Wittgenstein's deflationary account of reference

Language and Communication

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 331-351

  Proudfoot, Diane ^a   Copeland, B Jack ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

^b Turing Archive for the History of Computing   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Deflationism; Empty names; Intentionality; Reference; Representation; Symbol grounding problem; Wittgenstein

Indexed keywords

EID: 23744484218     PISSN: 02715309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00011-3     Document Type: Article

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