Europe and the new balance of global order

International Affairs

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 775-799

  Maull, Hanns W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRIER   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 22544468538     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00484.x     Document Type: Review

References (70)

1. For a subtle recent discussion of the concept of global order in an important political context, namely that of weapons of mass destruction, see William Walker, Weapons of mass destruction and international order, Adelphi Paper 370 (London: Oxford University Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004).
2. This legitimacy became ever more threadbare in the Soviet bloc, of course, in part because its model -unlike that of the western industrialized democracies - failed to deliver both military power and public welfare simultaneously.
3. The two terms reflect the different stages in the historical evolution of European integration; they are used here in line with their respective historical contexts, but interchangeably.
4. François Duchêne, 'Die Rolle Europas im Weltsystem: Von der regionalen zur planetarischen Interdependenz', in Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager, eds, Zivilmacht Europa: Supermacht oder Partner? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 11-35.
5. Duchêne, 'Die Rolle Europas im Weltsystem'.
6. David P. Calleo, 'The broken West', Survival 46: 3, Fall 2004, pp. 29-38.
7. See also Gustav Lindstrom, ed., Shift or rift: assessing US-EU relations after Iraq (Brussels: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003), pp. 21-42.
8. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in world politics: a theory of change and continuity (New York: Harvester, 1990).
9. Duchêne, 'Die Rolle Europas im Weltsystem'.
10. Robert Kaplan, Macht und Ohnmacht: Amerika und Europa in der neuen Weltordnung (Berlin: Siedler, 2003).
11. Friedemann Müller, 'German energy and security policy: technical versus political modes of intervention', in Hanns W. Maull, ed., Germany: uncertain power. German Foreign Policy (of the Berlin Republic) into the zist Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2006).
12. Gerald Segal once used the concept of 'enlitened' powers in a similar sense: see Gerald Segal, '"Enlitening" China?', in Denny Roy, ed., The new security dimension in the Asia-Pacific region (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 121-39.
13. The concept of 'force' used here thus resembles that of 'structural power', as developed by Johan Galtung and Susan Strange, among others. See Susan Strange, The retreat of the state: the diffusion of power in the world economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
14. Stefano Guzzini, 'Structural power: the limits of neorealist power analysis', International Organization 47: 3, Summer 1993, pp. 443-78. It seems misleading, however, to call both structural (that is, not necessarily intended) and personal forms of influence 'power', and to set aside what I consider fundamental differences in the internal logic of modern v. post-modern international relations. Hence my preference for distinguishing between influence based on 'weight' or 'force' and the ability to exercise 'power' in a modern sense on a systemically relevant scale.
15. The term 'modern' is used here in the sense of the three worlds of Robert Cooper, who distinguishes a pre-modern, a modern and a post-modern realm in international relations. The modern realm is that of the Westphalian state system, built on the external and internal sovereignty of nation-states. See Robert Cooper, Europe: the post-modern state and world order (London: Demos, 1996).
16. Knut Kirste and Hanns W. Maull, 'Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie', Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 3: 2 (1996), pp. 283-312.
17. See also Hanns W. Maull, 'Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers', Foreign Affairs 69: 5, 1990-1, pp. 91-106;
18. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, eds, Germany as a civilian power? The foreign policy of the Berlin republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
19. See Norbert Elias, Über den Prozess der Zivilisation (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976).
20. As a German of Jewish background forced to flee Nazi Germany, Elias was bound to have an acute appreciation of the ambivalence of 'civilizational progress'.
21. Dieter Senghaas, 'Frieden als Zivilisierungsprojekt', in Wohin driftet die Welt? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 17-49.
22. Senghaas, 'Frieden als Zivilisierungsprojekt", pp. 20ff.
23. See e.g. Richard Whitman, The fall, and rise, of civilian power Europe, National Europe Centre Paper no. 16 (Canberra: Australian National University National Europe Centre, 2002).
24. One reason is that the role concept of civilian power seems best suited to capture and integrate the very different national role concepts or 'identities' of member states. The compatibility of national identities from the perspective of a European foreign and security policy has been analysed thoroughly for France, Italy, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Greece by a project undertaken at Trier University. The results are summarized in Britta Joerißen and Bernhard Stahl, eds, Europäische Außenpolitik und nationale Identität, Vergleichende Diskurs- und Verhaltensstudien zu Dänemark, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Italien und den Niederlanden (Münster: LiT, 2003);
25. they clearly show that only as a civilian power could the EU plausibly contain the strongly divergent national identities of those countries. See also Henning Boekle, Anna Jóhannesdóttir, Jörg Nadoll and Bernhard Stahl, 'Understanding the Atlanticist-Europeanist divide in the CFSP: comparing Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands', European Foreign Affairs Review 9: 3 (2004), pp. 417-41.
26. See Walter Mattli, 'Sovereignty bargains in regional integration', International Studies Review 2: 2, 2000, pp. 149-80.
27. See Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in international politics: baptism by fire (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), esp. pp. 152ff.;
28. Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith, eds, European foreign policy: key documents (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 348ff.
29. John Vogler, 'In the absence of the hegemon: EU actorness and the global climate change regime', paper presented to conference on 'The European Union in international affairs', National Europe Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2-4 July 2003 (National Europe Centre Paper no. 20).
30. See Richard Youngs, The European Union and the promotion of democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
