Vertical mergers: Recent learning

Business Lawyer

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 1217-1248

  Morse, M Howard ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

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EID: 22444452259     PISSN: 00076899     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (273)

1. U. S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Merger Guidelines-1992 (with April 8, 1997, revisions to Sec. 4 on Efficiencies), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13, 104 (Apr. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
2. See infra notes 94-229 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 94-229 and accompanying text.
4. The defining characteristic of a vertical merger is that the product or service offered by one firm can be used as an input to or as a complement of the product or service produced by the other firm. Examples include a merger between a manufacturer and a distributor, a merger between two manufacturers, one of which produces an end product and the other a component of that end product, or a merger of firms that produce complementary products used together by consumers.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 10-39.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 10-39.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 10-39.
8. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U. S. 486, 497-98 (1974) (looking beyond the government's prima facie statistical showing to likely future competitive effects) ;
9. see also Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that courts must consider "the ultimate issue [of] whether the challenged acquisition is likely to facilitate collusion").
10. See Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 59 (1977) (holding vertical nonprice restraints to be judged under the rule of reason).
11. 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1994).
12. H. R. 2734, 81st Cong. (1950), reprinted in 1950 U. S. C. C. A. N. 1225.
13. 15 U. S. C. § 1.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218, 227-28 (1947) ("The theory of the complaint... is that 'dominating power' over the cab operating companies 'was not obtained by normal expansion to meet the demands of a business growing as a result of superior and enterprising management, but by deliberate calculated purchase for control.' ") (citation omitted). After remand, the Court affirmed the district court's finding that the defendants had no "design, motive and intent" to suppress competition.
15. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S. 338 (1949).
16. See also United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 526-27 (1949) (noting that the "so-called vertical integration resulting from the acquisition... docs not unreasonably restrict the opportunities of the competitor producers") ;
17. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 174 (1948) ("[T]he legality of vertical integration under the Sherman Act turns on (1) the purpose or intent with which it was conceived, or (2) the power it creates and the attendant purpose or intent.").
18. 353 U. S. 586 (1957).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 588.
21. Id. at 596.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 595.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 607.
26. Id. at 605.
27. Id. at 606.
28. 370 U. S. 294 (1962).
29. Id. at 297, 303.
30. Id. at 303.
31. Id. at 304.
32. Id. at 323-24 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 328.
34. Id. at 329.
35. Id. at 344. Brown Shoe is often cited for that now well-accepted proposition.
36. Id. at 331-34.
37. Id. at 333.
38. Id. at 332.
39. Id. at 334.
40. 405 U. S. 562 (1972).
41. Id. at 568.
42. Id. at 570.
43. Id. at 569.
44. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1978) (condemning a cement producer's acquisition of two customers accounting for 10.2% and 3.1% of local purchases) ;
45. Hcatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G., 553 F.2d 964, 971, 985 (5th Cir. 1977) (condemning Volkswagenwcrk's acquisition of an auto air-conditioner maker) ;
46. Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091-93 (8th Cir. 1972) (condemning a cement acquisition involving 20% foreclosure, where the acquisition allegedly heightened barriers to entry) ;
47. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 462-64 (N. D. Cal. 1967) (condemning a paper maker's acquisition of a paper distributor accounting for 1.8% to 14.9% of various markets) ;
48. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 253 F. Supp. 196, 200, 227 (D. N. J. 1966) (condemning the acquisition of a potash producer by the defendant which had purchased 1% to 2% of potash sold).
49. ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments 175 (2d cd. 1984).
50. See Alan A. Fisher & Richard Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, 6 Res. L. & Econ. 1, 59 (1984).
51. U. S. Dcp't of Justice, Merger Guidelines-1968, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13, 101, at 20, 525 (1968). From today's perspective, this test appears incredibly tight. It was not, however, as strict as the U. S. Supreme Court's 1962 Broun Shoe decision, which condemned foreclosure as low as 1-2% of the relevant downstream market.
52. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294, 303 (1962).
53. 4 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 1004 (1980).
54. Id. The Merger Guidelines indicate that vertically integrated firms arc generally included in measuring market shares "to the extent that such inclusion accurately reflects their competing significance in the relevant market prior to the merger." Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 1.31, at 20, 573-3.
55. See generally id.; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR with Itself, 225-45 (1978) ;
56. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 196-201 (1976).
57. See BORK, supra note 46, at 232.
58. Id.
59. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 44, ¶ 1004, at 222.
