Thinking about the political impacts of the electoral college

Public Choice

Volumn 123, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 1-18

  Grofman, Bernard ^a   Feld, Scott L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544439320     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3210-4     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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