The rise and fall of Russia's NTV

Stanford Journal of International Law

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 18-42

  Belin, Laura ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 23044532560     PISSN: 07315082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (251)

1. Moscow-based TV-6, founded in 1992 as a joint venture involving Ted Turner and Eduard Sagalaev, first went on the air on January 1, 1993. The network did not produce and air its own newscasts, however, until March of 1996. See ANVAR AMIROV & MAKSIM BALUTENKO, OBSHCHENATSIONAL'NYE TELEVESHCHATEL'NYE KOMPANII ROSSII [NATIONWIDE RUSSIAN TELEVISION BROADCASTING COMPANIES] 91-95 (1997).
2. ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, CHANGING CHANNELS 8-10 (1997);
3. RUSSIAN-AMERICAN PRESS AND INFORMATION CENTER, ZHURNALISTIKA I VOINA [JOURNALISM AND WAR] 7-14, 41-43 (1995), available at http://www.medialaw.ru/ publications/books/war/1-1.html.
4. Sarah Oates & Laura Roselle, Russian Elections and TV News: Comparison of Campaign News on State-Controlled and Commercial Television Channels, 5 HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POLITICS 30, 37-39, 42-43, 46 (2000);
5. LAURA BELIN & ROBERT W. ORTTUNG, THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1995: THE BATTLE FOR THE DUMA 93 (1997).
6. The website of the U.S.-based, nonprofit organization Internews (http://www.internews.org) is an excellent source of information on the nonstate television sector in Russia and other former Soviet republics.
7. Elena Vartanova, Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged, in RUSSIAN MEDIA CHALLENGE 21, 41-42 (Kaarle Nordenstreng et al. eds., 2001). In the late 1990s, although NTV ranked third among Russian television networks in terms of availability, it ranked second only to the Channel 1 broadcaster, Russian Public Television, in terms of audience share.
8. Russia's Union of Journalists warned in a statement that "[a]ttacks on freedom of speech in Russia are becoming more and more persistent and refined" and that the press is "persistently" portrayed as an "enemy." Ekho Moskvy radio broadcast, May 3, 2001.
9. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, on April 24, 2001, adopted a recommendation expressing "particular concern about the recent developments in Russia," including the takeover of NTV, the closure of the Media-Most newspaper Segodnya, and the sacking of the journalists working for the magazine Itogi. The recommendation added that "[t]he attacks on the freedom of expression and mass media in Russia, undertaken with the participation of the authorities, run counter to the basic principles of the Council of Europe and constitute a significant violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights." Freedom of Expression and Information in the Media in Europe, EUR. PARL. ASS. Recommendation 1506 (Apr. 24, 2001), available at http://stars.coe.fr/ta/ta01/EREC1506.htm.
10. In addition, Russia landed on "name and shame" lists issued by Reporters sans Frontiers and the Committee to Protect Journalists on World Press Freedom Day. Watch Out Predators, REPORTERS SANS FRONTIERS, at http://www.rsf.fr/rsf/uk/Predateurs/html/predateurs.html (Nov. 7, 2001);
11. CPJ Names Ten Enemies of the Press on World Freedom Day, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, at http://www.cpj.org/enemies/enemies_01.html (May 3, 2001). Eight members of the Coordinating Committee of Press Freedom Organizations adopted a resolution on May 6, 2001 deploring "growing actions and threats against press freedom in Russia," with specific reference to the campaign against NTV and other Media-Most outlets.
12. World Press Freedom Committee, Resolutions Adopted by Coordinating Committee of Press Freedom Organizations in Windhoek, Namibia on 6 May 2001, INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM OF PRESS EXCHANGE, at http://www.ifex.org/alerts/view. html?id=8700 (May 10, 2001).
13. See, e.g., Boris Jordan, NTV Has Real Money Troubles, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 18, 2001, at 6;
14. Yevgenii Anisimov & Olga Vandysheva, Predsedatel' soveta direktorov telekompanii Alfred Kokh: Zvezdy NTV vzyali molotok-i kliryaspo khrustal'nomu obraw kanala! [TV Company Board of Directors Chairman Alfred Kokh: The Stars of NTV Took a Hammer and Smashed the Network's Crystal Image!], KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Apr. 14, 2001, at 8.
15. Aleksandr Timonin, U Sud'i Garsona ruka krepkaya [Judge Carson Has a Strong Hand], ROSS. GAZETA, Jan. 25, 2001, at 7;
16. Zdes' i Seichas' [Here and Now] (Russian Public Television broadcast, Jan. 29, 2001);
17. Vladamir Ustinov, Eto-popytki uiti ot otvetstvennosti [These Are Attempts to Evade Responsibility], ROSS. GAZETA, Sept. 21, 2000, at 1;
18. Grigorii Punanov, Vladimir Lysenko: Ob arestakh ya zaranee ne ob'yavlyayu [Vladimir Lysenko: I Do Not Announce Arrests in Advance], IZVESTIIA, Feb. 21, 2001, at 1.
19. Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, Networks Agree to U.S. Request to Edit Future Bin Laden Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at A1.
20. Marshall Sella, The Red-State Network, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
21. See, e.g., Laura Belin et al., The Distorted Russian Media Market, in BUSINESS AND THE STATE IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 65, 68-80 (Peter Rutland ed., 2001);
22. CHRYSTIA FREELAND, SALE OF THE CENTURY: THE INSIDE STORY OF RUSSIA'S SECOND REVOLUTION 134 (2000);
23. JULIET JOHNSON, A FISTFUL OF RUBLES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RUSSIAN BANKING SYSTEM 114-125, 173-200 (2000);
24. PAUL KLEBNIKOV, GODFATHER OF THE KREMLIN: BORIS BEREZOVSKY AND THE LOOTING OF RUSSIA 144-48, 168-69, 221-23 (2000);
25. Sergei Peregudov, The Oligarchical Model of Russian Corporatism, in CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN POLITICS: A READER 259, 259-268 (Archie Brown ed., 2001);
26. Donald N. Jensen, Russia's Financial Empires, SPECIAL REPORT FOR RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY [RFE/RL], at http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/ rufinance/index.html (Jan. 1998).
27. For a summary of Russian media law, see Andrei Richter, Media Regulation: Foundation Laid for Free Speech, in RUSSIAN MEDIA CHALLENGE, supra note 5, at 115, 115-154.
