States are people too

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 1121-1131

  Sherry, Suzanna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

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EID: 23044521192     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 171 (1973).
2. See generally id. at 166-78, 446-48; Gregory A. Mark, Note, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1448-55 (1987).
3. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 171.
4. On fraud suits, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 448-52.
5. Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (No. 7052) (C.C.D. La. 1870).
6. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). For a good history of the case, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 116-24 (1991).
7. 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see also CHARLES FAIRMAN, 7 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 327-71 (1987).
8. See County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
9. FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW, EMBRACING CHAPTERS ON THE NATURE, THE SOURCE, AND THE HISTORY OF LAW, ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, AND ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW (1884), quoted in HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 95.
10. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
11. Id. at 396.
12. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
13. Id. at 28. An intervening case, Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888), held that corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Court in Pembina also upheld the challenged state statute - which imposed special conditions on out-of-state corporations doing business in the state - against an equal protection challenge: "The state is not prohibited from discriminating in the privileges it may grant to foreign corporations as a condition of their doing business or hiring offices within its limits, provided always such discrimination does not interfere with any transaction by such corporations of interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 189. The Court also repeated, without citation, its earlier determination that "[u]nder the designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included," noting that "corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose." Id.
14. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down state insurance regulation as violation of Due Process Clause); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding state liquor law but indicating that state police power was substantively limited by 14th Amendment). The state courts had been breathing substantive life into the Due Process Clause for some time. See, e.g., Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886).
15. HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 13.
16. See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897); Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896). At least one commentator suggests that modern jurisprudence misinterprets Santa Clara County when it attributes to the case an intent to equate corporations with persons. See Mark, supra note 2, at 1463-64.
18. Arthur T. Hadley, The Constitutional Position of Property in America, 64 INDEP. 834, 836 (1908).
19. Accuracy compels me to note that under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), of course, states can be sued by individuals seeking prospective relief. But while such a suit might put an end to the ongoing federal violation, it does not provide a remedy for those who have been damaged. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2294 n.43 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 691-92 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "[n]o other remedy [besides monetary penalties] can effectively deter states from the strong temptation" to save money by violating federal law).
20. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
21. Id. at 2229.
22. See id. Justice Scalia explicitly mentions the right to a jury trial in criminal cases and then cites the following cases in support of his argument that constructive waivers are an anomaly: Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel), Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389 (1937) (right to jury trial in civil cases), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (due process).
23. Id. at 2226 (quoting Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)) (emphasis added).
24. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 (1933); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 392 (1894).
25. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
26. Id. at 2256.
27. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999).
28. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2247.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2264.
32. Id. at 2268; see also id. at 2263 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) (stating that the principle of sovereign immunity "accords the States the respect owed to them").
33. Id. at 2263 (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
34. Id. at 2264.
35. Id.
36. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2238 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
37. Id. at 2233.
38. Id.
39. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 469 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 591, and Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725). The fact that Justice Scalia dissented in United States v. Virginia suggests that it is more permissible to confine women to certain roles than to confine states.
40. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 269 (1979).
41. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784, 788 (1989).
42. Mark, supra note 2, at 1443 (emphasis added).
43. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
44. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
45. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
46. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
47. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
48. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
49. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
50. On what the language might mean as a historical matter, see, for example, MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 192-93 (2d ed. 1990), William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989), William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989), Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989), James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998), and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
51. For an elaboration of this argument, see Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976).
52. See Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 461-66 (1890) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
53. See People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 34-71 (1889).
54. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the 11th Amendment bars suits against states even by their own citizens).
55. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that suit against state officer for injunctive relief is not suit against state for purposes of 11th Amendment).
56. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74-75 (1996).
57. 209 U.S. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240, 2268 (1999).
59. Young, 209 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266.
62. Even Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, who joined the majority in the 1999 cases, sprang to the defense of Ex parte Young when Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist wanted to recast it as a balancing test. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 291-92 (1997).