judgment about the propriety of the physician's conduct? Even without the benefit of such a statutory standard, many courts and commentators have declared that in shaping rules governing the medical profession, courts should consider the factor of the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the profession. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 432, 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (1986); Comm. Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 262, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (1979);
388. E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharp, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives. in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564, at 550;
389. R. G. Salguero, "Medical Ethics and Competency to be Executed," Yale Law Journal 96 (1986): 167-186, at 183;
390. V. A. Sharpe and E. D. Pellegrino, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 22 (1997): 373-379, at 377;
391. S. M. Wolf, "Quality Assessment of Ethics in Health Care: The Accountability Revolution," American Journal of Law & Medicine 20 (1994): 105-128, at 117. Professor Risinger has suggested that First Amendment obscenity trials might fall within this set.
392. D. M. Risinger, "Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World," Seton Hall Law Review 31 (2000): 508-536, at 527. In discussing the redeeming "value" of the allegedly obscene work, the expert would not necessarily have to assess value from a lay moral perspective.
393. Comm. Standard Jury Instructions, Super.Ct.L.A.Cty., Cal., California Jury Instructions-Civil Baji 7.12, 9th ed. (2002);
394. K. F. O'malley, J. E. Grenig and W. C. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: Civil, 5th ed. (St. Paul, MN.: West Group, 2000): section 128.81. See State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 403 (2003); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. Dekalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366 (Fed.Cir. 2003); TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F.Supp.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); McClain v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 259 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1231-32 (N.D.Ala. 2003);
395. A. L. Frey, "No More Blind Man's Bluff on Punitive Damages: A Plea to the Drafters of Pattern Jury Instructions," Litigation 29 (Summer 2003): 24-28.
396. P. Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (Charlottesville, VA.: Michie Co., 1989): section 10.03.
397. See generally id. at Ch. 5 .
398. United States v. Harris, 997 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1993); People v. Jamieson, 436 Mich. 61, 461 N.W.2d 884 (1990); Starkey v. State, 647 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982); Ransom v. State, 630 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982); P. Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (Charlottesville, VA.: Michie Co., 1989): section 5.01, at 175, 5.02, at 177 (1989). See also Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.1985); State v. Glosson, 462 So.2d 1082 (Fla.1985); Annot., Action by state official involving defendant as constituting "outrageous" government conduct violating due process guaranties, 18 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994).
399. P. Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (Charlottesville, VA.: Michie Co., 1989): section 5.02, at 177.
400. Id. at sections 5.06, 5.07; Hill v. City of Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Taylor, 931 F.Supp. 1447, 1453 n. 3 (N.D.Ind. 1996), aff'd, 154 F.3d 675 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 525 U.S. 1060 (1998); United States v. Collins, 755 F.Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Killough, 607 F.Supp. 1009 (D.C.Ark. 1985); Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 Mass. 484, 693 N.E.2d 381 (1998).
401. P. Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (Charlottesville, VA.: Michie Co., 1989): section 5.08;
402. W. R. Lafave, Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 2000): Section 5.2, at 461;
403. P. H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (St. Paul, MN.: West, 1984): 209(c), at 517 n. 21.
404. B. Spielman and G. Agich, "The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness," San Diego Law Review 36 (1999): 1043-1075, at 1065-68.
405. Fed. R. Evid. 401-02, 28 U.S.C.A.; United States v. Nasson, 9 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1993)("The threshold for relevance is very low under Federal Rule of Evidence 401"), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
406. Daubert v.Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
407. Id. at 594; Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
408. Id. at 157; General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
409. E. D. Pellegrino and V. A. Sharpe, "Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32 (1989): 547-564, at 559.
410. R. M. Veatch, Case Studies in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977): 3;
411. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 894.
412. D. B. Mishkin, "Proffering Bioethicists as Experts," The Judges' Journal (Summer 1997): 50-89, at 89.
413. R. Delgado and P. McAllen, "The Moralist as Expert Witness," Boston University Law Review 62 (1982): 869-926, at 903.
414. Cf. G. Joseph, "Less than 'Certain' Medical Testimony," Trial 14 (January 1978): 50-54, (at one time as a matter of evidence law the courts insisted that any expert opinion be couched as a reasonable scientific certainty; however, substantive Tort law increasingly permitted the recovery of futuristic damages; that substantive law development prompted the courts to relax the evidentiary rule).
415. O. W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1881): 127. See also United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930); Irwin v.
416. E. Bodenheimer, J. B. Oakley and J. C. Love, 2nd ed., An Introduction to the Anglo-American Legal System: Readings and Cases (St. Paul, MN.: West Pub. Co., 1988): 4-7.
417. Id. at 4.
418. Id. at 5.