Federalism and the Euro-polity

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 45-47

  Schmitter, Philippe C ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

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EID: 22844455980     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2000.0025     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Tocqueville was, to put it mildly, not favorably impressed by the Swiss: "As un american, I have developed such an utter disdain for the federal constitution of Switzerland, that I would unequivocally term it a league and not a federation. A government of that nature is certainly the weakest, the most impotent, the clumsiest and the least capable of leading its people anywhere except to anarchy, that one could imagine. I am also struck by the lack of any vie politique in its population. The Kingdom of England is a hundred times more republican than this republic" (my translation from Oeuvres Complètes, vol. XV, 1, 70-71). This was written in 1836 after he had lived several months in Switzerland.
2. Elsewhere, in a letter, he opined: "[In Switzerland,] power was exercised in the name of the people, but placed very far from it and handed over completely to executive authority. . . . The principle of the division of powers has been acknowledged by all publicistes, but it does not apply in Switzerland. Freedom of the press did not exist - neither in fact nor in law; the ability to form political associations was neither exercised nor recognized; and freedom of speech was restricted there within very strict limits. . . . Even if the Confederation had its own executive power, it would have been too impotent to make itself obeyed since it lacked the capacity to act directly and immediately upon the citizens." (Oeuvres Complètes, vol. XVI, 203-20). This was written in 1848, shortly before the new Swiss constitution was ratified.
3. For a more balanced treatment of the pros and cons, see Larry Diamond's chapter on "Size and Democracy" in his Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 117-60.
4. Tocqueville would not have approved this zeal for dismantling the coordinative and coercive capacity of the central state: "From my perspective, I cannot imagine a nation that could survive and especially prosper without strong government centralization" (Oeuvres Complètes, vol. I, 1, 87).
5. Thomas G. Kingsley, "Perspectives on Devolution," Journal of the American Planning Association 62 (Autumn 1996): 419-27,
6. as cited in Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, 121.
7. Tocqueville would most certainly have been even more cautious in advocating federalism as a strategy for democratization in multiethnic societies. It was precisely the absence of such "deeply-rooted" cleavages that made it appropriate for the United States. Unless some miraculous pattern of cross-cutting linguistic/cultural/religious cleavages permits the subunits of the emerging regime not to represent distinctive ethnic groups, federalism is likely to be an impediment rather than an inducement to democracy. The enthusiasm shown by Juan Linz for such a solution would not (I believe) have been shared by Tocqueville ("Democracy, Multinationalism and Federation," in W. Merkel and A. Busch, eds., Demokratie in Ost und West [Frankfurt: Surkamp, 1999], 382-401).
8. The parallel with parliamentarism is striking. In both cases, academics have made a strong case for the superiority of a single institution for the purpose of consolidating democracy - and the actors involved in making the actual choices have (largely) ignored the lessons and gone ahead with nonparliamentary and nonfederal arrangements. Could it just be that they know something that we academics tend to overlook - namely, that politics is a very time-sensitive enterprise and that choices whose benefits only emerge gradually and unobtrusively are heavily discounted? Politicians, especially under the highly uncertain conditions of a regime transition, are not in the business of optimizing for the system as a whole over the long run. They are at best "satisficing" and that usually means avoiding the worst possible outcome for the groups or cause in which they are engaged during their political careers.
9. Even the one case that had lasted the longest, Switzerland, he dismissed on the grounds that the survival of that country's institutions was more a result of its neighbors' bungling than its citizens' virtues.
10. Tocqueville made the brilliant observation that Maine and Georgia were 4,000 kilometers apart and yet the social and cultural differences between their inhabitants were less than those that divided Normandy from Brittany, two French provinces that were only separated by a small brook. Leaving aside the fact that Tocqueville was not very well informed about the Deep South and that Maine and Georgia subsequently found themselves on different sides of a civil war, I wonder what he would say today about the differences between, say, Malmö and Madrid as compared to Minneapolis and Miami!
11. This is precisely what Tocqueville regarded as one of the key weaknesses of the entire federalist project: "As a rule, only simple propositions are capable of being grasped by popular imagination (l'ésprit du peuple) . . . and (in a federal system), everything is artificial and by convention" (Oeuvres Complètes, vol. I, 1, 168-69).
12. For an exploration of specific reforms in citizenship, representation, and decision making that might conduce to such an outcome, see my Come democratizzare I'Unione Europea . . . e perché (Bologna: II Mulino, forthcoming). An English version is in the works, but for a preview, see my "The Future of Democracy: Could It Be A Matter of Scale?" Social Research 66 (Fall 1999): 993-58.