Buying out the state a comparative perspective on the privatization of infrastructures

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 704-727

  Schneider, Volker ^a   Fink, Simon ^b   Tenbücken, Marc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BAMBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Corporatism; Globalization; Infrastructures; Partial order scalogram analysis; Party difference hypothesis; Privatization

Indexed keywords

EID: 22944481818     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414005274847     Document Type: Review

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