Public good mix in a federation with incomplete information

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 381-397

  Cornes, Richard C ^a   Silva, Emilson C D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544481038     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00138     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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