Rational exchange – a formal model based on game theory

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2232, Issue , 2001, Pages 114-126

  Buttyàn, Levente ^a   Hubaux, Jean Pierre ^a  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; MOBILE COMMERCE;

EXCHANGE PROBLEMS; EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS; FAIR EXCHANGE; FORMAL DEFINITION; FORMAL FRAMEWORK; FORMAL MODEL; MOBILE E-COMMERCE; NASH EQUILIBRIA;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 23044530199     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45598-1_12     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (10)

1. N. Asokan, V. Shoup, and M. Waidner. Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 18(4), April 2000.
2. L. Buttyan. Removing the financial incentive to cheat in micropayment schemes. IEE Electronics Letters, 36(2):132–133, January 2000.
3. L. Buttyan. Building Blocks for Secure e-Commerce Services: Authenticated Key Transport and Rational Exchange Protocols. Ph.D. Thesis, in preparation.
4. M. Jakobsson. Ripping coins for a fair exchange. In Proceedings of EUROCRYPT’ 95,pages 220–230,1995.
5. S. Kremer and J.-F. Raskin. Formal verification of non-repudiation protocols – a game approach. In Formal Methods for Computer Security, Chicago, USA, July 2000.
6. N. Lynch. Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann, 1996.
7. M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994.
8. H. Pagnia, H. Vogt, and F. Gartner. Fair exchange. manuscript, August 2001.
9. T. Sandholm. Unenforced e-commerce transactions. IEEE Internet Computing, pages 47–54, November-December 1997.
10. P. Syverson. Weakly secret bit commitment: applications to lotteries and fair exchange. In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 2–13,June 1998.