60. See BORK, supra note 46, at 232.
61. Id. at 229.
62. Id. at 228.
63. Id. at 227-29.
64. Id. at 231-38.
65. Id. at 237.
66. See, e.g., Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that "respected scholars question the anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers, " and emphasizing the merger may well "result in efficiencies") ;
67. Fruchauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 360 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding a 5.8% foreclosure of wheels for truck trailers insubstantial as "there would merely be a realignment of existing market sales without any likelihood of a diminution in competition") ;
68. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987) ("Vertical integration is not an unlawful or even suspect category under the antitrust laws.")
69. aff'd in part and remanded in part, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990) ;
70. Carrier Corp. v. United Tech. Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62, 405 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that substantial foreclosure was not established) ;
71. see also Continental T. v. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 51-52 (1977) ("The market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition. " (footnotes omitted)).
72. In re Atlantic Richfield Co., 113 F. T. C. 1050, 1054 (1990) (alleging that the acquisition would increase the level of vertical integration and reduce the size of the merchant market for a chemical feedstock, thereby making entry into the upstream market less likely and reducing the probability of deconcentration of that market) ;
73. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1983-1987 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22, 349 (Apr. 11, 1986) (charging that Occidental Petroleum Corporation's (Occidental's) acquisition of MidCon Corp. (MidCon) could lessen competition in pipeline transportation and sale of natural gas in St. Louis by giving MidCon the incentive to purchase gas from Occidental at inflated prices and pass those costs on to consumers).
74. See James T. Halverson, An Overview of the Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the Vertical Merger Guidelines, 52 ANTITRUST L. J. 49, 76-81 (1983) ;
75. Oliver E. Williamson, Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reforms, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 604 (1983).
76. U. S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13, 105 (Jan. 23, 1985) [hereinafter Vertical Restraint Guidelines].
77. Anne K. Bingaman, Remarks Before the ABA Antitrust Section (Aug. 10, 1993), in 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50, 110, at 48, 921, 48, 923 (Aug. 17, 1993).
78. In 1992, the DOJ and the FTC indicated in a statement prefacing the 1992 Merger Guidelines that "[s]pecific guidance on non-horizontal mergers is provided in Section 4 of the DOJ's 1984 Merger Guidelines, read in the context of today's revisions to the treatment of horizontal mergers." See Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, at 20, 569.
79. Donald I. Baker & William Blumcnthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 311, 338 (1983).
80. See U. S. Dcp't of Justice, Merger Guidelines-1982, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13, 102, at 20, 539-42 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines].
81. U. S. Dcp't of Justice, Merger Guidelines-1984, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13, 103, § 4.24, at 20, 567 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines].
82. The latter two theories were characterized at the time as an "attempt to fashion rules of law where none have existed before" and likely to "face serious difficulty in the courts."
83. See Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 62, at 339. These authors characterized the first theory as lending new respectability to the largely discredited foreclosure theory and predicted vigorous enforcement activity.
84. Id. at 338.
85. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 4.21, at 20, 565-66;
86. see also Grappone, Inc., v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing the twolevel entry theory in a tying case).
87. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 4.21, at 20, 565-66.
88. Id.§ 4.211, at 20, 565.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 4.212, at 20, 566.
91. Id.
92. See id. § 4.213, at 20, 566.
93. Id. § 4.211, at 20, 565.
94. Id. § 4.22, at 20, 566-67.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 4.221, at 20, 566-67.
97. Id. § 4.222, at 20, 567.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 44, para; 1006 (requiring that (i) one level be noncompctitivcly structured, (ii) the second level be relatively competitive, (iii) suppliers price competitively, and (iv) such behavior results from the presence of one or a few large buyers).
101. See 1984 Merger Guideline, supra note 64, § 4.23, at 20, 567.
102. 1984 Merger Guideline, Id.
103. Robert Pitofsky, Vertical Restraints and Vertical Aspects of Mergers-A U. S. Perspective (Oct. 16, 1997) .
104. See infra notes 94-229 and accompanying text.
105. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 353 (4th cd. 1997) ;
106. Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 513, 516-22 (1995).
107. See also Michael W. Klass & Michael A. Slinger, Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?, ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (Fall 1995) ;
108. Christine A. Varney, Vertical Merger Enforcement Challenges at the FTC (July 17, 1995) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law) ;
109. Steven C. Sunshine, Remarks Before the ABA Antitrust Section (Apr. 5, 1995), in 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50, 147;
110. Mary Lou Steptoe, Prepared Remarks Before the ABA Antitrust Section, FTC Vertical Enforcement: What's New In RPM and Vertical Mergers (Nov. 4, 1994) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law) ;
111. Mary Lou Steptoe, Prepared Statement Before the Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights Subcommittee of the U. S. Senate Judiciary Committee (Nov. 16, 1993) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). As even critics of the "post-Chicago" learning and vigorous vertical merger enforcement have admitted, "[p]ost-Chicago analysis demonstrates the theoretical possibility of harmful vertical mergers."
