Sensitivity based analysis method and algorithm for generation bidding

Zhongguo Dianji Gongcheng Xuebao/Proceedings of the Chinese Society of Electrical Engineering

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 60-64

  Wu, Zheng Qiu ^a   Pan, Li Qiang ^b   Chen, Hui Hua ^b   Tang, Wai Wen ^b  

^a HUNAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b Hunan Electric Power Company   (China)

Author keywords

Bidding; Electricity market; Nash equilibrium point; Sensitivity

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS;

BIDDING STRATEGIES; ELECTRICITY MARKET; NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINT; OUTPUT POWER; PRICE PARAMETER;

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

EID: 2342436436     PISSN: 02588013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Ferrera R W, Shahidehpour S M, Ramesh V C. Transaction analysis in deregulated power systems using game theory [J]. IEEE on Power Systems, 1997, 12(3): 1340-1347.
2. Krishna V, Ramesh V C. Intelligent agents for negotiations in market games. Part: Model [J]. IEEE on Power Systems, 1998, 13(3): 1103-1108.
3. Krishna V, Ramesh V C. Intelligent agents for negotiations in market games. Part 2: Application [J]. IEEE on Power Systems, 1998, 13(3): 1109-1113.
4. Xiaomin Bai, Shahidehpour S M, Erkeng Yu. Transmission Analysis by Nash Game Method [J]. Paper 96WM 186-7-PWRS, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 1997, 12(2): 1046-1051
5. Zhang D Y, Wang Y J, Peter B L. Optimization based bidding strategies in the deregulated market [J]. IEEE on Power Systems, 2000, 15(3): 909-915.
6. He Y, Song Y H. Generation bidding strategies based on two-level optimization and bids sensitivities. IEEE Power Engineering Review [J]. February 2002: 44-46.
7. Weber J D, Overbye T J. An individual welfare maximization algorithm for electricity markets [J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2002, 17(3): 590-596.
8. Bai Lichao, Kang Chongqing, Xia Qing, et al. Analysis of the uncertainty of electricity price [J]. Proceedings of the CSEE, 2002, 22(5): 36-41.