28. For a longer overview, see Mikhail Fedotov, SMI v otsutstvii Ariadny [Mass Media in the Absence of Ariadne], in ZAKONODATEL'STVO ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII O SREDSTVAKH MASSOVOI INFORMATSII [THE LEGISLATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MASS MEDIA] 182-290 (1996), available at http://www.medialaw.ru/ publications/index.htm. For a discussion of television broadcasting and licensing regulations,
29. see Peter Krug & Monroe E. Price, Russia, in MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE AGE OF CONVERGENCE 171, 186 (Vicki MacLeod ed., 1996). For more detailed discussions of legislation affecting the Russian media and the application of the relevant laws and decrees,
30. see MONROE E. PRICE ET AL., POST-SOVIET MEDIA LAW AND POLICY READER (forthcoming 2002).
31. Monroe E. Price, Law, Force, and the Russian Media, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 795, 799 (1995);
32. see also Law on the Mass Media, available at http:/www.medialaw.ru/e_pa. ges/laws/russian/massmedia_eng/massmedia_eng.html (July 7, 2000).
33. KONST. RF art. XXIX (1993);
34. see also Law on the Mass Media, supra note 13, art. 4.
35. Price, supra note 13, at 799.
36. Pending the adoption of a broadcasting law, the 1998 law, "On Licensing Certain Types of Activity," regulates some aspects of the licensing process for media outlets. See Richter, supra note 12, at 132-33. However, the adoption of that law did not prevent the authorities from changing broadcast licensing procedures and even creating a new licensing commission for the media in 1999.
37. On Russian licensing bodies in the early 1990s, see Fedotov, supra note 12, at 210, 230-31.
38. For a detailed discussion of licensing issues and excerpts from the relevant Russian legal acts, see A.G. RICHTER, PRAVOVYE VOPROSY LITSENZIROVANIYA TELERADIOVESHCHANIYA [THE LEGAL ISSUES OF TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTING LICENSING], available at http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/books/wb-lic/index. html (2000).
39. The Russian constitution grants the president the right to issue decrees as long as those decrees do not contradict the constitution or federal laws. KONST. RF art. XC (1993).
40. Despite much political debate about the issue in the late 1960s and 1970s, West Germany failed to enact "internal freedom" regulations to shield journalists from undue proprietorial influence. See PETER J. HUMPHREYS, MEDIA AND MEDIA POLICY IN WEST GERMANY: THE PRESS AND BROADCASTING SINCE 1945, at 105-11, 187-89 (1990).
41. Founder is a legal concept developed in the last years of the Soviet Union. The authors of the groundbreaking 1990 USSR press law introduced the concept of founder to replace the idea of party or state organizations controlling their own press organs. Many of the same scholars drafted the 1992 Mass Media Law, which retained the concept. Under Article 7 of the 1992 law, founders or co-founders of media outlets may be individuals, associations of individuals, enterprises, organizations, institutions, or state bodies. Foreign citizens or stateless persons not residing in the Russian Federation may not serve as founders. Under Article 8 of the same law, the founder is responsible for submitting the application to register a media outlet. Law on the Mass Media, art. 7-8, available at http://www.medialaw.ru/e_pa.ges/laws/russian/ massmedia_eng/massmedia_eng_2.html (July 7, 2000).
42. For a description of the law's provisions and the framers' intentions, see Fedotov, supra note 12, at 236-241.
43. For a summary of the law's key points in English, see Krug & Price, supra note 12, at 177-79.
44. Fedotov, supra note 12, at 237.
45. Article 20 of the Law on the Mass Media pertains to charters of editorial offices, which are to be adopted by majority vote of the editorial staff and endorsed by the founder. Law on the Mass Media, supra note 13, art. 20.
46. Article 22 of the Law on the Mass Media states that founders, editorial offices, and publishers may conclude agreements among themselves. Law on the Mass Media, supra note 13, art. 22. Article 18, which covers the "status of the founder," states that the founder has "no right to interfere in the activity" of a media outlet except for the cases provided for in the Law on the Mass Media, the charter of the editorial office, or any agreement concluded between the founder and the editorial office.
47. Supra Note Id. art. 18.
48. Elena Vartanova, Corporate Transformation of the Russian Media, POST-SOVIET MEDIA LAW AND POLICY NEWSLETTER (Sept. 5, 1996), at http://www.vii.org/monroe/issue32/vartanova.html.
49. Andrew Richter, Zakonodatel'stvo i praktika [Lawmaking and Practice], at http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/zip/80/index.html (Apr. 2001). An undated commentary by Internews and the Moscow Media Law and Policy Institute estimated that sixty to eighty percent of all registered media outlets in Russia have not adopted a charter of the editorial collective.
50. Internews, K Voprosy o prinyatii ustava redaktsii SMI [The Question of Adopting Charters of Media Editorial Collectives], FOND ZASHCHITY GLASNOSTI [GLASNOST DEFENSE FOUNDATION], at http://www.gdf.ru/law/st-018.shtml (2001).
51. Ostankino, the Channel 1 broadcaster, was the successor to the Soviet-era nationwide television network, Central Television of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (the monopoly, Gosteleradio).
52. MICKIEWICZ, supra note 2, at 223.
53. FREELAND, supra note 11, at 145-48.
54. Oleg Dobrodeev, founding news director of NTV, later claimed that Pavel Borodin, head of the Kremlin's property management department, and Sports Minister Shamil Tarpishchev, the founder of the National Sports Fund, fought behind the scenes to secure the license for NTV. Oleg Dobrodeev, Otkrytoe pis'mo Olega Dobmdeeva Yevgeniyu Kisilevu [Oleg Dobrodeev's Open Letter to Yevgenii Kisilev], IZVESTIIA, Apr. 9, 2001, at 1.
55. Irina Lesnevskaya, head of the television production company REN-TV, was among those lobbying against the move to grant NTV the license. KLEBNIKOV, supra note 11, at 151-53.
56. AMIROV & BALUTENKO, supra note 1, at 74.
57. Krug & Price, supra note 12, at 187;
58. see also Svetlana Kolesnik, Content Control on TV in Russia, POST-SOVIET MEDIA LAW AND POLICY NEWSLETTER (Sept. 5, 1996), at http://www.vii.org/monroe/ issue32/kolesnik.html.
