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Volumn 3191, Issue , 2004, Pages 62-76

A probabilistic approach to predict peers' performance in P2P networks

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPLEX NETWORKS; MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD; PEER TO PEER NETWORKS; SEMANTICS; ELECTRONIC COMMUNITIES; FEEDBACK; INFORMATION DISSEMINATION; MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; ONLINE SYSTEMS; PROBABILISTIC LOGICS;

EID: 22944492087     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-30104-2_6     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (20)

References (23)
  • 3
    • 0036756312 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does a seller's ecommerce reputation matter? Evidence from ebay auctions
    • Melnik, M. I., Alm, J. : Does a seller's ecommerce reputation matter? evidence from ebay auctions. Journal of Industrial Economics 50(3) (2002) 337-349
    • (2002) Journal of Industrial Economics , vol.50 , Issue.3 , pp. 337-349
    • Melnik, M.I.1    Alm, J.2
  • 5
    • 34548140670 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The digitization of word-of-mouth: Promise and challenges of online reputation systems
    • Dellarocas, C. : The digitization of word-of-mouth: Promise and challenges of online reputation systems. Working paper, MIT (2002)
    • (2002) Working Paper, MIT
    • Dellarocas, C.1
  • 19
    • 44149093434 scopus 로고
    • Reputation and imperfect information
    • Kreps, D., Wilson, R. : Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982) 253-279
    • (1982) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.27 , pp. 253-279
    • Kreps, D.1    Wilson, R.2
  • 20
    • 0000572547 scopus 로고
    • Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player
    • Fudenberg, D., Levine, D. : Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player. Econometrica 57(4) (1989) 759-778
    • (1989) Econometrica , vol.57 , Issue.4 , pp. 759-778
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 21
    • 84963061006 scopus 로고
    • Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
    • Fudenberg, D., Levine, D. : Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed. Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992) 561-579
    • (1992) Review of Economic Studies , vol.59 , pp. 561-579
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2
  • 22
    • 25344448529 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Efficiency and robustness of binary feedback mechanisms in trading environments with moral hazard
    • Dellarocas, C. : Efficiency and robustness of binary feedback mechanisms in trading environments with moral hazard. Working paper 4297-03, MIT (2003)
    • (2003) Working Paper 4297-03, MIT
    • Dellarocas, C.1
  • 23
    • 0036355319 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Robustness of reputation-based trust: Boolean case
    • Bologna, July
    • Sen, S., Sajja, N. : Robustness of reputation-based trust: Boolean case. In: Proceedings of AAMAS02, Bologna, July (2002)
    • (2002) Proceedings of AAMAS02
    • Sen, S.1    Sajja, N.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.