31. Carlos Santiso, 'Sisyphus in the castle: improving European Union strategies for democracy promotion and governance conditionality', European Journal of Development Research 15: 1, June 2003, pp. 1-28.
32. See Hill and Smith, European foreign policy, pp. 255ff.;
33. Simon J. Nuttall, European political cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
34. See Ulrich Schneckener, States at risk: Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, SWP Studie S 43 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004).
35. This is also hinted at by the European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better world (Brussels: European Commission, 2003).
36. Stefan Lehne, 'Has the hour of the European come at last? The EU's strategy for the Balkans', in Judy Batt, ed., The western Balkans: moving on, Chaillot Paper no. 70 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004).
37. Lehne, 'Has the hour of the European come at last?'
38. See also Marie-Janie Calic, Der Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozeß auf dem Prüfstand, SWP Studie 833 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004).
39. CARDS, the financial instrument of the Stabilisation and Association Process for South East Europe, has a total volume of €4.65 billion for the period 2000-2006: Calic, Der Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozeß, pp. 26ff.
40. Ian Manners, 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 2, 2002, pp. 235-58.
41. The codeword 'effective multilateralism' first appears prominently in the European Security Strategy.
42. Michael Brenner, 'Introduction', in Michael Brenner, ed., NATO and collective security (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 1-5.
43. See T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: the new superpower and the end of American supremacy (London: Penguin, 2004);
44. Jeremy Rifkin, The European dream: how Europe's vision of the future is quietly eclipsing the American dream (New York: Penguin, 2004);
45. Charles A. Kupchan, The end of the American era: US foreign policy and the geopolitics of the twenty-first century (New York: Knopf, 2002).
46. Mark Leonard, How Europe will run the 21st century (London: Fourth Estate, 2005).
47. A short summary of the argument can be found in Leonard, 'Europe's transformative power', CER Bulletin 40, Feb.-March 2005.
48. The terminology of 'uploading' and 'downloading' has been adopted from Elizabeth Bomberg and John Peterson, 'Policy transfer and Europeanization: passing the Heineken test?' Queen's Papers on Europeanization no. 2/2000 (Queen's University, Belfast), available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies/ onlinepapers/poe2.html, last accessed 14 June 2005,
49. as quoted in Allster Miskimmon and William E. Paterson, 'German foreign policy, domestic constraints, and the limitations of Europeanisation since unification', in Maull, ed., Germany: uncertain power.
50. The most obvious evidence for this is, of course, provided by the outcomes of the referendums on the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands. See Hanns W. Maull, 'The melt-down of European polities', editorial, Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.De, weekly digest, issue no. 234 (6 Feb. 2005), available at http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de, last accessed 14 June 2005.
51. Nicolas Eberstadt, 'What if it's a world population implosion? Speculation about global depopulation', in The Global Reproductive Health Forum (Boston, MA: Harvard University), available at: http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ Organizations/healthnet/HUpapers/implosion/depop.html.
52. Hanns W. Maull, 'The European security architecture: conceptual lessons for Asia-Pacific security cooperation', in Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, eds, Reassessing security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: multilateralism and regional order (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming 2005).
53. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'We, the peoples of Europe...', Foreign Affairs 83: 6, Nov.-Dec. 2004, pp. 97-110.
54. Richard Rosecrance makes this important point in his study on modern v. post-modern forms of governance: Richard Rosecrance, The rise of the virtual state: wealth and power in the coming century (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
55. Interestingly, the euro, presumably because of its success, today is hardly ever referred to as the 'common currency': it goes without saying! On the need for stronger supranational elements in the CFSP, see Alyson J. K. Bailes, 'Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie: programmatische und praktische Petrspektiven für die GASP und ESVP', Integration 28: 2, 2005, pp. 107-18.
56. See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikov, The essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 1999), as the locus classicus for different perspectives on foreign policy outputs.
57. See also Christopher Hill, The changing politics of foreign policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
58. A secure Europe in a better world.
59. Hanns W. Maull, 'Welche Akteure beeinflussen die Weltpolitik?', in Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds, Weltpolitik im neuen Jahrhundert (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2000), pp. 369-82.
60. See David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global transformations: politics, economics and culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
61. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in world politics: a theory of change and continuity (New York: Harvester, 1990).
62. See Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: organised violence in a global era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
63. See Kaldor, New and old wars;
64. Münkler, Die neuen Kriege;
65. also Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, eds, War economies in a regional context: challenges of transformation (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 2004);
66. Sabine Kurtenbach and Peter Lock, eds, Kriege als (Über-) Lebenswelten (Bonn: Dietz, 2004).
67. See Maull, 'The melt-down of European politics'.
68. See Alasdair Murray and Aurore Wanlin, The Lisbon Scorecard V: can Europe compete? (London: Centre for European Reform, 2005).
69. These two modes of governance and their relationship are exemplified in the shift of state activity from the interventionist state (essentially a modern form of politico-economic management) to the regulatory state (which represents the post-modern approach). See Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996);
70. Wolfgang Czada, Susanne Lutz and Stefan Mette, eds, Regulative Politik: Zähmung von Markt und Technik (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003).