Revisiting legal realism: The law, economics, and organization perspective

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 383-420

  Williamson, Oliver E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2342520844     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/5.2.383     Document Type: Review

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