112. David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Comment: Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 917, 921 (1995).
113. See Sunshine, supra note 85, at 49, 122.
114. See, e.g., Cadence Design Systems, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 264, at 24, 094 (Aug. 7, 1997) (Commissioner Mary L. Accueragga, concurring in part and dissenting in part; Commissioner Roscoc B. Starck, dissenting) ;
115. Time Warner Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 104, at 23, 912 (Feb. 3, 1997) (Commissioners Mary L. Azcuenaga and Roscoc B. Starck, dissenting).
116. See infra notes 94-229 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 94-229 and accompanying text.
118. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 85, at 519.
119. See, e.g., id. at 517.
120. Id. at 519.
121. Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
122. at 15 U. S. C. § 79z-5c and in scattered sections of 47 U. S. C.).
123. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 497 (Nov. 15, 1993) (proposed consent order).
124. Id. at 23, 176.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 23, 177.
127. See, e.g., infra note 125 and accompanying text.
128. 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71, 496 (D. D. C. Aug. 19, 1994).
129. Id. at 77, 616.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 77, 618.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 59 Fed. Reg. 33, 009, 33, 015 (D. D. C. June 15, 1994) (Competitive Impact Statement).
137. Id. at 33, 015-16.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 33, 016.
140. Id. at. 33, 016-17.
141. Id. at 33, 011. In July 1997, the DOJ moved to modify the final judgment because BT and MCI had agreed to enter into a full merger. The modification strengthened the decree in certain respects, and modified it to take into account changes in the regulation of international telecommunications traffic.
142. United States v. Concert PLC, 62 Fed. Reg. 37, 594, 37, 600-04 (D. D. C. July 14, 1997).
143. -59 Fed. Reg. 44, 158, 44, 166 (D. D. C. Aug. 26, 1994) (Competitive Impact Statement).
144. 59 Fed. Reg. 44 Id.
145. Id. at 44, 168-69.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 44, 168.
148. Id. at 44, 169.
149. Id. at 44, 171-72.
150. 60 Fed. Reg. 44, 049, 44, 058 (D. D. C. Aug. 24, 1995) (Competitive Impact Statement).
151. 60 Fed. Reg. 44 Id.
152. 60 Fed. Reg. 44 Id. at 44, 063-64.
153. Id. at 44, 067-71.
154. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para; 24, 104 (Feb. 3, 1997).
155. One of the dissenting commissioners, Mary L. Azcuenaga, wrote, "[T]hc majority adopts a highly questionable market definition, ignores any consideration of efficiencies and blindly assumes difficulty of entry in the antitrust sense in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary."
156. Id. at 23, 913.
157. Id. at 23, 912.
158. Id.
159. Time Warner-TCI owned HBO, Cincmax, Starz!, Discovery Channel, The Learning Channel, and Court TV, while Turner owned CNN, TNT, and TBS. Id. at 23, 912.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See infra notes 138-75 and accompanying text.
167. United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Verified Complaint, Civ. No. 1: 98CV00731 (D. D. C. filed Mar. 23, 1998) .
168. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on Vertical Integration and Supplier Decisions 32 (May 1997) .
169. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 577 (June 22, 1994).
170. Id. at 23, 242.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 23, 243.
173. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 714 (Apr. 7, 1995).
174. Id. at 23, 472.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 23, 474.
178. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 748 (May 9, 1995).
179. Id. at 23, 498.
180. Id. at 23, 498-99.
181. Id. at 23, 499.
182. Id. at 23, 498-99.
183. Id. at 23, 499.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 23, 498.
187. Id.
188. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 976 (Apr. 30, 1996).
189. Id. at 23, 751.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 016 (Sept. 19, 1996).
194. Id. at 23, 826.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 23, 826-27.
197. Id. at 23, 827.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 051 (Sept. 3, 1996).
201. Id. at 23, 861.
202. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 365 (Apr. 6, 1998).
203. Id. at 24, 195;
204. see also In re TRW Inc., Docket No. C-3790 (Apr. 6, 1998) .
205. TRW, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 24, 195.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 24, 194.
208. United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Verified Complaint, Civ. No. 1:98C V00731 (D. D. C. filed Mar. 23, 1998) .