59. FREELAND, supra note 11, at 148.
60. Price, supra note 13, at 814.
61. Krug & Price, supra note 12, at 188 n.35.
62. The Glasnost Defense Foundation, a Moscow-based watchdog group, issued a statement on December 16, 1994, quoting Soskovents' words as they were reported by the state-run RIA Novosti news agency. NAUM NIM, PYATILETKA GLASNOSTI: KHRONIKA 1991-1996 [FIVE YEARS OF GLASNOST A CHRONICLE, 1991-1996] 134 (1996).
63. In June 1995, the Procurator-General's Office opened a criminal investigation into NTV correspondent Yelena Masyuk, who had interviewed a notorious Chechen field commander without disclosing his whereabouts to the Russian authorities. The Glasnost Defense Foundation pointed out in a statement issued on August 1, 1995, that a Russian government representative did not face criminal charges after meeting with Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev. NAUM NIM, PYATILETKA GLASNOSTI: KHRONIKA 1991-1996 [FIVE YEARS OF GLASNOST A CHRONICLE, Id. at 142-43. In July 1995, a criminal case was opened against the NTV satirical puppet show "Kukly," which aired an allegedly "insulting" show about the president and prime minister. The following month, the Procurator-General's Office opened a separate case on alleged tax evasion and illegal currency dealing by "Kukly" producers.
64. Laura Belin, Wrestling Political and Financial Oppression, TRANSITION, Oct. 6, 1995, at 59-63, 88.
65. Cf. KLEBNIKOV, supra note 11, at 231-33 (describing the National Sports Fund's immensely lucrative tax and customs duty exemptions).
66. Those lobbying the Kremlin on behalf of NTV in late 1995 won over Shamil Tarpishchev, the sports minister and founding head of the National Sports Fund, by promising that sporting events would receive a certain amount of airtime on NTV if it received permission to broadcast on Channel 4. FREELAND, supra note 11, at 147-148.
67. This law also conferred certain tax breaks and discounts on utility rates for the media sector. Richter, supra note 12, at 130-31.
68. See MICKIEWICZ, supra note 2, at 244-263.
69. In January 1996, NTV received permission to pay the same rates for signal distribution as did state-controlled television networks. See Gleb Pyanykh, Bankrotstvo NTV ne grozit [Bankruptcy Does Not Threaten NTV], KOMMERS., Jan. 22, 1998, at 3.
70. See Arina Borodina, Ugrozy dlya NTV [Threats to NTV], VREMYA-MN, June 4, 1999, at 2 (reporting that other private television networks paid up to four times higher rates for transmission services).
71. The Communications Ministry, which owned Russia's radio and television broadcasting towers, charged "exorbitant" fees for signal transmission. Jamey Gambrell, After the Bloodshed: Survey of the Russian Press from 1993 to 1995, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 781, 792 n.38 (1995);
72. see also Peter Krug, Pass the Advil: Financial Woes of Russia's State Broadcasters, POST-SOVIET MEDIA LAW AND POLICY NEWSLETTER (Feb. 28, 1994), at http://www.vii.org/monroe/issue05/advil.htm.
73. Mickiewicz argues that NTV still achieved a higher level of professionalism during the 1996 campaign, because it devoted more airtime in newscasts to the Communist campaign and even interviewed Communist candidate Gennadii Zyuganov. MICKIEWICZ, supra note 2, at 167-189.
74. However, NTV's interviews with Zyuganov were peppered with hostile questions, while interviews with other politicians were used to put the Communists in a bad light. NTV spent considerable airtime showcasing the most extreme elements of Zyuganov's coalition and giving little accurate information about Zyuganov's platform. In addition, the network broadcast some deliberately misleading reports at crucial junctures of the campaign - in particular on the night of June 19, 1996, when late night news bulletins on NTV depicted the arrest of two Yeltsin campaign aides. The aides were carrying more than a half-million dollars in cash out of the government headquarters as an attempt by Yeltsin's chief bodyguard to subvert the election. For a detailed analysis of NTV's coverage of the 1996 campaign, see OMRI Special Reports on the Presidential Election, at http://archive.tol.cz/Publications/RPE/Index.html.
75. Nataliya Osipova, RAO Gazprom stanovitsya aktsionerom NTV [Gazprom Is Becoming an NTV Shareholder], KOMMERS., June 8, 1996, at 1.
76. Galina Chermenskaya writes of a "widely held belief that the Kremlin was buying NTV's loyalty with Gazprom money." Galina Chermenskaya, After the Battle, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM (May 2001), at http://www.jamestown.org/ publications.htm.
77. Alfred Kokh, who became head of Gazprom's media subsidiary in June 2000, claimed in an interview that state officials told Gazprom bosses to loan money to Gusinskii's media empire, promising that if the gas monopoly did so, they would not "ask questions about what's going on in Gazprom." Anisimov & Vandysheva, supra note 7, at 8.
78. AMIROV & BALUTENKO, supra note 1, at 78.
79. AMIROV & BALUTENKO, supra note, Id., at 78.
80. Yassen Zassoursky, Media and Politics in Transition: Time Models, POST-SOVIET MEDIA LAW AND POLICY NEWSLETTER (Feb. 27, 1997), at http:/www.vii.org/monroe/issue35/zassoursky.html.
81. AMIROV & BALUTENKO, supra note 1, at 74 (citing a Nov. 1, 1996 instruction of the State Customs Committee that applied exclusively to NTV).
82. Igor Malashenko defended his decision to join Yeltsin's campaign team in an interview published in Izvestiia. He argued that becoming an "instrument of propaganda" temporarily was preferable to covering the campaign in an "unbiased, professional and objective" way, which would, in his view, clear the path to a Communist victory. Irina Petrovskaya, Predvybornaya Lovushka dlya TV [Pre-election Trap for TV], IZVESTIIA, Apr. 19, 1996, at 6 (transl. by author). Oleg Dobrodeev justified NTV's 1996 campaign coverage as an "ideological reflex."
83. Yelena Afanas'eva, Informatsiya - eto imperiya bet chuvstv [Information is an Empire Without Feelings], NOVAYA GAZETA, Mar. 22-28, 1999, at 7 (quoting an interview with Oleg Dobrodeev) (transl. by author).
