Good governance of the world economy?

Alternatives

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 119-142

  Patomäki, Heikki ^a  

^a NOTTINGHAM TRENT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 22644450246     PISSN: 03043754     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030437549902400105     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. It seems that the French demographer Alfred Sauvy first used these terms in an article in the newspaper L'Observateur (August 14, 1952) entitled "Trois Mondes, Une Planète."
2. See Peter Worsley, "Models and the Modern World-System," in Mike Featherstone, ed., Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 83-95.
3. For discussions of how the Third World has been redefined, see also Lloyd Pettiford and Nana Poku, eds., Redefining the Third World (London: MacMillan, 1998).
4. Livingston has accurately analyzed the Reagan administration's - eventually successful attempt to remove North-South relations from the international agenda in the early 1980s. See Steven G. Livingston, "The Politics of International Agenda-Setting: Reagan and North-South Relations," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992): 313-330.
5. The story of the decline of the Third World narrative has been told in various ways in various places. See for instance Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development (London: MacMillan, 1997), esp. pp. 53-54 about the rise of the local-empowerment studies.
6. Paul James, "Postdependency? The Third World in an Era of Globalism and Late-Capitalism," Alternatives 22, no. 2 (1997): 206. On p. 207, he goes on to point out correctly that "dependency theory was not a very good theory, but it brought themes into focus to which contemporary international relations has still to attend adequately: structures of power; systematic patterns of inequality; practices and ontologies of dependency."
7. As Huntington preferred to call these developments. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Demoralization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991).
8. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is "an international organization made up of democratic nations with advanced market economies." Founded in 1961, its aims included stimulation and harmonization of "its members' efforts in favor of developing countries," and contribution to "the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis." The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the organization deals with issues related to cooperation with developing countries.
9. Although I was representing a transnational NGO called the Network Institute for Global Democratisation, my participation was organized and financed by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This article is in fact a substantially modified and revised version of my report to the Finnish Foreign Ministry.
10. "In a given social formation, there can be a variety of hegemonic nodal points. Evidently some of them may be highly overdetermined: they may constitute points of condensation of a number of social relations and, thus, become the focal point of a multiplicity of totalizing effects." Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony & Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), p. 139.
11. With fifty thousand to seventy thousand people, mostly from the UK but also from other parts of Western Europe and North America, I took part in the seminars, speech sessions, and demonstrations in Birmingham on Saturday, May 16. The Summit and the shadow meeting lasted from May 15 to May 17.
12. Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960);
13. N.J. Smelser, "Towards a Theory of Modernization," in A. Etzioni and A. Etzioni, eds., Social Change (New York: Basic, 1964), pp. 258-274.
14. A good example of the emergence of this orientation in the praxis of development cooperation is UNDP's LIFE (Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment) launched in 1992. "[LIFE's] primary objective is to demonstrate local solutions to urban environmental problems. At the core of the program are small projects designed, implemented and operated by local community-based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities." UNDP, Participatory Local Governance, Technical Advisory Paper 1, Management Development and Governance Division, (New York: LIFE, 1997), p. 1.
15. There is considerable evidence to support this reading of the OECD DAC documents on PDGG. In particular, see Participatory Development and Good Governance, Development Co-Operation Guideline Series (Paris: OECD, 1995);
16. Final Report of the DAC ad hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance, part 1 and 2 (Paris: OECD, 1997);
17. and DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluation, Evaluation of Programs Promoting Participatory Development and Good Governance: Synthesis Report (Paris: OECD, 1997).
18. Evaluation of Programs Synthesis Report, note 12, p. 13.
19. In this discourse, "public" means anything related to state or municipal administration.
20. Evaluation of Programs Synthesis Report, note 12, p. 45.
21. Evaluation of Programs Synthesis Report, Ibid., p. 59.
22. The need for a predictable legal environment, with an objective, reliable and independent judiciary is also justified in terms of threat of increased business costs and discouragement of investors in Participatory Development and Good Governance, note 12, pp. 14-15.
23. Neoliberal Rule of Law aims at bounding "government in all its actions by rules fixed and announced beforehand - rules which make it possible to foresee with a fair degree of certainty how the authorities will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." See Stephen Gill, "Analyzing New Forms of Authority: New Constitutionalism, Panopticism and Market Civilization," paper presented at the conference "Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System," Warwick University, England, October 31-November 1, 1997.
24. Participatory Development and Good Governance, note 12, p. 5.
25. See Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World," Third World Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1993): 605-624;
26. Richard Sandbrook, "Democratization and the Implementation of Economic Reform in Africa," Journal of International Development 8, no. 1 (1996): 1-20.
27. The high-level meeting of the OECD DAC already forged a consensus on this in December 1990.
28. According to this definition, governance is "the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development." See Participatory Development and Good Governance, note 12, p. 14ff.
29. Helen Sutch, "Democratization in the Economic Transition Process: Issues, Problems and Progress,"'in Reino Hjerppe, Tapio Kanninen, Heikki Patomäki, and Katarina Sehm, eds., Democracy, Economy and Civil Society in Transition: The Cases of Russia and the Baltic States (Helsinki: UPI & Stakes), p. 22.