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 182 (Mar. 24, 1997).
215. See, e.g., Boston Scientific Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 774 (Apr. 28, 1995).
216. See, e.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. CIVA. 98-595, 596, 1998 WL 433784 (D. D. C. July 31, 1998).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E. D. N. Y. 1997).
218. See, e.g., California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997).
219. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para; 23, 873 (July 28, 1995).
220. Id. at 23, 627.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. The FTC noted it remained concerned that the acquisition, together with other vertical integration could lead to anticompetitive consequences and, thereby, necessitate additional relief. Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga dissented, arguing that the FTC's "murky allegations in the complaint" fail to articulate "a coherent theory of competitive harm" and the order "encumbers [Lilly] with pointless and unnecessary restrictions."
225. Id. at 23, 628 (Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, dissenting).
226. Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Merck & Co., File No. 951-0097 (Aug. 1998) (visited Sept. 9, 1998) (final FTC approval pending) [hereinafter Consent Order].
227. Press Release, Merck Settles FTC Charges That Its Acquisition of Aledco Could Cause Higher Prices and Reduced Quality for Prescription Drugs (Aug. 27, 1998) .
228. Id.
229. In re Merck & Co., Complaint, (visited Sept. 9, 1998).
230. Id.
231. Consent Order, supra note 193.
232. Id.
233. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 838 (Nov. 14, 1995).
234. Id. at 23, 586.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. In March 1996, SGI applied to the FTC for IBM to be its porting partner. The FTC approved SGI's application after SGI committed itself to market and support the ported software products until at least March 1999. Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, FTC, to Wayne D. Collins, Shearman & Sterling (Mar. 28, 1997) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
242. Press Release, FTC Settlement Would Preserve Competition on Price and Innovation for Entertainment Graphics Software and Hardware (June 9, 1995) .
243. One commissioner, criticizing the Silicon Graphics action, conjured up Bork's image of the industry social mixer:
244. The very possibility of excluding independent software producers from the SGI-platform suggests the means by which competing workstation producers will avoid foreclosure. The nonintegrated software producers surely have incentives to supply the "foreclosed" workstation producers, and each workstation producer has incentives to induce nonintegrated software suppliers to write for its platform. Otherwise, "we are left to imagine eager suppliers and hungry customers, unable to find each other, forever foreclosed and left to languish." This predicament is improbable in the dynamic markets at issue.
245. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, In re Silicon Graphics Inc., File No. 951-0064 (Nov. 1995) (quoting BORK, supra note 46, at 232) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
246. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 264 (Aug. 7, 1997).
247. Id. at 24, 094.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting majority).
251. Id.
252. Id. Commissioners Roscoc B. Starck, III and Mary L. Azcucnaga dissented. Commissioner Starck characterized foreclosure theories as "generally unconvincing as a rationale for antitrust enforcement, " while Commissioner Azcucnaga accepted the recognized theory but questioned its application, suggesting a firm would not need to enter the two markets simultaneously. Id.
253. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 384 (Feb. 18, 1998).
254. Id. at 24, 226.
255. Id. at 24, 230.
256. Statement of the FTC Upon Withdrawal from Consent Agreement in the matter of PacifiCorp, File No. 971-0091 (July 1998), 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 454 (July 2, 1998).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 24, 229-30.
260. Id. at 24, 230.
261. Id. at 24, 230.
262. 63 Fed. Reg. 33, 396 (June 18, 1998) (Competitive Impact Statement).
263. Id. at 33, 398.
264. Id. at 33, 404.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding no antitrust violation where two merged companies owned an 80% market share) ;
266. *38 (D. D. C. July 31, 1998) (enjoining mergers among drug distributors) ;
267. * 13 (E. D. Mo. July 30, 1998) (enjoining mergers among hospitals) ;
268. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E. D. N. Y. 1997) (holding a merger of two hospitals did not violate antitrust provisions) ;
269. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1093 (D. D. C. 1997) (enjoining a merger of two office products suppliers).
270. 504 U. S. 451 (1992).
271. 509 U. S. 209 (1993).
272. Commissioner Mary L. Azcucnaga issued a separate statement questioning the extent to which the firewall adds to private contracts and the FTC's ability to effectively monitor compliance. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23, 714, at 23, 474 (Apr. 7, 1995) ;
273. see also Christine A. Varney, Prepared Remarks Before the Conference of the National Health Lawyers Association, Competition Policy in Vertical Mergers and Innovation Markets 10 (Feb. 16, 1995) (stating that "[w]e will be watching the effectiveness of the firewall") (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).