84. Dobrodeev, supra note 30, at 1.
85. Patrick Henry, NTV Increasingly the Kremlin Voice, MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 19, 1996, at 4;
86. David Hoffman, Russia's Evolving TV Targeted Lebed, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1996, at A27;
87. Laura Belin, Media Campaign Against Lebed Intensifies, OMRI ANALYTICAL BRIEF, at http://archive.tol.cz/omri/restricted/article.php3?id=15860 (Oct. 18, 1996).
88. Dobrodeev, supra note 30, at 1.
89. The NTV-Plus satellite project financed by Gazprom in 1996 involved networks that could be received by subscribers using home satellite reception dishes. In November 1998, Most-1 (ordered by Media-Most and its subsidiary Bonum-1) became the first satellite ever launched by a private Russian media company. Its launch freed NTV and other networks in the Media-Most empire from the need to rent satellites owned by the Russian state or foreign companies. See Osipova, supra note 46;
90. Nikolai Zimin & Aleksandr Koretskii, V Rossii poyavilos' tsifrovoe televidenie [Digital Television Has Appeared in Russia], SEGODNYA, Nov. 24, 1998, at 1-2.
91. Yeltsin Ends Government Loan Guarantees, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/05/130597.html (May 13, 1997). For a discussion of the loan guarantees Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin authorized for the Bonum-1 project,
92. see Igor Ivanov, NTV-Minus, IZVESTIIA, Oct. 11, 2000, at 2;
93. Sergei Ponomarev, Chernomyrdin khotel kak luchshe Gusinskomu [Chernomirdyn Wanted the Best for Gusinskii], KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Oct. 2, 1997, at 2.
94. Russian media ownership and financing changed dramatically during the second half of the 1990s. For a broad discussion of the changes and financing, see Floriana Fossato & Anna Kachkaeva, Russian Media Empires, RFE/RL SPECIAL REPORTS, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia1/index.html (Sept. 2000) (six reports).
95. For a summary of the media coverage in the Svyazinvest "information war," see Belin et al., supra note 11, at 77-80.
96. For more detailed coverage of the media attacks on both sides, see More Fallout From Svyazinvest Auction, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/ newsline/1997/08/010897.html (Aug. 1, 1997);
97. Berezovskii, Malashenko On Russian Journalists' Release, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/08/010897.html (Aug. 20, 1997).
98. Nemtsov Defends Svyazinvest Sale, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/07/290797.html (July 29, 1997). For summaries of attacks on Nemtsov publicized in media linked to Berezovskii and Gusinskii,
99. see FSB Checking Svyazinvest Sale, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/08/050897.html (Aug. 5, 1997);
100. More Fallout From Svyazinvest Auction, supra note 59;
101. ORT, NTV Shareholders Deny Accusation By Nemtzov, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/07/300797.html (July 30, 1997).
102. Nemtsov singled out NTV and Russian Public Television, strongly influenced by Berezovskii, for criticism. Nemtsov Slams Mass Media, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/10/021097.html (Oct. 2, 1997).
103. Nemtsov Still at Odds with Berezovskii, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/10/231097.html (Oct. 23, 1997) (quoting an interview with Nemtsov in the weekly Interfax-AiF).
104. On Yeltsin's meeting with the bankers, see Yeltsin Meets With Top Bankers, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/09/150997.html (Sept. 15, 1997);
105. Yeltsin Upbeat on Meeting with Bankers, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/09/160997.html (Sept. 16, 1997);
106. Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Comment on Meeting with Bankers, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/09/170997.html (Sept. 17, 1997);
107. No Truce in Bank War, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ 1997/09/180997.html (Sept. 18, 1997).
108. For a list of Gusinskii's media assets, see Floriana Fossato & Anna Kachkaeva, Russian Media Empires II, RFE/RL SPECIAL REPORTS, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/RUMEDIA2/index.html (Mar. 20, 1998).
109. On a scandal involving suspiciously large book fees, see Duma Concerned about Royalty Payments to Officials, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/ newsline/1997/11/131197.html (Nov. 13, 1997);
110. First Head Rolls in Book Royalties Scandal, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/11/141197.html (Nov. 14, 1997);
111. Yeltsin Sacks Two More Officials in Book Scandal, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/11/171197.html (Nov. 17, 1997);
112. Yeltsin Sacks Chubais as Finance Minister, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/11/201197.html (Nov. 20, 1997);
113. Yeltsin Appeals to Duma, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/ newsline/1997/11/211197.html (Nov. 21, 1997).
114. For instance, on December 21, 1997, Yevgenii Kiselev, the anchor of NTV's weekly analytical program Itogi, accused First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais of passing along sensitive information to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. See TV Coverage Of Scandal Reflects Political Slant, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/12/231297.asp (Dec. 23, 1997).
115. NTV to Contest Higher Transmission Charges, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/12/291297.asp (Dec. 29, 1997). For background on the State Anti-Monopoly Committee's policy change,
116. see Gleb Pyanykh, NTV Bez Plusa [NTV Without the Plus], KOMMERS., Jan. 20, 1998, at 28-30.
117. NTV executives had expected to pay $17 million for signal distribution in 1998, but that figure would rise to between $25 million and $50 million if NTV were forced to pay the same fees as other commercial broadcasters. The level of NTV's transmission fees thus appeared likely to determine whether NTV made a profit in 1998 or lost money. Pyanykh, supra note 67.
118. For a discussion of NTV's legal arguments and those of the State Anti-Monopoly Committee, see Yurate Gurauskaite, Prezident dal skidku NTV [The President Gave NTV a Discount], RUSSKII TELEGRAF, Jan. 22, 1998, at 1;
119. Pyanykh, supra note 67.
120. Pyanykh, supra note 42;
121. Guarauskaite, supra note 69. An October 1995 presidential decree provided various special privileges, including discounted transmission fees, to "all-Russian" broadcasters, but the decree conferred that status only on state-owned nationwide radio and television companies.
122. For more on media coverage of the new cabinet headed by Sergei Kirienko, see IVAN ZASURSKII, MASS-MEDIA VTOROI RESPUBLIKI [MASS MEDIA IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC] 115-16, 120-22 (1999);
123. Belin et al., supra note 11, at 78-79.
124. In one memorable report, an NTV correspondent argued that the government does not have the right to be "stupid." Belin et al., supra note 11, at 79.