30. And in more detail, The World Bank, State in a Changing World: World Development Report 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 99-109.
31. For a discussion on the contrast between liberalism and republicanism in different conceptions of civil society, see Heikki Patomäki and Christer Pursiainen, "Against the State, With (in) the State or a Transnational Creation: Russian Civil Society in the Making?" (Helsinki: UPI Working Papers 4, 1998), a paper presented at the ISA annual convention, Minneapolis, March 1998, esp. pp. 3-11.
32. The explicit reasons for participatory development are (1) empowerment of nongovernmental actors to provide a check on government and to influence public policy; and (2) enhancement of the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainabillty of concrete development programs. This first is an explicitly political aim, although at the end of the day perhaps closer to political liberalism than republicanism proper. See Participatory Development and Good Governance, note 12, p. 8.
33. See, for instance, Arturo Escobar, "Planning," pp. 132-45;
34. and Gustavo Estevo, "Development," pp. 6-25;
35. both in W. Sachs, ed., The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (London: Zed Books, 1992).
36. Hayward Alker, "Dialectical Foundations of Global Disparities," International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1981):1, pp. 69-98.;
37. Richard Ashley, "Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 251-290.
38. Hong Kong has been well off because of its position as a neocolonial enclave and is now in the process of being merged into China, whereas Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are small desert sheikdoms with windfall profits stemming from oil. All the other richest countries of the world are Western (if Israel is included). See Göran Therborn, "Europe in the 21st Century: The World's Scandinavia?" Irish Studies in International Affairs 8 (1997): 22.
39. For an interpretation of the Asian crisis as just another sign of the capitalist world economy being in its long-term Kondratieff cycles in the B-phase, which is characterized by too much production for the available effective demand, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "The So-called Asian Crisis: Geopolitics in the Longue Durée," a paper given at the ISA annual convention, Minneapolis, March 17-21, 1998.
40. Hoogvelt, note 3, p. 202.
41. See World Development Report 1997, note 22, p. 1, which argues that one of the recent developments that has given a particular impetus to questions about the state's role is "the important role of the state in the miracle economies of East Asia."
42. World Development Report 1997, note 22, p. 99.
43. Discussed in Participatory Development and Good Governance, note 12, pp. 14-23.
44. Leftwich, note 19, p. 607.
45. Participatory Development and Good Governance, note 12, p. 8.
46. These links are scrutinized in Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 98-105.
47. "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa," Report of the Secretary-General to General Assembly (Fifty-second session, agenda item 10) and Security Council (fifty-third year), A/52/871-S/1998/318, p. 4.
48. Security Council, note 36, p. 5.
49. The changing forms of US/IMF power over Latin America, its relation to Latin American indebtedness, and the incompetence of the orthodox economic liberal recipes to make any long-term changes to the situation, see Teivo Teivainen, "Politics of Economism and Containment of Changes in the Global Political Community," in Heikki Patomäki, ed., Peaceful Changes in World Politics (Tampere: Tapri, 1995), esp. pp. 95-112.
50. This anonymity is the wish of the person concerned.
51. Klein, note 35, pp. 97-98.
52. Hilary F. French, "Assessing Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries," in Lester R. Brown, State of the World 1998 (London: Earthscan, 1998), pp. 149-167. On p. 150, French states that "in countries receiving private funds, the richer segments of society often benefit disproportionately."
53. This figure is a very rough approximation only. See Susan George, The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All (London: Pluto Press, 1992), p. xv.
54. Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 88.
55. In the OECD DAC there emerged in the 1990s a commitment to provide coordinated international support for selected countries that had already achieved some progress in democratization. "The donors agreed to engage in a number of pilot exercises pairing up an interested partner country and a lead donor." These exercises have been in the process of being designed and, gradually, implemented since 1996-1997. The pilot countries are Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, and Uganda.
56. Clark argues that as the health budgets are squeezed by economic crisis, primary health care services are often the first to be cut and then provides an example of how this has caused an increasing pressure on the NGO sector in Malawi and Zambia to step up their primary health-care work. John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1991), pp. 110-111.
57. GNP/capita was $310 US in 1992 (in 1994 Report), $270 US in 1993 (in 1995 Report), $250 US in 1994 (in 1996 Report), and $250 US in 1995 (in 1997 Report).
