A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 283-307

  Dominguez, Diego ^a   Thomson, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Claims problems; Recursive rule

Indexed keywords

EID: 23344442759     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0636-3     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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