125. According to Chris Renaud, Media-Most's finance and strategic development director, NTV's debts totaled "approximately $48 million to Gazprombank and approximately $40 million to an affiliate of Media Most." Chris Renaud, NTV: There Was No Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 30, 2001, at 11. However, other Media-Most entities had larger loans outstanding at the time of the ruble crisis; creditors included the Finance Ministry, Vneshekonombank, Vneshtorgbank, and Sberbank. The largest creditor was Gazprom, which guaranteed two loans extended to Media-Most by Credit Suisse First Boston: $211.6 million in March 1998 (due in March 2000) and $261 million in July 1998 (due in July 2001).
126. In late 1997, Malashenko became general director of NTV-Holding, which encompassed several of Gusinskii's media assets. But during the August 1998 economic crisis he became the number two man at the larger Media-Most, which included the companies in NTV-Holding.
127. OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, Aug. 17-23, 1998,
128. quoted in Aleksei Pankin, Krizis, kak shans [Crisis, as Chance], SREDA, Aug. 1998, at 1-2.
129. The Law on State Support for the Mass Media and Book Publishing had been scheduled to expire on January 1, 1999.
130. Shortly before the ruble devaluation that ended his stint as prime minister, Sergei Kirienko signed a directive ordering that all radio and television companies pay the same rates for transmission services as of January 1, 1999. Primakov issued a new directive pushing that date back to January 1, 2000. See Borodina, supra note 43.
131. Malashenko made that assertion in an interview much later. Yelena Afanas'eva, Igor Malashenko: Avtoritarizm - eto uzhe nabludayemi fakt [Igor Malashenko: Authoritarianism is an Already Observable Fact], NOVAYA GAZETA, Feb. 7-13, 2000, at 11. He did not specify the kind of financial help NTV expected to receive, but characterized the failure of officials to implement Yeltsin's order as "sabotage." In early 1999, NTV had not publicly requested, nor did Yeltsin announce, any presidential order to help NTV. On the contrary, NTV's news director, Vladimir Kulistikov, noted with pride that unlike Russian Public Television (the Channel 1 broadcaster), NTV did not receive subsidies from the state.
132. Galina Chermenskaya, Vladamir Kulistikov: Novosti - eto tozhe shou [Vladamir Kulistikov - The News Is Also a Show], LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Feb. 3, 1999, at 8.
133. NTV had to reduce its broadcast hours and its purchases of new programs. Dobrodeev, supra note 30, at 7.
134. Laura Belin, Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media, in CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN POLITICS: A READER, supra note 11, at 327 [hereinafter Political Bias];
135. see also Laura Belin, The Kremlin Strikes Back: The Reassertion of State Power Over the Russian Media, in POST-SOVIET MEDIA LAW AND POLICY READER, supra note 12.
136. Gusinskii was a longtime business and political ally of Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, who was by 1999 firmly in opposition to Yeltsin. Gusinskii's Most Bank earned a fortune in the 1990s as an "authorized bank" handling budget funds for Luzhkov's Moscow city government. See Jensen, supra note 11;
137. Juliet Johnson, Russia's Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups, 13 POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 333, 351 (1997) (explaining the development of the Russian banks in the 1990s).
138. Itogi [Results] (NTV television broadcast, Nov. 14, 1999);
139. Aleksandr Porfir'ev, U Kremlya otshibla pamyat'[The Kremlin's Memory Has Failed It], SEGODNYA, Nov. 11, 1999, at 1.
140. For Voloshin's side of the story, see Andrei Vandenko, Aleksandr Voloshin: Za Kremlen ne Zarzhaveet [Aleksandr Voloshin: The Kremlin is Not Getting Rusty], KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Aug. 3, 1999, at 3.
141. For Stepashin's version, see Rekomendatsii Vneshekonombanku daval glava administratsii [The Head of the Presidential Administration Gave Instructions to Vneshekonombank], SEGODNYA, Nov. 12, 1999, at 1. Although Stepashin suggested that no one explicitly offered Gusinskii money in exchange for political support, Voloshin hinted that Media-Most's financial problems were related to the fact that several Gusinskii-owned media outlets were working "against the president."
142. Floriana Fossato & Anna Kachkaeva, Russian Media Empires V, RFE/RL SPECIAL REPORTS, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia5/index.html (Aug. 1999).
143. According to Yulia Latynina, Gusinskii persuaded Primakov to instruct Vneshekonombank to give Media-Most another loan, but the deal fell through after Primakov was fired. Yulia Latynina, How Kokh Should Have Taken NTV, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001.
144. NTV's deputy editor in chief, Vladimir Kulistikov, told European Institute for the Media (EIM) monitors that the network deliberately tried to give more airtime to groups that were poorly represented on state television networks. For excerpts from the EIM's report, see Televidenie proyavilo tendentsioyiost' [Television Displayed Bias], SREDA, Jan. 2000, at 5-12.
145. See, e.g., Laura Belin, NTV Links Unity to Corruption, RFE/RL RUSSIAN ELECTION REPORT, at http://www.rferl.org/elections/russia99report/1999/12/07- 171299.html (Dec. 17, 1999).
146. Semen Liberman, Vtoraya Chechenskaya [The Second Chechen (War)], SREDA, Nov. 1999, at 6-9.
147. Semen Liberman, Vtoraya Chechenskaya - akt sleduyushchii [The Second Chechen (War) - the Next Act], SREDA, Dec. 1999, at 13-16;
148. Lev Lurie, The Russian Media Turns, INSTITUTE FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, at http://iwpr.vs4.cerbernet.co.uk/index. pl?archive/cau/cau_200001_14_03_eng.txt (Jan. 14, 2000).
149. Dobrodeev later claimed that the shift in NTV's coverage of Chechnya was intended to persuade state officials to offer financial assistance to Media-Most. Dobrodeev, supra note 30.
150. After Yeltsin granted NTV around-the-clock use of Channel 4, the network received a new license in January 1997, good for five years.
151. The Media Ministry's refusal to automatically renew the broadcast license of TV-Center, a network controlled by the Moscow city authorities, succeeded in softening that network's criticism of the government and presidential administration. It also brought that network's patron, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, to the bargaining table with state officials. Floriana Fossato, Luzhkov's TV Station Back in Favor, RFE/RL, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/ features/2000/07/f.ru.000707152617.html (July 7, 2000);
152. Fossato & Kachkaeva, supra note 58.
153. For further discussion of the Russian advertising market and Video-International's move away from NTV, see Fossato & Kachkaeva, supra note 58.
