Pay inequality and firm performance: Evidence from matched employer-employee data

Applied Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 11, 2005, Pages 1313-1327

  Heyman, Fredrik ^a  

^a FIEF (Trade Union Institute for Economic Research)   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INCOME DISTRIBUTION; INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE;

EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; NORTHERN EUROPE; SCANDINAVIA; SWEDEN; WORLD;

EID: 22744441786     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00036840500142101     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1986) Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
2. Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1990) The fair-wage hypothesis and unemployment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 255-83.
3. Ang, J. S., Hauser, S. and Lauterbach, B. (1998) Contestability and pay differential in the executive suites, European Financial Management, 4, 335-60.
4. Arai, M. (2003) Wages, profits and capital intensity: evidence from matched worker-firm data, Journal of Labor Economics, 97(5), 1027-59.
5. Baker, G., Gibbs, M. and Holmström, B. (1994) The internal economics of the firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 881-919.
6. Bingley, P. and Eriksson, T. (2001) Pay spread and skewness, employee effort and firm productivity, Working Paper, No. 2, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business.
7. Cowherd, D. and Levine, D. (1992) Product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management, Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 302-30.
8. Eriksson, T. (1999) Executive compensation and tournament theory: empirical tests on Danish data, Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 224-42.
9. le Grand, C., Szulkin, R. and Th̊lin, M. (1996) Sveriges Arbetsplatser - Organisation, Personalutveckling, Styrning, SNS förlag, Stockholm.
10. Hibbs, D. and Locking, H. (2000) Wage dispersion and productive efficiency: evidence for Sweden, Journal of Labor Economics, 12, 775-82.
11. Lazear, E. (1989) Pay inequality and industrial politics, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1261-84.
12. Lazear, E. (1992) The job as a concept, in Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives (Ed.) W. Burns, Harvard Business School Press, Boston.
13. Lazear, E. and Rosen, S. (1981) Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-64.
14. Leonard, J. (1990) Executive pay and firm performance, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 13-29.
15. Levine, D. (1991) Cohesiveness, productivity and wage dispersion, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 15, 237-55.
16. Main, B., O'Reilly, C. A. and Wade, J. (1993) Top executive pay: tournament or teamwork?, Journal of Labor Economics, 11, 606-28.
17. McLaughlin, K. (1988) Aspects of tournament models: a survey, Journal of Labor Economics, 15, 403-30.
18. Moene, K.-O. and Wallerstein, M. (1997) Pay inequality, Journal of Labor Economics, 15, 403-30.
19. OECD (1996) Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris.
20. O'Reilly, C., Main, B. and Crystal, G. (1988) CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison: a tale of two theories, Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 257-74.
21. Prendergast, C. (1996) What happens within firms? A survey of empirical evidence on compensation policies, Working Paper, No. 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
22. Rosen, S. (1986) Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments, American Economic Review, 76, 701-15.
23. Winter-Ebmer, R. and Zweimüller, J. (1999) Intra-firm wage dispersion and firm performance, Kyklos, 52, 555-72.