Allocating the gains from resource pooling with the Shapley Value

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Volumn 56, Issue 8, 2005, Pages 997-1000

  Reinhardt, G ^a   Dada, M ^b  

^a DEPAUL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Allocation; Computational analysis; Costing; Game theory

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OUTSOURCING; POLYNOMIALS; SET THEORY;

ALLOCATION; COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS; COSTING; POOLING;

COSTS;

EID: 22744445624     PISSN: 01605682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601929     Document Type: Article

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