154. Video-International produced the acclaimed pro-Yeltsin television commercials for the 1996 presidential campaign. For background on Lesin, see Belin, Political Bias, supra note 80.
155. The fee increase applied to state-controlled "all-Russian" television networks as well. See Olga Likhina, Telekompaniyam predlozhili skinutsya [The NTV Companies Were Sold to Save Money], KOMMERS., Jan. 18, 2000, at 7. However, compared to NTV and Media-Most, those networks faced fewer consequences as their debts to the Communications Ministry and other entities mounted.
156. Gleb Pyanykh, Imushchestvo Media-Mosta gotovo k rasprodazhe [Media Most's Property is Ready to be Sold], KOMMERS., Nov. 10, 1999, at 3 (transl. by author);
157. Laura Belin, NTV Charges Kremlin Is Trying to Silence Network, RFE/RL RUSSIAN ELECTION REPORT, at http://www.rferl.org/elections/russia99report/1999/ 11/03-191199.html (Nov. 19, 1999).
158. Putin became acting president following Yeltsin's surprise resignation on December 31, 1999.
159. Julie A. Corwin, Gazprom Tells NTV To Toe Government Line on Chechnya, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/02/160200.html (Feb. 16, 2000).
160. Aware that the company could not afford to repay $211 million when the Credit Suisse First Boston loan came due in March 2000, Media-Most executives tried to negotiate a debt-for-equity swap with Gazprom in late 1999. The deal fell through in January 2000. See Anna Raff, No Happy Ending for NTV, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at 12.
161. Gusinskii claimed Kremlin officials coerced Rem Vyakhirev, who became fabulously wealthy as Gazprom's chief executive, to turn the screws on Media-Most by threatening to arrest Vyakhirev or his son. See Nataliya Gevorkyan, Putin ne plokhoi. On prosto ne ponimaet. [Putin is Not Bad. He Just Doesn't Understand.], KOMMERS., Feb. 6, 2001, at 1
162. (citing an interview with Gusinskii). During their February 2000 meeting, Putin told Vyakhirev, "Gazprom owns shares in NTV and finances that company. I don't care how they cover me on NTV, but if the network's stance on Chechnya does not change, I will crush you, Rem Ivanovich." Kirill Belyaninov, Ne zabud'te vyklyuchit' televizor [Don't Forget to Turn Off the Television], NOVYE IZVESTIIA, Apr. 4, 2001, at 1 (citing an unnamed "leading television commentator").
163. David Huffman, Putin's Actions Belie Promise to Tycoons: 'Strange Decisions' Reveal Favoritism Despite Vow to Bring Equality, WASH. POST, May 7, 2000, at A21.
164. Vremya [Time] (Russian Public Television broadcast. May 11, 2000) (interviewing Yuri Martyshkin, an investigator with the Procurator-General's Office, and FSB official Aleksandr Zdanovich).
165. Gusinskii was released after three days in custody. For more on the circumstances surrounding his arrest, see Sophie Lambroschini & Floriana Fossato, Gusinskii's Arrest Has Several Coals, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/06/160600.asp (June 16, 2000);
166. see also Fossato & Kachkaeva, supra note 58.
167. Excerpts from "Protocol 6" appeared in Aleksandr Arkhangel'skii, Protokol n. 6. Aktsii v obmen na svobodu: takogo uslovie sdelki mezhdu Gazprom-Media i gr. Gusinskim [Protocol 6: Shares in Exchange for Freedom: That Was the Deal Between Gazprom-Media and Citizen Gusinkii], IZVESTIIA, Sept. 19, 2000, at 1. For more analysis of how the criminal investigations were linked to Gazprom's battle to take control of NTV's editorial policy on behalf of the state,
168. see Chermenskaya, supra note 47.
169. Gusinskii said he signed the July agreement under pressure. Ya podpisyvayu soglasheniya pod dulom pistoleta [I Signed the Agreements Under the Barrel of a Gun], KOMMERS., Sept. 19, 2000, at 1.
170. In that suit, Gazprom-Media was seeking $248.5 million ($211.6 million from the loan it repaid in March 2000, plus $36.9 million in interest). Lyudmila Romanova, Gazprom i Media-Most snova poverili drug drugu [Gazprom and Media-Most Believed Each Other Again], NEZAVISLMAYA GAZETA, Oct. 19, 2001, at 1.
171. Peter Baker, Gazprom Divulges Finances: Russian Gas Monopoly's Books Tell Tale of Insider Dealing, WASH. POST, June 15, 2001, at A26.
172. Laura Belin, Ten Ironies of the NTV Saga, RFE/RL RUSSIAN POLITICAL WEEKLY, at http://www.rferl.org/rfw/2001/04/11-160401.html (Apr. 16, 2001).
173. NTV devoted substantial coverage to bribery allegations against Kokh the month after his dismissal. See Some Russian Media Pick Up Allegations, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/09/290997.html (Sept. 29, 1997).
174. For example, Putin's press secretary said the president "considers it wrong to interfere in a conflict between two commercial organizations." Julie A. Corwin, Putin Says He Won't 'Interfere' In Media-Most Scandal, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/09/270900.html (Sept. 27, 2000). Meeting with NTV journalists in late January 2001, Putin refused to get involved in the dispute between Gazprom and Media-Most and denied that the criminal investigations of Media-Most officials were politically motivated.
175. Putin Meets with NTV Journalists, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Jan. 30, 2001), at http://www.jamestown.org/publications.htm. As the conflict neared its climax in April 2001, Putin again insisted that he did not have the right to intervene in a dispute between a debtor and creditors.
176. Paul Goble, Putin Says NTV Dispute Should Be Resolved in Court, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/04/100401.html (Apr. 10, 2001).
177. The Finance Ministry sought repayment of more than $44 million in loans that financed the Bonum-1 satellite project. Lyudmila Romanova, Gazprom i Most obsuzhdayut novye usloviya peremiriya [Gazprom and Most Discuss New Conditions for Truce], NEZAVISLMAYA GAZETA, Oct. 18, 2000, at 1.
178. Sberbank demanded immediate repayment of a $51.4 million loan to Media-Most not scheduled to come due until 2003. Bankovskii vestnik [Bank Bulletin] (Ekho Moskvy radio broadcast, Oct. 4, 2000). Vneshekonombank sought to collect on a $30 million loan it extended to finance the Bonum-1 satellite project.