58. World Bank, From Plan to Market. World Development Report 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 224.
59. In June 1998, I made enquiries about these figures and got a response from the World Bank by somebody who remained anonymous. The relevant parts of the two e-mail replies go as follows: "It appears that your comments on GNP per capita growth rate are based on 'old' data, which have been revised. . . . As to the country's GNP per capita in nominal US dollars, you are right to have questions about the decline of the 1995 dollar figure ($250) from 1993 dollar figure ($300) despite the 1995 figure in real terms is higher than the 1993 figure. The divergent trends reflect a significant real depreciation of Mali's exchange rate in 1995 as compared to 1993. Between the two years, the nominal exchange rate depreciated by 76%, while domestic prices relative to international prices increased by 38%. The real depreciation of the country's exchange rate was thus 28%. Normally, we use an alternative exchange rate to convert national GNP per capita into US dollars when the real depreciation or appreciation of the exchange rate exceeds 35%." After this answer, I asked further about the reliability of these "revised and adjusted time series" and about the meaning of the term "real" in this context. To put it simply, why is $250 in 1995 "in real terms" more than $300 in 1993? This query provoked two important qualifications: (1) The states themselves revise their data all the time (possibly, however, in close co-operation with the Bank, since the Bank has "regular contacts with national statistical agencies"): "As you know, it is a general practice that national statistical agencies prepare preliminary data for [the] most recent one or two years and then revise them as firmer basic data become available. Also, quite many countries revise their historical national accounts data regularly when they change the base year for the constant-price series or new benchmark survey results become available." (2) No comparisons over time are possible: "As to our 'Atlas' GNP per capita numbers, we prepare and publish those numbers for INTER-COUNTRY comparison purposes. We do NOT recommend our data users to compare the GNP per capita numbers over time. As you know, those numbers are in nominal terms and thus influenced by changes in various prices over time." This noteworthy qualification notwithstanding, the adjusted and revised (real-term) time-series (in constant prices after adjustments) are intended to do precisely this; that is, make comparisons over time.
60. In the Microsoft Excel figure attached to the first e-mail message (note 48) about the GNP/capita developments in Mali in constant prices, the year 1994 seems indeed to be a turning point. Yet in that figure, the 1994 GNP/capita seems to be lower than that of 1985 (despite the long-term time-series the Bank had earlier provided, which speak about 1 percent annual growth). Compared with 1994, there was some growth in 1995, yet it remains unclear what this alleged growth means.
61. According to the World Handbook, the GDP real-growth rate was 5.2 percent in 1995, while growth of population was 3.18 percent (1997 est.), which would mean a GNP/capita growth of about 2 percent in 1995. In the Internet, the CIA's 1997 World Factbook can be found at http://www.odci.gov/ cia/publications/factbook/country-frame.html; it does not give its source of information.
62. The "fact" of this ratio is nowadays cited not only in UNDP's Human Development Reports and the Commission on Global Governance report Our Global Neighbourhood, but also in standard IR textbooks. Naturally, it, too, should and could be critically scrutinized.
63. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "Democratization, Social Movements and World Order," in Robert Cox et al., International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder (London: Zed Books, 1995), p. 130.
64. At least in the United Kingdom, the media coverage of the Summit was dominated by the "the People's Summit." See e.g., "50000 protests at G8 inaction over debt," Independent on Sunday, May 17, 1998, p. 1, p. 6.
65. This has been originally proposed by the Commission on Global Governance: "The time is now ripe indeed, overdue - to create a global forum that can provide leadership in economic, social, and environmental fields. It would be more broadly based than the G7 or the Bretton Woods institutions and more effective than the present UN system. While not having authority to make legally binding decisions, it would gain influence through competence and relevance, and acquire the standing in relation to international economic matters that the Security Council has in peace and security matters. We propose the establishment of an Economic Security Council (ESC). The idea is not original - others have made similar proposals - but we have formulated it in terms we believe have the best prospect of early implementation and a successful outcome. See the Web page at http:// www.cgg.ch/econtex2.htm#econ.
66. See also the Web page at http://www.gn.apc.org/peoplessummit98/ polcy.html.
67. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
68. Sous-Commandant Marcos, "La 4e guerre mondiale a commencé," Le Monde Diplomatique 44, no. 521 (Aoui 1997): 1, and 4-5.
69. Roughly, these are the words of a former Indian defense minister, K. C. Pant, cited and amended in Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Shock Wave," an interview with PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in India Today, May 25, 1998.
70. Panarin's ideas are echoed and, to an extent, followed in the program of the Russian Communists. About Panarin's Eurasianist geopolitical theory, see Christer Pursiainen, "Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism: The Past, Present and Postmodernity of a Russian Integration Ideology" (Helsinki: UPI Working Papers 5, 1998), pp. 22-35; and Patomäki and Pursiainen, note 23, pp. 25-34, 50-51.
71. About the belated warnings of the dangers of the interwar liberalism, see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (New York: Harper & Row, 1946/1939).
72. A current warning is that of Samir Amin, "We cannot escape the crisis by following policies of liberalism without borders." This is a utopia, tenaciously held throughout the history of capitalism because it expresses in extreme form the hardcore ideological vision of a pure capitalism reduced to the laws of accumulation and guided exclusively by the strict logic of capital. Total liberalism has never existed and historical moments which approximate the political condition for its institution have always been brief. In Samir Amin, Capitalism in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 1998), pp. 98-99.
73. In the manner of David Held, note 56.
74. See R. B. J. Walker, "After Modern Utopias: Reflections on the Possibilities of World Order Discourse," in Heikki Patomäki, ed., Peaceful Changes in World Politics (Tampere: Tapri, 1995), esp. pp. 398-402.
75. Demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter i Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete (Stockholm: Regeringens Skrivelse [Riksdagen], 1997/98): 76, p. 34.