179. Vneshekonombank Sues Media-Most for Unpaid Loans, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Oct. 12, 2000), at http://www.jamestown.org/publications.htm;
180. Ivanov, supra note 57.
181. NTV's Kiselev Summoned for Questioning, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Nov. 20, 2000), at http://www.jamestown.org/publications.htm;
182. Ted Turner Hints He May Invest in Gusinsky's NTV, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Jan. 9, 2001), supra;
183. Prosecution Search Media-Most's Offices Once Again, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2001), supra.
184. Jonas Bernstein, Why They're Praying for Russia's NTV, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 6, 2001, at 7. Details about lawsuits and countersuits filed by different entities in various countries can be found in the archives of RFE/RL NEWSLINE and JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR.
185. RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/;
186. JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR, at http://www.jamestown.org/publications. htm.
187. Julie A. Corwin, Prosecutor Begins New Assault on Oligarchs, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/11/021100.html (Nov. 2, 2000).
188. Titov remains in pretrial detention in Moscow at the time of this writing. See Andrei Zolotov, Jr., Six Months On, NTV Still Up in the Air, MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at 1.
189. For details on that court case, see Alex Armitage & Patricia Youssef, Gazprom Ready for Turner to Take Over NTV at Gusinsky's Expense, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERV., Mar. 5, 2001.
190. The case was heard in Saratov because one of the defendants resided there. Mikhail Berger, et al., Nastoyashchee poslanie [Authentic Message], SEGODNYA, Apr. 4, 2001, at 1.
191. Chermenskaya, supra note 47.
192. NTV general director Yevgenii Kiselev, who was replaced at the April 3, 2001, shareholders' meeting, said the judge who allowed the meeting to go ahead had been intimidated. Peter Graff, Gazprom Pushes On with Effort to Seize Russian NTV, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2001.
193. Gazprom-Media attorney and board member Anatolii Blinov resigned in early April 2001 to protest the methods by which Gazprom asserted its power at NTV. He argued that the judge who issued two contradictory rulings on the NTV shareholders' meeting did so in violation of Russia's Civil Procedural Code. See Anton Charkin, Kokhu tyagostno [It's painful for Kokh], VEDOMOSTI, Apr. 6, 2001, at A3;
194. Yevgenii Chubarov, PR-Kampaniya "Gazprom-Media" provalilas' [Gazprom-Media's PR Campaign Has Failed], IZVESTIIA, Apr. 5, 2001, at 1.
195. Gleb Pyanykh, Chetvertaya vlast' menyaet nachal'stvo [Fourth Estate Changes Bosses], KOMMERS., Apr. 4, 2001, at 1;
196. Lyudmila Romanova et al., Bez i torgovoy marki [Without Even a Trademark], NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Apr. 4, 2001, at 1. NTV's new general director, Boris Jordan, said he persuaded Capital Research to send representatives to the shareholders' meeting.
197. See Chubarov, supra note 118;
198. Matthew Brzezinski, American Media Mogul Makes News in Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2001, at 40. However, sacked NTV general director Yevgenii Kiselev charged that representatives of the Bank of New York voted Capital Research's shares in NTV at the shareholders' meeting without authorization from Capital Research.
199. See Gleb P'yanykh, Boris Iordan dan svyshe [Boris Jordan Was Sent Down from Above], KOMMERS., Apr. 5, 2001, at 3;
200. Konstantin Fomichev, Neudachnyi kozyr' Yevgeniya Kisileva [Yevgenii Kiselev's Unsuccessful Trump Card], NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Apr. 5, 2001, at 8.
201. See, e.g., Aleksandr Mel'man, Alfred Kokh: Kiselev mne nravit'sya... kak zhurnalist [Alfred Kokh: I Like Kiselev...as a Journalist], MOSKOVSKII KOMSOMOLETS, Feb. 1, 2001, at 8;
202. Rem Vyakhirev, Otkrytoe pis'mo aktsioneram Media-Mosta i NTV [An Open Letter to the Shareholders of Media-Most and NTV], TRIBUNA, Feb. 9, 2001, at 2.
203. See Boris Jordan: Nam ostavili telekanal v ochen' trudnom polozhenii [Boris Jordan: They Left Us a Television Station in a Very Difficult Position], VREMYA-MN, Apr. 24, 2001, at 1;
204. Boris Jordan & Masha Lipman, A Free Press in Russia?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (July 5, 2001), at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14324;
205. Jordan, supra note 7.
206. Chris Renaud, finance and strategic development director for Media-Most, drew a very different picture of NTV's finances in his reply to Jordan. Renaud, supra note 73.
207. Belin, supra note 108.
208. Boris Fedorov, a longtime opponent of Gazprom management, asked rhetorically after the NTV takeover: "If they cared about the value of the company, why would they let the best journalists leave?" David R. Sands, NTV's Hostile Takeover Blasted; Federov Criticizes Gazprom's Move, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2001, at A11.
209. Masha Lipman, Putin Will Get Away With It, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30, 2001, at 36;
210. Masha Lipman, Russia's Free Press Withers Away, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 31, 2001), at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14324.
211. Sophie Lambroschini & Francesca Mereu, Ekho Moskvy May Be Next in Line for Gazprom Takeover, RFE/RL, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/ 09052001133259.asp (May 9, 2001).
212. Yevgenia Albats, Last Bastion of Free Press, MOSCOW TIMES, July 10, 2001, at 13;
213. Ana Uzelac, Five Ekho Moskvy Editors Quit Over Gazprom, Moscow TIMES, July 6, 2001;
214. Julie Corwin, Enter Nemtsov, RFE/RL RUSSIAN POLITICAL WEEKLY, at http://www.rferl.org/rpw/2001/07/17-110701.html (July 11, 2001).
215. Anna Dolgov, Russian Media Outlet to Liquidate, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 3, 2001.
216. Ekho Moskvy radio broadcast, Apr. 16, 2001. In January 2001, the Russian tax police had filed a lawsuit seeking to force the liquidation of TNT. Il'ya Khrennikov, Delo o likvidatsii TNT otlozheno [TNT's Liquidation Hearings Have Been Postponed], SEGODNYA, Jan. 11, 2001, at 2.
217. Belin, supra note 108.
218. '30 Like Gazprom, LUKoil is partly state-owned. Berezovskii: Kreml' ispol'zuyet "LUKoil" dlya skupki nezavisimikh SMI [Berezovskii: The Kremlin Is Using LUKoil to Buy Out Independent Media], LENTA.RU, at http://lenta.ru/russia/2001/04/18/interview (Apr. 18, 2001).
219. "LUKoilu" ne nuzhni SMI Berezovskovo [LUKoil Does Not Need Berezovskii's Media], GAZETA.RU, at http://www.gazeta.ru/2001/04/19/na987686940. shtml (Apr. 19, 2001).
220. Anna Borodina, Prishli za TV-6 [They Came for TV-6], KOMMERS., Sept. 28, 2001, at 1;
221. Anton Charkin, Sud reshil likvidirovat' TV-6 [Court Decided to Liquidate TV-6], VEDOMOSTI, Sept. 28, 2001, at 1;
222. Laura Belin, Will TV-6 Go Out With a Bang or a Whimper?, RFE/RL RUSSIAN POLITICAL WEEKLY, at http://www.rferl.org/rpw (Dec. 10, 2001).
223. Yelena Afanas'eva, Yevgenii Kiselev: Tak mozhno likvidirovat' pol-Rossii [Yevgenii Kiselev: You Could Liquidate Half of Russia That Way], NOVAYA GAZETA, Oct. 1-3, 2001, at 2;
224. Zolotov, supra note 114.
225. Belin, supra note 132.
226. Sarah Karush, Court Orders Closure of TV-6, MOSCOW TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at 1;
227. Peter Graff, Russian Closure of Independent TV Sparks Wide Concern, REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2002.
228. Gusinskii was not extradited because Spanish judges concluded that the crime with which he was being charged (taking out loans using insufficient collateral) was not a crime in Spain. Oksana Yablokova, Spain Refuses to Extradite Gusinsky, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 19, 2001;
229. Spain Refuses to Extradite Gusinsky, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Apr. 19, 2001), at http://www.jamestown.org/publications.htm.
230. Jonas Bernstein, who covers Russian politics for the Jamestown Foundation Monitor, said the series of criminal cases pursued against Gusinskii and Media-Most resembled a "fishing expedition." Posting of Jonas Bernstein, JBernstein92@aol.com, to Johnson's Russia List, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, at http://cdi.org/russia/johnson/5230.html##3 (Apr. 29, 2001).
231. Interpol dismissed Russia's second request to arrest Gusinskii after determining that the case had a "predominant political character." Paul Goble, Interpol Reportedly Won't Go After Gusinsky, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/07/100701.asp (July 10, 2001).
232. For example, the PGO closed its investigation of alleged bribes given by the Swiss construction firm, Mabetex. Investigator Declares Yeltsin Bank Account Story a Forgery, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://www.jamestown.org/publications.htm;
233. World Jewish Congress, U.S. State Department Condemn Gusinsky Arrest, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR (Dec. 13, 2000), supra.
234. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 27, 2001) (quoting Andrei Zolotov). For example, Vneshekonombank extended a $100 million loan to the politically docile fifty-one percent state-owned Russian Public Television (which was on the brink of bankruptcy) in January 1999, in accordance with a December 1998 presidential decree. But that network was granted a one-year reprieve when that loan came due in January 2000. Even as the net tightened around Media-Most, the Ministry for the Press, Radio and Television Broadcasting, and Mass Communications asked the government to extend for another year Russian Public Television's deadline for repaying its Vneshekonombank loan.
235. Anton Charkin, Kredit doveriya ORT [A Loan on Trust for ORT], VEDOMOSTI, Feb. 21, 2001, at A3.
236. Russia's Audit Chamber investigated fully state-owned Russian Television in 2000, but its report remained secret until early 2001. Leonid Maevskii, Proverka - ponyatie rastyazhimoe [An Audit Is a Loose Concept], OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, Jan. 25-31, 2001, at 11;
237. Yelena Rykovtseva, Double Standards in Television Row, THE RUSS. J., Feb. 17-23, 2001, at 5.
238. For instance, editors-in-chief of Media-Most outlets asserted in July 1999 that "Media-Most has never received financial help from the state." Zayavlenie rukovoditelei sredstv massovoi infonnatsii kompanii "Media-Most" [Declaration by the Senior Executives of the Media Companies in Media-Most], SEGODNYA, July 28, 1999, at 1. That statement is disingenuous, considering the many favors that state officials granted NTV and other Media-Most subsidiaries. Even narrowly construed, the claim is tenuous, as it does not acknowledge Media-Most's access to huge loans from partly state-owned companies.
239. Belin, supra note 108.
240. Regarding massive alleged asset-stripping at Gazprom, see Fresh Claims of Illegal Share Dealings Rock Russia's Gazprom, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 21, 2001 (based on a story published in the German newspaper, Frankfurter Rundschau);
241. Florian Hassel, Gazprom Assets a Family Affair, MOSCOW TIMES, May 21, 2001;
242. Anna Raff, Itera Paid $300 for Gazprom Gas Finn, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001;
243. see also Alan Cullison, Gazprom's Bid for Media-Most Comes at a Time of Internal Chaos for Firm, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2001, at 2 (speculating about a shake-up at the gas monopoly).
244. Gazprom-Media head Kokh indirectly admitted that point when he said that under Vladimir Putin "the rules changed" for Gazprom as well as for Media-Most, with the PGO asking questions. Anisimov & Vandysheva, supra note 7.
245. Sophie Lambroschini, Russia: NTV Seen More as 'Alternative' than 'Independent,' RFE/RL, at http:/www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/04/ 13042001115503.asp (Apr. 13, 2001).
246. Peter Baker, On NTV, Kremlin Is in Softer Focus; Seized Network Not Puppet, But Tamer, WASH. POST, June 27, 2001, at A18.
247. Zolotov, Jr., supra note 114.
248. Zolotov, Jr., supra note 114. Id.
249. Graff, supra note 135. The date for the competition for the Channel 6 broadcast license is March 27, 2002.
250. Yevgenia Albats, Press: As Free as Putin Says, MOSCOW TIMES, Jan. 16, 2001, at 15;
251. Yevgenia Albats, Cry for Russia's Lost Press Liberty, THE GUARDIAN, May 11, 2001, at 18.